The attitudes of the Evangelical Church of West Africa (ECWA) towards Islam in light of ethnic and religious violence.

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Abstract

The Evangelical Church of West Africa (ECWA), a major denomination in Northern Nigeria, is the product of evangelism by the Sudan Interior Mission (SIM). ECWA’s heartland is in Northern Nigeria, an area whose substantial Christian population is often ignored by scholars. However, bloody interreligious riots have characterised Northern Nigeria for thirty years.

This research examines the violence’s historical background including the dan Fodio jihad, subsequent enslavement of many, pro-Islamic colonialism, and reluctant permission for missions to enter Northern Nigeria post-1933. Pre-independence concerns focused on guarantees against Islamic domination. Recent socio-political issues including identity, corruption, and Shari'ah disputes are tinged by centralising, predominantly pro-Islamic governments.

Initially diverting missions from Islamic areas, colonialists encouraged work among traditionalists where churches were established. Yet SIM missionaries, despite their ignorance of Islam, were fascinated by the Muslim Hausa-Fulani. With colonial permission, SIM and ECWA used social services to evangelise Muslims. Christians, however, brought with them prejudices from the jihad and subsequent oppression. SIM failed to confront these, or educate converts on Islam, and discouraged political involvement.

NLFA evangelism boosted ECWA. Successive ECWA constitutions reveal ECWA’s theological changes in a Pentecostal direction. Pentecostalism provides an alternative, transforming worldview stressing access to divine power, and radically critiquing the Islamic-dominated corrupt political classes, whom, they believe, have destroyed Nigeria. ECWA’s bureaucracy has hindered evangelism, and theological reflection on Islam, traditional religions or Pentecostalism. Lacking intellectual leadership, violence has provoked suspicion, hatred, and a bunker mentality in ECWA.

Bad governance is constantly blamed for repeated riots. Innocent Christians’ sufferings are stressed ignoring ethnic conflicts. Some theologians critique popular beliefs but most ECWA people avoid Muslims. This denies SIM and ECWA’s historic emphasis on contextual evangelism. Peace can only return when both religions overcome prejudices, mutual distrust, and major theological concerns, to dialogue and build bridges.
Acknowledgements

Casting my mind back over the seven years of part-time study for this degree it is hard to remember just who to thank, and one fears committing the unforgiveable sin of leaving out someone who played a crucial role in helping this process along. So, if I do, perchance, forget to mention a name, please forgive me.

I started my studies very conscious that doing this course was where God wanted me to be. Thus, my first thanks needs to go to Him for wisdom, strength, direction, financial provision and the opening of doors right through the process.

My thanks too go to our home church, High Kirk Presbyterian Church and a number of friends and relatives both within and without the church who prayed for, and financially supported my wife Tricia and myself before, during, and after our two years in Nigeria. Without that financial support, including an unexpected, large, initial gift from a fellow missionary that served as confirmation to us that this was the right path to follow, it would not have been possible for me to do the fieldwork in Nigeria, visit archives there, and visit the SIM archives in the United States. Thanks also to Mrs Michelle McFadden for critiquing my grammar, punctuation and trying to ensure I followed most academic formalities, and to Dr Phillip McCartney & Mr Gordon Montgomery of MCC Computers for their help in printing.

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Of course, while I am grateful to all of these people, for their help and assistance, the views expressed in this thesis are my own.
# Table of Contents

Declaration ii  
Abstract iii  
Acknowledgements iv  
Table of Contents vi  

Chapter One .......................................................................................................................... 1  
Setting the Context ............................................................................................................... 1  
1. Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 1  
2. Research Objectives ............................................................................................................. 3  
   2.1 Historical Presuppositions ............................................................................................. 5  
   2.2 Nigeria Today ............................................................................................................... 7  
3. Relevance of the Study ......................................................................................................... 10  
4. The Way Ahead .................................................................................................................... 16  

Chapter Two .......................................................................................................................... 19  
The Development of Northern Nigeria ................................................................................... 19  
1. Historical Background ......................................................................................................... 19  
   1.1 Lugard's Promises ......................................................................................................... 25  
   1.2 Different Visions .......................................................................................................... 30  
   1.3 Post World War Two ................................................................................................... 38  
2. Current Issues and Trends in Nigeria .................................................................................. 46  
   2.1 Identity ......................................................................................................................... 46  
   2.2 Corruption and Power ................................................................................................. 48  
   2.3 Religion versus Secularism ......................................................................................... 54  
3. Summary and Conclusion ..................................................................................................... 60  

Chapter Three .......................................................................................................................... 63  
Research Planning and Responses ......................................................................................... 63  
1. Contemporary Research Methodology ................................................................................ 63  
   1.1 Research in a Nigerian Context .................................................................................. 70  
   1.2 Questionnaire Design .................................................................................................. 72  
   1.3 Sample selection .......................................................................................................... 74  
2. Library, Archive & Electronic Resources ........................................................................... 76  
3. The Field Research Process .................................................................................................. 78  
   3.1 Interviews ...................................................................................................................... 78  
      3.1.1 ECWA Interviews ................................................................................................. 80  
      3.1.2 Other Christian Leaders ..................................................................................... 81  
      3.1.3 Interviewing Muslims ......................................................................................... 81  
   3.2 Questionnaire Responses .............................................................................................. 81  
   3.3 Relationships ............................................................................................................... 84  
4. Data Presentation ................................................................................................................ 86
Chapter Six ................................................................. 197
The Changing Face of ECWA ................................................... 197
1. Introduction .................................................................. 197
2. New Life for All .......................................................... 197
3. Theological Developments in ECWA ......................... 201
    3.1 SIM Church Constitution ........................................ 202
    3.2 ECWA Constitution 1954 ......................................... 204
    3.3 ECWA Constitution 1964 ......................................... 206
    3.4 ECWA Constitution 1970 ......................................... 206
    3.5 ECWA Constitution 1980 ......................................... 207
    3.6 ECWA Constitution 1989 ......................................... 208
    3.7 ECWA Constitution 1999 ......................................... 210
4. Pentecostal Influences .................................................. 212
    4.1 Nigerian Pentecostal Origins ................................... 213
    4.2 Nigerian Pentecostal Beliefs ..................................... 216
        4.2.1 Worldviews ......................................................... 217
        4.2.2 Pentecostal Public Ethics ..................................... 218
        4.2.3 Pentecostal Political Principles ......................... 220
        4.2.4 Pentecostal Views of Islam ................................ 222
        4.2.5 Political Engagement ........................................ 224
    4.3 Fundamentalist? ...................................................... 227
5. ECWA Today ............................................................... 231
    5.1 Organisation and politics ....................................... 231
    5.2 Influence of Pentecostalism .................................... 234
    5.3 Religious violence ................................................ 236
    5.4 Changing attitudes ............................................... 242
6. Summary and Conclusion .............................................. 246

Chapter Seven .................................................................. 249
Complexity of Views ........................................................ 249
1. Policy Background ...................................................... 249
    1.1 Conflict Model ....................................................... 249
    1.2 Instrumentalist/Manipulation Model ...................... 250
    1.3 The Rainbow Model .............................................. 251
    1.4 Competing Fundamentalisms ............................... 253
    1.5 State Discourse ..................................................... 253
2. The Case for Self-Defence ........................................... 255
    2.1 Trust in God ........................................................... 255
    2.2 and keep your powder dry ..................................... 260
        2.2.1 Kafanchan Riots .............................................. 260
        2.2.2 Tafewa Balewa Riots ...................................... 264
        2.2.3. Kano Riots 1991 .......................................... 265
        2.2.4. Zango Kafat Riots ....................................... 266
        2.2.5. Kano Riots 2004 .......................................... 271
        2.2.6. Danish Cartoon Riots .................................... 271
        2.2.7. Jos Crisis November 2008 ............................. 272
3. Responding to Violence ................................................ 274
    3.1 A Failure of Options .............................................. 275
    3.2 The Search for Power ............................................. 279
    3.3 Love ................................................................. 284
    3.4 Evangelism .......................................................... 287
        3.4.1 SIM Efforts ...................................................... 288
        3.4.2 SIM-COME I ................................................. 291
        3.4.3 SIM-COME II .............................................. 294
        3.4.4 Recovering an Evangelistic Vision ................... 295
Chapter One
Setting the Context

1. Introduction

Since 1980 there have been periodic cycles of inter-religious violence between Muslims and Christians across central and northern Nigeria, the geographical focus of this research. In recent years, clashes have centred on the predominantly Christian Plateau State in central Nigeria. For instance, over 600 people, thought to be predominantly Muslims, were killed in the town of Yelwa in May 2004 in retaliation for attacks on Christians prior to that. These tit-for-tat killings had continued since riots in Jos in September 2001 when about 1000 died. (Since 1999, over 10,000 have died nationwide in this kind of communal bloodshed. However, by October 2004, there were estimates of nearly 58,000 killed in ongoing violence since 7th September 2001 in Plateau State alone.) In the northern Muslim city of Kano, there were public protests about the Yelwa massacre. Addressed by traditional and political leaders, the protests degenerated into anti-Christian riots on 10th - 11th May 2004. Some casualty estimates claimed 1400 Christians died with 3000 missing. By contrast, official figures downplayed the death toll. There have been plenty of recriminations.

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2 Tsetu (11/05/2007) suggests these were mostly mercenaries from Niger and Chad. He alleges that a Taliban element in Yelwa was behind the original violence in which 52 Christians were killed in a church. The mainly traditionalist Tarok and other more Christianised tribes trained separately, the latter group benefiting from modern weapons and training from retired Army officers, but fought together.

3 AFP and AP, ‘Sectarian violence leaves 630 dead in Nigeria,’ (May 6, 2004) on www.timesonline.co.uk. (DOA 07/05/04).


The violence has continued relatively unabated. Since the Yelwa crises mentioned above, which partially motivated this research there have been, at least, another eight major outbreaks of violence across Northern Nigeria. (See Appendix Two for a short summary of these). Increasingly these have been centred in and around Jos where it increasingly seems that violence breaks out at the drop of a hat. This has left its toll on many of the inhabitants, from both sides of the community. Carmen McCain is an American Christian who grew up in Jos as the child of missionaries, and currently lives and works in Kano. She speaks powerfully on the fear of her Muslim friends about the situation in Jos. Many of her friends had also grown up in Jos.

Their families have been in Jos for several generations, if not much longer, and until recently had fine relationships with their Christian “indigene” neighbors. They believe that churches are preaching violence and that the ‘yan kasa—Jos “indigenes” have political agendas in attempting to reclaim land lived on for generations by Hausa “settlers.” They feel like the “indigenes” refuse to live in peace with them and many fear returning to their childhood homes.8

Christians in Jos, however, speak of Muslim radicals, with foreign sponsorship and training, and the connivance of local Muslim leaders, trying to Islamise the city and Plateau State. Thus Salihu Garba, an ECWA Trustee who hails from Sokoto State and is not indigenous to Jos, wrote to Isaac Laudarji, another ECWA minister, about recent riots in Jos:

There is this truth. The Muslims of the far north of Nigeria have open disdain for Plateau people. They hate them for being Christians and in political control of their affairs. They want to take-over political control of Jos North Local Government and eventually the governorship of the state. If they can have that, there will be peace. They are also demanding to have an Emir with emirate in Jos. This is what Al Qaeda has taught them. The Muslims are being well funded, given training, equipment and other logistic support. The second truth is the backing of the Chief of Army Staff (COAS), a Muslim from the Islamic state of Kano for Muslims and Islam. The General Officer Commanding (GOC) the army in Jos is also a Muslim. The two supply army uniforms to Muslims in Jos. Please don’t ask about our national government. Our Muslim president is on life support but the cabals around him have held to power in spite of swearing in the VP, a Christian, into an acting position. The cabal makes sure he is rendered ineffective. We need a miracle for any positive change that can move the nation forward.9

He went on to speak of how Christians are boycotting Muslim traders which, in turn, is raising tension among the Muslims who are not selling their goods. Church headquarters are said to be targets for Muslim attack, with the ECWA Headquarters being the main target. The governor can do little as he has no control over the security forces.

9 Garba, S., E-mail to Rev Dr Isaac Laudarji, 10th March 2010.
Two perspectives on the same dispute, and in the meantime many innocent people suffer. Some reports speak of Christians giving shelter to Muslims, and trying to ensure that Christian youth do not take revenge; of Christian and Muslim leaders sitting down together to ensure peace in their areas. Yet other reports speak of hundreds killed, with seemingly no let up in the violence. How did a situation like this arise? What can be done about it? What role, if any, can the ECWA denomination play in helping to resolve the situation?

2. Research Objectives

Prior to commencing this work, the researcher spent sixteen years in Nigeria as a missionary theological educator seconded by Serving in Mission (SIM) to the Evangelical Church of West Africa (ECWA). This enabled him to familiarise himself with many of the issues relating to the conflict. At one stage, there seemed to be a lull in violent incidents and some hope that, with the election of President Obasanjo in May 1999 and the restoration of democracy, the era of religious and ethnic riots of the 1980s and 1990s had passed. Instead of peace, however, came more violence, and at an increased intensity.

Given ECWA's claim to a community of about 6 million people,\textsuperscript{10} which, if proven, would make ECWA the second largest Protestant church in Nigeria and possibly the largest in Northern Nigeria,\textsuperscript{11} the violence has undoubtedly affected the denomination. How exactly needs to be determined. Historically ECWA took a pacifist position. During some of the riots in the 1980s, one remembers Nigerian news reports remarking on Christians' peaceful and prayerful responses to Muslim attacks. However, given the increasing violence, pacifist views are increasingly scarce.

Reasons for the violence differ. Some, such as Samuel Huntington, controversially speculated about increasing culture clashes affecting relationships between the world's religio-cultural blocs.\textsuperscript{12} Alternatively, the media blames these riots mainly on

\textsuperscript{10} Motty, (14/12/2005). The ECWA official supervising the statistics estimates 4 million.


local political disputes and economic struggles. This seems inadequate. A casual observance of Northern Ireland, the ongoing Balkan saga, or even the more recent disputes in the Caucasus indicates that issues of identity, loyalty, and worldview run much deeper than disputes over politics and economics. They reside deep in the psyche of ordinary men and women. Securing good jobs and having a stake in society ameliorate but do not eliminate the ethno-religious pressures placed on individuals.  

The complexity of the situation, therefore, requires that historical development, contemporary analysis, and theological reflection are all necessary perspectives to be taken into account in discussion. As will be discussed in Chapter Two the history of central Nigerian Christian development has primarily focused on perceptions of colonial bias in favour of the Islamic establishment, tracing contemporary grievances back to that period or to the preceding jihadic empires of Sokoto and Bornu. Historians have concentrated on the pre-World War II period ignoring the massive changes that have subsequently occurred as, especially since 1960, Christian numbers in this region have grown substantially. Not only are these changes in religious demographics an important factor in understanding the contemporary situation, but the numerical growth cannot be divorced from pre-colonial inter-ethnic attitudes, nor from the cultural and theological perspectives of the Western missionaries. Through examining ECWA’s growth and development, one is able to tell something of this history.

Increased numbers, better education, and mature leadership bring with it increased competition for political power, and a wider worldview. Instead of the narrow confines of often relatively small ethnic groups, Christians and Muslims in central and northern Nigeria identify with and support their co-religionists across the region and interact with others across the country and internationally. It is important, therefore, to consider their analysis of their contemporary situation.

Finally, for the Christian, historical and contemporary analyses are insufficient on their own. Actions and beliefs must always be examined in the light of scripturally rooted theology. Such reflection enables one to break free from the past, developing new lines of thought and action, always seeking to re-interpret faithfully the Christian

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Gospel for the present and not to mindlessly perpetuate culturally irrelevant and Biblically flawed traditions and attitudes.

2.1 Historical Presuppositions
No historical examination, however, is value free. Any historical writer approaches his subject with a number of presuppositions as to method and goals. Such is no different here. Prior to presenting his argument for a Christian approach to history, Bebbington\(^\text{14}\) surveys a number of historical theories including cyclical history, the idea of progress, historicism, and Marxist approaches. It is, however, at the interaction between positivist and idealist approaches that he argues one finds a Christian approach to history. He states that positivism holds there are:

\[\ldots\] regularities that can be established in human behaviour. The technique of the historian is consequently a matter of empirical investigation to establish general laws. There is no method peculiar to history. \ldots\] A belief that history uses essentially the same methods as other social sciences is the common bond of the positivist school.\(^\text{15}\)

By contrast, idealists believe:

\[\ldots\] that historical method is unique. Whereas a scientist aims to formulate general laws, the historian concentrates on illuminating particular individuals and events. Many advocates of an idealist position would go so far as to claim that human beings cannot be studied by the methods of science at all. Human beings are charged with intention, which cannot be explained in terms of scientific categories. \ldots\] they stress that men have ideas. That is what makes human beings distinctive; and that in turn makes the history of human affairs distinctive. A belief in the autonomy of history is the hallmark of the idealist school.\(^\text{16}\)

Analysis of either of these views commences with their estimate of humanity. Positivism reduces man to being merely a part of nature, a ‘thing’ like everything else. Idealism separates him from nature elevating him above everything else. Bebbington argues that only the Christian view of human nature can adequately reconcile these positions. God created man who is thus a relatively insignificant part of nature. Yet man is created in the image of God and thus is singled out for greatness. To the Christian, therefore, the positivist and idealist approaches are complementary, not polar opposites.

\(^\text{15}\) Bebbington, pp.142 – 143.
\(^\text{16}\) Bebbington, p.143.
To this understanding of humanity, the Christian historian adds “confidence in the future. Its keynote of hope is grounded in the twin beliefs that God is guiding history forward and that it will in due time reach his goal.” The historian, unlike the prophet, does not claim inspiration or divine insight. Therefore, claims for such divine superintendence and intervention necessarily have to be cautious and discrete. However, a belief in an overarching theme of God’s guidance and intervention in the story of humanity is not invalidated by the need to be cautious in making such claims. For central to the Christian faith is the life, death and resurrection of Jesus Christ, the supreme intervention by God in history. To ignore or disregard such claims is merely to privilege the secular claims of other schools of historical interpretation and not to evaluate the Christian claim in a transparent manner.

One must also consider the African context. At the 1910 World Mission Conference in Edinburgh, there were no African representatives, for missionary work in Africa was, by comparison with work in Asia, insignificant. It was on China and India that missionary societies focused, where they sent their most able missionaries, and from where indigenous church leaders first began to emerge. Edinburgh University reflected this when they took the opportunity of the conference to honour a few distinguished Asian church leaders. Africa was left the “celestial cannon fodder” of missionary work. Yet “at the end of the twentieth century Africa was appearing as the Christian heartland.” Walls argues this growth is not just a transplant from the West but the development of an authentically African religion, which, coinciding with the retreat of Christianity in the West, has now moved to being “a major component of contemporary, representative Christianity, the standard Christianity of the present age, a demonstration model of its character.” It has put down deep roots into the African traditional religious past. The missionary use of the vernacular, in the adoption of vernacular names for God and in translation of the Scriptures, has brought recognition that the God the missionaries proclaimed was not an alien import but one whom Africans, to varying degrees, had known of before. “It is Christianity, not Islam, that has struck its roots into the vernacular past.” This, of course, has all sorts of implications for the African Christian’s worldview, whether it be relationships

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17 Bebbington, p.169.
19 Walls, p.118.
20 Walls, p.119.
with the supernatural world, the style and message of the Christian church or attitude to the Scriptures.

African Christianity, however, also has to address the present. Lumped together by colonial whim into artificially created states, Africans face a growing challenge from pluralism. This is not just a plurality of interests jostling for influence within the bounds of a commonly accepted state. Rather, there is a plurality of loyalties and citizenships, and all that implies with each seeking control of a relatively weak central government whose main claim to power is its ability to dispense goods and services. As Kalu points out, within this pluralism the core competition in West Africa is between Christianity and Islam. Islam mixes political power, ethnicity, and religion into one over-arching unity. By contrast, from Christianity’s ranks developed democratic liberalism, the privatisation of faith, and its concomitant, the modern secular state. Kalu writes:

The patterns of the church’s responses to the challenges of primal African culture and religion, the theological pretensions of the state, resurgent Islam, and the pluralism created by modernisation and global market economy, are essential indicators of its capacity to respond to the other challenges of power and poverty. These are the stuff of modern African church history.

Studying the history of a particular church like ECWA, therefore, is a unique challenge. It began through SIM work in the early twentieth century with Western missionaries evangelising in a still very unsettled territory, parts freshly conquered from the Sokoto Caliphate, and other parts still in rebellion against British colonial rule. There was increasing literacy along the coast, and Islamic leaders were literate in Arabic. However, the vast bulk of people in between were illiterate and many were deeply attached to traditional or Islamic customs and practices. These were extremely inauspicious beginnings for what is now one of Nigeria’s largest denominations. Hopefully, in the course of this research, one can suggest some of the reasons for such growth as well as showing some of the challenges that Kalu alludes to.

2.2 Nigeria Today
Nigeria is an ethnically and religiously complex country. It is one of the largest in Africa by area (356,669 sq miles) and is the most populous with the most recent census provisionally estimating the total population at over one hundred and forty

23 Kalu, p.252.
million.\textsuperscript{24} The CIA web site also reports more than two hundred and fifty different ethnic groups.\textsuperscript{25} \textit{Operation World}, a Christian database and publication, states that there are over four hundred and ninety ethnic groups.\textsuperscript{26} English, reflecting British colonial rule up to 1960, is the official language with other major languages including Hausa, Yoruba, Igbo, and Fulfulde.

Current religious statistics are so politically sensitive they did not feature in the last two censuses.\textsuperscript{27} Arguments revolve around which religion is in the majority, in part because of the annulment of two major censuses in 1962 and 1973.\textsuperscript{28} In 1901, across the whole of what is now Nigeria, Christianity accounted for 1.1 percent of the population, Islam 25.9 percent and traditionalists for 73 percent. This was out of a total population of just over sixteen million people. By 1975, Christians claimed 47.2 percent, with Muslims at 44.5 percent and traditionalists at 8 percent out of a total population of nearly sixty-three million. The Christian population growth has mainly occurred since independence in 1960.\textsuperscript{29} By contrast, one occasionally reads of Nigerian Muslim leaders claiming figures of up to 80\% of the population as a whole to be Muslim. Such claims, often appearing as assertions made without supporting statistical arguments, contrast sharply with the relative wealth and prominence of increasing numbers of Christian churches in such cities as Jos and Kaduna, let alone in Bauchi and Kano. Whichever side is right, it is probably safe to say that since 1960 there has been considerable religious change in Nigeria, especially as substantial numbers of those following African Traditional Religions appear to have become Christians. Such changes, not to mention the perception of those changes have profound political and economic implications. Prior to and after independence the


\textsuperscript{25} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{26} Johnstone, P.J. StG, \textit{et al}, \textit{Operation World CD}. 2001. Relies on data from Wycliffe Bible Translators and Gospel Recordings Network. Why there should be such a disparity is unknown.

\textsuperscript{27} Peters-Omale, F., ‘Jihad Threat Worries Christians,’ \textit{This Day}, 20\textsuperscript{th} April 2005 (on www.allafrica.com DOA 20/04/2005). Christian leaders openly sought the inclusion of religious statistics, while Muslim leaders strongly opposed such a move.

\textsuperscript{28} Commenting on this, Falola wrote, ‘In 1952, Muslims outnumbered Christians by 3.26 million; in 1962, by just 0.57 million; in 1963, by 2.58 million; in 1973, by 23 million; and in 1991, by 5.6 million. It is difficult to account for this wide variation but Christians and southern politicians argue that it is nothing but deliberate government mendacity.” Falola, T., \textit{Violence in Nigeria}, University of Rochester Press, Rochester, NY, 1998, p.307.

\textsuperscript{29} Abikoye, G., ‘Who Really are the Majority?’ \textit{Today’s Challenge (TC)}, No. 6, 1986, pp. 4 – 7, 32 summarizes Christian claims at that time. Current CIA website figures are Muslims are 50\% of the population, Christians 40\%, and traditionalists 10\%. This seems to be a standard figure adopted by external web sites without much thought or investigation. \textit{Operation World} in 2001 estimated Muslims were 41\%, Christians 52.61\%, traditionalists 5.99\% and non-religious 0.40\%. In addition, note the various figures regarding the size of the Muslim community ranging from 39\% to 45.40\% given in Nwanaju, I., \textit{Christian-Muslim Relations in Nigeria}, Free Enterprise Publishers, Lagos, 2005, pp.76 – 77.
traditional Hausa-Fulani ruling classes and their successors ensured that Islamic values and perspectives dominated the country. They relied on the large numbers of ordinary Muslim voters to return them to power. By contrast, followers of African Traditional Religions in central and northern Nigeria were often isolated, relatively small, often illiterate groups without the wider connections and worldview needed for political success. Christianity’s growth, especially in central and northern Nigeria, has provided its adherents with those wider connections and adherents, thus posing a threat to Islam’s traditional domination. This, in turn, threatens control of oil revenues, and with that the viability of much of Northern Nigeria. Thus, it is not surprising that Muslim leaders argued vehemently against asking ethnic and religious questions in recent censuses.  

The Federal Republic of Nigeria is organised into thirty-six states plus the Federal Capital of Abuja. Unofficially it divides into about six different regional political groupings. Federal institutions must reflect in their staffing and leadership representation from all parts of Nigeria. This principle extends to political party composition. Instead of the regionally based political parties of the early 1960s, political parties are required to operate across the Federation. A simple majority cannot win presidential elections: a formula determines if the presumed victor has drawn sufficient support across all states of the Federation.

In each of the states, however, an important political problem, for discussion more fully later, is the issue of indigeneity. Briefly, the Nigerian constitution guarantees equality of rights to all Nigerians no matter which part of the country they live in. However, each state and local government tends to favour those it deems to be indigenes. Land ownership, economic and political rights are all at stake. The situation is complicated further through the constant pressure for the creation of more states. Someone who has lived in the same house all his life and whose family can trace their roots back in that house for several generations can suddenly find himself on the wrong side of a newly-created state boundary and thus treated as non-indigenous, whereas before he did not face such discrimination.

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30 Christians tried to ensure the inclusion of these questions, but on losing this argument were fearful that Muslim Hausa leaders would rig the results. In the Jos ECWA Seminary church on 12th March 2006, Rev Emmanuel Jatau, the church’s associate minister, advised the congregation to forestall rigging by not using Muslim sounding names, and not acknowledging speaking Hausa when asked these questions in the forthcoming census.
The oil boom of the early and mid 1970s brought unprecedented wealth and development. Oil quickly replaced agriculture as the source of income providing “95% of foreign exchange earnings, and about 80% of budgetary revenues.”³¹ Agriculture was neglected, the population soared, and a country that had fed itself soon became a net importer of food. Along with oil and its revenues came mismanagement, corruption, and inflation. The clearest signal of such has been the sharp decline in the value of Nigeria’s currency, the Naira, dropping from about U.S.$2 to N1 to U.S. $1 to N120.11³² Little wonder that 90.8% of the population live on less than U.S.$2 per day.³³ Despite some positive steps taken to address these economic problems in recent years, the overall effect has been a sharp rise in violence and associated tensions. Various armed groups in the Niger Delta violently resist the Federal government, armed robbery is endemic across the country, and many have a cynical attitude towards the political establishment. For ultimately Nigeria is an artificial state owing more to the decisions made in the 1884 Berlin Conference than to geographical, ethnic, commercial, or indigenous political considerations. There is little reservoir of sympathy or loyalty to Nigeria as a political entity that will enable it to succeed against adversity.

3. Relevance of the Study

Southern Nigerians and the media often describe the whole of Northern Nigeria as Islamic not realising the large numbers of Christians who, especially in Nigeria’s Middle Belt, form a distinct challenge to Islamic domination. Large churches characterised by increasingly striking architecture are common in most Northern Nigerian cities. They are usually filled on Sunday mornings, not just with southern migrants but also with increasing numbers of people converting from an Islamic background. A good proportion of these churches belong to ECWA, a denomination arising from inter-denominational missionary work, and mainly located in Northern Nigeria.

It is an easy mistake for those more used to mainline denominations, or indeed Pentecostal churches to overlook other groups like ECWA, which are of central importance to the understanding of Christianity in Northern Nigeria. Yet ECWA and its parent Sudan Interior Mission have probably invested more time, effort, and
material resources into evangelistic outreach across Northern Nigeria than any other single mission society or denomination. This study, therefore, seeks to add to the relatively limited range of material on Christianity in Northern Nigeria by focusing on ECWA using its greatest challenge – Islam – as a theme by which to examine the church’s historical development and contemporary situation.

The longest serving of previous studies of Christianity in Northern Nigeria is E.P.T. Crampton’s *Christianity in Northern Nigeria*,. This continues to be the main history of Christianity north of the Niger-Benue confluence. Crampton highlights the difficult relationships between missions and colonial authorities in the early part of the twentieth century, and the role missions played in health and education provision in the middle years of the twentieth century. He also discusses the increasing growth and maturity of the churches, and the implications this had for relationships with independent, Muslim-dominated governments in Northern Nigeria. In a post-script to Crampton, Gaiya takes some of these themes forward highlighting church growth among the Maguzawa Hausa groups, and the growth in Nigerian Christian mission agencies.

Dealing with a similar period to Crampton is Niels Kastfelt’s *Religion and Politics in Nigeria, A Study in Middle Belt Christianity*. This primarily examines the work of the Danish Lutheran branch of the Sudan United Mission (SUM) and the resultant political struggles of the church it started in Adamawa Province both with the British colonial officials and with the Muslim-dominated governments of the province and of Northern Nigeria.

Jan Boer’s *Missionary Messengers of Liberation in a Colonial Context*, is a study of the work of the British branch of Sudan United Mission (SUM) in Northern Nigeria. In doing so, Boer examines many of the same issues that affected the work of SIM. Beginning with the evangelical background of the SUM, Boer proceeds through discussing some of SUM’s key leaders to show how, on behalf of all the Protestant missions in Northern Nigeria, they resisted British colonial pro-Islamic pressure. Instead, they argued for the rights of all Nigerians to enjoy the liberating power of the Gospel both from traditional religions and from the feudal oppression of the Hausa-

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Fulani Islamic aristocracy. Boer finds, however, that while missions criticized colonial policy they operated within it, not seeking its overthrow. Indeed, it was somewhat ironic that most of Africa’s early leaders in the struggle for independence were missionary educated! Further, the missionary message, while seeking individual transformation, failed to address the social and political structures, a failure that Boer believes underlies the current church’s inability to address adequately such challenges as Islamic demands for Shari’ah law or the issue of corruption.

The most prolific ECWA author to study ECWA’s history is Yusufu Turaki.37 His first work, The British Colonial Legacy in Northern Nigeria: A Social Ethical Analysis of the Colonial and Post Colonial Society and Politics in Nigeria is a revision of his 1982 Ph.D. dissertation at Boston University. In it, he examines the historical background of colonial central Nigeria, to draw lessons for the ethical and political issues facing contemporary Nigeria. In particular, Turaki is concerned with the establishment of social justice, and cites the example of oppressive rule by colonial officials and the Hausa-Fulani aristocracy of his own southern Kaduna homeland to illustrate the contemporary issues facing the ethnic groups living there. His second work, An Introduction to the History of SIM/ECWA in Nigeria, 1893 – 1993, was published to coincide with ECWA’s celebrations of the centenary of SIM’s work in Nigeria. It is primarily a descriptive survey of the origins and expansion of SIM’s work and its eventual transformation into ECWA. In doing so, he discusses SIM’s origins and some of the principles that lay behind its activities. Later Turaki expanded this work, primarily by the inclusion of considerably more detail in his Theory and Practice of Christian Missions in Africa: A Century of SIM/ECWA History and Legacy in Nigeria, 1893 – 1993, Vol. 1.

Crampton, Kastfelt, Boer and Turaki reflect at length on the difficult political relationships in colonial days between missionaries on the one hand and colonial administrators and the Hausa-Fulani aristocracy on the other, and after independence between Nigerian churches on the one hand and Muslim politicians on the other. None of them, however, explains the underlying theological and cultural issues, which this author believes, are foundational to understanding current Christian attitudes towards Islam. It is in an attempt to do this that the history of SIM

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37 Turaki’s works include:
*An Introduction to the History of SIM/ECWA in Nigeria, 1893 – 1993,* Jos, 1993 b;
and ECWA in central and northern Nigeria is examined. Through examining historical evidence, contemporary events and the surrounding documentation one hopes to construct a picture of how this major denomination addresses the challenges posed by its daily encounter with Islam.

Other historical studies of Christianity in Africa, by their very nature, have taken a broad-brush approach to Christianity’s spread across the continent. Adrian Hastings produced a comprehensive work surveying modern African church history.\textsuperscript{38} His primary concentration, however, was on where Christianity was perceived to be strongest during this period, in eastern and southern Africa. Nigeria gets a fair mention and Hastings notes the rise of American-dominated missionary work in central and northern parts of Nigeria, and with it the rise in church memberships. It is, however, but a drop in the overwhelming flood of African Christianity. Far more attention gets devoted to the Nigerian Civil War.

Elizabeth Isichei has only four references to the work of SIM, only one of which refers to work in Nigeria and that appears to be a typo calling ECWA the Evangelical Churches of the Western Sudan (ECWS).\textsuperscript{39} Mark Shaw’s short study moves from examining individual stories up to 1960 and concludes with some overall themes.\textsuperscript{40}

The best of these studies is Sundkler and Steed’s massive \textit{A History of the Church in Africa}.\textsuperscript{41} They examine Northern Nigeria from Usman dan Fodio’s \textit{jihad} in 1804, and trace the religious changes there, highlighting traditionalist resistance to Muslim conquest and slave raiding, and the shock General Gordon’s death in Khartoum at the hands of the Mahdist uprising caused on both colonial and missionary policies. They also note the importance that Bible schools and indigenous workers had on post-1920 church growth, as well as how the Nigerian Civil War led to the spread of Islam into Nigeria’s southeast and Christianity to the far North as chaplains followed the troops to their barracks across the country. However, their work, suggestive as it is, has to take a broad approach to the subject, finishes in 1992, and even then fails

\textsuperscript{39} Isichei, E., \textit{A History of Christianity in Africa: from antiquity to the present}, SPCK, London, 1995. Formerly Professor of History at the University of Jos, in which city ECWA’s headquarters are located, one would have thought she would have checked her facts more carefully. She may have confused SIM’s original name “Sudan Interior Mission”, with that of the church.
\textsuperscript{40} Shaw, M., \textit{The Kingdom of God in Africa}, Baker, Grand Rapids.1996.
to mention the growing problems with religious violence that have plagued Northern Nigeria since 1980.

Studies on West Africa have concentrated on the extension of Christianity along the coast and focus on earlier periods of missionary and church work. Lamin Sanneh’s *West African Christianity: The Religious Impact*, very ably surveys the background to and spread of Christianity along the coastal regions from 1400 up until 1957. Only in his penultimate chapter does he begin to address the encounter of Christianity with traditional religions and with Islam. Two earlier works concentrated on missions in southern Nigeria. J.F.A. Ajayi’s *Christian Missions in Nigeria, 1841 – 1891. The Making of a New Elite* examines the early days of missionary work in southern Nigeria. E.A. Ayandele’s *The Missionary Impact on Modern Nigeria 1842 – 1914. A Political and Social Analysis* has a useful discussion about early missionary fascination and advance into Northern Nigeria, but concludes in 1914. Barbara Cooper, writing about missionary work in Niger points out the weakness of these former studies:

Much of the most prominent historical literature on missions focuses on the European-dominated eighteenth – and nineteenth-century “Christianity, commerce and civilization” wave of missions, missing altogether the twentieth-century surge of American-led missionization that is far less amenable to analysis as handmaiden to the European colonial enterprise.

Much of this American-led focus was on the interior of Africa, often referred to as the “Soudan”, the nineteenth-century term for the relatively unexplored territory that stretched from present Sudan westwards to the Atlantic coast. One of the products of this American-led focus on the “Soudan” was The Association of Evangelical Churches of West Africa (ECWA) formed at a conference of churches held in the town of Egbe, Nigeria, between the 18th and 20th May 1954. The churches forming ECWA were the fruit of the evangelistic work of the missionary organisation then known as the Sudan Interior Mission (SIM).

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45 Of course, there has also been considerable interest in both the African Independent Church phenomenon, examples of which include the Cherubim and Seraphim movement or the Church of the Lord Aladura, and the more recent upsurge in the Pentecostal-Charismatic movement exemplified, but by no means restricted to the Redeemed Christian Church of God or the Deeper Life Bible Church.
Initially numbering about five thousand members, ECWA reflected the conservative evangelical and fundamentalist theological views of SIM. As SIM is an interdenominational missionary society, issues of church order and government were complex. The mission had organised its work into districts, each led by a powerful District Superintendent (DS) elected from among his peers but with considerable freedom to shape the work of the church in that district. Thus, when ECWA formed, churches in each district tended to reflect the views of their local DS regarding church order and government. Most SIM missionaries came from churches holding to either Presbyterian or Baptist theological views. Naturally, these views were reflected in the newly formed church. Thus, admission to membership is through confession of faith as evidenced in believer’s baptism on completion of a lengthy baptismal class. A conciliar church government model is followed with a hierarchy of councils. Initially there was considerable room for flexibility with the central headquarters exercising relatively little power. Power, as in the days of SIM control, remained with the districts. During the 1960s and 1970s, the interdenominational New Life for All (NLFA) evangelistic programme brought considerable growth to ECWA, as it did to other denominations. During the 1990s, a constitutional review increased central control of the denomination, tightened up financial management, and increased the power of the ECWA Executive who ran the church’s affairs, and revised the name to become The Evangelical Church of West Africa (ECWA). The church has grown substantially, currently claiming a community of over six million people worshipping in about two thousand five hundred churches, which are grouped in seventy-four District Church Councils.

The Sudan Interior Mission itself sprang from the vision of reaching the central “Soudan” which Walter Gowans and his mother shared with Rowland Bingham and Thomas Kent. The three men, failing to secure the support of any established church or missionary organisation, decided to set up their own faith mission following the example of Hudson Taylor’s China Inland Mission. More recently, Geysbeek argues that three others were involved in the decision at a meeting in September or October 1893 in Southport, England. David Loynd and Robert Lee were young English

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48 Presbyterian churches are part of the Reformed movement characterised by conciliar church government and infant baptism. Baptist refers to those denominations including Mennonite, Baptist, Bible or non-denominational churches characterised by congregational church government and admission to church membership through believer’s baptism.

49 Geysbeek, T., ‘The Founding of the Sudan Interior Mission,’ *The Record: The Occasional Bulletin of the SIM International Archives*, Issue 8, 23rd February 2009, pp. 3 - 17. Loynd and Lee were to follow the first three but finances only permitted Loynd to travel in October 1894. He stayed for four months returning with Bingham in May 1895. Bingham’s silence about Loynd has led some to think that the two clashed. Lee eventually became SIM UK’s honorary Home Secretary in London for some years.
pastors who also shared the vision. The five met in John Hindle's Mission Church after all of them had failed to find backers. Hindle, although not present when the group decided to set up their own mission organization, initially had suggested they consider doing so. For financial reasons, Bingham, Gowans, and Kent sailed first, arriving in Lagos in December 1893. Bingham fell ill with malaria preventing him joining the others in travelling up country. They both died, Gowans near Zaria and Kent in Bida. Shortly afterwards, Bingham returned home and set about providing a proper organizational basis for the fledging mission. After another unsuccessful attempt, in 1901 he was able to send out a team of missionaries, who, helped by Col. Lugard the incoming British Governor of Northern Nigeria, established a mission station at Patigi on the banks of the Niger River. It was a difficult station due both to the predominantly Islamic character of the Nupe people as well as the hot and humid climate. However, it was from here that missionaries began to move out, first to the Muslim Hausa trading colony of Wushishi and then branching out to work among the non-Muslim Yagba people.50 This last move was the beginning of a considerable movement of missionaries into other non-Muslim groups across central Nigeria. Over the years, SIM work grew not just in Nigeria but also in French-controlled territory to the north and west of Nigeria,51 later developing work in Ethiopia and Sudan.52

4. The Way Ahead

Before proceeding further with the study, it is helpful to explain the breakdown of the thesis. After this introductory chapter, Chapter Two will concentrate on explaining the historical background to the study and summarise some of the contemporary issues facing Nigeria. Issues discussed include the effect of the dan Fodio jihad; and the Islamic reliance on the slave trade. Also included are British colonial policies favouring Indirect Rule and thereby Islamicisation, while restricting and even prohibiting Christian missionary work in areas claimed to be controlled by Muslim Emirs. There follows discussion of the growing gulf between colonial policies, on the one hand, versus the hopes and dreams of the missionary societies on the other. Eventually missions were permitted to work in these areas often through the provision of various social services such as medical care or education. Post World

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51 Cooper, 2006 is an account of SIM work in the République du Niger with useful insights on work in Nigeria.

52 Through various mergers, SIM (now standing for Serving in Mission) carries on missionary work in much of Africa, several Asian countries and across central South America.
War II brought rapid constitutional changes leading up to Nigerian independence in 1960. Missions and their converts were very apprehensive about these, fearing the effects of Muslim-dominated government. Christian Nigerians began to network across ethnic barriers to ensure their interests were taken into account. There then follows a survey of Nigerian governments both before and after the civil war. The second half of this chapter looks at contemporary issues such as identity, corruption and power, and religion versus secularism.

Chapter Three examines various relevant theoretical issues. This includes discussing the nature of qualitative research incorporating issues of reflexivity and the insider/outsider, issues related to doing research in a Nigerian context, questionnaire design, and sample selection. Discussion of the field research process includes the composition of the groups interviewed or questioned, the rationale behind the choice of these people, a description of the processes involved in doing the study, and the relevant response rates. Central to this field research was developing or making use of relationships already existing.

Chapter Four presents and gives some preliminary analysis of data obtained through interviews and questionnaires administered amongst different groups of ECWA leaders, laity, SIM missionaries, and other church leaders. A few Muslims were also interviewed and their responses are referred to in the course of later discussion. Each Christian group interviewed or questioned is examined separately, with each question presented separately. While comments are offered about the responses made by a group to a specific question, no attempt is made to correlate all of the responses to this question at this stage. Such correlation is part of the discussion in chapters Five to Seven.

As will be discussed in Chapter Three, the questionnaires and interviews were built around three research questions. Chapter Five examines the first of these, i.e. What was the social, cultural, and theological context within which the ECWA church was formed, and acquired its early leadership? In so doing it looks back into the historical factors behind the formation of SIM; SIM’s changing understanding of the nature of Islam; SIM’s move into the Islamic areas of Northern Nigeria and Nigerian responses. This is followed by examining the religious and political issues that led to the formation of ECWA and the context within which it was formed. Finally, in this chapter the data obtained from all of the groups is correlated and analysed before conclusions are drawn.
Chapter Six proceeds along similar lines, examining the second research question, i.e. As the church has grown numerically has its theological and political views changed? What factors have influenced these changes? The chapter examines the influence of the New Life For All evangelistic movement, before proceeding to show, from a survey of ECWA’s constitutions how the church’s theological understanding and organisational structure has changed since its foundation. Much of the change in theological understanding has been in response to the development of Pentecostalism. The chapter analyses this particularly in light of the Christian-Muslim conflict. In turn, discussion about fundamentalism rises out of the discussion on Pentecostal influences on ECWA. Having looked at the relevant literature, presentation of data from the interviews and questionnaires examines ECWA’s organisation and politics, Pentecostal influences on ECWA, the causes and effects of religious violence, and changing attitudes.

Chapter Seven highlights the third research question, i.e. How has the church applied its background to its relationships to Islam today? Topics covered included self-defence, incorporating trusting God for protection in the face of pressure, standing up for your rights, and fighting back. Also covered is how Christians should respond to violence, occultic influences as people search for power, and various theological responses to violence. A third area examined is that of evangelism, tracing SIM’s focus on evangelising Muslims and showing how ECWA began to contribute the insights of its leaders to this effort. However, by the early 1990s ECWA leaders had noticed a declining interest in evangelism among their members. ECWA bureaucracy has not helped forcing a number of its evangelists to work outside the power structures, albeit in fellowship with ECWA, to accomplish their task. Some form of dialogue was suggested as another approach to bridging the gap between Muslims and Christians. This approach is controversial with some feeling it would not work, and others doubting there is enough theological common ground for such dialogue to take place. Lack of mutual trust is also a major factor here.
Chapter Two
The Development of Northern Nigeria

1. Historical Background

Just as no man is an island, so no society or country can be understood divorced from the connections that have created it and sustain it. Economics, culture, political ideology, and religion all go a long way to form and give identity to individuals, ethnic groups, and nations. All of these factors, however, take time to develop and to affect their context. Thus in examining the current inter-religious conflict in Nigeria an understanding of the historical context is essential.

When Bingham, Gowans and Kent arrived in Lagos in 1893, missionaries already there were sceptical about their mission’s outcome. The Methodist Mission Superintendent said to Bingham, “Young man, you will never see the Soudan, your children will never see the Soudan, your grandchildren might.”

The SIM pioneers were not the first to envisage the evangelisation of the northern Muslims. Samuel Crowther, the Anglican Church’s first African bishop, who had died in 1891, had sought to evangelise the north since 1857. His low-key approach fostered good relations with the emirs, but was not vigorous enough for the young radical evangelicals of the CMS’s Sudan Party. Setting off to Nigeria in 1890, they seized control of Crowther’s work, effectively destroying it, but then through disease and death their own work collapsed. By 1892, their leader G.W. Brooke feared a Muslim uprising. The hoped-for rapid conversion of Northern Nigeria had proved elusive.

The Sudan Party’s failure heightened the fascination that British and North American Christians had with evangelising the Hausa. Misleading reports by Western visitors to

53 Donne, J., Devotions Upon Emergent Occasions, Meditation XVII, 1624.
55 Crampton, pp.28 - 29.
Northern Nigeria, the influence of pre-millennialism,\textsuperscript{57} the work of the Hausa Association,\textsuperscript{58} and concerns about slavery all combined to increase interest in the area. Crampton notes how British missionary societies had concluded that the non-Muslims of Northern Nigeria would soon convert to Islam if not evangelised by Christians.\textsuperscript{59} Canon Robinson, the brother of one of the Sudan Party missionaries, toured Northern Nigeria in 1894 declaring thereafter that whereas the Fulani were thoroughly Islamized, the Hausa would be easy to convert.\textsuperscript{60} He also spoke of the extent of slavery in the Muslim emirates.\textsuperscript{61}

The country that was to become Nigeria consisted of a couple of British territories including Lagos Colony and the Niger Coast Protectorate centred on Calabar, surrounded by a vast hinterland populated by a myriad of often warring ethnic groups. Immediately to the north of Lagos were the Yoruba Empire remnants torn apart from a combination of Islamic pressure and the slave trade.\textsuperscript{62} Further north was the savannah belt, peopled by an array of smaller ethnic groups who struggled to maintain their autonomy against external oppression and slave raiding, from the Sokoto Caliphate and the Borno Empire to their north.

SIM’s founders’ expectations were realistic. Gowans wrote of the “deadly nature of the climate and the bitter hostility of the Mohammedan powers there dominant,” but this was a challenge that had to be met. Failure in this challenge at worst would mean “the death of two or three deluded fanatics.” Even then, death was not a failure.\textsuperscript{63} Gowans and Kent soon experienced the reality of those words. Gowans travelled north near to Zaria. One night, the Emir of Kontagora’s slave-raiders surrounded the village where he was staying. They seized all of Gowans’ trade goods promising recompense. He rejected the string of slaves sent in payment. Soon afterwards, he died sick, penniless, and alone.\textsuperscript{64} Kent died shortly afterwards in Bida.

\textsuperscript{59} Crampton, p.36.
\textsuperscript{60} Ayandele, pp.124 – 125.
\textsuperscript{61} Shankar, p.35.
\textsuperscript{62} Cf Crowder, pp. 84 – 97 for further details.
\textsuperscript{63} Gowans, \textit{W. Sudan Witness (SW)}, November 1962, p.1.
\textsuperscript{64} Bingham, 1943, pp.23 – 24. See also Hunter, J.H., \textit{A Flame of Fire}, SIM, Toronto, 1961, pp. 51 – 63.
Slavery, and the suppression of the slave trade, was probably the nineteenth century’s most prominent moral and social item. Western powers had begun to turn against their previous practices, and sought to abolish, first, the slave trade and eventually slavery itself. Britain banned her merchants from the Atlantic slave trade in 1807 with the United States following a year later. To enforce this ban the British government used a combination of diplomatic pressure and naval action, with a Royal Navy squadron patrolling the West African coast. From about the 1840s this military action, supported by other nations, became increasingly effective. The Islamic world also began to be pressured, but action to suppress the slave trade within Africa was slower.\(^\text{65}\)

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, a wave of jihadic struggles swept across the Sahelian belt as Muslim *ulama* expressed their dissatisfaction with the quality of Islam practised in the region’s various states. Islam had arrived in Borno in the eleventh century\(^\text{66}\) and in Hausaland in the fifteenth century mainly through the peaceful activities of merchants and traders. Initially, it appealed to the elite with relatively few ordinary people converting, but the elite struggled with the claims of traditional religions on which were based their claims to power. By contrast, Muslim *ulama*, often Fulani migrants, longed for a re-ordering of society along Islamic lines, deploring the compromises and looking for Islam’s extension. For generations the struggle continued until, as Levtzion notes:

> Indeed, the experience of many centuries proved that the ruling dynasties could not go all the way to become Muslims to fit the standards set by the *ulama*, because of their traditional pre-Islamic heritage. This radical break with the past could not be accomplished through evolution; an armed revolution was necessary. In other words, if chiefs cannot turn true Muslims, then the only way to make the state Islamic is for the *ulama* to become chiefs.\(^\text{67}\)

Usman dan Fodio led the struggle in central Sudan. Falling out with his erstwhile protégé, the ruler of Gobir,\(^\text{68}\) he launched a *jihad* in 1804 sweeping across what are now Northern Nigeria, Niger, and northern Cameroon.\(^\text{69}\) Islam has never

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\(^{65}\) Crowder, pp.100 – 105.

\(^{66}\) According to the Western calendar, not the Islamic one. Note that “Borno” and “Bornu” refer to the same territory.


\(^{68}\) Azumah notes how dan Fodio was a moderate preacher who had a series of visions that convinced him he was the *mujaddid*, a reformer expected at the turn of every century to call Muslims to the right path in preparation for the coming of the *mahdi* or messiah, p.75.

distinguished between religion and politics, between sacred and secular. The struggle was, therefore, as much political as it was religious. Only by seizing political power could religious practices be reformed. Traditional restrictions on fighting against Muslims were dispensed with by declaring that it was what one did, not what one said, that showed the reality of one’s faith. Into this mix, Logams adds ethnicity suggesting the jihad was, at least in part, a Fulani conspiracy to seize power. He points out that none of dan Fodio’s Hausa students were entrusted with leadership in the jihad. All, bar one, were Fulani. By 1807 the two major Hausa cities of Kano and Katsina were captured with most of Hausaland a year later. The only serious check on their ambitions was resistance from Borno with hostilities finally ending in 1811.

The *jihad* never really finished. It imposed predominantly Fulani rule on the Hausa people, and with Fulani rule fundamentalist Islam on a partially Islamized populace. At the British conquest in 1904, only fifty-four per cent of the Hausa people were Muslim. An integral part of the *jihad* was the conquest of non-Muslim minority ethnic groups throughout what is now Nigeria’s Middle Belt. This was the *dar al-harb*, the abode of war regularly pillaged to supply the Muslim elite’s insatiable appetite for slaves. Raids were conducted, military outposts and colonial settlements constructed, and emirates created all to subjugate the non-Muslim peoples. Enslavement was integral to that process.

Thus, while the Atlantic slave trade was increasingly restricted, there was ever greater demand for slaves within Africa, to meet the growing demand posed by legitimate trade in various agricultural products as well as the demands of Islamic rulers. Slavery was the prescribed way of dealing with unbelievers, as well as reflecting racist attitudes inherent to Islam. Azumah writes, “Muslims right across

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71 Azumah, p.76.


73 Azumah, p. 90.


75 Logams, pp.34 – 42 argues post-jihadic societies systematised and exploited the pre-jihadic Hausa practice of capturing slaves from traditionalist Middle Belt groups. Zaria and Bauchi raided for slaves in turn supplying other cities such as Kano. Slavery was the key to Islamic states’ prosperity.

ethnic, racial, and geographical boundaries, like the Christian West, had a systematic religious and racist justification for enslavement.  

Raiding parties captured both Hausa Muslims as well as traditionalists from other ethnic groups, killing those who were unusable due to age or gender, and transporting the remainder long distances, the slave caravans being characterised by high mortality rates. Surviving populations suffered catastrophic decline: during the eighty-year rule of the Nagwamatse family in Kontagora the population is estimated to have declined from about one million to about thirty thousand. In addition, as slaves adopted Islam in order to survive in their new context, so the faith grew. Across West Africa, the areas of greatest Islamic concentration are also the areas where jihadic slave-raiding states ruled.

Some examples illustrate the situation.

a. Salau argues that Kano’s capture by the jihadic forces in 1807 resulted in dramatic increases in slavery. From no significant mention of slavery in 1800, by the 1850s European explorers estimated that up to half the population were slaves. Not only did Islam permit slavery but also the very act of extending Islam through the jihads and consolidation of Islamic rule led to significant rises in the city’s slave population. The slave trade itself grew. By 1862 between 2,500 and 3,000 slaves were displayed for sale daily. Even with re-export, a considerable number remained within the city and inevitably, the city became increasingly dependent on them, not only on plantations but also in manufacturing, civil service, and military roles. Overall, slavery in Kano was typical of slavery in the Sokoto Caliphate.

b. Bagirmi, a state south of Lake Chad, and onetime vassal of Borno, also engaged in the slave trade. Capturing slaves in southern non-Muslim areas, they retained some for domestic and agricultural use, transporting the remainder across the Sahara with caravans transporting slaves as far as

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77 Azumah, p.117.
78 Azumah, pp.147 – 150.
79 For Azumah’s discussion of Muslim slavery across Africa see pp.109 – 169.
81 Citing Lovejoy, P.E., Transformations in Slavery. A history of slavery in Africa, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1983., pp.184 – 96 Azumah notes about 50% of Kano province were slaves with up to 95% of Kano City being slaves, p.152.
Tripoli and Benghazi. Such slaves often ended up in the Ottoman Empire, or in Egypt. La Rue notes this was a difficult passage with high losses. In 1846, a caravan arriving in Benghazi from Waddai had taken 5 months to deliver 1000 slaves, but lost 2000 slaves, camels, and merchandise to the desert. Alternatively, slaves served, either as porters, or as commodities, to help finance a Muslim’s pilgrimage to Mecca. LaRue estimates up to 290,000 slaves were sent through Central Sudan to North Africa during the nineteenth century. Lovejoy thinks, “a half-million or more slaves were involved with this traffic.”

c. Kolapo, in discussing Nupe jihadic activity closely aligns Islamic motivation with on-going military conquest. This was carried out at the behest of the Sokoto Caliphate with Caliph Muhammad Bello recorded as promising the English land for a town on the, as yet unconquered, coast as “God had given me the land of the infidels.”

The slave trade enriched the Islamic states of the Sokoto Caliphate and Borno Empire. It enfeebled and oppressed the non-Muslim peoples to their south. It also served to unite the oppressed against their oppressor. Working together in ad hoc federations or in military alliances, they fought off the invaders. While these alliances did not last, the common experience of subjugation, attack, and enslavement has not been forgotten. As Logams argues:

By 1900 therefore, most of the unconquered M-Belt groups, identified themselves as culturally distinct and as non-Muslim and non-Fulani, different from the pale-skinned, masked Fulani invader and slaver on horseback. Both the conquered and unconquered of the M-Belt group, saw themselves differently from the slave raiders and as victims of the externally induced Fulani (cattle owners) wars. . . the experience, among the victims of the Fulani raids in the 19th century, created the conditions for the creation of a common M-Belt identity over colonial rule in the 20th century.

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85 Lovejoy, 1983, p.150
Thus, the roots of current political and religious tensions go back to this time, and to
the non-Muslims' subsequent experience both of British pro-Fulani colonial rule, and
the work of Christian missionary organizations.

1.1 Lugard’s Promises

In 1901 SIM’s missionary party met Col. Lugard, the British commander, and future
High Commissioner, who was in the process of conquering Northern Nigeria. He
helped them travel up the River Niger and start a mission base at Pategi among the
Nupe.

Having conquered the country, Lugard had to govern on a tight budget with a
minimum of expatriate personnel. Up until World War Two British policy presumed
that colonial territories were self-financing. Territories were acquired more to exploit
resources and provide markets, than from any desire for investment and
development opportunities. Boer asserts, “the basic and primary motive for the
colonial enterprise was economic.” Initially Britain had tried to secure its trading
interests through treaties between chiefs and emirs on the one hand, and on the
other with the Royal Niger Company, which, with a grant of a royal charter combined
both commercial and colonial interests. When this approach could not respond
quickly enough to Franco-German rivalry the Colonial Office agreed to full-scale
colonisation.

Secondly, Britain had acquired responsibility for a large number of Muslims.
Suspicious of British intentions, they resented conquest by infidels, and assumed that
they would be forced to convert to Christianity. In addition, the whole Sahelian belt
was plagued by repeated bouts of Mahdism, the most notorious of which led to the
death of General Gordon of Khartoum in 1884. The reverberations of that event
spread across the continent with extensive links between Khartoum and Sokoto.
Colonial conquest heightened Mahdist expectations. The French had quelled
uprisings, and in 1906, the Satiru uprising just outside Sokoto greatly alarmed the

89 They called themselves the African Industrial Mission following current thinking that agricultural
projects were a way of supporting missionaries and providing an alternative economic base to society.
Later they merged briefly with Karl Kumm’s Sudan United Mission before reverting to their original
Sudan Interior Mission.
90 Bingham, 1943, pp.31 – 32.
91 Boer, J.H., Missionary Messengers of Liberation in a Colonial Context, Rodopi, Amsterdam, 1979,
p.45.
92 Mahdism refers to the Muslim expectation of the return of Jesus as Messiah.
British making them extremely wary of anything that might encourage a Mahdist uprising.\textsuperscript{93} This included Christian missionary work.\textsuperscript{94}

It was vital, therefore, that the British secure the cooperation of the Fulani elite who had ruled the Sokoto Caliphate. Without such they could not hope to secure colonial rule, nor effectively administer the region. Lugard outlined his policies in a speech in Sokoto in 1903 at Sultan Attahiru’s installation.\textsuperscript{95} After declaring that Fulani political rights now belonged to the British, Lugard stated:

Every Sultan and Emir and the principal officers of State will be appointed by the High Commissioner throughout all this country. . . The Emirs and Chiefs who are appointed will rule over the people as of old time and take such taxes as are approved by the High Commissioner, but they will obey the laws of the Governor and will act in accordance with the advice of the Resident. Buying and selling slaves and enslaving people are forbidden. . . All men are free to worship God as they please. Mosques and prayer places will be treated with respect by us.\textsuperscript{96}

Thus, Lugard set out the three strands of his socio-religious policies. The first was the institution of Indirect Rule. Adopted from British territories in Asia and the South Pacific it was refined and turned into “the structure of government for Northern Nigeria.”\textsuperscript{97} Instead of replacing the Fulani ruling elite, he co-opted them. True, they had to obey the Resident’s wishes in their decisions, and the British would introduce considerable change to criminal justice and taxation systems. Nevertheless, within these bounds there would be considerable scope for advancing their own interests.

There were too many minority ethnic groups for the British to learn their languages and cultures. Some of these ethnic groups had been conquered by the emirates and were reconciled to living under Hausa-Fulani control. Others continued to struggle for their independence, with the emirs making unsubstantiated claims. Finally, there


\textsuperscript{95} While recognising the Sokoto ruler’s pre-eminence among the emirs, the British changed his title from Caliph to Sultan and restricted his formal powers to his own sultanate.

\textsuperscript{96} Crowder, p.184. Colonial office-holders’ titles periodically changed. The senior official in Northern Nigeria was initially the High Commissioner. Structures below him consisted of a Resident who ran each province, assisted by District Officers (D.O.) and Assistant District Officers (A.D.O.). Professional advisers operated alongside this main power structure.

were ethnic groups that had maintained their independence from all external control. “What Lugard did in these different cases was to be of great importance in their subsequent social and religious history.”\textsuperscript{98} He opted for as little change as possible. It was far easier, in Northern Nigeria, to work through and promote Hausa, the language of the main ethnic group. Language, of course, conveys culture, and thus Islam began to spread as Hausa spread, both through fugitive slaves returning home and as Muslim Hausa traders flourished under the Pax Britannica.\textsuperscript{99}

Many of the Fulani elite were literate in Arabic, and thus able to assist in the bureaucracy of colonial rule. Soon Muslims were appointed as District Heads over non-Muslim ethnic groups, accountable to various emirs, who in turn took advantage of the situation by extending claims to rule over vast swathes of territory far beyond what they had practically been able to control prior to the British conquest. Of course, British utilisation of Muslim rulers, while not formally endorsing the spread of Islam, signalled traditionalists that Islam was the way ahead.\textsuperscript{100}

Secondly, Lugard prohibited the slave trade, whether through purchasing or through capturing slaves, and abolished the legal status of slaves. He did not prohibit the ownership of slaves. “At the time of the colonial conquest (1897-1903) the Sokoto Caliphate had a huge slave population, certainly in excess of 1 million and perhaps more than 2.5 million people”.\textsuperscript{101} By contrast, the United States had 4 million slaves in 1860 while Brazil had 1.5 million in 1888. Sokoto was one of the world’s largest slave owning economies. Slavery was integral to its economy. British policy had sought to abolish slavery since the first official encounters between Britain and the Sokoto Caliphate in the 1820s. A combination of rhetoric, correspondence, treaties and the promotion of “legitimate trade” had tried to wean the Caliphate away from the practice. All to little or no avail.\textsuperscript{102} Under the guise of furthering the cause of anti-slavery, the Royal Niger Company, Britain’s representative in Nigeria had attacked the Caliphate’s outlying states.\textsuperscript{103} In 1900 when the Colonial Office took over

\begin{footnotes}
\item[98] Crampton, p.52.
\item[99] Boer, 1979, p.73.
\item[100] Logams, pp.85 – 99 discusses Indirect Rule’s permutations depending on the extent of individual officials’ pro-Fulani biases; anthropological knowledge; political differences within the colonial administration, and financial pressures. Cf. Nwanaju, pp.89 – 93.
\item[101] Lovejoy, & Hogendorn, 1993, p.1.
\item[102] At the Berlin Conference (1884 – 1885), the British distinguished between their commitment to abolish slavery in colonies, and slavery in protectorates which required slower reform. This protected them from criticism by anti-slavery interests and gave freedom to decide the pace of anti-slavery actions in any protectorate – which Northern Nigeria became at the end of the century. Lovejoy & Hogendorn, 1993, pp.13 – 14.
\item[103] Lovejoy & Hogendorn, 1993, pp.10 – 19.
\end{footnotes}
responsibility for Northern Nigeria, a prime declared justification for continued attacks on the Caliphate was to stop the slave trade: both the retailing of slaves in towns as well as the forwarding of tribute slaves to Sokoto.\textsuperscript{104} This was what Lugard abolished in his declaration in Sokoto.

To abolish slavery itself, however, would have led to severe economic distress and probably the complete alienation of the Fulani elite. Colonialist rhetoric vilified the Fulani elite as alien oppressors of the indigenous masses; colonialist practice relied on them to run the country. Nor would abolition have provided a constructive alternative source of employment for many of the slaves. Those born into slavery, or captured when very young knew of no other life. In many cases, they would have felt a strong sense of allegiance to their masters. Older slaves were quite capable of escaping on their own, and the abolition of the legal status of slavery severely hindered slave owners recapturing them.\textsuperscript{105} Many tried to follow Lugard, for example, as he left Sokoto, but he could not afford to encourage them.\textsuperscript{106} Converting the economy from dependence on slave labour would take time. Thus, despite abolishing the slave trade, as the British consolidated their hold over the country they actually slowed down slavery’s disappearance. Until society’s economic basis was reconstructed, it was impossible to abolish slavery entirely. Slave owners were held accountable for the treatment of their slaves with the possibility of ill-treated slaves being freed, but they would not be penalised for owning slaves. Still, slaves, sensing the possibility of freedom, bargained for better terms and conditions, or melted away in increasing numbers.\textsuperscript{107}

The fear was that missionaries would view this issue in starkly moralistic terms. Their argument was that slavery was immoral and should be abolished immediately. Therefore, to allow missionaries to reside in these far northern emirates would only open up colonial rule to criticism on that score. Thus:

- The few missionaries who might have influenced public opinion back home in Britain were kept out of the way as much as possible, and they proved to be

\begin{footnotes}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{104} Boer, 1979, p.65 suggests Lugard conquered Northern Nigeria relatively easily because the indigenous population was about "to stir against the authoritarian regimes of the foreign Fulanis."
\item \textsuperscript{105} Lovejoy & Hogendorn 1993, estimate that about 10% of slaves did run away over the decade long British conquest of Northern Nigeria. This probably meant 200,000 in total, but the longevity of the time period meant minimal economic and social effects.
\item \textsuperscript{106} Lovejoy & Hogendorn, 1993, pp.45 – 46.
\item \textsuperscript{107} Jumare, I.M., ‘The Late Treatment of Slavery in Sokoto: Background and Consequences of the 1936 Proclamation,’ \textit{The International Journal of African Historical Studies}, Vol. 27, No. 2, 1994, pp. 303 - 322 discusses Sokoto slavery’s decline through the introduction of a wage economy.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotes}
relatively quiet on the slavery issue anyway…. Neither the "abolitionist" military officers nor the missionaries had any significant influence on developments.\textsuperscript{108}

Lugard, familiar with Islamic law from his East African experience, wanted to use the Islamic court system and Shari’ah law to control slave emancipation ensuring that slaves were enabled to purchase their freedom. From his experience in Kenya, he felt that missionaries would interfere in this process, and thus he wished to restrict them from settlement in Islamic territory.\textsuperscript{109}

Thirdly, Lugard guaranteed religious toleration. The British would not insist on the conversion of Muslims to Christianity. This attracted the appreciation of his listeners. However, it was to prove controversial. Lugard, the child of an Anglican clergyman and his CMS missionary wife, had departed from his Evangelical upbringing and tended to identify Christianity with the extension of western or specifically British civilisation. “Lugard believed the imperial mission to be a divine one.”\textsuperscript{110} When missionaries’ work assisted in those aims, he was accommodating and helpful.

The definition of religious toleration quickly became controversial. As Ubah points out, missionaries understood toleration differently from the emirs. The latter held it to mean non-interference with another’s religion, but not granting the freedom to proselytise. The former argued that it implied that the colonial government would be religiously neutral ensuring that both religions could advance their causes equally.\textsuperscript{111}

Paramount to Lugard’s thinking was preserving the white man’s position. The only way the small colonial contingent could remain in power was to always bolster the mystique of the white man. Missionaries might protest that they did not need or want colonial protection, and many of them had been in Nigeria prior to colonisation and preceded the colonial advance. Any attack on a white missionary,\textsuperscript{112} however, was an attack on all of the white people requiring a suitably harsh response from the colonial authorities. This Lugard did not have the means to do. Nor could he alienate the emirs whose help he needed in administering the territory. “The ruling classes of Northern Nigeria were the ones that most interested Lugard, and his policy of

\textsuperscript{108} Lovejoy & Hogendorn, 1993, p.32.
\textsuperscript{109} Lovejoy & Hogendorn, 1993, pp.99 – 101. Missionary advance into the far North was only permitted shortly before the final outlawing of slavery in 1935, by which time slavery had almost completely died out.
\textsuperscript{110} Faught, p.157.
\textsuperscript{111} Ubah, 1976, pp.357 - 358.
\textsuperscript{112} Ubah notes the emirs understood one of their key roles was to protect Islam. The British conquest heightened their fears for Islam. British fears of Mahdism served to heighten these concerns. 1976, pp.352 – 354. Note also Boer, 1979, p.70.
religious neutrality was designed to ensure their continued cooperation.”¹¹³ For the sake of the entire colonial enterprise in Northern Nigeria missionaries had to be restrained.¹¹⁴ Instead of permitting them to work in the Muslim emirates, they were encouraged to take up work among traditionalists instead.

1.2 Different Visions
Lugard’s first term of office in Nigeria concluded in 1906.¹¹⁵ As he left, the missionaries expressed their appreciation of his rule. After he left, however, colonial-missionary relationships deteriorated. At the heart of this deterioration seems to have been a deep antipathy towards missionaries and their message on the part of most colonial officials and the Colonial Office on the one hand, and, on the other hand, considerable misjudgement by the missionaries about the extent of Muslim opposition to the Christian faith.¹¹⁶

Late Victorian England saw debate about whether Islam or Christianity was better suited for Africans. David Livingstone, in his speech at Cambridge University in 1857, publicly linked commerce and Christianity with the civilisation of Africa.¹¹⁷ As Stanley points out, Livingstone did not originate the idea but reflected the thinking of many contemporary evangelicals, albeit with a deep distrust of commercial exploitation. British imperialism entailed obligations to those of its subjects not blessed with membership of a white “Christian” culture. It was then axiomatic that African traditionalists were the most benighted of all peoples. As British power extended, however, it came into increasing contact with various Muslim states. Indeed British conquests in India and Africa led to Queen Victoria ruling over more Muslims than any other sovereign. Thus:

The . . . notion that Islam could be a stepping-stone to Christianity for the African conflated two hierarchical systems: the ranking of races that had become a mainstay of late-Victorian anthropology, and the charting by cultural anthropologists of religious systems on a line of “progress” or “development” that

¹¹³ Faught, p.160.
¹¹⁵ He returned in 1912 to oversee the unification of British territories. Nigeria came into being on 1st January 1914. However, Crampton argues that Colonial Office interference prevented Lugard’s plans for a unified administration coming to fruition. Different policies were implemented in southern and northern Nigeria, p.57.
¹¹⁶ Disputing this Andrew Barnes argues that in reality Lugard was the author of the missionaries’ woes with his successors guilty more of the undue prolongation and overly rigid application of his policies. He cites Bingham as twice complaining about Lugard’s policies in 1907 and 1919. Cf. Barnes, A.E., Making Headway: The Introduction of Western Civilization in Colonial Northern Nigeria (Rochester Studies in African History and the Diaspora), University of Rochester Press, Rochester, NY, 2009, pp. 114 – 127.
moved unequivocally upward from "primitive" animism to "civilized spiritual monotheism".\textsuperscript{118}

Walls observed how Reginald Bosworth Smith inserted Islam into this religious hierarchy arguing that all religions are essentially moral and not theological in origin. “They have come into existence to meet social and national moral needs. They raise humanity gradually towards God.”\textsuperscript{119} As a moral religion, and as a faith deemed ideally adapted to tropical climes, Smith believed Islam was beneficial, and Christianity’s ally in raising African traditionalists towards monotheism’s civilizational benefits.

This was not to say that Islam was true, not to say that Islam was the highest religion, and certainly not to say that it had any relevance to Western society. All questions of truth claims could be by-passed; the administrative convenience was that the general tendency of Islam was, or could be, socially elevating.\textsuperscript{120}

Smith was not alone. Prominent among other advocates of these views was Edward Wilmot Blyden, an extremely well read former West Indian missionary to Liberia. He supported Smith’s views by arguing for the advantages of Islam and the harmful effects of a Westernised Christian faith in Africa. Walls points out, however, that it was Smith’s views, and especially his sociology, that appealed “to a great deal of the educated British public opinion forming Smith’s audience, opinion that created the climate in which administrative decisions were made.”\textsuperscript{121}

Missionaries disagreed, rejecting the developmentalism and cultural relativism of Victorian social sciences. Islam was static and regressive not progressive. Christology was central to their argument. They argued that Islam did not have a means of atonement comparable to that provided by Christ; that a comparison of the divine Jesus with the human Muhammad merely served to highlight the latter’s failings, and that, given Muhammad’s failings, the religious rituals he instituted were empty, meaningless and unable to provide a basis in moral law. Thus, Islam was not a means for the advancement of African traditionalists for it did not address their deepest spiritual and moral needs. Indeed Islam’s very success was due to its encouragement of evil and its lack of moral demands of its converts. Islamic acceptance of polygamy, its violent expansionary tendencies together with enslavement of those conquered merely served as examples of its lack of morality. It

\textsuperscript{120} Walls, 2002, pp.148 – 149.
\textsuperscript{121} Walls, 2002, p.150.
surely was the responsibility of a Christian society to use its imperial power to deliver people from such.\textsuperscript{122}

It was not to be. A combination of commercially motivated imperialism, resurgent Islam and the growing popularity of evolutionary science undermined the rapidly expanding missionary movement. Funding became difficult as evangelical self-assurance in the face of the new challenges at home and abroad diminished.\textsuperscript{123} For those who accepted Smith and Blyden’s views, the way ahead was to divorce missions from imperialism allowing each to move at their own pace. The missionary movement did not agree, continuing to hold to its condemnation of Islam. However, their views became increasingly irrelevant. As Walls points out, “The intellectual position of Christianity, the axiomatic character of its benefit to society, could no longer be taken for granted.”\textsuperscript{124}

Hence, Barnes’ analysis of the colonial officials versus missionaries conflict in Northern Nigeria.\textsuperscript{125} He argues that up until the late 1920s colonial officials opposed most missionaries for three main reasons. Firstly, they objected to the effects of missionary evangelism. The popularity of Christianity seemed to reflect more converts’ rebellion against local traditions and obligations than genuine conversion. Converts were disobedient, insubordinate, and hypocritical. The missionaries’ failure to supervise their converts to ensure that they became fitting members of the society the colonial officials were wishing to create aggravated the tensions. In part these views were racist, but as mentioned above they also reflected the colonial linking of religion with culture and especially the missionaries’ teaching of the equality of all races. Barnes believes that Lugard, for all of his personal sympathies with CMS missionaries, agreed with these views believing that Christianity was “too intellectual for the comprehension of members of the ‘tropical’ races”.\textsuperscript{126} Islam was much more suitable. While it could never rise to the level of Christianity, it catered more suitably to the spiritual, physical, and social needs of the African and made the convert to Islam a much better subject.

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{122} Prasch, pp.60 – 69.
\bibitem{123} Hence SIM’s commencement. Bingham, 1943, pp.13, 18.
\bibitem{124} Walls, 2002, p.151.
\bibitem{126} Barnes, 1995, p.426.
\end{thebibliography}
Secondly, Barnes highlights the colonial officials’ very strong anti-missionary social prejudices. Most missionaries were viewed as ill-educated, unprofessional, relatively unsuccessful, and, the Americans among them were viewed as fundamentalist and fanatical. They lacked social graces, common sense, and self-discipline. By contrast, the colonial officials tended to be products of British public schools and of Oxford and Cambridge universities.127

Thirdly, most missionaries had entirely different goals to the colonialists. The latter wanted social change – a disciplined obedient workforce, reliable taxpayers, medical care, properly supervised schools that taught practical skills as well as literacy. Some missionaries did this and were praised for their achievements. Other organisations concentrated on evangelism, seemingly without much success, and were heavily criticised for wasting time, effort and resources.

Did the missionaries themselves really understand the extent of Muslim elite opposition? Writing of Muslim reactions to the failed CMS Sudan Party, Ayandele states, “that the Muslims had implacable contempt for kafiris, as they termed the ‘unbelievers’.”128 Ubah argues that missionaries under-estimated the opposition of the emirs to Christianity. The failure of Tugwell’s group in 1900 to secure permission from the Emir of Kano to set up a CMS mission station in Kano was entirely consistent with this opposition.129 When missionaries were allowed to enter Muslim areas in the mid 1930s their anticipated fruitful evangelism yielded limited results.

Tugwell’s recklessness130 forced Lugard to restrict the work of missionaries further ensuring that no evangelistic work was permitted in Muslim emirates without colonial permission. Missionaries were directed instead to traditionalist areas. When the time was ripe, they were promised they would be allowed to enter Muslim-ruled territory. Simultaneously, however, the colonialists were telling Muslim emirs that the missions were prohibited. They were trying to avoid trouble by telling each side what they wanted to hear.

A range of conflicts between the missionaries and the government marked the next twenty years. As mentioned above, the conquered inhabitants of colonial Northern

127 Crampton, p.59 – 60 notes colonial officials resenting missionaries’ influence on local people and missionary ability to publicise colonial mistakes and misdemeanours.
128 Ayandele, p.121.
130 Despite agreeing to keep Lugard informed of their travel intentions and to accept Lugard’s advice on where it was safe to go, he had proceeded to Kano from Zaria without securing Lugard’s agreement.
Nigeria could be classified into three distinct groups. Firstly, those who were historically Islamicised: originally conquered by the emirs and if not Hausa Muslims were in the process of being assimilated into Muslim Hausa culture. Secondly, those who remained traditionalist even though an emir claimed to rule over them. Many of these groups in central Nigeria were distinct from the Hausa Muslims and their Fulani rulers. However, included among this second category was a large grouping of Hausa traditionalists, known as the Maguzawa, who lived among the Hausa Muslims, and were ruled by the Fulani. Thirdly, those people who clearly were traditionalist. No Muslim emir could easily claim authority over them. It was to this last group that the colonial authorities directed the missionaries. However, it was over the first two groups that the conflicts arose. Not only did the missions want access to Muslims but also they were extremely concerned at the effects of Muslim domination over non-Muslims. The emirs made expansive claims to sovereignty over territories they had little effective control over. With the more effective British administration, such claims were now enforced requiring non-Muslims to adopt Islam in order to ensure fair and just treatment. The net result was the extension of Islam. Ubah writes that:

British policy passed through two main phases. The first phase lasted from the beginning of colonial rule to the 1920s. During this period little or no account was taken of non-Muslim interests in the formulation and execution of colonial policy. The dominant consideration was the interests of the emirates and those interests aided Islamization. The second phase began in the 1930s and lasted through the rest of the colonial period. It was characterised by a re-examination of the existing policy for the purpose of taking the identity of non-Muslims into account in the administration processes.\[131\]

Ubah argues Lugard used Islamic government institutions to extend Islamic rule over non-Muslim areas. While Lugard was mainly seeking effective administration, his successors made Islamization deliberate policy. It was only with the appointment of Sir Donald Cameron as the Governor of Nigeria in 1931 that a reappraisal of this policy began. Cameron wanted to preserve the traditional cultures of non-Muslims as much as possible.\[132\]

Boer\[133\] highlights a number of the bureaucratic obstacles missionaries faced. These included deliberately raising the profile of Muslim Hausa culture through strategic placing of Muslim administrative officials, open discrimination against Nigerian

\[132\] Officials with stakes in preserving Islamic administrations undertook the reappraisals. Aligned with the emirs, contemptuous of traditionalists and manipulating Cameron’s instructions to achieve their goals, it was easy to ensure the maintenance of the status quo.
Christians, and imposing Muslim chiefs and judges over traditionalists who for years had rejected Muslim rule. Missionaries encountered such measures as declaring an area unsettled thus prohibiting missionaries from working in the area, and the 440-yard rule prohibiting missionaries from living close to Nigerian towns and villages. They also had to deal with restrictive, unreasonably short leases preventing mission station development and carrying out missionary work at sites leased to them, restrictions on the stationing of single missionary women, and undue bureaucratic delays in permitting new missionary stations. It seemed that there was one rule for missionaries and another for other white expatriates, as commercial traders or civil servants were not so constrained. Underlying these restrictions was colonial anti-missionary prejudice. Barnes describes H.R. Palmer, the Lieutenant Governor of Northern Nigeria in 1926, as “the most adamant opponent of any missionary presence in the Muslim territories of the province.”

A key area of conflict was education. In Southern Nigeria, in the absence of other formal educational provision, missions ran many schools. Children attending these schools often converted to the proprietor’s faith – it was a quick, effective means of evangelism and of changing worldviews. Northern Nigeria, by contrast, had about 25,000 Qur’anic schools. The challenge for colonial officials was how to provide education. Walter Miller, the CMS missionary in Zaria made some initial suggestions but he was distrusted by Lugard’s successors. They recruited Hans Vischer, a Swiss who had formerly been a CMS missionary, to pioneer a secular educational system. Vischer made a slow start opening some schools in 1909 near Kano and developing a number of elementary schools catering for elite children. Eventually Katsina College commenced in 1922. Ostensibly, a teacher training college, it provided the highest level of training available in Northern Nigeria. In 1928, another teacher

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134 Barnes, A.E., “Religious Insults”; Christian Critiques of Islam and the Government in Colonial Northern Nigeria,’ *Journal of Religion in Africa*, Vol. 34, Nos 1-2, 2004, p.67. Barnes, 2009, pp.114 – 127 goes further suggesting that such was anti-missionary bias that missionaries were deliberately steered towards the most difficult traditionalist groups where they would have least chance of evangelistic success but where they could be of most benefit to the government in provision of social services and representing government policies. Ultimately, this failed, because instead of relying on the spread of education to bring conversions as in Southern Nigeria, the missions in Northern Nigeria stressed itineration thus enabling the Christian faith to develop in ways the government had not anticipated. Nor were the missions restricted by bureaucratic obstacles and government bias resorting when necessary to clandestine evangelistic tours.

135 Crampton, p.98.

training college at Toro was established to provide an inferior education to young traditionalists. Barnes summarises the policy in the following terms:

A striking example of educational policy serving to give focus to broader schemes of cultural engineering can be seen in colonial Northern Nigeria, where the British government sought to encapsulate in an education program for the region’s Muslim elite the social processes perceived to have contributed to the formation of elite values in the graduates of England’s public schools. The government hoped that the students who emerged from the Northern Nigerian school system would provide the leading edge for a modern and aristocratic Anglo-Muslim civilization. The successful creation of an autocratic civilization would in turn preclude the need for Christian missionaries and their African converts would not need to introduce bourgeois values into the region.\(^{137}\)

Missions were initially not interested in education, wanting instead to focus on direct evangelism. Literacy and basic numeracy was sufficient for them. For this, Classes for Religious Instruction (CRI’s), and eventually some elementary schools opened.\(^{138}\) Gradually, and often because of Nigerian pressure, the missions began to shift their focus and develop educational institutions.

Two educational reports undercut the colonial government’s educational policies. The first of these, published in 1922, was the Phelps-Stokes Commission’s *Education in Africa*.\(^{139}\) This American-sponsored international commission examined educational provision across Africa and was severely critical of the lack of Government educational investment, and the resulting low standards. The second is the 1927 *Fraser Report*. Fraser slated the northern educational system as intellectually backward, staffed by incompetents, inefficient, expensive and harming the educational development of traditionalists. To help remedy the situation, Fraser suggested using missionary societies in the provision of social services both in traditionalist areas and in Muslim emirates. However, Governor Thomson’s goal was not to open the emirates to missions but to unify the educational departments under his control. Using Fraser’s report to secure Colonial Office support, he achieved this under E.R.J. Hussey’s leadership. Nevertheless, Fraser’s Report provided a chink of light. As Barnes writes:

From the governorship of Thomson onward, government policy in Northern Nigeria was to turn toward the missions for social services. In the context of establishing hospitals, orphanages, leper colonies and schools, missions came to


\(^{138}\) As political activity developed in the 1950s, the government accused CRI’s of being hotbeds of political activity.

\(^{139}\) Taiwo, pp. 65 – 74.
provide an increasingly more vital contribution to the health and welfare of local peoples.\textsuperscript{140}

The missionaries fought back in a variety of ways. Growing increasingly restive with the restrictions, they agitated for the lifting of the restrictions. Joint missionary conferences protested. At times public opinion in Britain and Canada was alerted to the worst of colonial abuses.\textsuperscript{141} In June 1927 J.H. Oldham, the secretary of the International Council of Missions led a delegation of mission societies to meet Thomson in London. This resulted in Thomson committing the colonial government to educating the emirs in the principles of religious tolerance. Neither side was satisfied. Missionaries, who thought they had won, protested the slow pace of any change. Colonial administrators resented perceiving to have lost the argument.\textsuperscript{142} However, Thomson’s commitment brought no concrete changes: missions were still refused entry to the emirates. In 1929 at a joint missionary conference at Miango, SIM’s Rowland Bingham finally lost his patience threatening to preach openly in Kano marketplace.\textsuperscript{143} Any subsequent arrest would draw the world’s attention to Northern Nigeria’s lack of religious freedom. Bingham was dissuaded from his threat and another meeting was arranged by Oldham with incoming Governor Sir Donald Cameron.\textsuperscript{144} This resulted in the gradual opening of the emirates for both ordinary evangelistic mission stations and medical work. By 1936 SIM, for example, began taking responsibility for leprosy treatment in Kano, Katsina, Sokoto, Ilorin, and Bauchi Provinces.

Relations still required sensitive management. Missions promised to post their best missionaries to the north thus assuaging government fears. There were still considerable disagreements concerning just how much freedom missions would

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\item[140] Barnes, 1997, p.219.
\item[141] Bingham, R.V., ‘Britain’s Crisis in Missionary Policy,’ EC, June 1919.
\item[142] Barnes argues that Thomson was still not permitting missionary evangelism although he was opening the door to missionary provision of social services. See Boer, Appendix IX, 1979, pp.499 – 500 for Dawson, a British SUM missionary’s account of this meeting. See also Barnes, 2009, pp. 161 – 165.
\item[143] Crampton, pp.62 – 64. cf Boer, ‘Historic Memorandum Presented to the Missionary Conference at Miango when the Subject of Relationship of Missions to Government was under Consideration,’ Appendix X, 1979, pp. 500 – 504 for full text of Bingham’s speech. Harold Fuller (personal correspondence, 5th December 2007) believes SIM’s low profile was due to political sensitivities and a belief that prayer resolved everything. He wrote, “Ian Hay and we were among the "young Turks," many of us war veterans, who were bold in tackling perceived government wrong.” Bingham’s threat is thus the more sensational: it was alien to SIM’s modus operandi. Cf. Hay, I.M., A Study of the Relationship between SIM International and the Evangelical Missionary Society, unpublished D.Miss. project, Trinity International University, 1984, p.29 for Harold Ogilvie’s recollection.
\item[144] Ubah, C.N., ‘Christian Missionary Penetration of the Nigerian Emirates: the Medical Works Approach,’ West African Religions, Vol. XX, Nos. 1 / 2 (1983), 1983 pp. 3 – 16. This suggests Cameron was able to interpret previous government statements more freely given H.R. Palmer’s retirement, Cameron’s determination to set out his own policies, and fears that further anti-missionary resistance would open the way for the missionary lobby in Britain to force the British government to allow unrestricted access despite local objections.
\end{footnotes}
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actually have. Many restrictions continued, including a ban on public preaching in sensitive areas and on door-to-door evangelism, and each missionary working in the emirates had to have a specific permit to be there. Later government attempts to restrict SIM’s freedom to evangelise anyone under the age of 18 at their leprosaria almost caused SIM to give up leprosy work altogether.

1.3 Post World War Two
World War Two brought many changes to Nigeria. Exposed as never before to world opinion, Nigerians, many of whom fought in the Burma Campaign and experienced Indian nationalist agitation, returned home to lead in their own independence struggle.\footnote{Crowder, pp. 207 – 258; Falola T. & M.M. Heaton, A History of Nigeria, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2008, pp.136 – 157. Logams 2004, pp.365 – 439 suggests the initial impetus to organise politically in Benue and Plateau provinces came from ex-servicemen, later replaced by those educated in mission schools. Elsewhere church and mission-educated leaders took primary roles. The form of political agitation varied according to area with smaller ethnic groups tending to rely more on regional movements, and larger ethnic groups on “tribal” unions.}

Constitutional changes commenced with the Richards Constitution taking effect on the 1\textsuperscript{st} January 1947. It divided the country into three Regions. Each region had a consultative House of Assembly that sent delegates to the Legislative Council in Lagos. The Northern Region also had a House of Chiefs while its Assembly was called the House of Representatives. The Richards Constitution was soon attacked as Nigerian politicians wanted more power and each region was suspicious of the power other regions had. In 1951, the McPherson Constitution granted more regional autonomy and promoted the formation of political parties. This only lasted a year as southerners wanted independence by 1956, while northerners, conscious of their lack of trained personnel and fearful of being over-whelmed by better-educated southerners, resisted. Further conferences took place in London (1953) and Lagos (1954). The resulting Lyttleton Constitution distinguished more clearly between federal and regional powers. All powers not specifically designated as federal now rested with the regions. The same arrangements also held for the civil service and judiciary. Eastern and Western Regions obtained internal self-government in August 1957. Further negotiations led to the 1959 agreement to Nigerian independence. Northern self-government preceded this in March 1959. Independence came on 1\textsuperscript{st} October 1960. The Northern Peoples’ Congress (NPC), led by Sir Ahmadu Bello
gained a parliamentary majority and formed the first government headed by Sir Abubakar Tafewa Balewa.  

Missionaries were extremely apprehensive of these changes. Niels Kastfelt, commenting on the Danish Lutherans and their converts in Numan and Yola, describes the missionaries’ mood as very uncertain. Would they be allowed to stay after independence? What would happen to their institutions? Would they be nationalised? The church they had worked so hard to bring into being was young and needed stronger, better-qualified leaders. How would it face the challenges of nationalism, Islam, and communism? To meet these challenges the Danish missionaries redoubled their evangelism, developed their leadership training – now needed more than ever before both for church purposes and to provide the secular leadership the country would need - and moved further and faster on the path to church self-government.  

Underlying these changes lay a growing swell of backroom politicking as Nigerians began to engage politically and the British sought to prepare the country for independent rule, preferably under the Muslim Hausa-Fulani elite they always favoured. In particular, the CRI’s were suspected to be vehicles for political agitation rather than religious instruction. Restrictions were imposed on these, including refusing permission for new classes, and insisting on a quarterly European missionary inspection of each CRI. 

British and Fulani authorities also understood CRI’s to be potential centres for political unrest, in which the Christians were engaged in clandestine political activities. Colonialists felt missionaries were supporting young rebels who were using the classes as platforms for political activities. Missionaries denied interference in politics but warned against ignoring the young Western-educated men who were often encouraged by their elders to work for the interest of their communities. 

Naturally, missionaries sided with their converts. They knew them extremely well, and identified closely with their concerns. A couple of times they identified so closely that the British felt compelled, despite pressure from missionaries and churches in Nigeria, to expel a particular missionary.  

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146 Crowder, pp.224 – 258.  
Increasingly, however, the focus shifted to Nigerian Christians. They had a wider and longer perspective incorporating pre-colonial historical memories, as well as current social and political issues, of which the politically neutral missionaries were not always aware. The missionaries, through their schools and their Bible translation, had birthed movements that were proud of their ethnic heritage drawing parallels between it and the Old Testament. Now with their education each ethnic group had a link to other similar groups and the intellectual tools with which to approach a wider world.\(^{149}\) It was time for the missionaries to step back allowing Nigerian Christians to lead. Speaking about the SUM-related churches coming together in TEKAS, Kastfelt writes:

The new inter-ethnic and regional church organizations had great potential political importance. They provided the Christians with a regional organization which covered most of Northern Nigeria. During the early colonial period, when political parties were not allowed, the missionaries had built up a strong regional organization which the Christians could take over when the churches became independent. This was seen, first of all, in the close personal and organizational ties between many local branches of the various missionary societies, such as the Sudan United Mission, the Church of the Brethren Mission and the Sudan Interior Mission. Where the Muslims of Northern Nigeria were united by the Emirate structure and by the \textit{tariqas}, the Christians were now regionally united in the church organizations. And since most Christians in Northern Nigeria supported the same political parties in the 1950s, the SUM federation was organizationally very important to the Christians.\(^{150}\)

At the heart of the Christian approach to politics was the merging of religion and ethnicity. In a similar way to Islam’s merging of ethnicity and religion, the Christian faith had become integral to minority ethnic identities.\(^{151}\) Christians were not in the majority among the non-Muslim ethnic groups but because of their educational and religious links, they became the leaders in the growing political struggle to maintain cultural identity and autonomy. Thus they mirrored the Muslim struggle to extend the Hausa Islamic identity accompanied by allegiance to the emirs’ leadership.

The politics of religion and ethnicity was reflected differently in missionary and Nigerian Christian views. To the missionaries religion was the prime angle at most events. To the Nigerian Protestants, however, ethnicity was as important as religion. To them politics was a matter of religious and ethnic survival in the face of the Muslim threat of political domination, and this was much more important to them than the question of national independence. And they tried to promote their


\(^{150}\) Kastfelt, 1994, p.63. TEKAS is the Hausa acronym for Tarayya Ekklesiyoynin Kiristi a Sudan (Fellowship of Churches of Christ in the Sudan). It has since been renamed TEKAN with Nigeria substituting for Sudan.

religious and ethnic interests in various organisations – churches, ethnic associations and political parties.\textsuperscript{152}

From these ethnically based local politics developed larger political groupings. Eventually two predominantly Muslim based parties were established, the Northern Peoples’ Congress (NPC) representing the traditional Muslim Hausa-Fulani elite, and the Northern Elements Peoples’ Union (NEPU) representing a more radical approach to politics. Pre-independence Muslim political debate revolved around the Islamic religious heritage and the roles of traditional rulers. The NPC stressed the cleansing role of the 1804 Islamic \textit{jihad}, the unity of the North achieved by the \textit{jihad}, and Fulani leadership of the \textit{jihad} and as the North’s ruling class since. It argued for historical continuity between the Caliphate and its own rule. Ahmadu Bello, the NPC leader and a descendent of Usman dan Fodio, the first Sokoto Caliph, looked on colonial rule as an interruption in the natural order of things. For him the image of \textit{jihadic} conquest was still a potent political tool consolidating Islamic support. That image, however, also raised those regional and religious tensions that would eventually overwhelm the country and contribute to the outbreak of the Civil War.\textsuperscript{153}

For Northern Christians, the Middle Zone League (MZL) developed out of various other organisations in 1951. Initially greatly influenced by Christian views\textsuperscript{154}, post-1956 Logams argues, “Christianity did not feature as an issue in the political rhetoric of the leadership.”\textsuperscript{155} Various splits occurred until a reunion took place in 1955 under the name of United Middle Belt Congress (UMBC). It then went through a variety of other splits and alliances eventually allying with NEPU in the Northern Progressive Front in 1963.

The Willinks Commission was established to investigate the demands coming from across Nigeria for protection of minority rights, in particular for the creation of further


\textsuperscript{154} Logams accepts Christian leaders’ emphatic rejection that mission societies helped to directly fund early political developments but suggests that they indirectly facilitated their development through approving paid leave of absences, helping with communications, and assisting Nigerians in thinking through policies. Mission societies, he alleges, clearly knew what was going on, even if they were not physically present at meetings. While he refers to two representatives from the SIM Church, the majority of participants and political leaders were from the TEKAS, Roman Catholic, Anglican, and South African Dutch Reformed Mission churches. One’s own research failed to discover any SIM archival records or missionary recollections of SIM encouraging political involvement. Indeed overt political involvement is contrary to SIM’s ethos. Logams seems, therefore, to overstate his case. Cf. Logams, pp.467 – 647; H.W.Fuller, \textit{personal correspondent}, 20/01/2009; T. Geysbeek, \textit{personal correspondent}, 30/01/2009; I.M.Hay, \textit{personal correspondent}, 02/02/2009.

\textsuperscript{155} Logams, p.410.
regions or states to safeguard those rights. Those demands included the creation of a Middle Belt State for the non-Muslim ethnic groups across central Nigeria. Crampton points out that this was not a unanimous demand from Christians. Some feared religious persecution while others, with a stake in the status quo, argued against it. The demand for a Middle Belt State was strongly opposed by the British authorities and the NPC-controlled Northern Regional government. Its motto “One North, One People” saw Northern history as moving towards an Islamic Hausa-dominated unity, a total contrast to the minority ethnic groups struggle for independence.\textsuperscript{156} The Willinks Commission’s decision to deny the Middle Belt their own State prior to independence not only denied northern minorities their claims, but was also a factor leading to the First Republic’s eventual collapse.\textsuperscript{157} Those calling for further state creation eventually prevailed.\textsuperscript{158}

Ahmadu Bello reassured the churches and missions when he visited Jos just prior to independence. In his speech he said:

> I want to emphasise two things. Firstly, our Government is a Government of Northerners, both Moslems and Christians: we wish to allow all men to practise their religions as they wish. I should like to assure you that the Declaration I made on behalf of the Government last year holds good, and we mean it from the bottom of our hearts.

Crampton quotes the Declaration he made in 1957.

> Subject only to the requirements of the law and public order the Regional Government has no intention of favouring or advancing any religion at the expense of another. All persons in the Region are, as they have always been, absolutely at liberty to practise their beliefs, according to their conscience without fear or favour, let or hindrance within the limitations outlined above.\textsuperscript{159}

All that Bello asked was that Christians teach their youth to respect their elders, perhaps especially where Muslim traditional rulers reigned over largely non-Muslim or Christian subjects.

After independence, however, Bello began a series of missionary tours on behalf of Islam. Conscious of his ancestry, and aspiring to be Islam’s Nigerian leader, he made

\begin{footnotes}
\item[156] Kastfelt, 2007.
\item[157] Hon, S., ‘Restiveness in the Middle-Belt: Northern Minorities And the Crises to Come,’ \textit{Vanguard}, (August 4, 2004), \url{www.allAfrica.com} (DOA 14/09/04).
\item[159] Crampton, p.83.
\end{footnotes}
full use of his government position to advance Islam’s cause. In his missionary tours, he gave out substantial gifts to those willing to convert.  

In 1962, he established the Jama’atu Nasril Islamiyya (JNI) to coordinate Islam in the country. He actively participated as the World Muslim Congress’s vice-president and frequently travelled to Mecca. All served to give an impression that Bello’s government wished to promote Islam.

The January 1966 coup d’état ended Nigeria’s first civilian government. The reasons for the coup are complex including ethnic issues, the Western Region’s political turmoil, the Tiv riots, corruption, and religious tensions. The coup plotters did not succeed in establishing their rule, forced by General Ironsi, the top surviving military officer, to surrender power. His rule was short-lived. Shortly after altering Nigeria’s government from a federal to a unitary model, he was overthrown in a Northern-backed coup that installed as Head of State a young Major (later General) Yakubu Gowon. Gowon, a Northern Christian, led the country through the next nine years, including the civil war when Biafra, the former Eastern Region, unsuccessfully sought independence.

Coming on the back of the anti-Igbo pogroms across Northern Nigeria, the civil war was quickly interpreted by the mainly Roman Catholic Igbos as their “Christian” struggle against Muslim oppression. This view continues to attract support. At the time, it was not so obvious, with ethnicity regarded as more important. Gowon is a devout Anglican, and more than fifty per cent of the Nigerian Army’s soldiers were nominally Christians from Nigeria’s Middle Belt. Crampton cites an instance where a Muslim officer tried unsuccessfully to stop non-Muslim soldiers from firing on Igbo

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160 Using funds donated by wealthy Muslims in the Middle East. Falola suggests that this evangelistic campaign was primarily an attempt by the Muslim leaders to regain political and economic control of central Nigeria and thus retain control of the whole of Northern Nigeria. Cf. Falola, T., Violence in Nigeria, pp. 168 – 169.


refugees fleeing the riots in Kano.\textsuperscript{165} Logams attributes anti-Igbo actions in Jos to long-simmering resentments among workers in the tin mines.\textsuperscript{166}

Gowon was magnanimous to the defeated Biafrans. The division of the country into twelve states, announced at the beginning of the war, went ahead. With that, the powers of the traditional northern elite were seriously restricted as for the first time minority groups not just in the North, but across the country, were able to rule themselves.\textsuperscript{167} Gowon, unable to control his increasingly corrupt officials, was himself overthrown in a coup led by General Murtala Mohammed, assisted by Olusegun Obasanjo.\textsuperscript{168} In the six months before he died in an attempted counter-coup, Mohammed had a profound impact on Nigeria. His successor Obasanjo returned Nigeria to democratic rule in 1979.

Shehu Shagari was declared winner of the 1979 presidential election and so began Nigeria’s second experiment with civilian rule.\textsuperscript{169} While constitutional measures tried to ensure that the North could not totally dominate any future government Shagari’s regime’s core support was from the same constituency Ahmadu Bello had depended on. It was a time of growing problems, not least when religious riots began with the Maitatsine outbreaks in several Nigerian cities.\textsuperscript{170} So began the cycle of violence that this paper seeks to examine.\textsuperscript{171}

Shortly after being re-elected in an election in which religion was a prominent factor,\textsuperscript{172} Shagari was overthrown in a coup d’état on 31\textsuperscript{st} December 1983.\textsuperscript{173} For the next twenty months, General Muhammadu Buhari’s military regime tried to instil a

\textsuperscript{165} Crampton, p.91. Cf Fuller, W.H., \textit{To SIM Personnel in West Africa}, September 1967, SIMA NG Box 87 File 2.
\textsuperscript{166} Logams, p.614.
\textsuperscript{167} See Falola, T., \textit{Violence in Nigeria}, pp.56 – 57 for a survey of Gowon’s rule.
\textsuperscript{169} Onabamiro, pp. 174 – 177.
\textsuperscript{172} Adogame, 2005. Nwanaju, pp. 259 – 264 charts how excessive corruption and Islamising policies combined to bring about the start of Nigeria’s economic decline.
sense of public discipline in Nigeria. His unpopularity paved the way for his overthrow by General Ibrahim Babangida in August 1985. “Maradona” as Babangida was soon nicknamed, for his political dribbling skills, was in power during some of the worst inter-ethnic and religious riots. The violence only worsened when Obasanjo returned to power in May 1999, this time as a civilian president facing the challenge of the declaration of Shari’ah law in northern Muslim states.\textsuperscript{174}

Between 1980 and 2010 over 30 different instances of religiously related violence occurred mostly in Northern Nigeria. Each episode builds on the unresolved issues of a previous outbreak resulting in the deaths of thousands, while repeatedly churches, mosques, hotels, shops, petrol stations, individual homes, and personal effects have been destroyed incurring tremendous financial hardship on the usually uninsured owners. Many have been injured, and hundreds more carry emotional scars; scars which rarely heal as almost annually another round of bloodletting brings fresh losses. Christians, who used to advocate non-retaliation, speak of “no more cheeks left to turn”. Falola believes that this shift from pacifism towards self-defence developed because of the Kafanchan and Kaduna riots in March 1987. He writes:

Christians in central Nigeria and in northern cities mobilized to defend themselves, organizing vigilante groups to ward off Muslim attacks. To many Christians, participation in vigilante activities was a turning point in their reconciliation with violence. Before that time, many Christians had hoped that calm, prayer, and fasting would suffice, but they now began to speak of the law of Moses – an eye for an eye. They voiced determination to physically defend their lives, houses, families, and property. The mood has not abated, and the use of violence is now regarded by Christians as a legitimate defence.\textsuperscript{175}

The upshot is that suspicion, and antagonism frequently characterise community relations. Christians and Muslims, who formerly were neighbours and friends, now live in separate \textit{ungwars} (neighbourhoods), prepared to mix at work, but rarely socially. Ethnic and religious cleansing, similar to the population movements in former Yugoslavia or in N. Ireland, are a current reality for some.

It would be easy to speak of violence in Nigeria generally: the ongoing Niger Delta problems are merely the most current instance of these problems. The focus of this paper, however, is specifically on religious and ethnic violence that has affected the ECWA church and how it has reacted to such. Only where other violence is relevant

\textsuperscript{174} See Appendix 2 for a full list of these riots. 
\textsuperscript{175} Falola, T., \textit{Violence in Nigeria}, p.185.
to this focus will it be considered. Before turning to such discussion, current trends and issues require discussion.

2. Current Issues and Trends in Nigeria

2.1 Identity.
Michael Levin notes Nigeria’s artificiality and consequent focus on constructing a national identity. This brought an alliance between Lugard’s doctrine of “Indirect Rule” and the Sokoto Caliphate’s vision of a state united by culture and religion, “a vision of conquest and conversion (if not assimilation) opposed by many peoples of Northern Nigeria and (after Amalgamation) by the Southern peoples.” Tensions, however, did not disappear with independence. With over 250 different ethnic groups approaching the state from different historical roots and seeking widely varying outcomes, rulers constantly need to be sensitive to popular pressure. The effects of the Civil War and the subsequent sub-division of the country into ever smaller and more ethnically cohesive states has, paradoxically in a country which officially does not tolerate ethnic bias, made ethnicity ever more important. In these one’s religion often marked one’s identity. Anthony argues, using the example of Hausa-Igbo tensions in Kano that:

... religious issues led to intercommunal conflict involving members of the groups in 1991 and 1995. In each case, however, violence occurred without the explicit manipulation of ethnicity that was present in 1966. For that reason, I argue that we must treat each disturbance as a religious conflict that, because of circumstances and patterns of affiliation, unfolded mostly between two ethnic groups. The centrality of Islam to Hausa identity and Kanawa’s often axiomatic association of Christianity with Igbos has meant past grievances, some long dormant, others lingering, were available for both sides to tap into, and almost inevitably surfaced.

A full discussion of identity issues is a much greater and more complex topic than can be properly addressed within the scope of this work. Take, for example,

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177 Levin, p.137. Anthony ascribes the origins of indigineity tensions to colonial policies.
178 Anthony, p.238.
however, Ahmadu Bello’s Northernisation policies. These were not just to ensure that Northern Nigerians and not Southerners were employed. To be a true Northerner one had to dress and worship like the Hausa-Fulani Muslims.\textsuperscript{180} Examples that are more recent are the crises in Jos in 2001 and 2008 between the Hausa “Jasawa”, and the indigenous Birom and other groups.\textsuperscript{181} The question of to whom Jos belongs to seemed to be a central concern. Thus, speaking of the 2001 crisis Umar Faruk, an official with the Plateau State branch of the JNI, said: “Religion was used in the Jos crisis, but the crisis was really caused by ethnic issues. So-called indigenes feel the Muslims are settlers and not the owners of the land: they fear Muslim domination of housing, politics, economics.”\textsuperscript{182} He criticized the Church of Christ in Nigeria (COCIN) for its anti-Islamic militancy accusing them of preaching violence in comparison with some of the other churches like ECWA or some Pentecostal groups.\textsuperscript{183} Abubakar Dawud Muhammad, a lecturer at the University of Jos, was also critical of COCIN and ECWA. He said:

Muslins see these churches as troublemakers: most of the followers of these churches are from the Middle Belt. The Plateau Christians who belong to ECWA and COCIN are using the churches to fight the Muslims. If you ask Muslims in Jos who are the troublemakers among the churches they will say ECWA and COCIN.\textsuperscript{184}

The answers of both of these Muslim leaders betray the indeterminate boundaries between ethnicity, religion, and politics, moving from religion, to ethnicity and back to religion again and not distinguishing between them. It is a fluidity that all recognise. As will be noticed in Chapter Six, religion and politics are consistently among the top three reasons given by respondents as accounting for the violence. Musa Gaiya, an ECWA leader and convert from Islam, explains:

For example, any ordinary Jasawa (Hausa Muslim from Jos) here feels he has been marginalised in the sharing of resources of local government because he is a Muslim. He doesn’t wait for a politician to tell him. He knows: his children are denied scholarships because his origins are from Kano or Bauchi. By contrast,
elsewhere in the North, the average Birom or Anaguta person knows that he has always been considered an underdog: not somebody that is worth respect because he is non-Muslim. If he was Muslim he would be assimilated and no one would know. But because he is non-Muslim his identity becomes a very sharp issue. He is not considered a real human being or is called a *kafiri* or pagan and not to be greeted as he is seen as backward, lazy, and unproductive.\(^{185}\)

Surveying the various violent incidents on the Jos-Plateau Fwatshak concludes, “there is need to revisit the indigeneship issue in the constitution and provide equal opportunities for Nigerians everywhere in the country, while also providing for the protection of disadvantaged groups and ethnic minorities.”\(^{186}\) This is not so simple. As Ilesanmi has argued, the state’s legitimacy, the people’s identity, and the distribution of political power and privileges are all inter-connected. Central to each of these factors is religion forming community identity and through that acceptance or otherwise of the state’s legitimacy and the distribution of power.\(^{187}\)

### 2.2 Corruption and Power

Corruption in Nigeria is as powerful a factor as religion. Occasionally it intersects with religion when qualified people are refused employment or promotion on religious grounds. At other times, corruption overrides religious morals, subordinating religious allegiance to financial greed. One looks to a variety of evidence, not least one’s own personal experience of living in Nigeria between 1984 and 1999, and coping with bribery, petrol shortages, currency exchange frauds etc. The world’s seventh largest oil producer could not provide a regular supply of petrol in its petrol stations during the 1990’s. Across the world, people rapidly became aware of the advance-fee fraud schemes perpetrated by Nigerian criminal gangs. Within the country police officers claimed they needed bribes because of inadequate resources.\(^{188}\) Nuhu Ribadu, one time head of Nigeria’s Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), complained about the effect that advance fee fraud (known in Nigeria as 419) have had on international relations.\(^{189}\) His commission investigated a U.S. $180 million slush fund operated by foreign companies interested in building a Liquified Natural

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\(^{186}\) Fwatshak, p.74.


\(^{188}\) Ologbondiyan, K., ‘Police to Senate: We Collect Bribe to Augment Salary,’ *This Day*, (August 29, 2004) on [www.allAfrica.com](http://www.allAfrica.com) (DOA 01/09/04).

Gas plant. There was systematic looting by the late military dictator, General Sani Abacha. He and his associates stole about U.S. $4 billion in the five years that he was Head of State. Much of this money seems to be lost forever.

This phenomenon had taken time to develop. Right from independence issues of corruption had been a growing problem. Gowon’s regime had been toppled because of his inability to tackle the corruption among his officials. However, as Falola points out, corruption seemed to take off with the restoration of civilian rule. Referring to Shagari’s National Party of Nigeria (NPN) government which lasted from 1979 to the end of 1983 he writes:

The NPN, which as the majority party, controlled the federal government, was incapable of providing strong leadership, effective government, or economic development. The NPN was concerned less about good governance and the promotion of democratic institutions than it was interested in exploiting its power for its own economic ends. The NPN was a patronage party par excellence, with its members across the country united by acquisitiveness. The NPN survived by distributing political offices and resources to powerful elements in many different regions.

The NPN tried to use the police to counter the influence of the army and of state governments controlled by opposition parties. In return, the police harassed political opponents and assisted in rigging elections. Oil boom money was squandered, external debts soared, and the party was only returned to power in 1983 through electoral fraud and a corrupt judiciary. The military seizure of power in December 1983 was widely welcomed, albeit later regretted.

The military were not any better. Buhari’s regime made an attempt but was soon replaced by Babangida’s administration. It was soon characterised by economic chaos, further rises in external debts, and the rapid rise in a patronage society as the only means to gain wealth was through state patronage. Babangida himself was the chief patron making use of the state coffers to achieve his purposes. Others aligned themselves with him to gain power and wealth. What the NPN had given birth to had now come to fruition.

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193 Falola, T., Violence in Nigeria, p. 60.
On such a scale, corruption has extremely serious international implications. Bayart, Ellis and Hibou, surveying African corruption, discuss how illegal activity has promoted wars and the drugs trade, misappropriated natural resources, and subverted natural moral principles so that young girls are lured into slavery and prostitution, and young men find gang warfare and armed robbery to be their only hope of an income. Education, the hope of secure jobs and stable lives becomes an unattainable mirage. Society breaks down with two similarly disastrous outcomes. One is open warfare such as engulfed Liberia and Sierra Leone between 1989 and 2003, currently reigns supreme in Somalia, and operates in fits and starts in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The alternative is the total breakdown in all aspects of life as in Zimbabwe. Increasing levels of violence in Nigeria’s Niger Delta bear all the hallmarks of the former, while Nigeria’s flawed electoral processes remind one of the latter.

Nigerian corruption has developed out of societies rooted in reciprocity and mutual obligation. Patronage provided a means of accountability for the wealthy and of assistance for the poor. Daniel Smith writes:

> In traditional systems of patronage, or at least as Nigerians romanticize them, exchange between elites and common people were based on reciprocity and a sense of mutual obligation. Inequality was tempered by a moral economy in which the links between the haves and the have-nots created mechanisms for accountability. In contemporary Nigeria, people of all social strata continue to navigate political and economic insecurity and inequality by relying on social networks of patronage rooted in such a system of reciprocity, whereby ties based on kinship, community of origin, and other associations provide access to the resources of the state. . . Yet many Nigerians believe that elites have hijacked the patronage system and perverted it to serve their own interests. . . Indeed, it is the integration of a system of patronage with the facades of bureaucracy and officialdom produced by the postcolonial state that facilitates the corruption that is so ubiquitous in Nigeria.

Thus everyone now has a stake in this corruption, from the millions stolen by the elite to the small stakes the poor need to survive. “It is almost a cliché to recognize that in African societies, everyone is a patron to a lesser person and a client to a more powerful person.” Income from oil increasingly replaced agriculture as the main source of national income. Along with oil revenue grew corrupt behaviour. Everyone

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195 The Nigerian judiciary has overturned some flawed election results.


197 Smith, D.J., p.13.
wanted to have access to his or her slice of “the national cake”. This can take a number of forms. Smith cites Blundo and de Sardan’s study as identifying seven different forms of corruption: “The seven basic forms they identify are: (1) commission for illicit services, (2) unwarranted payment for public services, (3) gratuities, (4) string-pulling, (5) levies and tolls, (6) sidelining, and (7) misappropriation.”

Under the recent Obasanjo government, Nigeria has made some efforts to address the issue of corruption. Transparency International in their 2003 worldwide corruption poll ranked Nigeria as 132nd out of 133, with 133 the most corrupt. By 2008, it ranked 121st out of 145. It could have been better. Nigerian newspapers wrote often of political interference in the work of the EFCC, initially by the Obasanjo government where Ribadu and the EFCC were allegedly used to attack Obasanjo’s political rivals, and under the YarAdua government under which Ribadu has been manoeuvred out of public service. State and Federal elections are also increasingly characterised by widespread fraud and violence.

At corruption’s root, however, is the desire for power. Understood in many different ways it is hard, as Joseph Kenny notes, to distinguish the different elements due to the African inter-mingling of spiritual and physical worlds. There is always a spiritual reason or cause for any activity. Ogbu Kalu stressed a view of politics that is

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199 Smith, D.J., p.17.


religious, as it has to do with morality and the underlying values that determine the exercise of power. He blamed Western culture for upsetting traditional checks and balances, creating new forms of society outside the traditional village culture and its sanctions. Corruption developed in an atmosphere lacking both internalised western values and traditional sanctions. Between 1960 and 1990, Africans searched for a meaningful way of publicly expressing their religious beliefs. Thus, while churches indigenized their services and theologies, nationalists accused Christianity of imperialism. Political turmoil including one-party states, dictatorships, Marxism, coups, and bloodshed reflected the intellectual and religious search. Churches retreated, becoming increasingly denominational until the Islamic resurgence forced them together. Nevertheless, they still did not show the leadership and theological maturity needed to engage effectively with the political world. Laymen turned instead to the spiritual world for power to cope: the occult, traditional religions, and secret societies.  

Since 1990, two new trends have emerged – the charismatic/Pentecostal and the rise of radical Islam. The former, far from being an American import, has struck a chord as it offers deliverance from the occult and a way out of the economic morass. Kalu wrote of the Pentecostal emphasis on holiness and repentance for individual sins, as well as historic corporate and national sins. This holds that the nation is under God's judgement for its past evil deeds; deliverance is only possible through confession and rededicating the land to God. In so doing, remedies are provided for both individual responsibility for evil and the openings for occult forces. Then the righteous can be prayed into positions of power. For God has a unique plan and purpose for Nigeria and only the righteous will be able to accomplish it.

Despite Kalu's analysis, Smith points out that with the rise of the prosperity gospel, the relationship between Pentecostal Christianity and corruption has become more complex. Not only are there accusations of occult involvement in obtaining wealth, and disquiet at the opulent lifestyles of some of the prosperity gospel leaders, but there is also a growing dichotomy between personal morality and public corruption. It is the born-again Christians who really try to live by their churches' teachings regarding personal and intimate behaviour, and yet still participate in public actions that perpetuate corruption, who encapsulate the complexity of the relationship between religious morality and corruption. The domestication of

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Pentecostal moralism, focusing attention on sexuality, marriage, and family, has enabled the prosperous to live piously even as they loot the state and society.\textsuperscript{207} Some believe Nigerian ethno-religious violence arises out of this inability to engage in meaningful political behaviour.\textsuperscript{208} There is, as Marshall-Fratani notes, the Pentecostal perception of Islam as among the evil forces they oppose. The longer Muslims dominated politics and the economy the more the nation failed. Christians should, therefore, resist attempts to Islamise the state. On the other hand, Smith argues that much of the religious and ethnic violence really has its roots in poverty, inequality, and corruption.

Radical Islam also offers itself as the answer to the problems of corruption and obsession with power. Reynolds found that the 1804 \textit{jihad’s} main rationale was religious: to establish a proper Islamic society. The British incorporated its feudal, emir-centred structure into their Indirect Rule system with the emirates reclassified as “Native Authorities”. The Native Authorities’ role and function was central to political debate before and after independence. The NPC, reflecting its feudal support base, wanted to maintain them, and used the traditional rulers to engender support for the party. The legacy of descent from the Sokoto Caliphate legitimized the NPC’s leadership. By contrast, some religious scholars, accusing the Native Authorities of being corrupt oppressors, helped to form NEPU. The \textit{jihad} was for the purification and extension of Islam, and to advance political reform. This was unsuccessful as a new set of corrupt rulers replaced the old ones. The hereditary succession principle at the heart of the NPC’s rationale was un-Islamic. The real heritage of the \textit{jihad} was in the ties of scholarship and piety found between NEPU and the devout leaders of the \textit{jihad}.

Along similar lines, Ibraheem Sulaiman draws lessons from the Sokoto Caliphate.\textsuperscript{209} The central lesson is a profound dichotomy between Muslims and non-Muslims embracing the totality of existence and involving perpetual competition and struggle for supremacy. Thus, was the \textit{jihad} fought, and the Sokoto Caliphate established, both developing out of a desire for a true Islamic state. The caliphal office was essential for ensuring justice and maintaining good government. This office - not

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{207} Smith, D.J., p.214.
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necessarily its occupants - united the empire for a century through the proper application of Shari’ah law. Another central role for the Caliphate was the extension of Islam, including the extension of its rule to other Islamic states that it could not recognise as being just. Rules for relationships between Muslims and non-Muslims allowed for normal relationships and commonality of interests, restricting allegiance to non-Muslim powers and forbidding Muslim support for anything contrary to Islam. This lack of support, he believes, eventually made colonial rule untenable.

2.3 Religion versus Secularism
In general, Christians have upheld the Nigerian constitutional principle that the state should be secular i.e. neutral between religions, while Muslims have sought a state that is at least officially multi-religious if not Islamic. Much hinges on which religious grouping is predominant thus commanding the most votes. Despite being the world’s most religious country, there is considerable dispute within Nigeria, springing from the questionable results of many of Nigeria’s censuses, concerning the exact nature of that religiosity. Everyone accepts a decline in traditional religions but dispute whether this is in favour of Islam or Christianity. In 1960, Christians were 34.5%, Muslims 47.2% and traditionalists 18.3% The World Christian Database indicates that in 2000, the Christian population was 46.88% and Muslim was 42.09%. By 2050, it expects these figures to be 47.17% and 44.35% respectively. Thus Christians emboldened by their numerical strength, and Muslims alarmed at Christian’s bold claims and strengthened by radical Islam’s dogmatism have clashed repeatedly over the role of Shari’ah law in Nigeria.

The British incorporated Shari’ah law into their colonial administration, but restricted its application to personal and family law. In preparation for independence, a legal structure was instituted, to which Muslims reluctantly agreed. This provided for a

Shari’ah Court of Appeal in Northern Nigeria, (later in each state in Northern Nigeria). Human rights and constitutional issues could be appealed from this court to the Supreme Court. In 1979, it was proposed to add a Federal Shari’ah Court of Appeal. The proposal was extremely divisive with Muslims insisting on it, and Christians regarding it as a plot to Islamise the country.\textsuperscript{214}

For Matthew Hassan Kukah, religion has always been a feature of Nigerian politics. Two different concepts of democracy predominate. Northern minorities see freedom as freedom from colonial and Fulani oppression. Muslims regard freedom as freedom to be under Islamic law: in the late Jeremy Hinds’ words a “freedom to impose a limitation on freedom.”\textsuperscript{215} The Shari’ah dispute, Kukah believes, occurred amongst the political elite to advance their own causes: an attempt by traditional Muslim leadership to mobilise the masses in their support. The Middle Belt feared this most, although given the venom Muslims used in the debate people wondered if they had a hidden agenda.\textsuperscript{216}

Kenny notes that despite the defeat of the initial Shari’ah proposals, between 1979 and 1984 Islamising trends in government policies were discernable. Kukah highlights some of the pro-Islamic policies that followed including anti-Christian discrimination in Kano, and hijacking Abuja’s development to reflect an Islamic ethos.\textsuperscript{217} Shagari’s civilian government, however, was overthrown in December 1983 by the pro-Islamic Buhari military regime. It, in turn, was overthrown in August 1985 by the officially secular Babangida military government, whose pro-Islamic actions, including a secretive admission to the Islamic Conference Organisation (OIC) did more to alarm Christians than any previous regime.\textsuperscript{218}

\textsuperscript{214} Ostien, P., ‘An Opportunity Missed by Nigeria’s Christians: The Shari’ah Debate of 1976-78 Revisited,’ in U.H.D. Danfulani, G.J. Dogara and F. Ludwig (eds), The Shari’ah Debate, . . . , pp. 68 – 96. He argues this Shari’ah proposal was not designed to extend Islamic influence, but to perpetuate legal principles and practices already agreed on in 1960. Its failure, he believes, was a mistake by Christians leading to ever more strident Muslim demands culminating in the post-2000 adoption of Shari’ah law by 12 states and associated political tensions and violence. Cf. Nwanaju, pp. 289 – 294 for discussion of some of the preparatory debates to this proposal.


\textsuperscript{217} Cf. Nwanaju, pp.295 – 301.

\textsuperscript{218} Sannneh, 1997, pp.220-222 discusses the Islamic objectives and character of the OIC. Cf. Adogame, 2005; Nwanaju, pp. 264 – 270. The latter clearly blames much of the religio-political turmoil of this period on General Babangida’s pro-Islamic manoeuvring.
The Shari’ah issue returned in 1988 with another Constituent Assembly. Kenny recorded the Christian Association of Nigeria’s (CAN) protest against Shari’ah demanding exactly the same privileges and treatment as Muslims enjoyed.²¹⁹ Sanneh, noting that in their method of protest CAN allowed the Muslims to set the agenda, described such as “Christians wheeling and dealing on a stage Muslims have constructed for their own purpose”²²⁰. Muslims, sowing further confusion, argued that until Christians decide between secular humanism or transcendent truth Muslims would have to carry the burden.

The OIC issue generated more heat. Muslims saw membership as a right, drawing parallels with Nigeria’s diplomatic relationships with the Vatican. Christians, citing the OIC constitution, argued that OIC membership was designed to propagate Islam, yet Nigeria is officially secular. Attitudes hardened. Kenny refers to a statement from the Council of the Ulama in March 1986, setting out demands for parity of treatment between Muslims and Christians should Nigeria withdraw from the OIC. These consisted mainly of the Islamisation of society for 25 years to make up for the “Christian” society current, followed by both Christian and Muslim symbols to be used in parallel.²²¹ Along these lines, Sulaiman²²² argued that both Islamic and European civilisations compete for supremacy in Nigeria. The latter is currently in charge resulting in racist and capital dogma as the nation state’s foundation leading to its idolatrous worship. British colonial strategy had surrounded, weakened and isolated Muslim communities allowing secularism, derived from Christian principles of the separation of church and state, to hold sway. Islam, however, understands life as a coherent whole with no division between the secular and the spiritual. It thus renders secularism irrelevant and is the only model that can restore true harmony to society. Muslims have, therefore, a duty to seek an Islamic state.²²³

²²² Sulaiman, 1986.
The violent rhetoric employed on both sides led, inevitably, to a number of religious riots. Kenny suggested continual attacks on churches spoke of a political and religious basis to the conflict as opposed to ethnic or economic motivation. Kukah thought that as military rule restricted political freedom people turned to religion to express their aspirations and identity. In this process, as Adogame points out, the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) and the Pentecostal Fellowship of Nigeria (PFN) provided increasingly important leadership for the Christian community. They sought to resist the radical Islamic ideology that lay behind much of the violence, as well as to hold to account the pro-Islamic military government.224

For a while, the annulled June 1993 elections and General Sani Abacha's brutal regime became the centres of political attention. After the election of Olusegun Obasanjo, religious divisions revived. The northern Muslim establishment initially trusted Obasanjo, a Southern Christian, as like many of them he was a retired general and former military Head of State. They assisted his election, only to discover that he was willing to act against them. As an alternative, they used a constitutional loophole that allowed individual states to extend Shari'ah law from personal and family law to encompass criminal law. The newly elected Governor of Zamfara State started the process in 2000.225 Shari'ah would solve the crises and malaise of yesteryear by curbing the excesses of the rich.226 The wealthy also sought advantage in the extension of Shari'ah law. Its adoption calmed the masses' anxieties about non-Muslim rule by showing that Islamic authorities were still in control and reaffirming orthodoxy at the expense of any dilution of faith or practice.227 The swift adoption of varieties of Shari'ah law across twelve northern Nigerian states alarmed Christians. Arising from the tensions and protests came bloody riots in Kaduna City where 2,000 people died in 2000.228 Subsequent riots in Jos in 2001, and 2008 sprang more from a combination of local ethnopolitical issues with wider religious issues than concern solely about Shari'ah imposition.

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224 Adogame, 2005.
What is the proper role of the state? Is it to be theocratic or will such endanger political stability and religious integrity? How can this state create and foster a moral society when faced with the pressures of modernity and anti-theistic forces? Muslims divide between those, like former Governor Yerima of Zamfara State who wished to Islamize society, but not the state, and those radicals who wish to Islamize the state first. Sanneh sees such a distinction as offering possibilities for civil society to address tolerance, diversity, and pluralism. In reality, however, Northern Nigerian Muslims see religion as too important to be left to individuals. The law of God requires state protection. This may mean partition between the religions, or the replacement of the present state with an Islamic one. Yet Sanneh also states that Muslim opponents of Shari’ah law see state sponsorship as threatening the moral foundations of religion and leading to political instability.

Which way should Nigeria go? The Nigerian Constitution prohibits the establishment of any faith as a state religion. This model of secularism, however, allows for the support of religious activity, in contrast to Western models which promote strict demarcations between secular and religious interests. David Smith warns Nigerian Christians of the dangers of modernity citing its negative effects on the Western church. Muslims are right to point out that economic activity has “both theistic and transcendent reference points. It is not an amoral activity governed by so-called scientific laws.” An-Na’im argues that ultimately Shari’ah law is the product of human reflection on divine revelation. This is an on-going process and it would be

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229 Hackett, R.I.J., ‘Rethinking the Role of Religion in the Public Sphere: Local and Global Perspectives,’ in P. Ostien, J.M. Nasir and F. Kogelmann (eds), Comparative Perspectives on Shari’ah in Nigeria, Spectrum Books, Ibadan, 2005, pp. 74 - 99 surveys contemporary Western thinking about state-religion relations highlighting the resurgence of religious beliefs in politics amidst the limitations of secularism. Ludwig, F., ‘The Shari’ah Controversy and Christian-Muslim Relations in Northern Nigeria,’ in U.H.D. Danfulani, G.J. Dogara and F. Ludwig (eds), The Shari’ah Debate, . . , pp. 38 – 46 notes how Shari’ah has made Nigeria more pluralistic, while giving individual states more central control over their societies accompanied by increasing Islamic socio-political mores. Turaki, Y., ‘The Shari’ah Debate in the Northern States of Nigeria: Implications for Muslims, Christians and Democracy,’ in U.H.D. Danfulani, G.J. Dogara and F. Ludwig (eds), The Shari’ah Debate, . . , pp. 98 – 133 believes dialogue is pointless as ultimately Muslims are part of a monolithic oppressive faith that demands total control and obedience, the antithesis of the democratic values of individual rights and freedoms.


wrong to impose one particular interpretation from on high. It is far better to allow Shari’ah principles to influence public policy and legislation. Tayob\textsuperscript{234} advocates a pluralistic legal culture. Muslim demands for Shari’ah law are politically motivated, reflecting a desire to see Islamic symbols in the political space. The introduction of Shari’ah, however, has moved religion from politics to the judiciary. Due legal process has opened up space for groups to insist upon, and take measures to legally protect human rights. Thus, the needs of ordinary people are met, even if at the expense of the politicians. Sanusi\textsuperscript{235} notes how Muslims dismiss Western criticism of Shari’ah law as hypocritical. Criticisms from western-educated Islamic scholars are more valid but these scholars fail to grasp the depth of traditional Islamic rejection of western egalitarianism. There needs to be proper distinctions made between the corrupt and the honest, proper dialogue and greater flexibility in and diversity of sources of legislation. The focus must shift from punishment, to social justice, education, poverty alleviation, and moral reform.\textsuperscript{236}

Sanneh also highlights the failure of Shari’ah advocates to criticise oppression or to propose answers to the country’s economic problems. Bringing God into the equation without addressing socio-economic injustices just makes him a party to the problems. Both the secular state and the theocratic state can be equally oppressive: the one under the dictatorship of the majority, and the latter capturing religion to serve its expedient political purposes. The secular state needs an external objective arbiter to preserve the rights of the individual. The religious state, wishing to protect religion, needs to ensure a safety net of separation to preserve religion’s integrity. Sanneh plots a middle course arguing that the way forward is for a secular state to be supported with moral principles. Thus, both secular and religious are preserved from their own worst excesses.\textsuperscript{237}


\textsuperscript{236} Cf. Gaiya, M.A.B., \textit{Muslim and Christian Scholars Debate Shari’ah in Nigeria}, paper presented at the Jos-Bukuru Theological Society, 6\textsuperscript{th} March 2007.

\textsuperscript{237} Sanneh, 1997, pp.228 ff.
3. Summary and Conclusion

Reviewing the history of Northern Nigeria one is struck by the operation of two distinct historical and contemporary forces. On the one hand, there is the age long desire to homogenize, to unify, and to centrally control the region. Prior to independence this was seen, first of all through the dan Fodio jihad and the subsequent actions of the Sokoto Caliphate, before being adopted by the British colonisers with their Indirect Rule governmental principles, as well as their promotion of Hausa and of Islam. Subsequent to independence, Ahmadu Bello sought to unify the North not just politically under his NPC-controlled government, but also religiously through his missionary campaigns. No subsequent Muslim rulers have been as openly evangelistic in their promotion of Islam, but repeatedly, decisions and actions have been made that have effectively promoted this centralising trend which Islam finds so amenable. Thus, whether the decisions were taken under the military rule of Generals Muhammad, Buhari, Babangida, Abacha, and Abubakar, or under President Shagari and more recently under President Yar’Adua, this has been a constant theme. Decisions and policies relating to appointments to high office, the design of Abuja, subsidies to pilgrims, educational and economic policies, control of resources, especially oil have all reflected this desire to control from the centre.

By contrast, the influence of Christian missions, and their successor churches, has been to celebrate diversity and promote ways of working together that arise out of common consent, not central coercion. Instead of the promotion of Hausa, for example, missions encouraged the use of minority languages through Bible translation and associated literacy. Christian missions and churches, to the dismay of the British colonisers and their Hausa-Fulani friends, not only promoted an alternative religion but also an alternative worldview, quite distinct from the official line. Receiving a Western style education, accompanied by fluency in English, was quickly seized upon by minority ethnic groups as a means of developing out of the confines of their minority status, and, along with the Christian faith, enabling them to network across ethnic and political boundaries. Autonomous government, and freedom of choice has been the hallmark whether it be in terms of state creation or in the state’s recognition of the rights of minority ethnic groups to rule themselves. Thus the call for the creation of minority states that the Willinks Commission denied, was achieved under the leadership of General Gowon, a member of an ethnic minority and a devout Christian. More recently, considerable progress towards peace has been made in Kaduna State, for example, by ensuring the independence of minority
groups from the rule of the Emirs of Zaria or Jama’a. The Hausa-Fulani political hegemony was thus broken, probably irretrievably. However, the competition between these worldviews, far from ceasing, merely shifted from maintaining a central regional government in Kaduna, to other forms of centralisation.

This was not immediately discernible under the decades of predominantly Islamic military rule. Armies do not countenance devolution of powers relying instead on central command. However, with the restoration of a form of democratic rule other issues have come to the fore. They have been present in some form or another for many years, but the differing visions present in civilian rule have heightened their importance. Issues to do with identity, especially as religious adherence is often a core component of one’s identity, are increasingly prevalent. For example, much of the contemporary conflict in and around Jos in Plateau State revolves around the question of who is indigenous to the area, with minority ethnic groups, who are predominantly Christian, refusing to permit the predominantly Muslim Hausa-Fulani, some of whom are the second or third generation descendent of immigrants, from enjoying full economic or political rights. The minority groups fear being swamped by the Hausa-Fulani and losing political and economic control, and along with such loss, their religious freedom also. For such has been the case elsewhere in Nigeria’s Middle Belt where minority ethnic groups have been assimilated into the Hausa-Fulani religious and cultural embrace.

The struggle for political power that this entails has been heightened in its importance, by the associated struggle for control over oil revenues. This has hijacked the traditional custom of patronage by bringing the custom out of the confines of the village or the ethnic group and into the wider national arena where the traditional checks and balances no longer apply.

Alternative answers to this struggle for power and identity have been suggested by both Pentecostalism and by radical Islam. Neither, however, has really confronted the social evils arising from corruption and ethnic discrimination. Both reinforce the essential division between the pro-Islamic centralising worldview and the pro-Christian celebration of diversity. This is the central issue that lies at the root of the conflict over religion and secularism. It is not that Christians believe in an anti-religious secularism as is often evidenced in Europe and North America. Rather they wish for a religiously neutral arena in which all religious views would be free to practice. To Muslims, however, religious neutrality is a social evil. For all things, and
all people, must be brought into subjection to the will of Allah. Hence the Muslim campaign for the extension of Shari’ah law. Yet, as some commentators noted, this in turn raises issues as to which version of Shari’ah law that are to be followed, the role of the judiciary in interpreting that law and mitigating some of its harsher features, and the danger inherent in the politicians’ deployment of Shari’ah law to advance their own purposes. What is needed is a different viewpoint, a different understanding of the state as secular but informed by moral principles. Only with such will the social evils rampant in Nigerian society be curtailed, will both religions find adequate freedom for worship and political participation, and will the economic issues bedevilling the nation be properly addressed.
Chapter Three
Research Planning and Responses

From this research's beginning, the intention has been to approach it from an historical perspective determining to what extent historical factors influence current perspectives, before drawing theological conclusions. The writer’s previous research, completed in 1989, served to provide an historical understanding of the Northern Nigerian religious and political context.\textsuperscript{238} Much has happened since, in historical research, as well as in socio-political events necessitating a fresh approach to the subject. Prior to detailed discussion of the research process, some consideration needs to be given to methodological issues.

1. Contemporary Research Methodology

While a considerable amount of this research centres on libraries, archives and other sources of documentation, an essential component is ascertaining contemporary views and relating those to the documentary sources. In doing this, some thought must be given, both to the methods used, and to the underlying presumptions behind these methods. There are two primary methodologies to choose from, qualitative research, and quantitative research. Swinton and Mowatt define the former as:

Qualitative research involves the utilization of a variety of methods and approaches which enable the researcher to explore the social world in an attempt to access and understand the unique ways that individuals and communities inhabit it. It assumes that human beings are by definition 'interpretive creatures'; that the ways in which we make sense of the world and our experiences within it involve a constant process of interpretation and meaning-seeking.\textsuperscript{239}

They describe qualitative research by drawing an analogy between qualitative research and a good detective story without a fixed ending. By contrast, quantitative research is what it portrays itself to be, research that seeks to quantify or measure in statistical terms its results. The two approaches need not be mutually exclusive, but often one is more appropriate for a particular kind of research than the other is.\textsuperscript{240}

\textsuperscript{238} Todd, 1989.
\textsuperscript{239} Swinton, J., & H. Mowatt, \textit{Practical Theology and Qualitative Research}, SCM London., 2006, p.29.
Which forms of research method are most appropriate for a given situation depends on each method’s underlying epistemological foundations. In particular, Swinton and Mowatt argue that there are two types of knowledge: nomothetic and ideographic. The former is the model underpinning much of modern society. It is obtained using the scientific method and must meet the three-fold criteria of falsifiability, replicability and generalizability. In other words, if a truth is not falsifiable then it is not factual; it must be possible to replicate it, and it must be possible to extrapolate one’s findings to the general population. Normally this method starts with a hypothesis that the research seeks to validate.

Ideographic knowledge “presumes that meaningful knowledge can be discovered in unique, non-replicable experiences.” Just as a river is constantly changing so are life experiences. No one encounters the same experience in exactly the same way as another. It is true to life, and reflects the individual’s experiences. This is just as valid a form of knowledge as the nomothetic. The post-Enlightenment Western world has sought to quantify and reduce knowledge to scientific data. Certainly, such is a form of knowledge that is extremely useful in medical science or in chemistry. History and theology however, are just as valid approaches to knowledge, which rely on ideological or qualitative research approaches to make sense of the world. The ideographic approach starts without hypothesis but allows the data to speak for itself, and thus hypotheses emerge from the data.

The task of qualitative research, therefore, is not to explain the world to all peoples, but to describe reality in ways that enable understanding and changed actions. Generalizability is not the responsibility of the qualitative researcher. “The primary task of the qualitative researcher is to ensure the accuracy of their description.” Description, interpretation, and understanding are what the qualitative researcher aims for. Swinton and Mowatt proceed to point out that while qualitative research is not generalizable it may raise issues of identification and resonance.

Cohen makes the point:

In the idiographic [sic] tradition as applied to Africa (or elsewhere), the central problem for analysis is the nature, meaning, and origin of the social, political, economic, psychological, cultural, or historical situation as it is observed by the analyst and experienced by the people themselves. . . . A full analysis of any

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241 Swinton & Mowatt, 2006, p.43.
242 Swinton & Mowatt, 2006, p.46.
human situation requires hundreds - even thousands - of individual descriptive generalizations. These must be tied together into a related whole by interpretation, inference, and deduction, ultimately creating a description that is itself interpretive. 243

The key to the success of the research, therefore, is the interpretation of the information collected. Yet how can someone really understand another without assuming his identity? This is the insider/outsider problem. As McCutcheon writes:

In a nutshell, the problem is whether, and to what extent someone can study, understand, or explain the beliefs, words or actions of another. . . . Do students of culture have virtually unimpeded access to the intentions and meanings of the people, societies, or institutions they study or, to take the contrary view, are all human observers cut off from ever being able to see past their own biases, contexts, and presuppositions? 244

McCutcheon then proceeds to survey how various groups have approached this problem. Some argued that through the recognition of common experiences, tendencies and capacities, techniques could be developed, albeit with some difficulty, to enable this gap to be bridged. In other words, the scholarly outsider can get inside and re-experience the subject’s own experiences and states of mind. Others see this as impossible, concentrating instead on studying what can be observed and developing theories to explain such. Insiders’ objections to these theories are dismissed because of their ignorance of all of the facts. A third group follow a more agnostic line not accepting that one can definitively make any statement about human actions preferring to concentrate on accurate descriptions and comparisons while remaining neutral about questions of truth and value.

More recently, the concept of reflexivity has gained ground. In this, each individual sees the same events and phenomena differently, depending on their own presuppositions, training, and orientation. Each researcher thus needs to be aware of how his or her background and beliefs interacts with the research data. Indeed, there is an autobiographical element to this kind of research. McCutcheon writes:

In recent years, there has been a virtual revolution in the way in which scholars conceive of themselves in relation to the people they write about. This revolution has entailed rethinking the very opposition between insiders and outsiders, between subjects and objects, that has so far been simply presumed . . . What some writers have begun questioning . . . are the limits of the subject, the limits of the object, and whether anyone can ever attain neutrality when it comes to studying human behaviour. In other words, where does the detached observer begin and the observed subject end? 245

243 Cohen, p.38.
This approach, drawn from postmodernism, raises issues of truth and error for theologians, which are far beyond the scope of this research. The method it uses, however, when applied to historical or sociological research, can help to illuminate the subject in fresh and interesting ways allowing the scholar to assess data from a different angle.

The best way of illustrating this approach further is refer to one's personal background. I am the child of SIM missionaries. I was born in Nigeria, spent much of my childhood in Ghana, and visited Nigeria often for holidays, or for my siblings' births. Thus, I grew up with SIM, and when my thoughts turned to missionary work, it was, naturally, to SIM that I first turned. I became, therefore, an insider remaining such for sixteen years, and resuming this insider status for the period I spent doing research in Nigeria. Being a long-time member of SIM provided access and contacts for this research probably unavailable to an outsider.

And yet I am also an outsider, for when I was growing up, SIM missionaries predominantly came from Canada and the United States. By contrast, my family came from N. Ireland, and thus, could never totally identify with North American cultures and histories. My own educational journey differed also taking me through Ghanaian and British schools and universities, instead of the SIM-run, American-curriculum schools, and eventually American colleges. As will be seen later, many SIM missionaries, including my parents, had their religious roots in the premillennial fundamentalist reaction against the dominance of liberal theology in major Protestant denominations and institutions. My own thinking, however, has led me from these views towards an amillennial and Reformed approach to evangelical theology: again an outsider position in an organisation where the views of such prominent premillennial institutions as Dallas Theological Seminary or Moody Bible Institute have been influential.

Sometimes, however, the researcher needs to engage with both sides of the insider/outsider problem. Thus, a common trait among missionaries is to present their work in the best possible light, glossing over or ignoring problems and difficulties. Sharing an insider position, I understand some of the pressures leading to this, especially ill-informed expectations from financial supporters. As a scholar, however, I need to be able to stand outside that situation and examine critically what the missionaries are saying. Thus, using my insider knowledge I read between the lines.
of SIM magazines, (often the only surviving historical documents), to try to come to an assessment which will withstand outside critique. Another illustration of this ambiguity is in relationship to the paternalist, or perhaps racist comments missionaries made in the early twentieth century. These may have been acceptable comments then, but they are certainly not now, and should not have been acceptable then. Yet history has always taught me to try to judge people by the light they knew, rather than by later and necessarily different standards of attitude, belief, speech, and conduct. Treading a line that faithfully portrays the past but does not absolve or ignore errors is never easy.

When it comes to ECWA, there is also this continual tension between being an insider and an outsider. With ECWA, I share a common evangelical Christian faith, differing in a few details such as church government and eschatology but united in understanding of Christ's person and work, and humanity's need of salvation. Sixteen years working in ECWA's theological education system provided a wide understanding of the issues the church faces and a wide range of contacts among current and former students. Graduate studies on Nigerian religious conflicts opened a vista on Nigeria that many expatriate colleagues do not share. Lecturing in a theological seminary, part of which included serving as its Registrar provided a useful status in a society where status seems to be extremely important. Indeed the status of Registrar seemed in some ways to outweigh my lack of status due to my then unmarried state. Northern Nigeria is also a male-dominated society thus giving my gender an advantage.

Yet for racial and ethnic reasons I am also an obvious outsider. While it would be possible to be naturalised as a Nigerian, provided I obtained the necessary security and governmental clearances, Nigeria's constitution from colonial times has reserved the right to citizenship to those who can prove descent from indigenous ethnic groups. My Nigerian birth counts for little except for occasionally favourable treatment from Nigerian officials. I had to try to learn Hausa, and have since forgotten most of it, and speak no other indigenous Nigerian language. There are aspects of Nigerian culture that I like: its cheerfulness, its spirituality, its respect for the elderly for example. On the other hand, I get extremely frustrated by the mismanagement, the corruption, and the fatalism that seems to prevail. The oral nature of much of Nigerian society has become familiar, but my natural desire is for written documents. My post-Enlightenment upbringing in which I naturally turn for scientific answers to health and environmental problems is in conflict with the traditional Nigerian
sensitivity to the supernatural. The strong sense of identity provided through belonging to an extended family, a particular village or an ethnic group is not shared given my multi-cultural upbringing and lack of that sense of belonging to any particular culture. Nigerian colleagues patiently accepted my foibles and forgave my mistakes as that of a well-meaning Bature (white man) who remains interested in what happens in Nigeria. They were prepared to permit the use of my training and abilities in theological education. Yet there is always a glass ceiling for the expatriate: top positions are reserved for Nigerians no matter how culturally sensitive, able, and well qualified the expatriate is. For fundamentally the expatriate in Nigeria is always an outsider.

Thus, any analysis that I bring to an historical or contemporary study of Nigerian church history will necessarily be filtered through my background and experiences. As a Christian investigating a conflict between Muslims and Christians my natural sympathies are with my fellow-religionists. In particular, when the violence affects people I know, and some former students have suffered violent deaths in the riots, it would be morally wrong to divorce myself from their suffering.

Yet, as an expatriate studying a very complicated mix of religious, ethnic, and political issues, I also need to be able to stand back and try to illuminate issues my friends might prefer kept quiet. In this, I am conscious all the time of Christ's command, “If any one of you is without sin, let him be the first to throw a stone at her.”\textsuperscript{246} The ethnic conflicts of my Northern Irish background and the failure of the churches in Ireland to adequately address these mean that any criticism I may bring cannot be harsh or condemnatory but reflect the worldwide failure of contemporary Christianity to truly unite “Jew and Gentile”. We cannot be “one body”,\textsuperscript{247} not just because of theological differences, but because we have failed to overcome the ethnic differences that Christ so clearly set aside in Acts 10. How much more is this the case when addressing inter-religious issues?

Furthermore, how can I, as an outsider who can always escape the violence, analyse the situation fairly and objectively without adding to the burden of many who feel their civil and religious rights are being trampled on and stolen from them? While I can be a participant-observer, I need to ensure that I do not become a precipitant-observer straying over the line between observations and asking questions into suggesting

\textsuperscript{246} John 8:7b.
\textsuperscript{247} 1 Corinthians 12:13.
and recommending specific actions.²⁴⁸ Most of the time I did not see this as a problem, having been long enough in Nigeria to discern the sensitivities. An exception was when asked in Gombe about whether Christians should obtain guns for self-defence. I was taken aback by the question, yet sympathised with those asking it, a number of whom were former students of mine. They explained that local Muslims, observing the hunting hobbies of Southern Baptist missionaries, believed that all white men possessed and distributed guns to their Nigerian friends. If Muslims did not attack those Christians whom they believed to possess guns, then should not Christians get guns anyway? Nigerian security forces usually arrive too late to save life and property from rioters. As an outsider, however, I could not be seen or heard to advise anyone to purchase or to use guns. Is the issue even theologically appropriate? Christians are called on to follow Christ who turned down the opportunity to lead an armed rebellion against the religious and political establishment, instead accepting suffering, and ignominious death.²⁴⁹ Yet Christians have a legitimate argument that they are not just defending their religious rights but also their political freedoms. After discussing the issue, I turned the question back to my questioners. They needed to make their own independent decisions.

Despite my attempt to be neutral concerning guns, I felt both elation and sadness that I had been asked this question. Elation in the sense that my questioners felt close enough to me to raise the issue. To that extent, I was an insider, able to share with them the pressures they faced. They struggled with a constant sense of anti-Christian hostility from certain sections of the Muslim community. Occasionally this flared up with a church destroyed here, a manse there, a Christian secondary school teacher senselessly beaten to death, or a lack of educational and job opportunities for indigenous Christians. Christian political leaders in the state, they alleged, were corrupt and useless many having not darkened the doors of a church for quite some time. The state’s Muslim Governor refused to confront the troublemakers, indeed some of the troublemakers were reputed to be in his employ. Thus, I felt sad. As an outsider, I could leave Gombe. For my friends it was and is their home. They are the church leaders who struggle with providing leadership and help to their members, all the time needing help, and advice themselves.

²⁴⁹ John 18:11.
Awareness of the tensions raised by these and other experiences enable the researcher to interrogate the available data most effectively. Actual methods employed will vary: there is no one set form of qualitative research. The key is being flexible using a variety of tools to the best advantage. Such an approach is certainly most helpful in this research. Starting with the current context of a society deeply divided by violent religious and ethnic disputes, it seeks to understand these issues through examination of historical records, current literature, oral interviews, and surveys. No one method is used to the exclusion of the other, the key to the study being found in their interaction.

Before proceeding further, three specific issues need consideration in this research. These are doing research in a Nigerian context, questionnaire design, and sample selection.

1.1 Research in a Nigerian Context.
A key feature, of course, is the African and specifically Nigerian context for this research. Logistical challenges will always be present. Nigeria presents a unique set of challenges and opportunities to those used to living in well-ordered, predictable, and sometimes boring European and American societies. As mentioned previously, a flexible approach is essential. Methods and approaches that might well work in Europe or America do not necessarily travel well to Africa. Barr et al in discussing whether Western methods will work in Africa stress two questions to ask. These are, “Can the same techniques be used in different societies? If not, how is it possible to assure the comparability or equivalence of the data produced by different research procedures?” Of course, they are referring to the principles of generalizability mentioned above. What is most significant is that they are raising these questions rather than just making unwarranted assumptions. Borrowing from the West is inevitable but how appropriate is the method, how reliable is the data collected, and do alternative methods need developing to cater for the local context?

Cohen raises a number of problems with qualitative research in an African context. To begin with, the larger and more complex a society studied then the more difficult it is to ensure accuracy of data. The successful qualitative researcher depends on a

\[250 \text{Erratic electrical and fuel supplies as well as increasing incidences of violent armed robbery both on homes and along major roads are among the most obvious. Making the right contacts, penetrating protective bureaucracies, and coping with corruption are just as great a challenge as the former.}\]

\[251 \text{O'Barr, W. M, D. H. Spain & M. A Tessler, } \textit{Survey Research in Africa: } \ldots \textit{, } 1973, \text{p.14.}\]
relatively small number of interviewees and his personal rapport with them. This can lead to biased and misleading conclusions only correctable by larger quantitative surveys. Linguistic issues can also raise difficulties, especially ensuring that questions asked carry the same meaning when translated. Africans living in an authoritarian society are also reluctant to express their true feelings when discretion is often the better part of valour. Answers can also become stereotyped as the questions are seen to be irrelevant to the respondent’s concerns. However, even responses that show a lack of salience, as Cohen calls it, show some interesting data.

In Africa, salience becomes an interesting means of measuring such qualities as national integration or participation in national life. If a survey indicates that people have no opinions or random opinions on national issues, it shows a low degree of awareness and a lack of relevance of these issues among the population. Thus, even a poor result becomes, especially for Africa, an important datum on its own.252

However, careful choice of respondents, familiarity with the local language, or if using English with the local use of English, and above all personal relationships can minimise, if not totally eliminate, many of the problems Cohen raises.253 Taking the time to explain what one aims to achieve in an interview; a friendly manner, and reassuring the respondent that where he or she wishes, his views would be kept confidential can also assist the interview process. In addition, using local examples to illustrate points, and taking one’s time so as not to rush the respondent are ways that the researcher can adapt a Western academic model to the African context.254 Such personal relationships, however, develop through prolonged exposure to the situation under examination. Fleeting visits, or even staying for a year or two as the basis on which the researcher establishes his academic authority merely invite sceptical attitudes from Africans and expatriates who have lived in Africa for a long time.255

In Africa, cross-cultural relationships and communication are of central importance. These only develop over a period as trust is developed. One’s own experience in

252 Cohen, p.44.
253 Most ECWA respondents were senior church leaders whom I have known as colleagues, or former students, for a number of years. These relationships permitted an open and frank exchange of views. In turn, this allowed different opinions to be expressed. Occasionally a particular respondent was suspected to be trying to evade questions or deny certain situations he was asked about. Political considerations, ethnic loyalties, or fear of retribution seemed to lie behind such responses. In general, however, most respondents seemed to be open and straightforward in their answers.
255 While the writer spent two years doing part-time field research this built on his previous sixteen years of missionary work and the knowledge and contacts he had made during those years. He sympathises with those who question the validity of research done by those with only fleeting acquaintance with Africa!
Nigeria is that outsiders are only trusted after they have been observed over a long period. Western models, stressing efficiency and swiftness of action, rarely fit into such societies that stress relationship, community, and patronage. Societies that are literature based, relying for historical records on documents and personal papers find it difficult to understand and accept the validity of oral records.

It is in this Nigerian context, therefore that Janvier writes:

A face-to-face culture like Nigeria is a natural setting for doing interviews and discussing opinions verbally as that is how problems have traditionally been solved. Westerners have an over reliance on paper and books so the interview and survey comes naturally for many people in the African setting.\(^{256}\)

Not only is this more culturally appropriate, but in a historically oral society it is often more successful in extracting useful data. One found that the amount of data volunteered through interviews was considerably greater than the rather scanty replies usually received from the same questions used in a questionnaire format. Such interview data can be supplemented with further questions to elucidate a point or to enquire further about something hinted at in the first reply. In addition busy people, as many of the respondents are, are more likely to answer verbally than to spend the time and effort to complete yet another form.

1.2 Questionnaire Design

Given the sensitivities of the subject, right from the start the researcher felt that it would be more appropriate to allow people to express themselves freely. When there has been so much bloodshed and strife it is inappropriate for an expatriate to be too directive in his questioning. It is far better to allow Nigerians to speak for themselves.

Furthermore, the discussion above concerning nomothetic and ideological theories of knowledge and their normal association with quantitative and qualitative research methods also indicated that it would be more academically appropriate to adopt an open-question format to the interviews and to the questionnaires.

Smith points out that closed-ended questions are best used, “to classify an individual’s attitude or behavior, on some clearly understood dimension”\(^{257}\) Clarity of understanding is precisely the problem with this topic. A number of reasons are...

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\(^{256}\) Janvier, G. How To Write a Theological Research Thesis, ACTS, Jos, Nigeria, 2000, p.64.
regularly proposed for the religious and ethnic conflicts in Nigeria and most seem to avoid the religious factor completely. Political and economic disputes centring around the issue of indigenes, access to political office, and land often seem favoured. It seemed to this researcher that the whole area of religious and ethnic disputes is neglected.

Furthermore, as Smith also points out, open-ended questions tend to make the respondent explain their views, whereas closed-ended questions generally provide an easier answer. In interviewing Nigerian Christians, a specific goal was to stimulate discussion on the premise that such discussion was more likely to reveal the respondent's real attitudes than in a rote-like manner repeating back to the interviewer popular prejudices.

As a first step in designing interview/questionnaire questions, the major elements essential to the project as a whole were identified. These are the following three research questions:

1. What was the social, cultural, and theological context within which the ECWA church was formed, and acquired its early leadership?

2. As the church has grown numerically has its theological and political views changed? What factors have influenced these changes?

3. How has the church applied its background to its relationships to Islam today? Question one looks backwards to the historical roots of ECWA both in examining the influence from SIM as well as from other cultural and political factors. Question two takes those historical roots and asks, “What has changed?” Question three then examines the contemporary situation seeking to understand ECWA's current views. In other words, in light of its past, how is ECWA doing theology today, not only in terms of evangelism and missions, but also in intellectual thought, social relationships, and political activism?

From these core research questions, the basic set of questions designed for ECWA leaders and members was then developed. In constructing these kinds of open-ended questions it is extremely important to build on what is familiar, as well as to eliminate bias or any hint thereof. The goal is to get the respondent to make the

259 See Appendix 1 for details. Alternative questionnaires, based on the three research questions and trying to stay as close as possible to the ECWA questionnaire, were designed for giving to other Christian leaders, SIM missionaries, and Muslims.
suggestions rather than the interviewer to suggest an answer. Only occasionally did the interviewer rephrase a question with the goal of clarifying it.

Under the first research area are seven questions. The first two are designed to put the respondent at ease by asking personal details such as their name and how they became Christians. Various sources in Nigeria had suggested that much of the violence from the “Christian” perspective had originated from nominal Christians. Asking how a person became a Christian would help to distinguish any such. The next three questions sought to ascertain the individual’s historical knowledge, their ethnic group, the impact of the Hausa/Fulani Muslims, and of the British colonial officials. The final two questions asked about SIM and ECWA teaching on Islam, and on current relationships between Christianity and Islam.

Under the second research area are six questions. The first two questions tried to ascertain if ECWA itself had changed in the last thirty years and, if such change was noticed, why it had taken place. The next three questions probed what had actually happened during the violence and what its effects are. The final question examined if ECWA really did practice what it preached.

Under the third research area are seven questions. The first four of these questions implicitly suggested some possible answers that ECWA might adopt. These included resorting to traditional religions and occult practices, Biblical teaching, dialogue, and political partition. The next two questions asked for suggestions as to how ECWA leaders and members could address the problem, particularly asking respondents to reflect on practical ways of loving your neighbour. Finally, an open question was asked to allow someone who might have some other suggestions to make, the opportunity to make such.

1.3 Sample selection
Drake argues that surveys tend to work best in highly urbanised, industrialised societies with far reaching media and an individualistic social structure with little, if any, primary groups beyond the nuclear family. Attitudes and beliefs are thus likely to vary considerably independent of common factors like age, sex, religion, or politics. That said there is enough social cohesion to make surveys a valid form of assessing opinions. Thus surveys are predicated on certain assumptions; assumptions reflecting Westernised urban societies.
By contrast, in traditional societies the social structures are quite different. Division of labour can be much simpler, while status may be considerably more important.

Social roles in such a system are far less segmented and interdependent, and community cohesion is based instead on far more homogeneous value and cognitive characteristics. Indeed, in one sense the individual is not at all an appropriate response unit in some communities of this type. Rather, the community headman or lineage leader would be far more appropriate, since he speaks for a highly homogeneous community or kinship grouping who differ little among themselves on role characteristics and issues.²⁶⁰

The opinions of leaders in this kind of society, therefore, have considerable importance. An early feature of colonial rule, especially over non-Muslim ethnic groups, was their disregard for the local leaders preferring to install their own choices as chiefs instead.²⁶¹ Often the true village or tribal head was also the religious leader, the person popularly known as the “witch-doctor”. The arrival of Christianity replaced this “witch-doctor” with the pastor, the minister, or the priest. Drake’s argument, that in such corporate societies, one should concentrate on the leaders, ties in very well with the researcher’s finding that religious and traditional leaders, whether in interviews or questionnaires, provided the most data-rich responses.

Therefore, a major key to understanding ECWA attitudes is to listen to ECWA leaders and their contemporaries from other denominations. A detailed breakdown of the various leaders interviewed is included below, and the bibliography contains a list of their names and positions.

These people²⁶² were drawn from a wide variety of regions within Nigeria from Kano in the north to Lokoja on the Niger-Benue confluence, from Potiskum, Billiri, and Gombe north-east of Jos to Abuja, the Federal Capital which is almost in the geographical centre of Nigeria. Their spread of ethnic identity, their status, and their central leadership roles within the denomination indicate the geographical and ideological comprehensiveness of this study. One could be confident that, for the most part, these were men in tune with their church members and able to accurately reflect what the general feeling in the church was at the time we talked.

²⁶⁰ Drake, H.M., ‘Research Method or Culture-bound Technique? Pitfalls of Survey Research in Africa,’ in W.M. O’Barr, D.H. Spain, & M.A. Tessler (eds), Survey Research in Africa: ... 1973, p.64 ...
²⁶¹ For example, the creation of Warrant Chiefs among the Igbo in south-east Nigeria. The Igbo, who are traditionally republican in political organisation, did not take kindly to this imposition.
²⁶² The leadership of ECWA is male-dominated. The Zumantar Mata (Women’s Fellowship) has a very influential role in funding the church, and has its own autonomous structure. However, none of ECWA’s elders or ministers are female. A few theologically trained women, however, lecture in ECWA’s theological institutions. One or two women were interviewed elsewhere.
Of course, such leaders are not without their own faults and biases. In order to broaden the range of people consulted in the study firstly questionnaires were distributed among some ECWA DCC leaders and, secondly, among some church members from across northern and central Nigeria.\textsuperscript{263} While the data recovered from these questionnaires was relatively sparse, the responses or lack thereof, plus opinions expressed about ECWA leadership by some of those interviewed are also helpful. These surveys, interviews with other Christian leaders outside ECWA, and surveys and interviews of some SIM missionaries also serve as a control with which to evaluate the answers from ECWA leaders. Evaluating these responses, however, would be difficult without the aid and the background provided through various forms of library and archival research.

2. Library, Archive & Electronic Resources

Since undertaking the above-mentioned M.Th, research methods have changed considerably. The information explosion accompanying the growth of the internet has opened up considerably more, easily accessible sources of information. In addition to the facilities of the local university library, internet access has helped provide access to a number of Nigerian newspapers and magazines, and has begun to provide access to SIM’s own archives, based at SIM’s International Headquarters in Fort Mill, South Carolina.

Internet-based research brings with it a fresh set of challenges. By their nature, internet sources are somewhat selective, depending on the relevant publishers and archivists who choose which articles to publish electronically, and how much to charge for access to the articles. There is the danger that the information sought is manipulated, through editorial bias, or via monetary means to favour one particular view or another. However, any time a scholar consults another scholar’s work, or cites a newspaper or magazine article he or she must also take into account the author’s or publishers bias. In addition, scholarly magazines and books have to be paid for. It is no different in this respect for the internet.

Nevertheless, the nature of the internet where one tends to consult one article at a time does restrict the scholar’s ability also to scan other related articles in the same

\textsuperscript{263} While interviewing lay church members would have been extremely helpful, time and financial constraints, both on the researcher and on the lay people, precluded such. Focusing on leaders was the most feasible option.
publication that may in turn prompt further investigation. This lack of cross-fertilization of ideas can excessively narrow the focus of one’s work.

The same phenomena are also true of consulting archival websites. Editorial bias may not be the problem although restrictive archival rules may well be. However, especially where the original material has been electronically scanned, the scholar depends on the archivist scanning the complete article, together with all relevant publication data. There is nothing more frustrating than to discover an interesting article from which the publication data or the last few paragraphs are missing.

Library access is still crucial. Interlibrary loan through Queen’s University library, as well as access to the Jos ECWA Theological Seminary (JETS) library was very helpful. While doing field research in Nigeria, the writer visited both the National Archives, and the Arewa House Archives in Kaduna. The ECWA General Secretary kindly granted access to ECWA’s own fledgling archive. Various individuals also provided access to materials they personally possessed.

After returning to the UK in June 2007, the researcher proceeded in August 2007 to visit the SIM archives in the United States. Access to materials from these archives has been crucial to this research. With the help of some friends, material was gathered, and some further interviews conducted with retired SIM leaders. It was helpful that during the researcher’s visit SIM revised its archival access policies replacing the forty-year embargo with a twenty-five year embargo. This permitted examination of material from after the Nigerian Civil War. The only drawback was that while SIM is currently developing its archives in a professional manner, there seemed to be considerable gaps in material available. The vagaries of a tropical climate on written material could well be one reason for this.\footnote{Written records in the Nigerian National Archives in Kaduna occasionally were crumbling away when the author visited.} One’s own experience of the practical nature, and lack of historical sensitivity of typical missionaries, plus anecdotal discussions with Dr Geysbeek, the SIM Archivist, suggested that potentially useful material might have been disposed of as office records were culled. SIM currently encourages the collation of a wide variety of material: publications, director’s files, personal letters etc. Unfortunately, there is no mission wide records-management policy with each office determining what material should be sent, and
when. Sometimes minutes have been thrown out when the filing cabinet got too full, another office, by contrast, scanned their files and forwarded digital copies. 265

3. The Field Research Process

The process of doing field-based research is also instructive. The writer conducted field research, on a part-time basis, from July 2005 until June 2007 based in the central Nigerian city of Jos. The remaining time was engaged in managerial and theological education roles. 266

The researcher’s previous experience in the ECWA theological education system had brought him in contact with about one thousand students many of whom are ministers in ECWA churches, or hold senior administrative positions at District Church Council (DCC) or ECWA Executive level. He also discussed his research or interviewed a number of colleagues with whom he had worked for some years. Former students and colleagues were extremely helpful volunteering to complete questionnaires themselves, allocating time in their busy schedules for interviews, and facilitating other interviews or distribution of questionnaires. The original plan was to interview some of these leaders, as well as develop a questionnaire to administer to a number of students at a couple of ECWA theological seminaries. The same questionnaire was also to be administered to sample populations in three ECWA churches in Jos, Kaduna, and Kano. 267 In addition, using e-mail a questionnaire would be distributed to serving and former SIM Nigeria missionaries who either were involved in theological education or led the mission.

3.1 Interviews

The actual process of doing the interviews worked out differently. To begin with, the discussion above about qualitative research, and open-ended questions, led to the conclusion that the same set of questions should be used for both interviews and questionnaires with all ECWA personnel. The same information was after all, being


266 During the first year, the researcher assisted in the SIM Nigeria office 3 days a week, with a further day given to lecturing at the Jos ECWA Theological Seminary and a day for research, although often research was undertaken over weekends as well. Office work was flexible enough to allow occasional research trips. During the second year, several trips were taken in July 2006, before the researcher acted up as the SIM Nigeria Personnel Manager until April 2007. During this period, research was generally confined to evenings, the occasional day, and weekends. Most of May 2006 was devoted to research including final interviews.

267 These cities were chosen on two grounds: firstly that ECWA has a prominent presence in them, and secondly, that they had all experienced major outbreaks of inter-religious violence.
sought from each of the ECWA groups. A related set of questions was developed for use with SIM personnel. Following advice to obtain the views of Christians from other Nigerian denominations, a similar set of questions was developed. The writer interviewed thirty-nine ECWA members. Ten of these were serving or retired ECWA Executive members. Eleven were clergy and lay people directly involved in evangelism among Muslims. Four were non-governmental organisations (NGO’s) leaders involved in dialogue and peace-building efforts. Six were university or seminary lecturers. Five were traditional rulers, two were ECWA Trustees, and one was a Hausa lady who had converted from Islam. The writer also interviewed thirteen church leaders from other Christian denominations, including Anglican, Catholic, Lutheran, Church of Christ in Nigeria (COCIN), Baptist and Methodist backgrounds. In no case was a request for an interview refused. Interviews with Muslims were more difficult to arrange perhaps because of the heightened suspicions and tensions current in Jos. Friends at the University of Jos helped to arrange for three Muslim scholars to be interviewed. Details of all interviewees, including where possible, their positions, are included in the bibliography.

The researcher conducted the interviews. Prior to conducting the interview one explained that the respondent should indicate if a particular reply or portion thereof should be off the record. Interviews were normally in English. In only one situation was an interview conducted in Hausa with a Nigerian church leader translating between the researcher and the respondent. As and when needed the researcher felt it appropriate to probe respondents’ answers a little further by asking a supplementary question.

In almost every case, respondents’ answers were immediately entered on a laptop computer. In only one case was an electronic recording made, primarily due to the interview taking place at 10 p.m. Using the laptop immediately in this way came about through Janvier’s recommendation not to use tape recorders or electronic recorders as he regards them as culturally insensitive in the Nigerian context. Most interviews lasted about one hour. In certain cases, either because of the respondent’s schedule or health a selection was made out of the set questions thus shortening the time required.

268 The eight ECWA Trustees hold an extremely powerful position in the ECWA structure. They are the legal owners of ECWA and guarantee its continuity and direction. They often serve as impartial advisers and referees when problems and disputes arise within their regions. They are highly respected across the denomination.

3.1.1 ECWA Interviews

Three primary criteria determined the selection of ECWA interviewees. The first was relevant leadership responsibilities. The writer consciously sought out those in leadership positions, both religious and lay, who would be able to represent the views of ECWA members affected by the violence. For example, three ECWA Trustees who represented three of the geographical areas most affected by the violence were approached. Two were interviewed, while the third, completed an extremely detailed questionnaire that he e-mailed to the writer. Current and former members of the ECWA Executive, which is responsible for the day-to-day operation of the denomination, were also interviewed. Traditional rulers in southern Kaduna, all members of ECWA, were recommended as people who could speak of how the violence had impacted their people. Often theological institutions are good places to gauge the views of a wide variety of church leaders, hence a number of theological educators were interviewed.

The second criterion was to look for people who are para-church leaders, or involved in evangelistic outreach to Muslims, or had been involved in some form of dialogue process. The writer already knew some of these prior to commencing interviews. Others, the writer only became aware of as he discussed his research with Nigerian and Western colleagues who would recommend contacting certain individuals. This dynamic approach ensured that feedback from colleagues and other interested parties was incorporated into the on-going research process, thus making the information gathered relevant and recent. Making contacts in this way also helped to incorporate diverse views revealing a wider perspective among ECWA leaders than that obtainable solely from the establishment figures.

The third criterion was to look for people who had personally experienced this religious violence, whether through relatives killed, property destroyed, or narrowly escaping rioters themselves. Some of these people were discovered through the above recommendation process. Others were only revealed as they were questioned in the interviews.
3.1.2 Other Christian Leaders
Church leaders from other denominations were selected on a similar basis. For example, the Catholic Archbishop of Jos is involved with inter-religious dialogue. Contrarily, Muslim rioters have attacked the Anglican Archbishop of Jos or his family three times, because of his forthright opinions on the conflict. The then Deputy Provost of the Theological College of Northern Nigeria was that institution’s Islamic expert, and formerly a member of ECWA. As mentioned above, they were from a wide variety of ecclesiastical denominations. Most were in a position to speak as church leaders for their denominations. Some were involved in different forms of dialogue processes themselves. Some had personal experience of riots, mostly on the receiving end, but in one case participating in violent action against Muslims.

3.1.3 Interviewing Muslims
The levels of inter-religious suspicion in Jos arising from the 2001 riots meant that while interviewing Muslims was necessary it was also difficult. Increasingly the Christian and Muslim communities live apart and have little contact with each other except through work. Nor, despite visiting the main Muslim bookshop in Jos was it easy to find much in English that addressed these conflicts. Thankfully, through friends at the University of Jos, contacts were made with three Muslim leaders, two of them faculty members of the Religious Studies Department in the university, and the other an official with the Jama’atu Nasril Islamiyya (JNI).

3.2 Questionnaire Responses
A flexible approach to the research was often essential. Haphazard petrol and electricity supplies, security issues and increasing work pressures necessitated adapting original plans to respond to the changing situation. Thus, instead of a second trip to Kaduna to conduct a survey in a church, the questionnaire was e-mailed to the church’s minister and he arranged for twenty copies to be distributed with nine returned to Jos, a 45% response rate. Other opportunities included a trip eastwards to Gombe State in July 2006 with an opportunity to meet most of the leaders of the ECWA Gombe DCC and discuss with them the pressures they are under from Islamic radicals.

270 Rev. Yunusa Nmadu, ECWA Good News Church, Ungwar Rimi, ECWA Kaduna Central DCC. This church, in northern Kaduna City, was chosen because it is located in a predominantly Muslim area. Due to past violence, most Christians in Kaduna prefer to live in southern Kaduna City.

271 On arrival in Nigeria, it became clear that Gombe city and state also fit into the criteria of being an area where ECWA has a prominent presence, and was currently experiencing religious violence. Similar
members, both male and female, to complete. Three were returned, a 30% response rate. Later that same month came a trip to Kano, opportunities to meet key church leaders who had first hand experience of persecution by Muslims, and also to distribute fifteen questionnaires in the main English-speaking ECWA church there. Six of these questionnaires were returned, a 40% response rate. Other opportunities developed within Jos. Twice yearly the Chairmen and Secretaries from all of ECWA’s DCC’s come to Jos for church meetings. Up to half of these men had been students in the two institutions the researcher had worked at. Ideally, one would have preferred to interview them, either in Jos or in their DCC offices. However, the scheduling of their meetings in Jos ruled out the former, while the distant locations many had come from, and their frequent travelling around their districts made the latter option extremely difficult. On being approached, twenty-five were willing to take away and complete a questionnaire. Twenty-one of these questionnaires were returned, an 84% response rate. Fifteen questionnaires were distributed to women and youth at the ECWA Seminary Church, Jos, and five questionnaires to some graduate students at JETS. The Jos women and youth returned three questionnaires, a 20% response rate, while the graduate students’ response rate was 100%. In total, ninety questionnaires were distributed among ECWA members and adherents, and forty-seven were returned, a 52.2% return. In tabular form, this is as follows:

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272 The questionnaires were left with Rev. Bulus Micah Yaute, the Assistant Secretary of ECWA Gombe DCC and minister of ECWA Good News Church, Gombe GRA where they were distributed.

273 Meetings continually over-ran, and usually went on late into the night. The DCC officials sought to wind up their meetings as soon as possible so that they could return to their homes as soon as possible.

274 Numbers of DCC delegates completing these questionnaires could have been much higher but for one’s attempt to ration the questionnaire distribution to one person per DCC. This was not always possible to achieve.
Responses by SIM missionaries were quite varied. The numbers of SIM missionaries currently working among Muslims, or familiar with the issues has declined from hundreds to a handful since the 1970s. Some of these were interviewed. However, it was much more difficult to obtain responses from retired or former SIM missionaries to whom the questionnaire was sent out. Where possible, individuals who had worked in Nigeria were e-mailed the questionnaire. In addition, while in the United States, the researcher was able to conduct some phone interviews with a number of retired SIM missionaries. Many of these retired missionaries felt they could provide little useful data because either they had been away from Nigeria for a considerable time, or that they had not worked amongst Muslims. However, one was conscious that these were only those who could be contacted. Many could not be because no one currently working with SIM had their contact details. Occasionally someone would forward on the questionnaire to someone else, or suggest a name. In general, however, one was conscious of a tremendous turnover in SIM missionaries and a failure to maintain contact with those who had left the mission prior to retirement. The mission’s vast expansion into a worldwide operation through mergers with other mission organisations has brought with it a large number of people with little knowledge of, nor interest in, SIM’s history.

### Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondents</th>
<th>Numbers Distributed</th>
<th>Numbers Returned</th>
<th>Percentage Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DCC officials</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gombe</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kano</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaduna</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jos</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JETS Graduate Students</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>90</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>52.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

275 Various individuals either personally asked to complete the questionnaires or asked to pass a questionnaire on to someone else for completion. No attempt was made to track how many of these were distributed. If they were returned, the data was incorporated into the study.

276 This figure does not include the 6 miscellaneous responses received as no attempt was made to track the distribution of these questionnaires.

277 It was interesting to see from their responses how different areas that had been almost entirely non-Muslim when these missionaries had worked there now had a substantial Islamic presence. A reflection perhaps of better internal communications and trade, or of substantial southward pressure by the Hausa/Fulani due to the desertification of the far North, or of population growth among the Hausa/Fulani and with it political pressures to Islamise?

278 In the last thirty years, SIM has merged with, among others, the Andes Evangelical Mission, International Christian Fellowship, and African Evangelical Fellowship. It also co-operates with a number of other organisations, and seeks to develop missionary outreach from countries that traditionally...
3.3 Relationships

In response to Cohen’s raising of problems with qualitative research relationships were identified above as central to the successful completion of the qualitative research process in Africa. This was particularly evident in responses to this research process. The successful return of questionnaires appears to be in direct proportion to the individual relationship between the researcher and the respondent. Interviews proved to be the most data rich sources of information, followed by questionnaires distributed among church leaders. Lay church members completing questionnaires generally submitted the least amount of data.

To an extent, this reflected the researcher’s insider-outsider status. As noted above his long experience in ECWA’s theological education system provided many of the contacts for interviews as well as distribution of questionnaires. The data provided through these contacts was richer and more comprehensive than that provided from questionnaires distributed among laity with whom there was little or no relationship. Perhaps to them the researcher was at best a remote missionary with whom they had little regular contact or just an inquisitive bature (white man). As with all cultures, how can an outsider really understand?  

This pattern of results is also consistent with Nigerian cultural traits. The lengthy responses from interviews and the relatively limited information obtainable from most of the questionnaires reflects the oral culture traditions in many parts of Nigeria in which people who wax eloquently and knowledgeable on a subject find it difficult, or impossible, to put the same information into writing.

In addition, personal relationships are central to the smooth operation of Nigerian organisations. Sometimes, as will be seen in Smith’s discussion of the patron-client phenomenon, such can lead to corruption. At other times, these relationships smooth or hinder the progress of legitimate work. The most data was obtained where the researcher and respondent met and discussed, and thus could form a

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279 Students taught by the researcher at JETS would occasionally suggest to him that as a white man he could never understand the ethnic divisions endemic to life in Nigeria. The researcher’s usual response was to point them to the ethnic divisions endemic to his ancestral homeland of Northern Ireland!

relationship. The second most useful group was where the researcher and the respondent knew each other.

As mentioned, lay responses yielded the least amount of data. However, as Cohen noted in his remarks on the salience of data quoted above, even the absence of data is also informative possibly indicating ignorance, distrust, or lack of interest. A gender-specific factor might also be a reason for this. While the researcher did not exclude men from the lay group, given that most interviewees were middle-aged or older men, he specifically sought information from women and youth. When discussing the research with church leaders the researcher stressed the importance of hearing from these groups. Unfortunately, women and youth were considerably less responsive than the men were. One comment reported back from youth in the Jos church was that before answering the questionnaire they needed to study their own history! This was despite explanations that such was not required to complete the questionnaire. To help the process in Jos the researcher met a group of women in the Jos church to explain the questionnaire further. Most were still unresponsive, seemingly uninterested, or too busy. Elsewhere occasionally women were reticent to complete the questionnaire or be interviewed because they felt their views did not really matter. This correlated with the researcher’s own experience of female students at JETS who often did not perform well academically. This did not seem to be because of their inability, but more a combination of cultural pressures where women were not expected to do well, combined with traditional expectations regarding the role of a wife and mother in the home.

The researcher attempted to address the personal relationship issue by personally asking for assistance. As mentioned above, this failed to work in Jos. It was more successful in the ECWA English church in Kano, where there was an opportunity to address a church meeting, thus allowing people to put a face to a name, and decide to respond to one’s appeal for assistance. In Kaduna and Gombe the more indirect approach of working through a church’s pastor produced even more marginal results. In particular, several anonymous responses from Kaduna were notable for expressing their distrust of the whole process.

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281 The concept of youth in Nigeria often stretches from teenagers up to people about 30 years old. Generally, youth are unmarried. They tend also to be the group that is likely to be most violent.
282 There seemed to be a departure from studying history at this time in Nigeria. ECWA’s new Bingham University, (then located in Jos and now at its permanent site outside Abuja) failed to attract any applicants for its proposed history courses whereas the university’s business classes were said to be very popular.
It is difficult to ascertain whether data obtained was accurate or not. Data diversity is to be expected in the open-ended qualitative research process. Even long-standing relationships with various contacts did not guarantee that each individual would be entirely truthful. For example, responses varied when questioned about rumours of occult practices in the violence in Yelwa-Shendam. Some quite openly acknowledged their ignorance of the rumour; others accepted that the rumours were true and they were involved in counselling those who had participated; some hesitated before accepting the truth of the rumours, while at least one individual, who came from the area, flatly denied anything of the sort had taken place. These responses aptly illustrate the researcher’s insider-outsider position. The insider status gave access, and generally truthful responses. The outsider status of being a European missionary meant that there was always a question as to how much information, and how accurate information to provide. It is an on-going tension in relationships between expatriate missionaries and Nigerians, with the former feeling that they were the last to find out what was happening, and the latter hesitant to reveal too much perhaps fearing negative consequences. Discretion, as noted above, can be the better part of valour.

4. Data Presentation

The methodological background and the aims and objectives of the research process having been set out, it is now time to present and offer some preliminary analysis of the data. However, the volume of data obtained from the interviews and questionnaires was such that it required a chapter devoted exclusively to such. Chapter Four is such a chapter.

Unfortunately, many expatriate missionaries do little to discover what is happening around them, content to do their immediate jobs, and to live and socialise almost entirely within the expatriate community. They have little knowledge of the Nigerian religious scene, of Nigerian history, or current affairs.
Chapter Four
Detailed Responses

1. Introduction.

In order to analyse properly the data obtained from the interviews and questionnaires, the researcher divided the responses into four different groups. These are ECWA interviews, ECWA questionnaires, Other Christian responses, and finally SIM responses. The three Muslim responses will be incorporated later into the text in subsequent discussion. Within each of these sections, responses may be further sub-divided according to appropriate categories. For example, within Questionnaire Responses, an appropriate sub-division would be between clergy and laity, as any smaller a sub-division would make the sample size for each section too small to analyse.

Within each group of sub-divisions each question answered was then analysed by the researcher attempting, as far as possible to categorise the answer or answers given by the respondent. A distinction should be made between respondent and responses, with respondents frequently offering more than one response to a particular question. This distinction is noted in the explanatory text. When all answers to a particular question across the group or sub-division had been noted and recorded, the researcher tried to group the answers into categories that presented themselves naturally from the answers given. An interpretive paragraph was then written to include the resulting numerical information. Each paragraph is also illustrated by means of a straightforward bar graph.

2. ECWA Interviews

This section analyses those responses obtained from interviews with ECWA clergy and lay leaders. Twenty-six of these were clergy and thirteen were lay.

As mentioned previously, at the time of their interview, ten were serving or former members of ECWA’s Executive. Eleven were involved in some kind of evangelistic work among Muslims. Four worked in three non-governmental organisations (NGO’s) concerned with building better inter-religious relationships. Six were theological
educators. Five were traditional rulers. Two were ECWA Trustees, and one was a Hausa lady who had converted from Islam.

2.1 What was the social, cultural and theological context in which the ECWA church has developed and its leadership has been formed?
Each individual clearly identified themselves and their employment status, whether in the church or elsewhere. Their geographical spread is shown in the following table.

<table>
<thead>
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<th>State of Origin</th>
<th>State of Residence (if different)</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bauchi</td>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benue</td>
<td>Plateau</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gombe</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaduna</td>
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<td>Kano</td>
<td>1 x Plateau, 2 x Kano</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Plateau</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nassarawa</td>
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<td>Ogun</td>
<td>Kano</td>
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<td>Plateau</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Plateau</td>
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<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>39</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As to be expected, and in keeping with ECWA’s evangelical theological views, all of these people could point to a specific conversion experience. Ten became Christians while at school, eleven through hearing an evangelistic sermon, whether it be in church, or at specific evangelistic meetings, or on the radio, and fourteen through the personal witness of other Christians, whether it be at home, or via friends or SIM missionaries or ECWA evangelists. One had a dream in which Christ gave him an ultimatum, another heard the voice of God speaking, one worked his way through the Qur’an and the Bible before coming to faith, and one became a Christian while at
Bible School training for Christian ministry. Most spoke quite warmly of their conversion experience, it meant a lot to them. Contrastingly, a couple of lay respondents, spoke of their conversion experience in a rather matter-of-fact manner making one wonder about the nature of the experience they professed to have undergone.

Ethnically they are quite diverse. Most could identify their ethnic group and speak of that group’s origins. In general, the older the individual, the better informed they were of their ethnic origins and history. Groups included Amo, Bajju x 4, Buji, Fadan Fantswam, Fulani x 2, Gbagyi, Gong, Hausa x 2, Igbo, Jaba, Kagoro x 4, Kaka, Kaninkon, Kare Kare x 3, Kataf x 1, Longuda, Mada, Miship, Moroa, Ngass, Ogon, Tangale x 3, Tera, Tiv, Waja, and Yoruba x 2. Most of these respondents are from minority ethnic groups, traditionally resistant to the Hausa/Fulani policies of conquest, enslavement, and Islamization.

When asked about the impact of the Hausa/Fulani on their ethnic group reactions were varied. Among the thirty-five respondents who are not Hausa-Fulani, nineteen responses referred to a tradition of stoutly resisting Hausa-Fulani attacks, through a combination of effective military action and shrewd use of natural defences. Six of these respondents also spoke of repeated slave raiding by the Hausa-Fulani and their occasional successes in such. A further ten responses suggested that historically the Hausa/Fulani had little or no influence on their people as either their tradition of living on top of hills, or the remoteness of their homelands had enabled them to live free of conquest. Thirteen responses referred to the spread of Hausa culture, language, and political domination. Hausa is the main trade language spoken

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284 This is not an uncommon occurrence. The author is aware of a number of other ministers with a similar story. One of those interviewed had actually completed his theological training with ECWA and was doing graduate studies in America when a friend explained to him how to become a Christian.

285 To be fair, not all enslavement was the result of raids. Family members would sometimes be sold into slavery because of the effects of drought or as a disciplinary measure. Later they might be purchased back, or set free when too old and of no further use to their owners.
throughout Northern Nigeria and is taught in the primary schools. The Hausa-Fulani have also traditionally exercised political control since the British imposition of the Indirect Rule system. Conquest, by either the Hausa-Fulani or the British and the subsequent imposition of Islamic rule and religion was mentioned in eleven responses. Three responses referred to past trading links and cooperation between their ethnic groups and the Hausa-Fulani, and two referred to current radical forms of Islam. Two of the three Hausa or Fulani respondents who converted from Islam spoke of the myths relating to the origins of their ethnic groups, while the third was not acquainted with Fulani history. Five respondents are converts from Islam and two others are members of religiously mixed families.

A majority of respondents perceived British colonial rule in negative terms. Twenty-five responses complained of British conquest and subjugation of the land was bloody, especially the massacre of the Kare Kare people. Indirect Rule imposed Hausa-Fulani Muslim rulers who enforced taxes, forced labour, and government-run education systems were markedly pro-Islamic. Four responses were neutral or made no comment. Eighteen responses referred to the enforcement of the pax Britannica permitting trade, stopping slavery, and encouraging the introduction of education, better infrastructure, western medicine, cash crops, and the introduction of Christianity.
Teaching about Islam and how to relate to Muslims in many situations was very limited or non-existent. Fourteen responses referred to little or no teaching from SIM, and a similar number of responses stated the same for ECWA. Sometimes this was because there was either very little Islam in some areas, or simply that the violence has been a recent development: one respondent noted a major deterioration in Islamic tolerance of Christian evangelism from the oil boom of the early 1970s. What teaching did take place tended to stress either building relationships with Muslims through medical and educational work, or simply the need for Muslims to be evangelised: the two methods are not, in practice, mutually exclusive as the former, and a loving attitude was needed to gain an opportunity for the latter. Thus, seven responses referred to SIM’s creation of hospitals and schools, and eight responses to SIM’s stress on evangelism. Eleven responses referred to ECWA stressing building relationships and eight to evangelism. Four responses spoke of SIM encouraging their converts to have nothing to do with Islam: often Islam and the Hausa trader were seen as synonymous. Seven responses spoke of ECWA encouraging people to defend themselves and their property from attacks by Muslim rioters, although this categorisation also incorporates references to growing hatred of Muslims after the Maitatsine riots. One response referred to the theological differences between Muslims and Christians regarding the person and status of Christ.

When asked about the current state of Muslim-Christian relations thirty-seven responses were negative. Many regretted this state of affairs attributing it variously to
political competition, or the growth in radical Islam locating the beginnings of such variously from the mid-1970s to the early 1980s. Because of the tendency for many Nigerian ethnic groups to identify with one or other of the religions, these religious tensions had merged with ethnic tensions. Within these thirty-seven responses six responses recognised that the distrust and enmity was on both sides, and a further six responses felt that the average Christian’s hostility towards Muslims was not right, was not biblical. Nine responses complained of on-going anti-Christian discrimination in traditionally Muslim-dominated states, or of Muslims causing the riots often to advance their own causes such as the imposition of Shari’ah law. In addition to the thirty-seven responses, eleven responses referred positively to ordinary social relationships between Muslims and Christians, sometimes only in historical reminiscences but also to current friendships, or work and family relationships: relationships that can easily be ignored when the focus is on the issues that divide. Two responses regarded the situation as an example of divine sovereignty suggesting that the conflict was a sign of the progressive breakdown of Islamic resistance to the Christian gospel. Three responses stressed the need for continued Christian evangelism of Muslims, a view acknowledged by a number to be increasingly unpopular, as many Christians want little or nothing to do with Muslims whom they categorise as enemies.

2.2 In what ways has ECWA’s theological and political attitudes developed and changed over the years?

When asked about changes in ECWA since 1980 twenty responses spoke of increasing spiritual lethargy and factionalism. This included such issues as a marked decline in interest in evangelism, and increasingly ethnically dominated internal politics. These seem also to be related to the eighteen responses that spoke, usually in admiring terms of ECWA’s organisational growth and development. Over the
years, ECWA’s organisational structure has grown in sophistication and in its ability to harness and employ the church’s financial resources. This has borne positive fruit in better-educated clergy and a wider range of church organisations offering medical, agricultural, developmental, and evangelistic services. Yet the very institutionalisation of the church means it has lost its dynamism: the thirteen responses speaking of church growth tended to reflect back on how the church has grown, rather than its current plans for growth. Organisational growth has not been accompanied by theological development. Thirteen responses spoke of the influence of other denominations on ECWA. These were mostly generic references to Pentecostal worship styles, although three respondents referred to what one called “new wave” Pentecostal churches including prosperity gospel teaching and associated preaching styles. One reference was to an increasing Episcopal influence on ECWA. As for any form of response, theological or otherwise to the conflict situation, seven responses suggested there had been none. Instead, five responses spoke of increased participation in party politics, a further five responses referred to calls for vigorous, if necessary violent, self-defence, and two responses to a growing sense of insecurity among Christians that was driving them to the churches. Two responses failed to comment on this question and a further response referred to pacifism.

So what churches have influenced ECWA? Clearly, the most significant influence, mentioned by thirty responses, was that of Pentecostal language and worship styles. Particularly in English speaking churches and among the youth, Pentecostal styles of music, prayer, liturgy, and preaching have become normative. Fifteen responses noticed that accompanying this Pentecostalisation of worship has been the growth of certain Pentecostal doctrinal beliefs, including public speaking in tongues, prosperity gospel, the extension of the efficacy of the blood of Christ from the atonement to every aspect of life, and an increasingly literal interpretation of the Word of God.
Three responses mentioned Anglican influences, two Catholic influences, and three responses various ecumenical influences, chiefly from the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) and New Life for All (NLFA). Three responses suggested there had been no influence from other churches on ECWA. Eight responses were more concerned about various secular influences on the church. By contrast, ten responses pointed to how ECWA was influencing others through its roles in evangelism, theological education, doctrinal standards, and church government. Two responses felt there was a mutual influencing between ECWA and other churches and one made no comment.

When asked about their personal experience of the violence twenty-six responses spoke of friends and colleagues who had been killed while a further eight referred to the deaths of their own relatives. With the former, occasionally the deaths referred to were of the same people. With the latter, occasionally these were multiple deaths. Several had narrowly escaped with their own lives. Fifteen responses mentioned either in personal or in general terms, the loss of property including burning of churches, the loss of lives, and the religious segregation of neighbourhoods the violence had brought. Ten responses highlighted the relatively poor responses of the churches to violent incidents. Various reasons for this were suggested including low morale and stagnation, corruption and the inadequate provision of relief, political point-scoring, inadequate theology, and anti-Muslim attitudes. Seven responses referred to developing a more pro-active approach including practical measures like building fire-resistant churches on separate sites from church manses, good publicity and political involvement, plus intelligence gathering, as well as longer term theological approaches such as helping people to forgive, and keeping up an emphasis on evangelising Muslims. Two felt the violence had not been so much persecution of Christians as religious war, and there was nothing more terrible than religious war.
There was an almost equal division between politics and religion with twenty-nine responses citing religion as the reason for the violence and twenty-seven citing politics. Economic reasons such as poverty and control of land came third with eighteen responses and only five responses alluded to ethnic issues. What seemed to be uppermost in most interviewees' minds was the way many political and traditional leaders exploited religious sentiment, poverty, and ignorance to stir up violence in the expectation that when the dust had settled they could reap the political benefit. Some of these leaders seemed primarily motivated by their personal desire for power, others by their own religious zeal. After all, in Islam there is no distinction between religion and politics: Muslims believe that the Islamic faith should provide the context within which politics operates. It is interesting, however, to notice the lesser importance given to economic and especially to ethnic factors. Grievances from these sources there certainly are, but they could be resolved if there was the political and religious will to do so. However, politics and religion would appear to be a priori factors that determine responses to economic and ethnic issues, not vice versa.

Have Christian attitudes changed? Unanimously all of the interviewees accepted they had. Twenty-five responses spoke of Christians being more suspicious of Muslims, trusting them considerably less and being much more assertive of their civil and political rights. Because of this, four responses noted a decline in evangelistic
interest among Christians: to paraphrase one response, it is a bit hard to fight Muslims and then preach to them! Eight referred to antagonistic attitudes: Christians felt they were in a religious war and hated their enemies. By contrast, eight responses spoke of the Christians’ obligation to love and forgive their Muslim neighbours for the violence. A further six responses mentioned the search, by both Muslims and Christians for an end to the violence through the creation of peace committees and various types of dialogue. Three responses talked of their perception of Islam’s demonic nature, and two responses each spoke of democratic politics forcing through change, and of the increasingly compromised lifestyles that Christians were leading.

Is ECWA hypocritical in its approach to Christian-Muslim relations, saying one thing, and doing another? Opinions were divided. Eleven interviewees felt ECWA was hypocritical, with a few illustrating their responses by speaking of their frustrations with ECWA's internal politicking or their perceptions of inconsistent lifestyles allegedly followed by considerable numbers of ECWA members. A further eleven interviewees did not feel that ECWA was being hypocritical. People may fail to live up to ideals because of their ignorance or mistakes, but no one was being deliberately Machiavellian. Fourteen interviewees tried to take a balanced approach crediting positive behaviour where they saw it, while decrying negative actions and attitudes. Attitudes can and do change according to location, the influence of individual leaders, and historical events. Three interviewees made no comment. One of these was not asked the question due to his health, and the researcher felt, after reviewing the rest of their responses, that the other two no comments implied that they believed ECWA to be hypocritical.
2.3 How can ECWA contribute to a solution of the Christian-Muslim divide in Nigeria?

Different groups and individuals have proposed various solutions to the violence problem. This section seeks to determine responses to these.

During the period the interviews were being conducted, rumours began to circulate about “Christians” resorting to occult practices in their attack on Muslims in Yelwa-Shendam. The first question seeks feedback on these rumours. Seven responses acknowledged the truth of the rumours, speaking from their own personal knowledge of what had happened. A further eleven had not seen or heard any evidence of such. Fourteen responses pointed out that resorting to these methods had been common when minority groups had defended themselves from Muslim attacks before colonialism, and it was not, therefore, surprising that people resorted to such methods in a time of crisis. Some referred to other bouts of violence they had experienced. Thirty responses felt that it was wrong for Christians to resort to occult practices. Doing so was a sign of a lack of Biblical understanding, and a failure to trust God in the situation. Agreeing with this, twenty-one responses suggested that nominal Christians were most likely to be at fault. There needed to be a re-definition of what the term Christian means: as it is, the term was being used to describe anyone who is not a Muslim.

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286 Due to his age and ill health, the late HRH Dr Gwamna Awan, Chief of Kagoro was not asked any questions in this section. This reduces the interview pool to 38 for this sector.
When asked about Biblical teaching on relating to enemies thirty responses spoke quite clearly about loving enemies, praying for them and doing good to them. Not many of these actually gave practical examples of such. Seven mentioned feeding enemies, and five the hope that by loving and feeding their enemies they will be converted. Ten responses, however, raised the issue of what loving enemies meant in a time of violent conflict. For example, it was one thing to suffer injustice and violent attack because of your faith, but it was another thing to suffer the same because someone wished to deny you your political rights. Four responses questioned the concept of enemies, and one response argued theologically that if Christians focused on Christ then the other issues would fall into place.

Opinions were quite divided when asked about discussing their differences with Muslims in the hope of achieving peace. The nature and extent of such discussions was not predetermined. The term “dialogue” was deliberately avoided by the researcher, as it can be understood to involve theological compromise, an idea unlikely to find favour with anyone in such a theologically conservative denomination as ECWA. Thirteen responses however, were in favour of such discussions feeling that it would assist in lowering tensions, and building links between individuals and communities. Several could cite examples of such discussions with which they were personally familiar. Ten responses acknowledged that such discussions might work, but were more sceptical of their outcome. Eighteen responses were against such discussions. Most of these responses alleged that Muslims could not be trusted
having deceived Christians in previous discussions. A couple of these responses suggested that Muslims worship a different God and so there was no point discussing anything with them. Three of these responses were also against such discussions arguing that Christians should maintain their spiritual and evangelistic focus instead of such distractions.

The late Abubakr Gumi, a former Muslim leader, had been reported as calling for the division of Nigeria rather than allowing a Christian to be elected as President. Division is not something new to Nigeria – the civil war in the early 1970s and later in the 1990s the Gideon Orkar coup d’État attempt had tried to divide the country. Thus it was an appropriate question to ask. However, thirty-five interviewees condemned the idea with most regarding it as impractical given the levels of intermingling between Muslim and Christian communities. Three interviewees, apparently feeling the question was politically sensitive, preferred not to comment.

Can ECWA theologians help to provide a solution to the conflict? Twenty responses called for a lot more church focused effort. This would include training courses, non-academic books, teaching, and preaching to encourage church members to respond biblically and build bridges to their Muslim neighbours. Eighteen responses suggested practical measures including setting an example through good leadership and personal integrity, building bridges with Muslims, evangelism and practical aid. Sixteen responses addressed the academic area suggesting not just conferences and papers, but addressing the problem in the context of theological education,
ensuring that theology taught in seminaries and theological colleges was appropriate and relevant. Seven responses felt that theologians could not do that much. At the root of the conflict is a spiritual battle, not between Muslims and Christians as individuals, but between Islam and Christianity as spiritual and theological systems. Christian theologians should thus seek to be faithful to the Bible, and trust God for the outcome.

Several times in the course of these interviews, responses have stressed the difference practical measures have made to inter-religious relationships. This next question sought to explore that further. Twenty-five responses mentioned befriending and loving Muslims, and a further twelve responses spoke of personally helping Muslim neighbours and friends. Eleven responses stressed innovative forms of evangelism and prayer. Ten spoke of various social services ECWA provides or could provide in areas such as health, agriculture, development, and education. Five mentioned the need for a high level of personal integrity, and three the example that could be set by properly caring for converts from Islam.

Of the twenty-two interviewees who had final suggestions nothing new was proposed. Six responses each referred to the need for dialogue, on the one hand, and on the other hand the need to think and act strategically in self-defence and
political involvement. Five responses each wanted better teaching of the Bible to church members and converts, a renewed emphasis on evangelism, and an emphasis on integrity of conduct. Three responses felt the church needed to understand the way God is using the violence to advance his strategies. Two responses each referred to practically helping Muslims as a way of breaking down barriers, the need for Western support for evangelism, and the need for greater church unity. One response emphasised the crucial role traditional rulers play in a community and the need to respect them.

3. Questionnaire Responses.

This section seeks to analyse responses received from questionnaires distributed among ECWA DCC officials and certain lay members of ECWA churches in Kaduna, Kano, Gombe and Jos.

3.1 ECWA DCC Leaders Questionnaires

As mentioned above, 21 responses were received out of 25 questionnaires distributed making an 84% response rate for this category, which figure makes for a statistically significant response. Fifteen of those responding were, or had been ECWA DCC officials. Two were undertaking graduate theological studies overseas, one was an evangelist, one had been Academic Dean at JETS, one had been the ECWA Vice-President, and one was an ECWA Trustee.

3.1.1 What was the social, cultural and theological context in which the ECWA church has developed and its leadership has been formed?

Each official clearly identified themselves, and their position within the church. Their geographical spread is seen in the following table.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State of Origin</th>
<th>State of Residence (if different)</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td><strong>21</strong></td>
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</table>

Table 3
As to be expected, and in keeping with ECWA’s evangelical theological views, all of these men could point to a specific conversion experience. Four became Christians while at school, eleven through hearing an evangelistic sermon, whether it be in church, or at specific evangelistic meetings, or on the radio, and six through the personal witness of other Christians, whether it be at home, or via friends or SIM missionaries.

Ethnically they are quite diverse. Most could identify their ethnic group and speak of that group’s origins. These groups included, Ampandi, Angas, Bacha, Birom, Chawai, Fulani, Gure, Hausa x 4, Izere x 2, Moro’a, Mupun, Sayawa, Tangale x 2, Tarok, and Waja. One person professed ignorance of his ethnic origins and history, although he appears to have grown up in a community that had begun turning to Islam from the 1960s.\textsuperscript{287} Again, most of these men are from minority tribes, traditionally resistant to the Hausa/Fulani policies of conquest, enslavement, and Islamization.

When asked about the impact of the Hausa/Fulani on their ethnic group reactions were varied.\textsuperscript{288} Among the 16 responses from minority ethnic groups, six felt that

\textsuperscript{287} Often such communities in the process of turning to Islam also identify with Hausa culture and deliberately downplay or deny any historic ethnic identity.

\textsuperscript{288} The same procedure as above was adopted to distinguish between multiple answers to a particular question, i.e. the number of responses listed may exceed the total number of actual respondents. These
historically the Hausa/Fulani had little or no influence on their people as their tradition of living on top of hills, or military resistance had enabled them to live free of conquest. Eleven referred to the spread of Hausa culture, language, and dress. Six responses referred to how their people were converting to Islam: for one respondent the majority of his people had converted, other groups contained substantial Muslim minorities. A couple of responses referred to current political and religious discrimination while four referred to historic enmities between their people and the Hausa-Fulani jihadists. The four from Hausa-Fulani background spoke of the Islamic culture in which they had grown up. Two had converted from Islam while the other two came from the non-Muslim Maguzawa sub-group of the Hausa people.

Equally as varied are memories of British colonial rule. Positively, nine responses looked to the Western education and progress it had brought. Four felt it had brought the rule of law, three that it had brought Christianity and two positive economic changes. However, eight felt its role has also been negative with the imposition of Muslim traditional rulers on people who had previously been independent. Three felt it had had little or no influence as their people lived in such remote areas.

Also varied were responses concerning the influence of SIM teaching, and later that of ECWA. Five did not know what SIM or ECWA taught. This was because formerly multiple answers are denoted as “responses”. When the term “respondent” is used it refers to single answers.
there were no conflicts perhaps because in many areas there was not a lot of contact
between Muslims and non-Muslims. One felt that this position remained current,
doubting that ECWA had any policy about Islam at all. Where there was teaching, it
was to emphasise the otherness of Islam: eleven categorised it as a false religion.
Evangelising Muslims, primarily through practical assistance as well as through
preaching was the emphasis of thirteen responses.

Finally, in this section, seventeen respondents expressed negative perceptions of the
current state of Christian-Muslim relations. Words used to describe such included:
lack of trust, suspicion, scepticism, separation, aggressive relationship, very tense
and strained, not cordial, enemies, bad, chaotic, gone sour, hatred, no love, rivalry,
and competition. Four respondents took a wider view speaking of better inter-
religious relationships in southern Nigeria, of the situation having improved since the
1980s, and of some Muslims who wished to live in peace.

3.1.2 In what ways has ECWA’s theological and political attitudes developed
and changed over the years?

When asked how ECWA has changed since the 1980s sixteen responses pointed to
organisational growth and development including better education, increased
attendances, and better financial management. Eight responses spoke of ECWA
being more politically aware. This mainly referred to a switch in ECWA’s position
from abstention from party politics (a position usually blamed on SIM missionaries),
to active encouragement of members involvement in party politics. Eight responses also lamented increasing politics within ECWA accompanied by a loss of its original focus on evangelism, and a growing spiritual lethargy. Two responses each referred to increasing awareness of Islam, the influence on ECWA’s worship by other denominations, and evangelism remaining a focus.

Nineteen of the respondents accepted that ECWA had been influenced by other denominations. Of these, ten specifically mentioned Pentecostalism. Five others who did not mention Pentecostalism by name referred to practices traditionally understood as characteristically Pentecostal such as speaking in tongues, prosperity gospel, worship styles, public prayer, beliefs about the occult, and healing. A couple of responses also referred to Episcopal influences on ECWA’s church government and clerical dress. Finally, two respondents did not believe that ECWA had been influenced by other denominations.

A sensitive question was how the respondents and those they knew had been affected by the violence. Ten responses mentioned the deaths of relatives, friends, and colleagues. Nine responses said they had been emotionally affected, including wondering about the spiritual significance of all the violence. Six responses each spoke of loss of property or how, while not personally affected by the violence they
knew others who were. Four responses spoke of physical effects including being wounded in attacks and some narrow escapes from rioting mobs.

What are the reasons for the violence? Most respondents gave multiple responses to this question. Almost all of the responses blame the Islamic community in some form or another. Fourteen attributed the violence to increasingly radical Islam, including Iranian influence. Eleven felt it was due to the political and economic manipulations of the Islamic elite. Ten attributed the violence to poverty and unemployment, which could easily be true of non-Muslims, but in the context referred to Muslims. Closely related to this was the Muslim poor’s ignorance and jealousy of Christians. Only three responses felt that Christians were in some way to blame, regarding the violence as divine punishment for their disobedience to Christ.

Christian attitudes towards Muslims have inevitably changed. While two responses said they were more or less the same as before, eight responses spoke of distrusting Muslims, seven responses of living separate lives, and either fearing or hating Muslims. A further five responses spoke of the change from toleration of Muslims to retaliation, four of the effect of increasing fundamentalisms, and one of moving from toleration and evangelism to Christians fighting for their political rights.
What then of ECWA leaders and members? Did what they said, and actually did about Muslim-Christian relations, tally? Two respondents did not answer the question, and a further four ducked the question by suggesting that ECWA’s speech and actions should be mutually consistent. Seven respondents, however, felt that in varying degrees ECWA leaders and members were hypocritical. The impression they gave was of ECWA people falling short of the holiness of conduct they proclaimed and being unwilling to change. Finally, eight respondents felt that inconsistency between speech and conduct was not surprising given the repeated waves of Muslim attacks the Christians had endured over the years.

3.1.3 How can ECWA contribute to a solution of the Christian-Muslim divide in Nigeria?

When respondents were asked about stories of “Christians” resorting to occult practices in the Yelwa fighting twenty out of twenty-one strongly condemned such practices. The remaining respondent, who hailed from the area, asserted that no such practices had taken place. Those condemning the occult practices felt that they were a denial of the Gospel, syncretistic, and a sad reflection on the shallowness of many “Christians’” faith. Furthermore, it was a reversal to a cultural and traditional way of life. Instead of trusting God, they had reverted to the old ways.

289 He was covering up what had gone on. Interviews with a number of church leaders confirmed the general thrust, if not necessarily the specific details, of the rumours to be factual.
Sixteen respondents knew that the Bible teaches Christians to love their enemies and to pray for them. However, they said little more than that, giving the impression that this was an accepted belief that they had thought little about. Five others took this teaching further. Four raised the quandary they find themselves in of having to deal with a persecution that is not solely religious in nature but also political. ECWA did not seem to have thought through how this should be handled. Theory was one thing, but the reality of life was another. By contrast, one person felt that Christians had abandoned Biblical teaching on relating to their enemies.

Eight respondents were opposed to dialogue with Muslims, feeling it was either wrong in itself, or a waste of time given Islamic teaching or their perception of Islamic duplicitous practices. A further five were sceptical about dialogue, feeling that it might reduce divisions with some, but not all Muslims. Eight respondents felt that dialogue would be worth a try.
Almost everyone dismissed Gumi’s idea of dividing Nigeria into Christian and Muslims states as a non-starter. Nigerians are too intertwined and such division would lead to yet more strife with minorities from both religions still living in each other’s territories. Besides which, several suggested that God had brought Nigeria into existence and his purpose was for the Christians to evangelise the Muslims, not to hive off into a separate country. One person agreed division might be possible but at best it would only be a partial solution: it would be better to develop mutual toleration.

When asked how ECWA theologians could help solve the inter-religious divisions there was a wide range of views, none of which struck one as having been well thought through. Eight responses spoke in various ways of building relationships with Muslims, of loving Muslims, of dialogue and of writing, speaking and educating people about peace. Seven responses gave traditionally “spiritual” answers focusing on prayer and Biblical teaching, on Christians believing and obeying Christ. An academic suggested various consultations followed by discussions at the ECWA General Church Council (GCC). Six responses suggested Christians should gain a better understanding of Islam, and through clear speech and faithfully living out their faith would expose error and gain the respect of Muslims.
Practical suggestions for loving enemies were also somewhat theoretical. Eighteen respondents pointed in some way to building relationships, the use of social services (which ECWA already does through its medical, rural and community development work), and neighbourly kindness when faced with the vicissitudes of life. Two respondents confined their responses to implementing Biblical teaching or copying what SIM did. One, in addition to some of the above, suggested avoiding Muslim dominated places. No one made any clear reference to some project or other that they were personally involved in that did any of these things.

There was an assortment of other suggestions, none of them entirely original. Five respondents made no suggestions. Four suggested developing dialogue with Muslim leaders, either directly between the religious groups, or through making use of state government facilities. Two spoke of self-defence. Four suggested devoting more attention to evangelising Muslims and encouraging holy conduct among Christians. The remainder made a variety of suggestions: two supporting the author in his research, one recommending an undergraduate thesis to read, one requesting comparable Western financial aid to that Muslims received from the Middle East, one advocating better news management of the riots, and one suggesting Muslim leaders should be cautious of the Islamist ideas emanating out of Pakistan.
3.2. ECWA Laity Questionnaires
Thirty-two questionnaire responses were received. Three responses came from Gombe. Nine responses were from Kaduna. Six responses were from Kano. In addition to three questionnaires received from the ECWA Seminary Church in Jos, five ECWA students attending the Jos ECWA Theological Seminary also completed questionnaires. Six others completed questionnaires.

3.2.1 What was the social, cultural and theological context in which the ECWA church has developed and its leadership has been formed?
Individuals were asked to identify themselves and the state where they came from. Six people (four from Kaduna, one from Seminary Church in Jos, and one from Borno State) chose to remain anonymous and to give little or no data about their ethnic origins. Sometimes it was possible to deduce some of this information from the remainder of the questionnaire. The geographical spread of all these respondents is set out in the following table.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State of Origin</th>
<th>State of Residence (if different)</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abia</td>
<td>Plateau</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Akwa-Ibom</td>
<td>Kano</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anonymous</td>
<td>Plateau x 1, Kaduna x 1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bauchi</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Borno</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gombe</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaduna</td>
<td>Plateau x 1, Unknown x 1, Kano x 2, Kaduna x 7, Nasarawa x 1</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kogi</td>
<td>Kano x 2, Kaduna x 1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nasarawa</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>Gombe</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plateau</td>
<td>Plateau x 4, Kano x 1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>32</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Geographical distribution thus reflects the relatively cosmopolitan nature of Kano, Kaduna, and Jos cities attracting people from across Nigeria. By contrast, church leadership tends to be closely tied to one’s ethnic or state origins. Seven of the respondents have female names. One suspects that a number of the anonymous respondents are also women. As discussed above, it seems that women were more reluctant to participate in this study than men, perhaps seeing such questions as being more part of a man’s world.
All of the respondents were clear about their spiritual conversion experience. Ten had become Christians through various church activities including routine services, prayer meetings, Bible classes, Sunday school and Boy’s Brigade. Five converted as a result of decisions made in special evangelistic meetings. Four mentioned the personal witness of other people as instrumental in their conversion. Three became Christians while at school, and three mentioned their parents explaining the Gospel to them. Two mentioned the role of SIM missionaries and finally five did not mention any specific route, just that they personally confessed Jesus Christ as their Lord and Saviour.

Those completing the questionnaires hailed from a wide range of ethnic origins. These included: Bajju x 2, Bassa-Nge x 1, Buji x 1, Ebira x 1, Gbagyi x 1, Igbo x 1, Igala x 1, Irigwe x 1, Jaba x 5, Jhar x 2, Kadara x 1, Kagoro x 1, Kataf x 2, Kulere x 1, Mada x 2, Marghi x 1, Not stated/unknown x 2, Tangale x 3, Tarok x 1, and Tula x 1. Including those who did not know or state their ethnic origin, nine respondents acknowledged they knew little or nothing of their ethnic heritage. A further eight respondents gave minimal information, little more than stating their ethnic group and where it is located. In other words, just over fifty-three per cent of these respondents knew little or nothing of their ethnic origins and heritage.

Ten responses suggested that for various reasons the Hausa/Fulani and Islam had
made little or no impact on their ethnic group. Eight responses each spoke of the spread of Islamic culture and of Hausa rule. Six responses referred to the jihad and slave raiding in the past. Five responses mentioned the spread of the Hausa language. Four responses viewed the Hausa as troublemakers, and two responses did not know.

British colonial rule is believed, by fourteen responses each, to have helped with the introduction of Christianity and of western education. A further eleven responses spoke of various other civilisational benefits – European clothing, and healthcare being the main ones. Six other responses were negative citing the baleful effects of Indirect Rule, or the violence of British conquest for their views. Five responses either had no answer or did not know what impact British colonial rule had on their people. There was also an assortment of solitary responses including the British stopping the slave trade and instilling discipline, through missionaries arriving before the British to the ethnic group being ignored by the British or because of Islam the British having no influence.

Nineteen responses referred to SIM or more usually ECWA teaching that Muslims are to be loved, and ECWA members should try to relate to Muslims in a friendly, respectful, and peaceful manner. Eleven responses also mentioned seeking to evangelise Muslims. However, seven responses spoke of having nothing to do with
Muslims, one response of not loving Muslims, and six responses were unaware of any teaching on relating with Muslims or did not answer the question. Assuming all of these responses are related it signifies a significant number of ECWA people who do not know what their church teaches on relating to Muslims or believe that it encourages them to be antagonistic towards Muslims. Four responses referred to orthodox Christian teaching of the eternally lost estate of those without Christian salvation, yet only four spoke of praying for Muslims. For a Christian to truly love a Muslim then the highest act of love one can show is to pray for them. Nineteen responses referring to loving Muslims, but only four mentioning prayer makes one wonder just how much talk of love is merely paying lip service to Christian teaching?

Twenty-eight responses were fairly negative about current relationships between Christians and Muslims. Adjectives used included, tense, hostile, not cordial, suspicious, misunderstanding, very bitter, bad, broken, and distrustful. Within this group, seven responses made the point that Christians have tried to be friendly and are taught to love others, but Muslims seem consistently to be difficult, being taught to hate Christians. By contrast, ten responses indicated that the bad feelings were not all one way, acknowledging Christians to have played their role as well. Two responses tried to avoid committing themselves by suggesting that each religion worships their God in different ways. Two further responses gave no answer. Both of these latter response groups suggest respondents who fear making comments that might rebound negatively upon them.

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One wondered, although it was impossible to tell, if three of the seven responses referred mainly to avoiding any romantic relationships with Muslims as their answer was “have no intimacy with them” and a reputed Muslim tactic is to try and marry and thus convert Christian girls. If this were the case then these three responses would be better understood as exhortations to stay faithful to Christianity.
3.2.2 In what ways has ECWA’s theological and political attitudes developed and changed over the years?

What changes have people noticed in ECWA since the 1980s? The strongest single response to this question with seven responses was the increasing Pentecostalisation of worship. The use of drums, other musical instruments, choruses, and dance drew comments. Another category with five responses was numerical and organisational growth. This might also link to the twelve responses which were positive about developments in church life such as better educated godly leaders preaching better sermons, a wider range of church programmes to meet people’s needs, and more missionaries and evangelism being carried out. Nine responses took a negative view decrying power-hungry fraudulent leaders, materialism, tribalism, and declining evangelistic zeal. Ten responses saw changes in theology and politics with the church theology changing from orthodox to conservative evangelical, its structures becoming more Episcopal in form, it encouraging members to be more involved in party politics, and young people moving from self-defence when attacked to attack. Five responses failed to answer or replied, “Don’t know”.

Fifteen responses identified some aspect of Pentecostalism as having influenced ECWA. Sometimes they meant worship styles. At other times, they referred to speaking in tongues, exorcism, as well as the prosperity gospel and associated
Pentecostal attitudes towards money and social networking. Pentecostal churches have a considerable pull as some ECWA members leave ECWA to join them, or others just visit and return with new ideas. Some of these responses were favourable to this trend while others seemed to regret it. Two other responses spoke of CAN's involvement in influencing ECWA. By total contrast, eleven responses indicated that other churches had not influenced ECWA's beliefs and practices. One would have liked to explore this reaction further, but obviously, a questionnaire format does not permit such. Six responses failed to volunteer an answer or indicated they did not know.

A total of nineteen responses spoke of those who had been killed. Of these five responses were referring to close relatives, while six spoke of their friends' relatives, and eight more generally of Christians who had died in the riots. A further six responses spoke of their narrow escapes from death or of being wounded. Thirteen responses spoke of the tremendous destruction of property with the burning of churches and homes. Nor had the problem ceased. Eighteen responses in total referred to a whole host of direct effects of the violence. Ethno-religious cleansing meant that people had been forced to move, some had lost jobs, others found it hard to make a living or complete their education, families crossing the religious boundaries had been permanently broken apart. More specifically, of these eighteen responses five spoke of hating Muslims, two of not being interested in Muslim evangelism, and one of being forced to retaliate against Muslim attacks. On-going anti-Christian discrimination was mentioned in two responses, and two other responses referred to being psychologically affected. Only four responses referred to forgiveness, renewed spiritual zeal, caring for widows and orphans, and the love and care that Christians should have for hurt Christians. One response mentioned Christians who had denied their faith under pressure from their attackers, and one
response answered, “Don't know”. Violence, therefore, has clearly affected many of these respondents deeply.

When asked about the causes of the violence the majority of responses were evenly spread amongst three main groups. Seventeen referred to economic issues especially Muslim poverty and their desire to loot from Christians who, by contrast, appear far wealthier. \(^{291}\) Sixteen responses mentioned a combination of Muslim arrogance reinforced by increasing radical Islam trying to force Islam on others. Fifteen responses blamed politicians for stirring up trouble in the hope of gaining advantage. Ethnic divisions were only mentioned eight times. Perhaps linked to the economic issues are the five references to illiteracy and poor education, mainly although not exclusively among the Muslims, and the one reference to land disputes. Linking too to the Muslim arrogance complaint are the six responses portraying a rather philosophical understanding that conflict is inevitable when two belief systems operate so closely together. Indeed these responses see such conflict almost in eschatological terms. The three responses blaming foreign (i.e. Muslim) interference are also part of this grouping. Linked to the political grouping are six references to injustice, Government favouring Muslims, and corrupt, weak Christian leaders. Five responses suggested various spiritual reasons behind the violence, and two responses did not know or provided no answer.

\(^{291}\) Western education and employment in business and civil service has given the Christian community a generally more prosperous, almost middle-class appearance. By contrast, the Muslim peasantry tend to suffer from a very poor standard of Western education restricting their job opportunities to a mixture of day labouring, or rural farming. At the summit of the wealth scale, however, are a group of immensely wealthy Muslim traditional rulers and businessmen. That this semi-feudal aristocracy fails to remedy the poverty and suffering of their Islamic brethren contradicts their affirmations of unity and community.
The violence has brought significant changes in Christian attitudes towards Muslims. Six responses spoke of ethno-religious segregation as various parts of towns and cities became “no-go areas” for those of the other faith. Six responses spoke of a lack of trust, a mutual feeling by both Christians and Muslims. Five responses categorised Muslims as troublemakers, looters, and murderers. Another six responses spoke of a mixture of: unspecified deterioration in relationships: each group fearing the other, and Muslims now being regarded as enemies who are not to be evangelised. Nine responses referred in various ways to Christians retaliating against Muslims. Two of these felt that but for the grace of God and Scriptural teaching, this would be far more extensive than it currently is; one mentioned Christians purchasing weapons, and four spoke of retaliation in general. One drew parallels between the church and Israel in the Old Testament having to fight against her enemies, and one mentioned Muslims being humbled by and fearing Christian retaliation. Only seven responses suggested a more traditionally Christian response of seeking to live in peace, prayer, the work of the Holy Spirit in convicting Christians of their errors, and the need to build relationships with Muslims.

Are ECWA members and their leaders hypocritical about Muslim-Christian relations? Seven responses either did not know or did not register an answer. Twelve responses, in various ways, indicated there was some disparity between what was said, and what was actually practiced. Sometimes this criticism was softened as both
sides were accused of hypocrisy, or everyone was seen as being, in some way, hypocritical. Ten responses suggested that ECWA leaders and members are not hypocritical. They are doing their best, but being human may fail. ECWA was alleged not to be liked in Nigeria’s far north, because it is known for speaking the truth. A further two pointed out that while leaders may be doing their best their followers may be behaving quite differently. Finally, five responses dealt with classic spiritual perspectives – loving enemies, Christians are in a spiritual battle and only God knows the hearts of people.

3.2.3 How can ECWA contribute to a solution of the Christian-Muslim divide in Nigeria?

When questioned about the incident in Yelwa involving the occult almost everyone deplored it. Fifteen responses asserted that Christians should rely only on the Holy Spirit and the Word of God. Twelve described any occultic involvement as wrong, seven said those involved were not Christians, and six said it was unbiblical reflecting the Christian’s “old nature” and the traditional African world view. Two took a pacifist viewpoint, while one, while deploring the occultic involvement said Christians need to be prepared for war as the end times approach. Three did not give any answer.

Thirty-one responses affirmed that Biblical teaching on Christians relating to enemies
was to love, pray and seek to build friendships with Muslims. Four pointed out that vengeance needs to be left to the Lord. Four responses focused on continuing to preach, teach, and witness to others, the latter by actions as well as words.

Seventeen responses felt that dialogue with Muslims in the hope of bringing peace would not work. Different reasons were put forward for this including: Muslims are not sincere; we have tried dialogue in the past and it has not worked; Muslims are arrogant and intransigent; violence is inherent to Islam, and peace will only come through force. Eleven responses felt that dialogue, with the help of God, would bring some measure of peace. It might need a lot of patience, but many Muslims wanted peace but were too scared to say so. Two suggested dialogue would bring at least a temporary peace. Six believed that only by reliance on God, and through prayer and evangelism would peace be obtained. One respondent refused to comment.

The late Abubakr Gumi’s suggestion to divide the country into Muslim and Christian states was not popular. Twenty-eight responses condemned such a proposal. Ten of these responses gave no reason for their answer. Eight responses pointed to their belief that God had created Nigeria, and to break it apart would be against His purposes for the country. Four of these responses noted how religiously and ethnically intermingled the country already is. Any division would be a recipe for chaos and evil. The remainder called for mutual respect and tolerance; for Muslims to abandon their Islamisation plans, and suggested Gumi’s call reflected his own
prejudices. A couple of responses suggested there might be a point in Gumi’s call, but even then only if all other possibilities have been exhausted. Two responses replied “Don't know”.

Fourteen responses called on ECWA theologians to promote dialogue and relationships with Muslims. This seems somewhat contradictory to the seventeen responses recorded above who disapproved of dialogue. Ten responses stressed a return to proper Biblical teaching and the ways of the early church. A further five responses spoke of other aspects of spiritual leadership including prayer and fasting, personal integrity, and dependence on the Lord. Seven responses called for the promotion of peaceful forms of Christian witness to Muslims, one response citing the impact of recent ECWA-sponsored radio broadcasts have had. Two people suggested making better use of the media, one person that ECWA theologians should challenge Government bias, and three made no comment or did not know.

The theory of practical expressions of loving enemies was clear. Twenty-one responses referred to meeting people’s physical needs, be they for food, medicine, help with jobs, housing etc. Twenty responses mentioned being good neighbours, visiting people, being kind and loving, working together as a community. Twelve responses spoke of praying for enemies and seeking to evangelise them. None of these responses mentioned anyone actually doing any of these things. Other
suggestions were a little more concrete. Six responses spoke of encouraging inter-religious dialogue, a further six mentioned avoiding provocative language and not looking for revenge. Two responses protested against continued segregation, two mentioned living Biblically, and one of voting for enemies in elections. Three made no suggestions.

When asked for any final suggestions eleven responses stressed the importance of Christians living by Biblical standards, loving and forgiving their enemies, and portraying an attractive genuine faith. Six responses were more confrontational, educating people on Islam’s true nature, standing up to their attacks, encouraging Christians not to intermarry or to be close to Muslims. One called for dialogue, one was fatalistic asserting that religious crises will continue until the end of time, and two called for ECWA to be faithful in its actions. Fifteen respondents did not make any suggestions. One individual blamed British falsifying of the 1953 Nigerian census in favour of the Muslims for causing the problem in the first place. Britain, he argued, has a responsibility for sorting out the mess.

4. Other Christian Responses

Twenty-two responses were received via a combination of interviews and questionnaires from other Christian leaders. Denominations represented included: 2 x Anglican; 2 x Assemblies of God; 1 x Baptist, and 9 x Church of Christ in Nigeria (COCIN). Others included: 1 x Evangelical Reformed Church of Christ (ERCC); 1 x Ekklesiary ‘Yan’uwa a Nigeria (EYN); 1 x Lutheran Church of Christ in Nigeria; 1 x Nongu u Kristi u ken Nigeria her Tiv (NKST); 2 x Roman Catholic Church; 1 x United Methodist Church of Nigeria (UMCN), and 1 independent. Fourteen of these were

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292 Elisha Thomas (19/05/2006). He cited the Nigerian “Sun” newspaper of Friday, February 3, 2006 which quoted from Harold Smith’s unpublished “Blue Collar Lawman”. Smith, apparently had admitted British falsification of the 1953 census to justify giving 50% representation to the North. Smith’s work is available on http://www.libertas.demon.co.uk/autobio.htm#autobiography (DOA 4/11/2009).
interviews. A further interview was agreed with a retired Lutheran Archbishop but it was not possible to arrange a suitable time. Various interviewees suggested seeking interviews with a number of other people, but pressure of time precluded such. The seven remaining questionnaire responses were obtained from non-ECWA students attending JETS. Nine responses were received from non-ECWA JETS students, but two were eliminated as they had failed to complete the questionnaire. The nine respondents from COCIN was incidental to the research. It is a major church in Plateau State, albeit not as significant nationally. Several COCIN people were interviewed because, independently of their religious leadership roles, they were thought to have specialist knowledge and understanding of the Christian – Muslim conflicts.

4.1. What was the social, cultural and theological context in which the ECWA church has developed and its leadership has been formed?
Each official clearly identified themselves, and their position within their church. Their geographical spread is seen in the following table.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State of Origin</th>
<th>State of Residence (if different)</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>Plateau</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benue</td>
<td>Kaduna</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Borno</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaduna</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oyo</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gombe</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Three respondents attributed their Christian faith to being born into a Christian family. The remainder all stated they had gone through a conversion experience. Of those experiencing conversion five stated they came from a traditionalist family.
background, and fourteen from a Christian background. In contrast to the ECWA leaders, none had converted from an Islamic background. Four each had become Christians through school, or evangelistic crusades, or the personal witness of individuals. Three became Christians in response to sermons heard in church, and three others had responded to talks in youth fellowships or in Sunday school. One professed conversion after experiencing a spiritual attack.

Ethnically they are just as diverse as the ECWA leaders. Ethnic groups represented included: Angas x 2, Bachama, Bajju, Birom x 2, Bura, Chakfen, Fantswam, Jarawa, Jukun Kona, Mumuye, Mupun x 2, Mwaghavul x 2, Tal, Tarok x 2, Tula, Tiv, and Yoruba. One interviewee was female. She was also the only one to profess ignorance of her ethnic origins and history.

Twelve responses referred to war between their ethnic groups and the Hausa/Fulani. Whether at the time of dan Fodio’s jihad or subsequently in resisting the expansionary ambitions of the Sokoto Caliphate their ethnic consciousness had been moulded by the struggle. Three responses spoke of their ethnic group resisting Hausa/Fulani conquest as they lived in mountainous terrain. Nine responses referred to Hausa/Fulani rule either through conquest or by British colonial imposition, or post-independence. Four responses each mentioned Hausa/Fulani slave raiding, and how their ethnic groups disliked the Hausa, finding them to be very untrustworthy. One response referred to forced conversions to Islam because of conquest. Five responses mentioned the extension of Hausa linguistic and business influences.

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293 Other women interviewed or surveyed in this research also professed ignorance of their ethnic origins and history. Is this because women traditionally take their identity from their husbands? Or is this due more to a division of roles between men and women, with men being responsible for folklore and tradition, and women more concerned with running the household?
British rule was viewed in a number of ways. Four responses spoke of British conquest, “the so-called pacifying expeditions” which killed rebels and enforced British authority. A further five responses spoke primarily of the educational and lifestyle changes that British colonialism brought. Thirteen responses referred, generally in negative terms, to the British Indirect Rule policy that foisted Muslim rulers, and Muslim ways of ruling on their ethnic groups. While three responses confused the effects of colonial and missionary work, seven responses clearly distinguished between their favourable perceptions of missionary impact and that of the colonial authorities.

Nine responses referred to missionaries encouraging peaceful relations with Muslims and witnessing through loving interaction with Muslim neighbours. This was occasionally regarded as a fault as it allowed Muslims to oppress the Christians, and when Christians later began to assert their rights the Muslims took umbrage. A further nine responses mentioned that little was said about Islam, in part because there were not many Muslims around, their numbers growing significantly after Independence in 1960. Four responses spoke of the initial SUM missionary strategy of preventing the spread of Islam through evangelising traditionalist groups who might otherwise succumb to the advance of Islam. Three responses spoke of Christian seminaries training their students in Islam, although one person felt that

such training tended to be from a Christian perspective, when it needed to convey the Muslim mindset in order to be effective. Little was said about the church needing to evangelise Muslims. Three responses mentioned this, two spoke of dialogue, and five of the churches warning their followers to be careful. One respondent with intimate knowledge of ECWA and another denomination gave the impression that while evangelising Muslims was a core concern for ECWA, the other church had hitherto just paid lip service to the idea. Another respondent mentioned how his denomination had only recently started to take seriously the idea of evangelising Muslims.

The overwhelming description of Christian-Muslim relations in Nigeria was that they were poor. Thirteen responses described them as not cordial or very suspicious of one another. Five responses argued that Islam is inherently violent some tracing this right back to the Qur’an itself. Because of all this, two responses expressed how hard it is to fulfil the Biblical injunction to love Muslims. Seven responses were more nuanced, pointing out that attitudes varied depending on which part of the country was being referred to; which issues were at stake, and even which Islamic group was involved. Three responses suggested that there is a fair amount of deceit on both sides of the religious divide, with participants adjusting their message according to which audience they are addressing. Two responses argued that what is really needed is less religious talk and more attention to good governance: instead of Muslims dwelling constantly on implementing Shari’ah law, they should copy Muslims elsewhere and concentrate on economic development.
4.2. In what ways has ECWA’s theological and political attitudes developed and changed over the years?

The growth and influence of Pentecostalism attracted nine responses when asked about post-1980 changes in churches. This was not just in relation to worship styles or charismatic gifts. There was recognition of a whole series of seemingly interconnected changes. Six responses spoke of churches being more politically aware, with a further three bringing the formation of CAN into the equation as part of this political awareness. Seven responses spoke of Christian self-defence, as young people especially, are no longer pacifists and are willing to react violently to Muslim attacks. At the same time, however, there has been a surge in church growth (seven responses) and evangelism (six responses). The two concepts are not identical as church growth included growth in numbers of Christian organisations and in the way they operated, not just increasing numbers of Christians or churches. The two Catholic respondents spoke of a sense of competition in evangelism evoked by the growth of Pentecostalism. Some others highlighted the pioneering roles in evangelism taken by the Anglicans and ECWA.

Yet the churches still struggle. Five responses spoke of internal divisions, nominality and increasing amounts of internal politics. The levels of violence have also left the churches struggling how to respond with one respondent speaking of how they are beginning to develop their publicity, and to provide relief and rehabilitation for the victims of violence.
Christians in Nigeria are increasingly working together. Whether this be through CAN, or whether it is because of the old school tie phenomenon fifteen responses identified that ECWA increasingly works with other churches. There are theological interchanges with other churches copying ECWA’s moral standards and emphasis on Biblical preaching, while ECWA’s attitude to Pentecostalism, traditional instruments, dance and clerical robes have moved in the other direction. Other churches have learned from ECWA’s stronger organisational and financial management skills. One person felt that ECWA was somewhat aloof from ecumenical activities, and two responses felt that it was not proactive enough in the face of the Islamic challenge with ECWA Headquarters, at the time of the interviews, being too concerned with internal bureaucracy and grandstanding. Seven responses suggested that ECWA has a good reputation for evangelism, especially among Muslims. Both Catholic respondents did not know ECWA enough to comment.

When it came to asking about personally being affected by the violence eight responses each mentioned knowing people who had been affected, and knowing people who had been killed. Three responses spoke of being personally attacked, one three times, and narrowly escaping with their lives. Two of these people spoke of their resulting renewed dedication and zeal in their Christian witness. Four responses spoke of loss of personal property and a further four responses spoke of the destruction of church property. Two regretted the loss of personal freedom resulting
from the violence, and one of how urban evangelism has become much more difficult. Because of the violence, four spoke of their personal involvement in refugee relief, and two of attempting to dialogue with Muslims to find a way out of the violence. Three clearly blamed the Muslims for the violence with one of these rejecting the term "religious violence" as it made it sound as if the Christians were equally to blame. Six responses were quite general in their comments not being much affected by the violence.

When asked what the reasons for the religious riots were many respondents saw an interplay between economic, political and religious factors as all playing a part. Often respondents, who did that, saw religion as the tool being used for ultimately political or economic reasons. However, overall, with twenty-one responses religious reasons was the single biggest group among the respondents. Islam was blamed for its intolerance and history of violence. Radical Islam, influenced by outside forces, and including growing numbers of hate preachers were seen as heavily mixed up in the problem. The spark that lit the fire was the recent spread of Shari’ah law that alarmed many Christians. One response spoke of the threat Muslims faced from Christianity’s growth, and another response of the need to work through misunderstandings before violence occurred.

Fourteen responses mentioned political factors especially ethnic conflicts, and politicians using religious disputes to gain or retain power. When such politicians do sponsor riots eleven responses mentioned how they have a ready pool of poverty-stricken, unemployed, semi-literate youth who can easily be bought and will often use the riot as an excuse to loot, either for themselves or for their sponsors. Mercenaries from surrounding countries were also said to have been employed. One response spoke of historical factors such as the jihad and Hausa beliefs in their divine right to rule.
Christian attitudes towards Muslims have become considerably more distrustful. Within these nineteen responses a range of approaches were mentioned. Christians did not want to live near, or do business with Muslims. They understood the Muslim agenda better, and felt that self-defence was a positive thing forcing Muslims to consider the consequences of their actions. Christians remained on their guard as Muslim arrogance had grown with no one being called to account for previous attacks. These interviews were conducted in 2006/2007 and a few people felt that this level of distrust was slowly disappearing then after the 2001 Jos riots and subsequent problems. Thus, three responses felt that both sides were learning how to handle disputes better.\(^{295}\) One response suggested that Christians were really struggling with the conflict between their natural desire for justice and traditional Christian teaching regarding loving your enemies. Another response suggested leaving everything to God, and finally one response did not discern any change in attitudes.

When asked if ECWA leaders and members were sincere about loving Muslims, or were just hypocrites, responses were quite varied. Five responses indicated they were generally sincere, and four responses that they are hypocritical. Twelve responses were ambiguous. Of these five suggested that attitudes in ECWA are quite mixed with some sincere in loving Muslims and others quite opposed to having

\(^{295}\) One could surmise that the November 2008 riots would renew this sense of hostility and distrust.
anything to do with Muslims. The others in this category felt they could not definitively answer the question for various reasons including that much depended on the background and context the individuals were coming from. One response suggested that ECWA was actually doing better than most of the other churches as it contained a far higher percentage of Hausa/Fulani church members than the others. Finally, one respondent did not know ECWA well enough to answer.

4.3. How can ECWA contribute to a solution of the Christian-Muslim divide in Nigeria?

When asked about the story of the use of occult powers in the Yelwa-Shendam fighting eleven responses clearly held that this did not reflect true Christianity. At best, those practicing this were nominal Christians or had never been taught the Christian faith properly in the first place. Anglican, Catholic, and COCIN leaders all spoke of their on-going experience of having to re-evangelise, re-catechise, or counsel those who had resorted to occult practices in this crisis. Five responses sought to distinguish between an ethnic militia in the area and the activities of Christian youths. Both groups fought together, but the former, it was suggested, resorted to occult practices, while the latter trained separately following Old Testament sanctification principles. Seven responses, while not necessarily knowing anything specific about what happened, condemned the reliance on occult practices out of hand, with two suggesting that given the levels of hypocrisy among Christians in Plateau State they would not be surprised if such happened. One prominent church leader denied all knowledge of the story. This is hard to believe given the range of other denominational leaders who acknowledged the truth of the story. Perhaps this is another incidence of trying not to reveal everything to the outsider; of feeling distinctly uncomfortable when the outsider begins to get to the inside of the matter? One church leader was not asked about the incident due to time pressures.
Twenty-one responses clearly affirmed that Biblical teaching regarding enemies was to show love and to pray for them. One respondent was not asked this question due to lack of time. As for how well ECWA practiced this, there was a much wider range of opinions. Six responses felt that ECWA was showing love to enemies. Five responses did not know what ECWA’s position is. Four argued to the contrary. Another four pointed out that the issue is not what any single denomination does, but the individual’s level of Christian maturity and teaching. A further four responses argued that the issue is not so much loving enemies as recognising that Christians are engaged in a defensive war against an enemy that wants to obliterate them. Two responses acknowledged that forgiveness in this context is extremely difficult.

When asked about inter-religious dialogue seven responses felt that such might bring a measure of peace. Much would depend on how it is done, and how truthful participants are prepared to be. Three further responses were in favour of such dialogue. However, thirteen responses argued against dialogue. Six felt that Muslims have their own agenda and so discussions would inevitably be a waste of time. Two pointed to past failures as a reason for no dialogue now. Two felt that dialogue just would not be successful and three argued that it would be better to evangelise.
The late Abubakr Gumi’s refusal to accept a Christian as President preferring to divide the country into Muslim and Christian states was roundly condemned by twenty respondents. Politically and economically, such a suggestion was totally unrealistic as Nigerians are far too intertwined to separate. Besides which the Muslim Hausa would be confined to a poverty-stricken far north with almost all of Nigeria’s best land and resources in the hands of the Christian dominated ethnic groups. One individual was glad that he had lived among Muslims as he had been forced to get to know his Bible a lot better. Others pointed out that Muslims are very divided among themselves. A better solution would be honesty and integrity, not using religion to fight one’s political battles. One respondent felt that Muslims themselves are beginning to change their thinking especially as better-educated Muslim women challenge the male-dominated thinking of the past. Only one respondent felt Gumi was right, but then only for as long as Islam tries to impose its views on others. One respondent was not asked this question due to time pressures.

These church leaders overwhelmingly felt that ECWA theologians needed to devote considerably more time to training and developing ECWA people at all levels in Islam. Eleven responses suggested either a general education programme or more specifically training theologians and pastors who could then permeate this teaching more widely among their congregations. A further five responses suggested greater openness to dialogue. This was not to deny the necessity of evangelism but to work
co-operatively with other churches in building relationships with the Islamic community thus allowing evangelistic opportunities to develop naturally. Three responses suggested renewed emphasis on evangelism especially through making greater use of ECWA members in Muslim-dominated states. Two were sceptical of more theological arguments, suggesting instead, the theologians set an example of love and personal interaction with the Islamic community. One response was sceptical of any solution stating that Muslims needed to change first. A couple of others spoke of advising the government on human rights, or of permitting church members to defend themselves when attack. Pressure of time meant one respondent was not asked this question.

![Showing love](image)

Thirteen responses felt that developing friendships and from that various forms of dialogue were crucial to a practical means of loving enemies. Closely associated were the ten suggestions of using various forms of humanitarian work, such as medical, education, and rural development work to show the love of Christ. Personal generosity towards Muslims was encouraged by five responses. Prayer for Muslims surprisingly only attracted four responses: prayer is surely at the heart of the Christian life. Similarly surprising were that forgiveness and personal integrity only attracted three responses each. Loving and obeying God and evangelism attracted two responses each. One suggestion was that Christians should critically evaluate their own value systems in light of Biblical values. Another was for greater cooperation among churches in times of crises. Two respondents did not offer a response.
Finally, six responses stressed loving and praying for Muslims. Building relationships was the key suggested four responses. Two responses each spoke of the church trusting God for the understanding and skills to respond to the crisis, and of the need for economic development to absorb the pool of unemployed youth so often exploited by religious troublemakers. Two responses also spoke of trusting God to work out the problem and not trying to sort it ourselves, and that ECWA needed to take some leadership in working with other churches to resolve these problems. Six respondents made no suggestions.

5. SIM Respondents

SIM is an international and interdenominational missionary organisation that, as noted above, has had a long history of work in Nigeria. In obtaining this data, five serving missionaries with experience of working among Muslims were interviewed, five retired missionaries were interviewed over the phone, and twenty-four missionaries with experience of Nigeria sent e-mail responses to questionnaires.

5.1. What was the social, cultural and theological context in which the ECWA church has developed and its leadership has been formed?

The national origin figures below do not reflect the nationalities of current SIM Nigeria missionaries among whom are increasing numbers of South Koreans and ethnic Chinese, as well as some continental Europeans. This neglect is deliberate both because one wished to use this data primarily to gain information about the post-Civil War period where the SIM archives are embargoed, and also that very few of these Asian missionaries are actually working among Muslims.
### SIM Missionaries Countries of Origin

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>England</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N Ireland</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>34</strong></td>
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This distribution of national origin among the interviews and questionnaires is probably a fairly accurate representation of the overall national origins of SIM’s missionaries in Nigeria with American missionaries counting for slightly over 58.8 per cent. For some years, SIM estimated that about fifty per cent of its overall missionary workforce were Americans. However, anecdotal evidence indicates that the number of American SIM missionaries in Nigeria probably exceeds this figure. A snapshot picture is obtainable from SIM’s 2009 Prayer Guide and Personnel Directory. This indicates that in the autumn of 2008 when the directory was probably compiled, of the 104 names listed, 62 were Americans, slightly over 59.61 per cent of the total. In a context where the bulk of other Protestant expatriate missionaries in Nigeria are also American, this can create an overwhelmingly American cultural atmosphere in the expatriate community around Jos where most of the mission organisations are headquartered. This undoubtedly influences the Nigerian churches they are working with. At the very least, Nigerian church leaders are being educated by Americans, and thus will be influenced by American theological and ecclesiological models. How this affects attitudes towards Islam needs examination. Secondly, the interviews and questionnaires, while not planned to reflect the preponderance of American missionaries, do in fact do so, thereby giving weight to the idea that the opinions expressed go some way in reflecting the overall attitudes of SIM missionaries.

Their work covered a variety of activities, often the same person being responsible for a variety of activities. Sometimes this multiplicity of roles was simultaneous, at other times it followed the normal experience of promotion. Thirteen responses each spoke of administrative roles and of evangelism and church planting. Eleven responses referred to some form of theological education ranging from rural primary-
level Bible schools up to tertiary level seminaries. Ten responses spoke of secular teaching, six of literature and media roles, five of various types of medical work, and two of rural development.

The thirty-four who indicated the length of time they had been SIM missionaries in Nigeria had worked there for a total of 753 years, or an average of 22.15 years each. Six had worked or were working for ten or less years, thirteen had or were working for between eleven and twenty years, five between twenty-one and thirty years, a further five for between thirty-one and forty years, four for between forty-one and fifty years, and one person had worked in Nigeria for fifty-two years. Some had spent their entire missionary career in Nigeria; several had worked as SIM missionaries in other countries as well. One had worked with SIM, returned to his home country, and later returned with a denominational mission. Some worked for a period with SIM and then moved on to work for other organisations in their home countries. Five are current missionaries with SIM Nigeria. Five initially arrived in Nigeria during the 1940s, two of them in 1941. Eleven arrived during the 1950s, ten during the 1960s, three during the 1970s, three during the 1980s, and two in 2001.

In terms of church background, thirteen respondents said they came from a Baptist background. That is quite a generic term as Baptists, while distinctive for insisting on

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297 Only his time as a missionary with SIM was counted. Likewise, only the time spent with SIM in Nigeria was counted for those who worked as SIM missionaries in other countries.
believer’s baptism by immersion, and congregational church government are notorious for their wide range of views on eschatology, politics, and ecumenical relations, as well as core doctrinal beliefs. While five are probably from fundamentalist backgrounds, clues to their church background are best found through answers to such questions as which theological college they attended. Five of the Baptist respondents had become Baptists after leaving Anglican, Congregational, Presbyterian, Lutheran, or Roman Catholic churches. The remaining eight had been raised within their Baptist churches. A further seven respondents came from independent type churches, often of a Baptistic type. Five came from some variety of Methodism, three each from Mennonite/Anabaptist or Presbyterian/Reformed, two were Open Brethren and one from the Evangelical Free Church.

While examining the theological education an individual received can be helpful in determining what their beliefs and conduct are likely to be, it is always worth remembering that people change their thinking after their formal education has been completed. Thus, twenty-two responses indicated that the individual concerned had studied at a theological college or seminary\textsuperscript{298} that adhered to the generally conservative premillennial, dispensational understanding of theology.\textsuperscript{299} However, four respondents who had been at such schools openly stated that their thinking had subsequently changed. Six of the premillennial responses referred to institutions that

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{theological_training.png}
\caption{Theological Training}
\label{fig:theological_training}
\end{figure}

\begin{itemize}
\item Dispensational
\item Evangelical
\item Liberal
\item Personal/extension studies
\end{itemize}

\\textsuperscript{298} Institutions attended included, in no particular order: Moody Bible College, Davis College, Baptist Bible Seminary, Cedarville University, All Nations Christian College, Bible College of New Zealand, B.T.I. in Glasgow, New Tribes Bible Institute, Bethel Bible College, Spring Arbor College, Dallas Theological Seminary, Trinity Evangelical Divinity School, Grace Theological Seminary, Biola/Talbot Theological Seminary, Fuller Theological Seminary, Bethel Seminary, Columbia International University, Philadelphia School of the Bible, Wheaton College, Bob Jones University, Pioneer Missionary Training Camp, Prairie Bible Institute, Mennonite Brethren Bible College, Winnipeg Theological Seminary, Herbert Bible School, New College, Irish Baptist Missionary Training School, London Bible Seminary and College, Houghton College, Northwestern Bible and Missionary Training School, Multnomah Biblical Seminary, Bryan College and Temple Baptist Seminary. Some of these institutions have changed their names, ceased operations, or merged with another institution since the respondent studied there. Where possible the name put forward by the respondent has been used.

\textsuperscript{299} Given the North American practice of students building up credits from various institutions before graduating, as well as a number of respondents doing graduate studies at a different institution from their undergraduate studies one listed each institution mentioned as a response.
currently call for adherents to separate themselves from all ecclesiastical institutions that might compromise their beliefs. This separatist stance is usually a definitive indication of an exclusivist, and perhaps belligerent Christian fundamentalist position, although the individuals concerned have become more flexible over the years. Twenty responses indicated institutions whose current doctrinal statements indicate a broadly evangelical theological position. One respondent was, by his graduation, the only surviving evangelical in what he designated to be a liberal denominational college, and two responses spoke of extension studies or private tuition.

Few remembered being taught much about Islam when attending Bible College or seminary. Sixteen referred to the subject being touched on briefly in World Religions type classes. Twelve said they were never taught anything about Islam. Seven spoke more of their own self-study or taking a course outside their seminary. Three just did not remember any teaching on Islam.

Knowledge of the impact of the Hausa/Fulani and of Islam was pretty sketchy, especially among older missionaries. Five responses spoke of not really being taught much about Islam in SIM’s language school, as the concentration was on learning the Hausa language. Six responses mentioned their own individual initiative in

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300 All of the currently active theological institutions have readily accessible web sites that normally include a statement of faith, or a doctrinal statement. In addition, some give further explanation of their beliefs and practices. Classification of the different institutions was based on this information.

301 Fundamentalism is discussed at greater length later on in this dissertation. Suffice to say at this stage that the term is rather loosely used depending on one’s own religious convictions and national origin. Thus, whereas some Christians in the UK might self-designate as conservative evangelical, their theological counterparts in the United States might self-designate as fundamentalist. Alternatively, non-Christians may well designate all evangelical Christians as fundamentalist because they hold fairly closely to a defined set of beliefs, are evangelistic about such, and use those beliefs as a criterion for membership of their organisations.
learning about Islam and the Hausa/Fulani. Ten responses mentioned various reasons for their ignorance chiefly that of working primarily among non-Muslims, and of concentrating on their evangelistic or Bible-teaching work. Six responses mentioned different ethnic groups peacefully co-existing, and three spoke of adjoining ethnic groups reacting in different ways, some accepting Islam and others resisting it. References to Islam as a growing threat tended to come from younger missionaries. Six responses spoke of Muslim persecution of Christians, four of British colonial bias, three of Islamic proselytising methods, and nine of the formidable threat Islam posed to the Christian population. These differences can, perhaps be accounted for in different ways. Prior to Nigerian independence in 1960, Islam seems to have not been as widespread as it is today. Thus, missionaries in much of the Middle Belt could speak of having little contact with Muslims, which would not be true today. Secondly, the nature of Islam itself has changed with younger missionaries highlighting the growth in radical Islam. The lack of attention to formal training in Islam is surprising given SIM’s fascination with reaching the Hausa Muslim.

Nineteen responses spoke fairly highly of the legacy of British rule. They nostalgically recalled the smooth functioning of the police, the railways, the postal system, and the civil service, not to mention a good education system. One or two even noted overhearing Nigerians wishing for the return of colonial rule once the initial enthusiasm of independence had worn off. This sense of nostalgia is not that surprising, given that the earliest any of these missionaries had arrived in Nigeria
was in 1941, after the government-missionary conflicts of the 1920s and 1930s had been resolved. The bulk of their experience, therefore, was in the late 1940s and 1950s when the British were investing substantially in their colonies in preparation for independence. Relatively few responses (7) spoke of colonial pro-Islamic biases creating obstacles to missionary work. Most did not seem to have any knowledge of the earlier battles and of British restrictions on missionary work among Muslims. This may have been because they were not primarily working among Muslims, or simply a lack of historical knowledge: perhaps both. Five responses said that the British had no impact on the ethnic groups they worked with, four did not know of any impact.

When asked about SIM and ECWA teaching about Islam and Christian relationships to Muslims the predominant feeling conveyed was that of ignorance with eighteen responses stating that SIM did not teach that much, and professing ignorance of what either body taught. The second most common response spoke of Christians being encouraged, despite Muslim opposition, to portray positive personal examples in their witness to and interactions with Muslims. About sixteen responses stressed this. Fourteen responses spoke of various ways of interacting with Muslims whether through innovative evangelistic methods, medical work, or conferences. Ten responses highlighted the threat that Islam and the Hausa people posed to the predominantly Middle Belt Christians and their negative responses.

The missionaries were asked what they themselves had taught, or were teaching
about how Christians should relate to their enemies. Nine responses indicated that they had not taught on this area, mainly because it had not been an issue they had been forced to deal with. Twenty responses referred to Scriptural teaching on loving your enemies, praying for them and depending on God for protection. Nine responses referred to practically expressing love for others, whether it is just being good neighbours, or active assistance in times of need. Ten responses tried to grapple with the present reality of conflict. They highlighted the confusion there often is in Christian circles as to when a conflict is religious or secular, when it is permissible to stand up for civil and religious rights, and how can outsiders sensitively encourage Nigerian Christians to stick to Scriptural teaching when they have not themselves so suffered.

What about dialogue between Christians and Muslims? Four respondents did not answer this question. Eight responses indicated that they had not had cause to think about the issue, perhaps because there were few Muslims in the areas where they worked. Eleven responses tended to be opposed to dialogue with about half of these sceptical of it achieving anything mainly because they felt that Muslims could not be trusted to stick to any agreements. Interestingly, however, another missionary felt that Muslims would be justified in opposing dialogue because of Christian hypocrisy! Eight responses stressed their own personal relationships and bridge building with Muslim friends and acquaintances. Seven responses were broadly in favour of formal dialogue. Three of these stressed that dialogue needs careful preparation, with another three distinguishing between dialogue, which they favoured, and debate, which they felt was pointless. Another individual spoke of hosting Muslim-Christian dialogue when he was involved in youth work in Nigeria.
5.2. In what ways has ECWA’s theological and political attitudes developed and changed over the years?

Probably the main change in ECWA noticed by these missionaries was its numerical and organisational growth. Responses described this in various ways. Twelve spoke of numerical and organisational growth, nine referred to increasing numbers of capable clerical and lay leaders, five of the church becoming more politically active and antagonistic to Islam, four of positive and negative management changes, and two of the urbanization of what had hitherto been primarily a rural denomination. Surprisingly, changes within what is the core mission of any church, i.e. to win new converts, start new congregations, and within existing congregations enable members’ spiritual development through preaching and worship attracted considerably less comment. Only nine responses mentioned this area with three each commenting positively and negatively on evangelistic zeal, one response mentioning more charismatic style worship in urban churches, one response better theological education standards, and one response a growing focus in the church on both training its lay members and on the importance of prayer. Two spoke of better relations between SIM and ECWA. Three responses failed to discern any change, and four gave no answer.

Surveying the responses to whether other churches had any influence on ECWA’s

302 At least one respondent did not appreciate the hierarchical nature of some of these changes.
beliefs and practices one can almost discern a timeline on the changes within Christianity in Northern Nigeria. Six responses indicated they had not observed any such influence, and another six responses spoke on ECWA’s exclusivity and of the influence that ECWA had on other organisations. Four responses suggested that there had been no theological change in ECWA with those wishing for compromise, such as on the issue of polygamy departing to what they felt to be the more accommodating Baptist or Catholic denominations. However, as the violence forced Christians to co-operate more closely, ECWA’s exclusive attitudes began to moderate and six responses spoke of the church co-operating with other denominations. Some of this spilled over into ECWA’s organisational structure and liturgy with five responses mentioning Anglican influences, eleven responses speaking of Pentecostal influences, and three responses of the prosperity theology often associated with Pentecostalism. Anglican influences mentioned include clerical and choral dress, as well as increasingly hierarchical governing structures. Pentecostal influences ranged from worship styles through beliefs to a hardening of attitudes towards Muslims. Five responses either did not know or failed to answer the question.

Most of these missionary respondents were fairly remote from the violence, only one individual speaking of hiding in a bathtub as the bullets whizzed around! Fourteen had no personal knowledge of anyone suffering, four had some indirect knowledge, and three failed to answer the question. By contrast, only four responses indicated knowledge of people who had been killed and eight responses referred to people who had been injured or dispossessed. Two spoke of their own narrow escape from violence, and one of helping refugees escape in earlier violence. Fourteen responses spoke more of the effects of violence on people they knew. Some were traumatised, others wary and battle-hardened, determined to stand up for their rights and if need

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303 Personal knowledge is actually knowing someone who had suffered in some way, be it injury, loss of possessions or death. Indirect knowledge refers to Nigerian friends telling them of the suffering of their friends.
be retaliate. One of these responses mentioned a growing reliance on the occult. Four responses spoke of the church growing stronger and of more reliance on prayer.

Overwhelmingly with nineteen responses, the innate character of Islam was blamed for the violence. Worldwide Islamic fundamentalism combined with the traditional Hausa/Fulani desire for dominance reflected Islam’s essentially violent dominating nature. Interestingly, of these nineteen responses, six clearly referred to outside Islamic influence – oil money and scholars from the Middle East radicalizing Nigerian Muslims and stirring up trouble. Ethnic disputes was the next most popular rationale with ten responses, although this tended not to be the main reason proffered by missionaries currently working in Nigeria. The third most popular reason with eight responses was the struggle for political power. Moreover, as a number of people pointed out, all three of these factors are deeply intertwined making it difficult to distinguish between them. Economic factors attracted four responses, and growing Christian inroads into traditionally Muslim territory was mentioned three times. A couple spoke of spiritual attacks, one response noted that these attacks tended to come in the hot season when people’s tempers are frayed by the heat, and no answer was proffered six times.

The continued violence has driven the two groups apart. Whereas once there were
close social ties in many places, this has been replaced by suspicion, wariness, and a deep-seated weariness at the constant outbreaks of trouble. Christians are standing up to the attacks, and at the same time less willing to love and witness to their Muslim neighbours. Such is the summary of twelve missionary responses. A further eight responses spoke of Christians being more willing to fight, at least in self-defence. One response spoke of Muslims enforcing the law of the infidel more strictly than before, while another three responses spoke of how, in the middle of all of this violence, increasing numbers of Muslims are converting to Christianity, and zealous Christians are counting the cost of their calling to evangelise the Muslims. Seven responses each either gave no answer, or had not detected any change in Christian attitudes, primarily because they had left Nigeria before much of the violence had occurred, and not maintained contacts.

5.3. How can ECWA contribute to a solution of the Christian-Muslim divide in Nigeria?

When asked if SIM could have done anything more to safeguard converts from the pull of traditional answers to the search for power, ten responses felt that SIM had done the best it could given the circumstances. These circumstances included the educational and attitudinal development of the Nigerian Christians trained by SIM. However, seventeen responses were much more critical. One of these seventeen responses described SIM as feeling what it was doing was right, unaware of the issues going on around them, and three spoke of SIM not really coming to terms with the traditional worldview of their converts, approaching matters from a Western viewpoint instead. Six of these responses spoke of missionaries not being trained in understanding and dealing with the occult. Nine responses spoke of solutions being found in better Bible teaching; looking afresh at what the Scriptures teach; developing more contextualised theological literature, or starting with ensuring that complete translations of the Bible were published instead of the concentration on the New Testament. Too much effort had been placed on developing theological
education institutions and not on one-to-one discipleship of the students in these institutions. Thus, individuals who may have yet to get to grips with the legacy of their previous traditional beliefs, on graduation end up fairly quickly as church ministers, thereby perpetuating the failure of the church to get to grips with the problem. Ultimately, as one response acknowledged, ECWA must find solutions for this issue from within itself, and its own understanding of the Scriptures. It is not something that SIM can impose from outside. Seven responses did not have an answer.

Ten responses expressed no personal regrets concerning their own teaching or conduct re Christian-Muslim relations. Five people, not all of whom would have encountered Muslims in a significant way, did not answer this question. Eight responses felt they could have done more in terms of both teaching and showing Christians how to love, pray for, dialogue with and build relationships with their Muslim neighbours. Six responses felt that they could have done with a better understanding of Islam, its historical effect on Nigeria, and thus been able to teach and prepare associated materials that would build relationships and encourage Christians to lovingly witness to Muslims. Seven responses felt other frustrations. One of these had taught the Scriptures faithfully, but students argued in return that living peacefully with Muslims was only possible if the Christians converted to Islam. Three responses expressed personal frustration that they could have done more, and two regretted not knowing Hausa well enough to have done more. Finally one current missionary felt frustrated that Christians were failing to see the urgency of the task given people’s openness to the Christian faith.
How can SIM help ECWA develop solutions to this problem? Twelve provided no answer, with five of these responses pointing out that they had been away from Nigeria and the ECWA scene for too long. Another ten responses spoke in various ways of training. Making use of other Africans who had experienced persecution, benefiting from specialist scholars in Islam with current understanding of how to reach Muslims, and training believers in spiritual warfare and in prayer were all suggested. Twelve responses looked more to examples SIM could set ECWA: in showing practical love to Muslims, in concentrating on evangelism instead of institutional development, in showing that being true to Christ is more important than life itself, and in proclaiming a fully-rounded gospel that provides a complete Biblical world view capable of taking on and defeating Islam. Finally, five responses felt that SIM had more to learn from ECWA than to contribute. SIM’s role should be that of encouragement and assistance, not taking the lead.

Nineteen respondents had no further suggestions to make. Four suggested developing further training, either, through encouraging ECWA to develop Islamics specialists, or making use of international specialists. Two spoke on needing to really understand Islam as it is, not in the politically correct version often portrayed in the Western media. Eight stressed the central importance of prayer for both more Christian missionaries, and for divine intervention in resolving the conflicts.
6. The Next Step

What has been presented here has been the collated data from the interviews and questionnaires along with some preliminary explanatory comments. In each of the next three chapters of this dissertation, one of the three main research questions will successively be examined. This will entail discussing the relevant historical context before examining the associated data from each of the four groups discussed above. Finally, in Chapter Eight an overall assessment will be made seeking to bring together all of the information presented.
Chapter Five
No Condition is Permanent: ECWA in Context

1. Missionary Background

The British Resident in Bauchi Province was exasperated with SIM missionaries. Writing to the Chief Secretary, he stated:

3. I have known the Sudan Interior Mission fairly intimately since 1912 and I agree with Mr Hooper (paragraph 5 of the Chief Secretary’s Confidential 17734/Vol.3/431 of 31st December 1927) as regards the poorness of the type of Missionary usually working (in this case for the Sudan Interior Mission) in Nigeria.

4. I and other Political (and Educational) Officers of this Province are ready to meet the Missionaries two thirds of the way and make every effort to do so, but it is beyond our powers to establish cordial personal relations with the quite uneducated men and women we usually meet, often fanatical fundamentalists of the ultra Middle West type, who think it is beyond the pale if we smoke cigarettes, being inconceivably narrow in their views.\(^{304}\)

Newton’s frustration with SIM missionaries, later resolved, came from lengthy interaction with them. Concerning the suitability of missionaries for work amongst Muslims, he stated, “The Church Missionary Society excepted, I believe that the personnel of the majority of the other Missions are drawn from a class (farmers and such like) that have had little or no education or prior training of any sort for the work that they come out here to perform.”\(^{305}\)

Despite the underlying cultural clash, Newton is correct in his perceptions of the missionaries’ social and educational backgrounds. Only three SIM missionaries then in West Africa – Stirrett, Hall, and Kapp – had graduate degrees. Most came from a North American fundamentalist and dispensational background. Many, and not just those from the American Mid-West, were farmers or from the upper working and lower middle classes.

Prior to the “faith mission” movement, the classical denominational missions had dominated missionary work.\(^{306}\) These missions relied on sponsoring denominations for funds and personnel. Developing after William Carey started the Baptist

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\(^{304}\) Newton, T., Memo from Resident, Bauchi Province to the Chief Secretary, Northern Provinces, No C 45/1927, 21st October 1930, AHA File 5553, Vol. 1., Religious Toleration 1930.

\(^{305}\) Newton, T., Memo from Resident, Bauchi Province to the Chief Secretary, Northern Provinces, No 45/1927/10, 9th January 1928, AHA File 5553, Vol. 1., Religious Toleration., 1928.

Missionary Society in 1792, they predominantly focused on coastlines and islands, not continental interiors. While initially accepting lesser-qualified men to serve as missionaries, all denominational missions preferred university graduates. Denominations expected their ministers, whether at home or abroad, to achieve certain educational standards. Initially many volunteering to go abroad did not achieve these standards so denominational missions, at some considerable expense, had developed intensive training programmes to bring their new missionaries up to the expected standards.

“Faith missions” had different expectations. The first mission to concentrate on the interior was Hudson Taylor’s China Inland Mission (CIM), the model to which faith missions looked for inspiration and advice. Fiedler summarises some of the principles of the CIM as follows:

1. The mission is interdenominational. Missionaries from all Protestant churches can become members if they agree to the statement of faith.
2. Church order is a secondary issue. Problems of church order may be solved in a pragmatic way.
3. Missionaries are not employees, but members of the mission.
4. Missionaries receive no salary, but expect that God will supply their every need through the hands of his children (‘faith principle’).
5. Missionaries with any type of training are equally welcome.
6. There is no difference between ordained and unordained missionaries.
7. Wives are full missionaries and all possibilities open to men are open to them as well.
8. Single women have the same possibilities as men. They may work on their own as pioneer evangelists.
9. Missionaries must be willing to accept sacrifice and suffering.
10. In missionary work, evangelism takes precedence over institutional work.
11. It is the first priority of all evangelistic work to give everyone at least one chance to hear the Gospel. Therefore, evangelistic itineration must receive special attention.
12. Converts are to be joined into local congregations and to be used to further evangelism.
13. The mission is international.

Missions like the CIM were thus pragmatic, voluntary organisations open to all of like mind, without distinction between clergy and laity, or male and female. As Cheesman notes, “Faith Missions were all about the foot soldiers not the officers in the Lord’s Army: ordinary people to reach ordinary people.” Their central concern was

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307 Although Bishop Samuel Crowther had participated in, or led various CMS attempts, at penetrating Nigeria’s interior.
309 Fiedler, p.33.
evangelism, not constructing denominational structures or adherence to set ecclesiastical principles. Missionaries depended primarily on God, working through ordinary people to provide financial support, as well as enable them to do their work. Faith missions sought to mobilise the greatest amount of spiritual and financial participation in the task of evangelism, reflecting the pre-millennial heritage of many of their founders, not least being Hudson Taylor himself. In 1914, SIM adopted the CIM principles building much of its work upon them.311

Early twentieth-century Toronto was the North American missionary hub. Austin, writing of the Canadian origins of the CIM states:

Unlike the United States, where denominational headquarters are located in several cities, north and south, in Canada the major Protestant churches had all centralised their operations in Toronto. So, by settling there, one could reach all of English Canada. By the 1920s there were, within a few blocks of the University of Toronto, some thirty missionary-sending churches and twenty-five missionary societies or educational institutions. The CIM was across the street from the (liberal) Canadian School of Missions, down the street from the Sudan Interior Mission, and around the corner from Toronto Bible College.312

This network of missionary societies and theological training institutions, including SIM, was the dynamic behind early fundamentalism.313 Bingham, SIM’s Founder-Director, was a member of CIM’s Canadian Board and Henry Frost of CIM reciprocated.314 Both were also members of Toronto Bible College’s board.315 It was also an international network. Grattan Guinness, the Irish church leader, was intimately involved in missionary training in the UK. He “…founded the most influential of the Bible Colleges at the instigation of Hudson Taylor, the originator of the Faith Mission Movement…”316 He was also intimately involved in sponsoring a number of missions and in the development of a number of other missions. Samuel Bill, a student of Guinness’s from Belfast founded what is now Mission Africa, while

2004, p.27.
314 Austin, p.57.
315 McKenzie, p.57.
316 Cheesman, p.5.
Guinness’s daughter Lucy married Karl Kumm, the founder of the Sudan United Mission. Guinness was also influential in the United States advising Emma Dryer, the founder of Moody Bible Institute and, as Cheesman writes:

Harley House’s influence on other colleges was seminal and immense. Fiedler presents Harley House as the first Bible College. A.B. Simpson opened the first United States Bible College in 1883, avowedly patterned on the East London Institute, in New York. This, in turn, became the pattern for many Bible Schools in the United States and Canada, including Prairie Bible Institute. When Grattan Guinness visited the States in 1889, he inspired A.J. Gordon to open the Boston Missionary Training Institute that year.  

Simpson also founded the Christian & Missionary Alliance (C&MA), a denomination reflecting more baptistic and holiness teaching. Prior to going to Nigeria, Bingham studied under John Salmon, the founder of the Canadian branch of the C&MA, and on his return attended Simpson’s Missionary Training College in New York.  

Bingham’s spiritual journey, from English Methodism, via the Church of England, the Salvation Army, and the C&MA, to becoming a Baptist minister lay behind SIM’s interdenominational character. Following the 1893 failure Bingham tried to develop a Baptist work. His failure to interest the Baptists, coupled with a $100 gift (her life’s savings) from a Presbyterian supervisor in a home for delinquent girls led him to reconsider his strategy. After all, Walter Gowans had been Presbyterian and Thomas Kent, Congregationalist. In theory and in practice God had blessed interdenominational work, while the rivalries of denominationalism were sinful and an obstacle for new converts on the mission field.  

Two magazines chart the progress of SIM’s early work. Published in Nigeria, initially under the editorship of John Hay, was the Sudan Witness (SW). Meanwhile Bingham was editor of the Canadian journal Evangelical Christian (EC). Both magazines depended heavily on news reports and circular “prayer” letters for many of their

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317 Cheesman, p.42.
318 Fiedler, pp.32 – 69.
319 Bingham, R.V., ’Making of a Mission. The Story of the Sudan Interior Mission,’ EC, 1 Vol. 29, No. 1, January 1933, pp. 27 – 28. Bingham speaks of the development of missionary interests from 1875 to 1895 highlighting the influence of A.T. Pierson, Robert Wilder & Grattan Guinness in the development of missions, the formation of the Student Volunteer Movement and the start of the Bible institute movement pioneered by the Moody Bible Institute. In that context, S.H. Kellogg, a former missionary to India, commenced ministry in Toronto’s St James Square Presbyterian Church in 1886. This sparked a surge of missionary interest that led Walter Gowans et al to train for missionary work in Simpson’s college where he studied alongside Thomas Kent. Meanwhile A.J. Gordon’s lectures on the Holy Spirit and Missions profoundly influenced Bingham.
320 McKenzie, p.228.
322 Then Canada’s leading interdenominational Christian magazine.
articles. In the absence of original articles and letters, these two magazines, and their successors, are the best available sources for understanding SIM's historical attitudes towards Islam. As Cooper points out:

... SIM missionaries were active in Bible translation and produced tracts – the Gaskiya Corporation of northern Nigeria, for example, owes its existence in part to SIM interest in producing vernacular texts. However, missionaries within SIM never authored richly detailed, introspective, or intellectually provocative writings. SIM mission publications were, and still are, by and large, pitched at an unsophisticated reader of a literalist bent, with a view toward motivating others for mission work or raising funds for the mission. They bear the marks of the kind of black-and-white dualist thinking that Mark Noll likens to a kind of evangelical Manicheanism.

The articles referred to, usually stress a positive approach to SIM's work: it was important to highlight successes and where possible, conversions, or failing to do so to reflect on the spiritual opposition the missionary faced. It would be wrong to regard them as objective and comprehensive reports of life and work in Nigeria. For such one would have to rely on colonial anthropological, political, and economic reports just as much as any religious reports. Yet it would be equally mistaken to dismiss them as unreliable accounts, mere hagiography. The missionary authors were more than likely straightforward, honest, hard working, zealous and sacrificial. It is, thus, a reasonable presupposition initially, at least, to presume that what they wrote, while not terribly profound, was an accurate reflection of how they understood their world (emphasis mine). This was a world that as likely as not was circumscribed by the boundaries of their mission station or their specific responsibility, and thus shows little awareness of the wider picture of what is happening elsewhere in Nigeria.

They were also writing for people essentially similar to themselves, fellow members of the ordinary working or lower middle classes trying to give an account to these financial and prayer supporters what was happening in Nigeria in days long before widespread travel and television made the world a global village. In addition, for many, advancing either a personal or a corporate political agenda would have been an alien concept, except, of course, where colonial policies and missionary goals clashed. In light of these presuppositions and bearing in mind a similar discussion in Chapter Three, it is possible, I believe, to study these documents, and to discern some of the missionaries’ trends in thinking and changes in attitudes. In the final analysis, of course, there is little else to examine. Colonial administrators’ reports

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323 Extensive collections of both of these publications are available in SIM’s archives.
324 Cooper, p.91. She cites Noll, M.A. The Scandal of the Evangelical Mind, IVP, Leicester, 1994, p.52.
325 Most missionaries remained on or about their mission stations for eleven months a year. Once Miango Rest Home was opened they went there for their annual leave, initially trekking there, and later when SIM acquired small planes flying.
tended to focus on particular issues such as permission to open mission stations: or where an individual missionary had incurred the wrath of the colonial administration. To study how missionaries thought and how their thinking changed one has to examine what they wrote, even if it is not as self-critical as might be desired.

Bingham’s editorship of the EC opened up a fresh network of overlapping religious interests. The magazine promoted missionary work around the world, not just in connection with SIM. His editorial and missionary leadership position also gave him a unique role in the fundamentalist controversies of the early twentieth century. Close associates were involved with the creation of the World’s Christian Fundamentalist Association (WCFA). Like T.T. Shields, Bingham fought modernist tendencies among Baptists in Ontario, especially expressing concern over modernist lecturers at the Baptist-owned McMaster University. His anti-modernist theological principles drove him closer to the Bible College movement, among whom he did extensive speaking tours. On his return from one of these in 1916, he wrote:

The growth of the Bible College movement may be in part God’s method of protest against the apostasy in the denominational seminaries; and it is also, we feel sure, the re-assertion of the Spirit’s prerogative of discarding much of the elaborate scholastic preparation of the modern church, in order to emphasize the fact that the primary and essential qualifications for spiritual ministry at home and abroad are bestowed by, and held in, His own sovereign gift.326

By 1921, Bingham was comparing the seminaries’ decline with the Bible Colleges’ dramatic growth. Since 1900, Presbyterian seminaries had lost about half of their student enrolment, while Toronto Bible College, for example, had tripled its numbers over the same period.327 These Bible Colleges supplied the bulk of SIM’s missionaries.328 Thus “by the 1940s a quarter of [Toronto Bible College’s] 2,000 graduates were serving as overseas missionaries, with over 150 with the CIM in China or SIM in Africa.”329 Often candidates responded to the challenge of foreign missions proclaimed through Bingham’s own extensive deputation tours.330 As for British Bible Colleges, Cheesman writes, “Judging by the contribution they made to foreign mission, we must rate the Bible College as significant.”331 Three quarters of

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327 McKenzie, p.145.
328 The SW, SIM’s main magazine from 1925 to 1967, spasmodically recorded new recruits’ academic background. Of the ninety-nine who arrived between 1925 and 1943, ninety-two graduated from fundamentalist institutions. Twenty-seven had all or part of their training at Moody Bible Institute, with eleven training at Prairie Bible Institute.
329 Austin, p. 59.
330 McKenzie, footnote 59, p.50, speaks of Bingham concentrating on North American Bible Colleges while not neglecting speaking at seminaries and Christian liberal-arts colleges.
331 Cheesman, p.63.
Harley House students went into foreign missions. By 1899, 790 of the British foreign missionaries came from three Bible Colleges, and amounted to 9% of the total missionary workforce. This did not account for those who died abroad, or returned home. Between forty and fifty British Bible College graduates were annually heading into missions.

However, Bingham, and eventually SIM, steered clear of the fighting fundamentalist approach. The rapid growth of SIM helped to dissuade him from the despondent and narrow attitudes of Riley’s dispensationalist WCFA towards historic premillennialism. His interdenominational links gave him a wider vision and acceptance of difference than the vociferous Baptist, T.T. Shields, and his Baptist Bible Union (BBU). While Bingham agreed with fundamentalism’s basic theological views, he sought a broader approach to modernist theology, inclusive of those who could not endorse the minutiae of fundamentalist doctrine, or ally themselves with the combative, egotistical leadership styles of some fundamentalist leaders. At heart Bingham was an evangelist who sought to convert, not to alienate and fight. Unity on Scriptural essentials characterised his approach. The interdenominational mission agency’s rise, therefore, reflected similar concerns for Christian unity as in the ecumenical movement, but built on early fundamentalism’s theological foundations. Thus, it provided an orthodox alternative to modernist-based ecumenism.

For long years most of the Bible Institutes of North America have been almost wholly committed to a single interpretation of prophetic Scriptures. Futurism has almost entirely dominated them until they had begun to think that Futurism was orthodoxy and everything else must be looked upon with the greatest suspicion.

Most Bible Institute graduates, therefore, inevitably were “Futurists” or dispensational pre-millennialists. Among missionary leaders, Hudson Taylor and Henry Frost of the CIM and A.B. Simpson of the C&MA were prominent pre-millenialists. Bingham

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333 McKenzie p.51 notes a rise from 230 American, Australian & British missionaries in 1933 to 400+ in 1942. By 1956, SIM had 1300 missionaries and was then, the largest faith mission.

334 McKenzie pp.169 – 181, discusses relationships with the WCFA. See also pp.305 ff.

335 McKenzie, pp.181 – 220, discusses these differences of approach further.

336 Was this eirenic approach a characteristic of Simpson’s training? Maxwell, Prairie Bible Institute’s co-founder, graduated from the short-lived Midland Bible Institute whose principal William Stevens previously led Simpson’s Missionary Training Institute. Stevens and later Maxwell’s theological emphasis was the “way of the Cross” or as Maxwell put it, “born crucified”. See Fuller, W.H., Maxwell’s Passion & Power, Maxwell Foundation, Huttonville, Ontario, 2002.

337 McKenzie, p.247.

himself was introduced to dispensationalism in 1892 and followed it for some years. His views shifted in favour of historic pre-millennialism by 1914 after exegeting the relevant Greek New Testament texts.\(^\text{339}\) Given all of these factors, therefore, it was inevitable that many applying to work with SIM would hold dispensational theological principles. While some dispensationalists argued against evangelism and missions holding either, that the gospel had been preached in apostolic times, or that it was the responsibility of the post-rapture Jews, others disagreed. As Weber put it:

But... such generalizations about the pre-millennial outlook were simplistic and misleading. Despite the apparent pessimism and the conviction that the world’s spiritual and social course would inevitably be downward until the personal intervention of Christ, pre-millennialists often did not act as their opponents said they must. Worldviews notwithstanding, pre-millennialists insisted that they were the world’s greatest optimists and frequently did not act as though they believed the world was beyond saving.\(^\text{340}\) (p.66)

“And this gospel shall be preached in the whole world as a testimony to all nations, and then the end will come” (Matthew 24:14, NIV) was a key text. By evangelising the world as rapidly as possible, Christians not only fulfilled Christ’s command, but actually speeded Christ’s return.\(^\text{341}\) Bingham had seen the effects of this in his own work with SIM, in the EC, as well as in his leadership of the Canadian Keswick. Pessimistic dispensationalism was not for him. The world might be getting worse, but the church was growing stronger. The problems facing the church were no greater than those faced by the church throughout its history.\(^\text{342}\) Pre-millennialism, therefore, whether historic or dispensational in form was a key factor in missionary motivation. Bingham shared these views and led a mission society in which he estimated that over ninety per cent of his missionaries had trained in dispensational colleges and most of SIM’s supporters leaned in this direction.\(^\text{343}\)

Newton was perceptive, however, when he spoke of the “uneducated” SIM missionaries. Despite their training in the Bible Institutes, which was not necessarily to degree standard, there was an anti-intellectual approach to SIM’s work. Throughout most of its history, SIM has stressed the practical over the intellectual. Whereas CIM, now the Overseas Missionary Fellowship (OMF), benefited from such

\(^{339}\) McKenzie, p.271, argues Bingham held to a pre-tribulational understanding of the rapture up to 1914, then up until the late 1930s moved to a post-tribulational position, before dispensing almost entirely with dispensationalism in the last years of his life. (p.273).


\(^{341}\) Note A.P. Stirrett’s comments in ‘Bring Back the King,’ EC, March 1936, p.114.

\(^{342}\) McKenzie, pp. 297 – 299.

\(^{343}\) McKenzie, p.317 referring to letter from Bingham to Playfair, 6 July 1939, p.1.
as the “Cambridge Seven” and subsequent generations of university-educated missionaries, SIM traditionally attracted few such personnel, let alone those with sufficient academic ability to analyse and write the theological, historical, and anthropological studies needed for effective communication of the Christian faith. Mark Noll’s discussion of North American fundamentalism suggests some reasons for this lack. Noll believes that North American fundamentalism was characterised by a mixture of Holiness or Keswick theology, Pentecostalism, and dispensationalism. While each of these views tended to coexist uncomfortably with the others, together these late-nineteenth century theological innovations gave rise to an anti-intellectual stance. Noll writes:

Fundamentalism – especially as articulated in dispensationalism, the most self-conscious theological system supporting the movement – was important for encouraging several kinds of simple anti-intellectualism, for reinforcing some of the questionable features of the nineteenth-century American evangelical synthesis, and for promoting right conclusions with the wrong kind of thought. The result was a tendency towards docetism in outlook and a Gnosticism in method that together constitute the central intellectual indictment against the fundamentalist past.

The Holiness argument of allowing the Holy Spirit to do all the work, the fascination with dispensationalism’s overly simplistic Biblical literalism coupled with its dogmatic leaders combined to create an atmosphere that frowned on intellectual effort, and academic debate. Too often dispensationalist thought relied on outdated static methods that ignored contemporary historical interpretations or personal reflexion in favour of reassembled proof texts. Instead of engaging with the world around them, the world was interpreted through the lens of these theological systems with current events being seen solely in terms of how they fulfilled Biblical prophecies. Yet it was from these groups that SIM was recruiting the bulk of its missionaries and it was these theological views that were taught to their Nigerian converts. The implications of such for ECWA will need exploring.

345 Cooper, p.91.
346 Holiness theology is often called Keswick theology after the annual convention in England that from 1875 initially popularised Holiness thinking outside traditionally Holiness churches. This kind of theological thinking then spread around the English-speaking world as similar conventions were established in different countries. Bingham established and led the Canadian Keswick for many years, while in Nigeria SIM missionaries established a short-lived Keswick convention at Miango for the benefit of fellow expatriate missionaries.
347 Noll, pp.122 – 123.
348 For further discussion see Noll, pp. 109 – 145.
349 Cooper, (p.91), points out that this legacy of North American fundamentalist anti-intellectualism has become a problem for SIM as it becomes more international in its recruitment. These younger missionaries are more willing to engage with secular scholarship and ecumenical dialogue than their seniors, and are poorly prepared to understand or respond to the anti-intellectual legacies on the mission field.
2. Evangelistic Goals

Joel Carpenter reviewed Bingham’s *Seven Sevens of Years and a Jubilee* and Clarence Jones’ *Radio: The New Missionary*. When discussing cultural presuppositions he stated:

. . . whatever the theory (or lack of it) behind their work, these fundamentalists showed very little interest in systematically transforming the cultures to which they went into the image of North America. Whatever their assumptions about the relative worth of cultures, SIM staff were eager to take the Gospel beyond the secure environs of the coastal colonial enclaves, and to equip indigenous Christian leaders to take over responsibility for their churches’ mission. Whether this initial eagerness turned to reluctance during the coming-of-age of the evangelical churches in the Sudan region since World War II is another story. But what is clear in Bingham’s account is that his missionaries had very little use for western cultural mandates.350

Central Nigeria is multi-ethnic, with ethnic groups differing linguistically, socially and politically. SIM’s initial station at Pategi was among the predominantly Islamic Nupe, followed by a short attempt at work in Bida, also a Nupe town.351 The next major move was to Wushishi, a Hausa colony, fairly close to Zunguru, then the colonial capital of Northern Nigeria. Situated on a major trade route the hope was that evangelism here would enable the Gospel to spread widely.

The experience of the mission at Pategi, Bida, and Wushishi (predominantly Muslim towns that were unresponsive to the Gospel), made the mission change its mind about its primary goal of reaching the Muslims with the Gospel. This change led the mission to emphasise reaching, instead, the traditional groups (non-Muslims)352

The first of these non-Muslim groups to be evangelised were the Yagba, a sub-group of the Yoruba.353 From 1908, pioneer evangelism by Tommy Titcombe was extremely successful. From a mission station in Egbe, most of the ethnic group converted and evangelism spread to another Yoruba sub-group, the Igbomina. By 1909, missionaries had moved to Paiko, among the Gbagyi Yamma, a large group linguistically linked to the Nupe.354 This station, as indeed others that followed, would also serve as a central station for evangelism among other smaller ethnic groups.

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351 Bida was abandoned in favour of the CMS after the SIM house burned down.
352 Turaki, Y. 1999, p.179.
354 Then known by the Hausa term Gwari Yamma. There is also a related group called the Gbagyi Mattai.
The fourth ethnic group to have a permanent mission station were the Jaba, when Kwoi opened in 1910. Missionaries settled in Minna, another Hausa colony, in 1913. The development of the railway enhanced the importance of Minna for SIM work, and in 1917, it became the site of SIM’s headquarters until it was transferred to Jos in 1924. In-between these mission centres opening, SIM also moved into other towns and villages. By 1920, it “had opened 12 new stations and had about 44 missionaries on the field.” By 1930 a further 18 new stations were opened. Entry among the Tangale ethnic group in 1917 was to prove extremely fruitful. Fiercely independent, warlike, and cannibalistic, they eventually converted in large numbers. By the early 1940s, the Tangales were sending 80 missionaries of their own to the Hausa Muslims. Carpenter writes, “While SIM’s results were not that spectacular everywhere, the Mission grew rapidly in the space of 25 years: from less than forty missionaries to nearly four hundred between 1917 and 1942; and from $29,000 to $388,000 of annual income over the same period.” It was from among the converts SIM made during this period that the future ECWA church would develop.

A key SIM leader was Dr Andrew Stirrett. A Canadian pharmacist, at the age of 37 he was challenged about missions through reading Bingham’s pamphlet *Burden of the Sudan*. His initial application for service was refused as he was too old. Despite this, he handed over his affairs to SIM and worked his passage on a cattle boat to Liverpool whereupon he did a crash course in missionary medicine. As SIM still was not sure what to do with him, he proceeded to Nigeria arriving at Pateti in 1902 where he was finally accepted. He eventually became SIM’s Field Secretary, and the administrative lynchpin upon which much of the mission’s work depended. Later, while on furlough he completed his medical studies and became SIM’s main doctor in the early twentieth century, known by his Hausa nickname, “Bature Mai Magani” – the white man who owns medicine. He eventually died of old age in Jos.

357 Carpenter, 1988, p.62.  
358 Hunter, pp. 97 – 103.  
Stirrett’s goal was to preach the gospel to the Hausa. He was very disappointed to discover that SIM's Pategi station was not among the Hausa but the Nupe. He found learning the tonal Nupe language a good foundation for his later mastery of Hausa. He was overjoyed on being permitted to move to Wushishi in 1904. Here missionaries could preach to caravans of traders passing through and hope the travelling merchants would spread abroad something of what they had heard. Hausa work was never easy and he felt that Bible translation should reduce the problems. Ultimately, it was a matter of trusting God for results. “Now, is the time to exercise faith, NOW, when there are few or no indications of his precious truth supplanting the lie of the Devil – the Koran. Yes, NOW is the time for faith.”

Despite his concern for the Hausa, he agreed it was God’s will to reach the non-Muslim ethnic groups; “before they became engulfed in the Moslem error, and this work our Mission has been doing for the last twenty years with magnificent results.” However, following the 1926 Miango inter-mission conference, it was time missions turned their attention to Muslims, of which the most important group were the Hausa. The Hausa had, as mentioned above, been the centre of missionary fascination for some time. By comparison, the traditionalist groups missionaries had worked so successfully among were seen as backward and ignorant.

Missionary work among traditionalists was necessary to forestall the advance of Islam, and broadly speaking was extremely successful. The challenge of evangelising the Hausa, however, never disappeared.

Andrew Barnes believes all of the Protestant missions arriving in Northern Nigeria had come with the “preconception that Muslims held greater potential as converts than traditionalist groups.” Government restrictions had forced them to concentrate on the traditionalist groups instead. However, the missionaries did not believe their converts from traditional religions were coming with the right motives. Missionaries essentially wanted converts who would become itinerating evangelists like themselves. “Missionaries were evangelists converted by evangelists hoping in their turn to convert evangelists.” The trouble lay in part with the missionaries' refusal to educate their converts properly. All they were initially prepared to offer their converts

363 Stirrett, ‘Who Will Respond to this Appeal?’ EC, September 1928, p. 380.
365 Barnes, 2009, p.103.
was enough reading, writing, and numeracy as to equip them to be rural evangelists depending on farming for a living. This was not enough for those with no wish to be evangelists, wanting to progress in the new worlds of business and government employment that were opening. Paradoxically, while dissatisfied with their illiterate or semi-literate traditionalist converts whose education and mental skills they had no wish to improve, the missions were strongly attracted to the already literate, albeit unreachable Muslims. It was an attraction made all the stronger by government restriction.

Stirrett likened the new outreach to the Hausa to warfare. “Even so it would seem here in our warfare the Lord would have us use different tactics with the Moslem than we have used with the Pagan.” Stirrett’s key weapon was the Hausa Bible. Stirrett and Dr Walter Miller of the CMS were the two main missionary translators of the 1932 edition. Writing after the 1927 meeting between missionary leaders and Sir Graeme Thomson, the Governor of Nigeria, from which point missions began to anticipate expansion into the Northern Provinces, and anticipating the near completion of the Hausa Bible, he called for 100 teachers of the Bible. They did not have to be professional teachers “but necessarily fundamentalists” (his emphasis) who would teach reading and writing. As secular subjects led students astray, the curriculum would focus on the Hausa Bible. Graduating Bible students should, adopting the Hausa penchant for long-distance travel and trade, become lay evangelists across the whole region. Thus, he hoped Christianity would spread among the Hausa Muslims in a similar way to Islam’s spread among traditionalists. Evangelists would come from different backgrounds; some might well be converted traditionalists, there being no reason to restrict Muslim evangelism to Muslim converts.

Despite Stirrett’s evangelistic zeal for the Hausa, and his active participation in Bible translation, he had no illusions about the nature of Islam. During SIM’s early days,
the language used to describe Islam and Muslims is harsh and blunt. In a 1920 sermon Stirrett spoke of the crisis of thirty-six non-Muslim ethnic groups who needed to be evangelised

... before such time as they become Mohammedans. What an awful calamity it will be if they are allowed by our negligence to go over into participation in that terrible religion.

What does Mohammedanism stand for? It stands for the utter denial of all that we consider essential to salvation. It absolutely denies both the Sonship of Jesus Christ and His atoning death. It stands for all that Turkey has done to the Armenians. Other religions may be termed non-Christian – Mohammedanism must be termed Anti-Christian.

Stirrett illustrated his point by the gruesome story of the Isawa founder's impalement,371 and on-going anti-Christian resistance by Muslims elsewhere.372 He contrasts that with the responsiveness of the Yagba and other traditionalists. The difference in responsiveness Stirrett blamed on the Qur'an and the Qur'anic school system. “It is the masterpiece of the Devil, the Koran, and there is nothing that will meet it but the masterpiece of God – our Holy Bible ‘the sword of the Spirit which is the Word of God’.” He was confident the Hausa Bible would counteract such influence.373 Already there was a considerable upsurge in numbers of converts, many of whom were young male students in his Hausa Bible school in Jos.374 Thus, despite the post-1933 softening of language, he wrote; “Remember that the strength of Moslemism is the Koran, and the strength of the Koran is the Devil, the strength of Christianity is God’s Word, the Bible, and the strength of the Bible is the Risen Christ of God.”375

Stirrett’s evangelistic preaching was just as forthright. Preaching in Minna marketplace in 1925, he asserted that Jesus is the resurrected Son of God. “He tells his audience that the followers of Mohammed would deny these truths by saying that Jesus was not the Son of God, that He never died for our sins and that He never rose again.”

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372 A Muslim group, which venerates Jesus above Muhammad, and from whose ranks a number of early Hausa converts to Christianity, came. See Bingham, R.V., ‘A Remarkable Movement Among Moslems in Nigeria,’ EC, August 1913 b, pp.246, 250 in which he cites Miss E.A. Clark explaining what was known about this group.
374 Stirrett, EC, 1934.
Stirrett was not alone. Albert Hughes tacitly accuses Mohammad and his successors of immorality, and Islam of cruelty, deceit, and lust. To him the heart of Islam was morally rotten. Islamic theology was unattractive: a remote, autocratic, and unfeeling deity, no hope of salvation, no sense of a loving God, only a religion of “outward form and show”. Heaven was remote, and merely sensual.\textsuperscript{378} Beitzel also resorts to warlike language, writing [in capitals] “THE ENEMY MUST FIRST BE STOPPED IN THEIR TRIUMPHANT FORWARD MARCH.” Christian tardiness, impressive Muslim ritual, and Muslim oppression had left the Jarawa people he worked amongst under considerable pressure to adopt Islam.\textsuperscript{379} Straightforward evangelism was best, proving that “Mohamed is a false prophet, the Koran is a false bible and that their whole religion is a broken staff which will only pierce them through.”\textsuperscript{380} Merryweather views Islam as a satanic deception entrapping millions of “dupes”. Proof of Islam’s evil nature is its opposition to Christianity with Mohammed usurping the authority and glory owed to Christ. Muslims are hypocrites breaking the very laws they profess to honour.\textsuperscript{381} Muslim oppression was Ogilvie’s theme describing Buba’s fright at the treatment of the apostate Muslim.\textsuperscript{382} Yet the average Nigerian Muslim’s actual knowledge of Islam was poor. John Hay writes, “the general mass of the followers of the Prophet are like children, imitating without comprehending, and believing that the public observance of prescribed formulae raises them in the eyes of Allah as it does in the eyes of their fellow men. Their religious outlook is little wider than that of the pagans they despise.”\textsuperscript{383}

It was strong language, designed mainly for their supporting constituency. Its use in Nigeria would undoubtedly have been offensive and counter-productive. For example, when Ethel Miller, Walter Miller’s independently minded sister, published her \textit{The Truth about Muhammad} in 1926\textsuperscript{384} a tract which employed similar language, it attracted some fairly hostile attention from the Sultan of Sokoto and the colonial authorities including an abortive attempt to deport her from the country.\textsuperscript{385} Miller’s pamphlet, printed by the SIM-related Niger Press, with the knowledge of the SIM

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\textsuperscript{378} Hughes, A., ‘Why We Cannot Trust the Sudan to the Moslem,’ \textit{EC}, Vol. 21, No. 8, August 1925, pp. 315 & 324.
\textsuperscript{379} Beitzel, C.F., ‘The Coming Crisis,’ \textit{EC}, Vol. 19, No. 12, December 1923, pp.449 – 450
\textsuperscript{382} Ogilvie, H.L., ‘Which Will Triumph – Love or the Sword?’ \textit{EC}, November 1935, p. 442.
\textsuperscript{384} Miller, E., \textit{The Truth about Muhammad}, The Niger Press, Minna, 1926.
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leadership may well have reflected many SIM missionaries' thinking. There is no indication, however, that SIM missionaries actually employed polemical language within Nigeria. Fortright preaching as in Stirrett's open-air above clearly demarcated the theological differences between Islam and Christianity. Nevertheless, forthright preaching is different from offensive polemics, which the colonial authorities and the traditional rulers would have been quick to seize upon. Their failure to do so indicates that this kind of language was not an issue within Nigeria.  

Stirrett's reasoning about nomadic trader/evangelists was defective. Students attended school because they valued western education in a rapidly changing society. Refusing to teach secular subjects drove many to look for this in government, Roman Catholic or more liberal church contexts. Barnes writing about missionary frustration with their non-Muslim converts states:

> Without offering in any way a comment on the appeal of Christianity to Muslims, it can be pointed out that widespread conversions of the kind missionaries desired would not have occurred among Muslims for the same reason they did not occur among traditionalists. There was no way for Africans to survive economically as Christians.

The missionary failure to recognise this left little choice for converts than to become evangelists, or to go elsewhere. “The Christian message was a message of self-empowerment for would-be preachers, but virtual self-annihilation for everyone else.” Eventually SIM changed this policy. Trade also requires capital and networks of suppliers and purchasers, accessible for Muslims among their co-religionists. Where would Christian converts, usually from isolated, poor traditionalist backgrounds, access the required capital and networks? Conversions among

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386 How much this kind of polemical example set an example for current polemical speech is difficult to say. One doubts that it did, as missionary speech moderated substantially during the 1930s. In fact, the missionary polemics reflected their frustrations with being forbidden access to Muslim areas. In a similar way, it could be argued that current polemics reflects frustrations and anger with current violence and political corruption and is probably not an inheritance from the 1920s.

387 Barnes, 2009, pp. 106 – 107. He goes on to allege that an SIM missionary pointed out in 1905 that it was pointless to convert a Muslim without providing him with a job, due to the economic and social boycott he would face from other Muslims. Cf. Anon, "Mohammedanism and Christianity Face to Face in North Africa, The Missionary Witness, January 17, 1905, pp. 40 – 42. Barnes overstates his case somewhat. He alleges that the author was an SIM missionary when the article does not state who the author was. While Bingham was the editor of this magazine, which later became known as the Evangelical Christian, and it extensively reported on SIM work, it was never an SIM magazine, and the article itself refers even more to the work of the North Africa Mission than it does to that of SIM. Nor did the writer express himself as bluntly as Barnes makes out.

388 Barnes, 2009, p. 108. Barnes proceeds to suggest that this situation arose because missionaries had an unrealistic, idealised picture of a European past which bore no relationship with early-twentieth-century Nigeria.


390 Although Ruth Cox's informant Gyarazama Gumau speaks of Numau an itinerant iron trader who travelled around his area teaching people to read and starting small Christian groups, cf. Cox, R., The Lord's Work: Perspectives of Early Leaders of the Evangelical Church of West Africa in Nigeria.
Muslims were limited in number. A few prominent Muslims – the Alkali of Jos, for example,\textsuperscript{391} - converted, or were extremely interested, such as the Emir of Gwandu.\textsuperscript{392} Normal evangelistic preaching, however, was relatively unsuccessful when compared to results with traditionalists. Muslims tended to despise the Christian gospel.\textsuperscript{393} Finally, SIM by promoting the use of Hausa, probably unwittingly, was aiding Islam’s spread. SIM had little choice,\textsuperscript{394} as promoting Hausa was colonial policy. However, language and culture are inseparable: the promotion of Hausa also meant the promotion of the Hausa Muslim culture. Paradoxically, as Sanneh argues, it is where missionaries translated the Scriptures into the languages of the individual ethnic groups that those cultures and identities are best preserved. The act of translation releases the Gospel to take root in and to shape the culture in a new way, and in turn to shape the Gospel in new and different ways.\textsuperscript{395}

Yet the world was changing, and with it missionary perceptions and language. Kapp wrote of tremendous changes in the Muslim world occasioned by the Caliph’s downfall post-World War 1 and the translation of the Qur’an into Turkish using a Romanised script. He too spoke in warlike imagery, but instead of an offensive war against Muslims, it was of resisting Muslim invasion. Evangelistic progress was possible provided the right sort of missionaries were available: women who could evangelise Muslim women kept in purdah, and better educated men who, knowing Arabic and Islamic theology, could more coherently discuss with Muslim leaders.\textsuperscript{396} Later he wrote of his use of conversational and friendship forms of evangelism in his work in Garko.\textsuperscript{397} Anticipating the opening up of the Northern Provinces, Beacham called for doctors and for university and seminary-trained men who specialised in Islamics.\textsuperscript{398}

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\textsuperscript{395} Sanneh, 1989.
\textsuperscript{396} Kapp, N.A., ‘Present Day Opportunities in Moslem Lands,’ SW, July – August 1933, Vol. 6, No. 1, pp. 4 – 6.
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3. Opening the North

As the largest missionary society in Northern Nigeria, SIM was intimately involved in the struggle with the colonial authorities for entrance into the Muslim emirates. Hay pointed out that “The last census, taken in 1921, shows 6,699,427 Mohammedans in the Northern Provinces TO WHOM WE ARE NOT SUPPOSED TO TELL THE GOOD NEWS.” [Hay’s emphasis]. He proceeds to quote Meek’s description of most Muslims as being ignorant of their religion and not much different from traditionalists in beliefs and practices. Playfair, referring to the 1931 census, points out that there are only 57,724 Protestants in Northern Nigeria. In Kano Province out of a population of 2,424,000 there were only 16 Hausa Christians.

Not all of the movement into the Northern Provinces focused on Muslims. The mission was just as interested in traditionalist areas often surrounded by, and owing some allegiance to, Muslims. Work among these people would prove fruitful, although it required patience. A few Hausa traditionalists, known as Maguzawa, converted while Western missionaries worked among them, but large numbers converted once Nigerian evangelists had replaced the Westerners.

Unofficially, SIM had worked in the Northern Provinces prior to gaining official permission. In late 1933, Beacham writes that for thirteen years several societies, including SIM “have carried on a widespread Gospel ministry,” resulting in two Hausa speaking Christian congregations in Kano. Once the government officially permitted the missionary societies to enter the Northern Provinces in 1933, SIM seized the opportunity with both hands. This was an advance into territory that was staunchly Muslim and they asked their readers, “is the standard of the Prophet to yield to the standard of the Cross. . .” Reports in the Sudan Witness were optimistic. Trust in God and in the Scriptures would result in significant numbers converting.

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401 Hay, 1984, pp.38 – 46 discusses these mass conversions to Christianity among the Maguzawa. Shankar, in her Chapter 5, notes how SIM’s northern mission stations were placed close to Maguzawa areas reflecting government desire to reach out with medical facilities to the traditionalists and the crucial role missions had played in medical care further south.
402 Beacham, C.G., ‘Kano,’ SW, Jan. – Feb. 1934, Vol. 6, No. 4, pp. 4 – 6. Perhaps this was part of the clandestine evangelism referred to above?
The strategy was two-pronged. On the one hand, the government wanted medical assistance, especially in the leprosy settlements. Six of these became SIM’s responsibility. These were operated on a tripartite basis with colonial government and Native Authorities responsible for providing land and patient grants, the American Mission to Lepers paying for site development, public health programmes, and Nigerian staff salaries, while SIM provided the medical and supervisory personnel. Initial reception from the Native Authorities was positive. SIM felt this was a strategically important evangelistic development. Helser wrote, “It is a recognised fact that no class of people respond more readily to the Gospel message than the lepers, with all their physical and spiritual need.” He stresses the impact of Christian love in providing patients with renewed hope. Evangelistically, leprosy work seemed successful with regular reports of conversions. By April 1940, Playfair reported 67 converts from the leprosy work. Beacham, reporting on three semi-annual visits to Leper Settlements, wrote that in the first visit patients were quite cheerful: for once, they felt cared for. By the second visit, he could see some physical improvements. By the third visit, he could report that many had become Christians. In addition, an Eye Hospital opened in Kano in January 1943. By addressing the problem of high levels of blindness the Eye Hospital was a means to develop other evangelistic contacts, drawing people from all social classes from Kano and much further afield.

On the other hand, SIM wanted to develop general mission stations through which evangelism, basic medical care and schooling – a successful formula in non-Muslim areas - could be undertaken. In Kano Province, for example, SIM opened a station at Garko, close to Kano City and shortly afterwards took over the leprosarium, arranging with the Native Authority to move it to a more suitable site. The government was anxious that top quality personnel would staff these new stations: they could point to a number of situations where SIM and other missions had been

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405 Cox, Mrs H.L., ‘In Search of Lepers,’ SW, March – April 1938, Vol. 14, No. 2, pp. 20 – 22 portrays the mixed results from such outreach programmes.

406 Playfair, Circular letter, 1936.


badly let down by the indifferent quality of their missionaries.\textsuperscript{412} John Hall, one of SIM’s most experienced missionaries, transferred from his booming work in Kaltungo among the Tangale to staff Garko.\textsuperscript{413} From seeing thousands of converts in Kaltungo in the first twenty years of his missionary work, he quickly began to see how difficult it would be to obtain a response from Muslim areas. In 1941, he reports only eight people participating in a communion service at Garko, three of them missionaries, and five believers from Kaltungo who were assisting him in evangelism.\textsuperscript{414} Three local men, who had professed faith in Christ, were still to become church members.\textsuperscript{415} Often the key to any ministry in these Islamic areas would be medical or educational work. Garko’s dispensary attracted fifty to sixty patients per day. Normal procedure was to preach an evangelistic message before commencing treatment.\textsuperscript{416}

A Waif’s Home in Kano offered a home for unwanted street children, as did a boy’s school that opened in 1945 at Roni outside Kano. Many of these were Muslim children, victims of divorce or polygamy.\textsuperscript{417} Some of these would convert. Beitzel, writing of the industrial school he ran at Bununu near Bauchi states, “We have more converted Moslems [his emphasis] here than in any other place in the north that I know of.”\textsuperscript{418}

Beitzel excepted, responses were slow. Encouragement came in the responses of one or two individuals, in low-key discussions with individuals, and subsequent networking;\textsuperscript{419} slow progress that would eventually lead to a group of converts meeting for worship.\textsuperscript{420} Missionary reports tended to either focus on the stories of individual converts,\textsuperscript{421} or reflect on the sovereignty of God, and the atoning sacrifice of Christ in whom the missionary placed his spiritual hope.\textsuperscript{422} A consistent theme was that of foundation laying, and of Islam’s crumbling.\textsuperscript{423} Renewed contact was made with the Isawa.\textsuperscript{424} There was still some talk of Muhammad as a “False Prophet”, of

\textsuperscript{412} Cf Ubah, 1983.
\textsuperscript{413} Hay, J., ‘Editorial Comment,’ \textit{SW}, July – August 1933, Vol. 6, No. 1, pp. 1 – 2.
\textsuperscript{414} Hay, 1984, p.176.
\textsuperscript{415} Hall, J.S., ‘Church in Garko,’ \textit{SW}, October 1941, Vol. 27, No. 4, pp. 7 – 9.
\textsuperscript{423} Owens, H.D., ‘Moslem Contacts,’ \textit{EC}, April 1940, p. 219.
the *ulama* as “the Pharisees of Islam”, of the need, in the context of evangelism among Muslims, to shake off “the lie of the Devil and cease to hinder God’s working by our unbelief.”  

One female missionary saw Islam as an oppressively male religion, “for Mohammed has no religion for women at all.” However, while bemoaning Muslim resistance, Hall cannot “believe that this “native” is under any different kind of a curse from which Christ, vicariously bearing it, delivered us.”  

Missionaries began to stress more of the positive aspects of the Christian faith vis-à-vis Islam. They contrasted Biblical claims about Christ’s holiness and resurrection with Muhammad’s sinful life, and grave. They contrasted Christian ethical standards with the evils in Muslim society. They contrasted Christian claims to being a child of God, with Muslim acceptance of being God’s slave. They contrasted the varying visions of heaven and eternity. At the heart of missionary beliefs was the Muslims’ need of Christ.

Muslim reactions to the Gospel varied. Sometimes these were friendly, evangelistic sermons punctuated by Hausa comments agreeing with the preacher; women missionaries welcomed into Muslim homes to speak to wives kept in *purdah* and their children. Stirrett spoke of the Emir of Katsina’s openness, and of a long-standing Kano resident informing him that the Hausa man was no longer the bigoted Muslim of yore. He was more open and wanted to learn to read and write. Stewart agrees, “Nigeria’s type of Mohammedanism is not so bigoted as that found in other parts of Africa, consequently Moslems attend the [open air] meetings, and their various exclamations of assent indicate that they understand what is being said.”

Yet a survey of news flashes in *SW* gives the impression that while initially there was some curiosity and interest in the missionaries’ message, by 1940 both Muslims and Isawa were increasingly resistant.

At other times, Muslims were indifferent or hostile. Zinder, in Niger Republic (then Colony), was an Islamic centre that was consistently hostile to the Christian

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missionaries. Osborne, writing of work here states, “Moslem opposition is very strong – perhaps stronger than in any part of West Africa. A few converts have been won, but they have practically all backslidden.”

A combination of spies and intimidation prevented conversions. Medical work in Sarkin Pawa, in Nigeria, was delayed, “owing to the Moslem’s hatred of the Name of the Lord Jesus Christ and the Gospel of His salvation.”

Beacham in Kano felt “an icy wall of separation. The antagonism of Islam against Christianity. With crowds around us, we feel as lonely strangers – an experience quite different from that which has been ours heretofore among the pagan tribes.” Hall, while encouraged with the interest of some, complained both of being forbidden to preach in Garko’s Sunday market, and of the distractions of that market from his message.

Gauging individual reactions to missionary preaching was difficult. Older missionaries remarked on the Muslim tendency glibly to announce, “I repent” or on their pride. Some imams tried to assert their own intellectual and religious superiority by confounding missionaries’ arguments. Younger missionaries speak of theological differences such as who is a sinner, or who is greater, Muhammad or Jesus. Occasionally miraculous answers to prayer provoked further interest in the missionaries’ message. Curiosity about the white man and his message often seems to have marked individual responses: curiosity, but not a willingness to convert. As Barnes writes:

Public preaching was perhaps the least effective part of the ministry of the first generation of missionaries. No one could understand what they were saying. But public preaching brought aspiring native evangelists to mission stations. Native evangelists would turn the missionaries’ greatest weakness into one of African Christianity’s greatest strengths.

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433 Pre-1960 work in Niger is included as SIM missionaries there were supervised from Nigeria, working also among the Hausa tribe that straddles the borders between the two countries. SIM commenced work in Niger in part to circumvent British restrictions on work among the Hausa in Nigeria.


438 Cf. Cox, R., p.219 where Iliya Asi explains the Hausa word “tuba” can either mean to apologise or to repent. Often those listening to missionary sermons would express their regret for offending God and offer their apologies: they had been ignorant. They were not actually repenting, however, much to the missionaries’ frustration.


443 Barnes, 2009, p.143.
Missionaries spoke more of individuals rather than impersonal forces. Even when these individuals were hostile, they were portrayed sympathetically. The Islamic faith might be harsh but it included parents who grieved the loss of their infants just as much as any Western parent. Muslims might irrationally reject Christ but their faith was seen as empty as opposed to evil. Muslims only pretended to pray relying solely on ritual, pride, and public image for their hold on people. Missionaries highlighted superstitious practices such as using charms, or fatalism as evidence of Muslim spiritual blindness. “In Islam there is neither inward cleansing from sin’s defilement nor power to live a holy life.”

Davis’ *Swords in the Desert* summarises all of these changing attitudes. Written for a mass market, it introduced missionary work among Muslims to SIM’s supporters, and drew from his own experience at Roni. In it, he imagines a series of encounters between the missionary and a Muslim named Alhaji. Each chapter covers a different aspect of the Christian – Muslim encounter: health; prayer; fasting; pilgrimages; the after life; persecution; women in purdah; the occult; charms; immorality; and the deity of Christ each portrayed in story form. Davis’ style, although paternalistic, is humane: he has friendly relations with the people he portrays, although distinct theological differences remain. Yet in his preface, Davis speaks of Islam’s “fanatical followers, with their sweeping scimitars, forced decisions from millions of people. Those who refused were slain by the conquering sword of Mohammedanism, until today this false religion has swept over most of the world…” Playfair’s Introduction speaks of bringing the Gospel to “an arrogant, proud, and haughty people.” He writes of the Dan Fodio’s jihad enslaving up to fifty thousand non-Muslims a year with tribute, in slave form, sent to Sokoto. It was this country, conquered by the British in 1900, to which missionaries have taken the Gospel. SIM’s language had softened since the early warlike days, but its underlying opposition to Islam had never changed.

What of the missionaries’ converts? What were their perceptions of Muslims? Nigeria’s multiplicity of ethnic groups, many at the time poorly educated or illiterate
makes this difficult to tell. To some extent, one must rely on the few missionary comments, or later recollections. Oliver, writing of the Gbagyi, states:

They are naturally stubborn and conservative to a degree, and these characteristics are shown by the way in which throughout the years, although in more or less close contact with Mohammedanism, very, very few of them have become followers of the false prophet.452

Beitzel writes of the Jarawa people in Dass, “They had become hardened from fighting Moslem invaders for a hundred years. They were suspicious of everyone. Little wonder that we had to fight hard eleven years to show them that we were their friends.”453

Among the stories of early converts recorded by the missionaries, three are prominent. Mallam Mohamadu, the imam of a tin-mining camp, converted convinced he had found the truth.454 Mallam Ibrahim, at one time the Alkali of Jos, came to faith both through listening to Christian sermons and through reading the New Testament. He increasingly found erroneous teaching in his reading of the Qur’an but was comforted when reading the New Testament. Despite strong temptations to remain a Muslim he converted.455 Abba Musa of Zinder, who had trained to be an imam, converted through his friendship with a missionary and through reading the Bible.456 Increasingly SIM relied on the work of these converts to do the evangelism. It was through Ibrahim’s preaching that Mohamadu converted. Abba Musa’s preaching in Zinder attracted a lot of opposition, but he was quite an encouragement to other Christians in Niger.

In general, however, there is little information in SIM-related publications about the ethnic groups or the people the missionaries evangelised. Turaki describes the missionaries’ attitudes as “The whole way of life, religion, customs, and social values of a pagan society all stand to be redeemed, and liberated by the Gospel of Christ.”457 There is thus little attempt to understand and explain each ethnic group’s views. Missionary portrayals that do exist either give a paternalistic account of the ethnic group or of the individual focusing on their backwardness and “heathen” customs. Yet, as Gayus Dogo pointed out, this dismissal of their customs and history was counterproductive.

When the gospel came, all at once, all the customs and culture of the people were rejected! To my understanding, if this had not been done, had they not been rejected totally, it would have been better. This is my own opinion. If the customs and culture are rejected totally . . . well . . . it is not every group that you should reject everything they have. For example, we heard the missionaries talking about idols. The missionaries would come with the few evangelists who were coming up among us, they said, "All these people are worshiping idols!"

Ah, ah (not so) . . . we were not worshiping idols. Some may but this is not among us. 'We, in Bauchiland, every place has the name of god. The god they are talking about is the god of creation. Then again, like our own custom, there is the name of god, there is the name house of fire, there is payment of wages, there were many things that we had which the missionaries did not understand. For example certain feasts or festivals. They did not ask the meaning of these feasts. Had they asked, it would have been better; we could have explained them.

Despite this, a good number converted and immediately were recruited into the evangelistic teams that radiated out from mission stations every weekend. Every convert was involved in evangelism.

Everybody was an evangelist in our area. Everybody! Once you became a Christian, you have to go out to tell your friends about the good tidings. So, whether you were trained as an evangelist or not, still you would go as an evangelist to preach. One good thing that I could remember was that all Christians, every weekend, must go out in twos to different villages. Whether baptized or unbaptized. You should go . . . maybe one baptized person with some helper would go from village to village. And you would go on Saturdays, some will travel fourteen miles, ten miles, eight miles, seven miles, six miles, two miles and so on, to preach.

Sent further afield were Nigerian missionaries from Tangale and Kagoro who worked in the Northern Provinces assisting SIM's missionaries. For those so recruited, this was a bigger step than for the Western missionaries: they did not have the social, material, and educational advantages of the white missionaries. SIM did not pay any salaries, only the little that was collected in offerings in churches. Nigerian missionaries normally farmed to support their families. Yet they were powerful and faithful preachers. Mai Kudi Kure spoke of,

Pastor Andarawus. He was one who went around here and there. His own strength was preaching among the Muslims. He used the Koran and the Bible. He had two bags with a Bible in one and the Koran in the other and would hang one on each shoulder. This is how he travelled. After he would go out for a week or so, then he would come back. When I was a boy, I used to follow them with a gramophone on my head. Sometimes when they went, they would find others attracted to their group who would also follow them. Sometimes they would continue like this with up to seven people going with them from place to place.

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458 Dogo, as told to Ruth Cox, p.103. Cox's informants were retired church leaders speaking of their own youth in the 1940s, or of prominent Christian leaders, they had known who might have been first generation converts.

459 Asi, as told to Ruth Cox, pp. 140 – 141.

When he stopped, they all stopped with him... they were attracted to the singing and preaching... Haruna Boraje... he was like Malam Andarawus and did the same thing, singing and preaching.  

He was not alone. Little is said of the work of many of these men and women in the pages of the SW or the EC. Without their unsung faithful witness, SIM’s work would have been much harder. They were just as much pioneer missionaries as anyone else. Yet much of their work was subsumed into mission station reports, at best labelled as that of unnamed African assistants.

Many early ECWA leaders participated in significant ministry in their home areas and cross culturally. The mission reports do not always reflect the extensiveness of the ministries of these early evangelists and missionaries. On occasion, it is the African Christians who opened up new areas and western missionaries came later to officially open a mission station. Missionaries often thought of these African workers as assistants in their mission work. The African evangelists themselves speak of the call of the Lord on their lives.

Muslim persecution of converts runs through many accounts. Clymer speaks of those converted through medical work but of subsequent persecution. Freda Jones speaks of a poisoning at Fago, and the widow’s struggle to carry on as a Christian. Hazel Callaghan speaks of the persecution Christian young people at the Katsina Leper Home endured. A major problem was the Muslim perception that in converting they rejected family and community ties. This always attracted a hostile response albeit not necessarily a lasting rejection of the converts, a feature that the missionaries do not mention. Iliya Asi summarised the situation:

And those who are Muslims, in fact, some because of the fear of members of their family, this makes them not to become Christians. Actually, before somebody leaves his religion, then he should be ready to face any kind of humiliation from the family. First, they would isolate him and even though they would have some contact with him, they would tell him... that is not our religion. If you leave that religion then that means, you are trying to leave our family and so on. So some become afraid. But if one becomes, or takes courage to become a Christian, they actually will not leave him. They will threaten to leave him but they don’t... Our own brand of Islam there was not like that introduced by Fulani jihadists. They do not leave their family or hate their blood relation because of religion. They don't.

Marriage issues could be a particular problem. It was not just the issue of polygamy, which all of the mission societies forbade. Converts from Islam who were married were liable to lose their wives and children as relatives took them away. Their families, whose responsibility it would normally have been to secure them a bride,
abandoned young men seeking wives. This was a particular problem as culturally the mark of adulthood is to be married with children, especially sons.

4. Changing Relationships

Relations with the colonial government remained difficult. Logams writes of tensions in Kagoro, a traditionalist area, albeit very responsive to SIM evangelism led by the Glaswegian missionary Tom Archibald who established a mission station there in 1926.\(^{467}\) Here the British-imposed alien chiefs persecuted converts fearing that missionaries and Christian converts were threats to their rule. When the area transferred from Plateau Province to Zaria Province in 1934, administrators were posted from Zaria to advise and reorganise administration along Islamic lines. Attempts were made to Islamise local customs such as marriage practices. Yet Kagoro Christianity grew so that by 1950, up to a third of the population were Christian, and half of the children were in mission schools.

Political tensions grew. While on the one hand, the colonial government kept a careful watch\(^ {468}\), on the other hand local people formed the Southern Zaria Freedom Movement aiming for independence from Zaria rule, and a stop to Islamic influence. Their strategy included securing the appointment of their ablest men into positions in the Native Authorities. One such was Mallam Gwamna Awan, a teacher in an SIM school, who was appointed as Assistant Scribe in the Native Administration. He used that position to stymie the Chief Scribe’s Islamising efforts. In 1945 when the position of Chief of Kagoro became vacant, he was the popular choice, of both Christians and traditionalists, to be the first indigenous man to hold that post. Even then, he faced a struggle as a rival claimant, Mallam Gwoni, left the SIM church for the Roman Catholics, and set himself up in nearby Kafanchan with colonial and Hausa backing.\(^ {469}\)

Obstacles in Muslim areas were more expected.\(^ {470}\) Hall had complained about being forbidden to preach in the Garko marketplace. This was government policy.

\(^{467}\) Logams, pp.416 – 421.
\(^{468}\) Colonial authorities reputedly regarded Tom Archibald as a security threat right up until independence in 1960.
\(^{469}\) Mallam Dauda Kwoi was another prominent SIM Church layman. Headmaster of the Kwoi SIM school, in 1951 he was appointed a Special Member of the Northern House of Assembly representing non-Muslims in Southern Zaria, no non-Muslim having secured election. Logams, p.421.
\(^{470}\) Turaki cites Playfair stating that SIM’s move into the Northern Provinces was due to a Mr Brown who succeeded Palmer as Lieutenant Governor of the North. Unlike Palmer, Brown favoured missions. Brown’s successor, however, was T.S. Adams, another opponent of missions. Cf. Turaki, 1999, pp.265 – 267.
Missionaries were forbidden to preach in market places or near mosques. Nor were they allowed to do house-to-house visitation.\textsuperscript{471} Instead, they could speak freely at their own mission stations: hence the importance of medical and educational work. They were also free to speak to individuals on the street, and to visit in homes when invited. The nature of evangelism, therefore, had to be low-key using personal contacts, developing friendships, and often using literature: someone usually could read.\textsuperscript{472} In rural areas, missionaries had some more freedom, as long as they avoided Native Authority and colonial officials.\textsuperscript{473}

A growing problem was evangelism in the leprosy settlements. Muslim Native Authorities who sponsored these settlements were concerned about Christian evangelism, especially among young people and children. They requested the colonial authorities to change the terms and conditions under which the missions operated these institutions. The Protestant missions were not prepared to accept this restriction: indeed SIM took the highly unusual step of highlighting the problem in the SW. Beacham wrote:

Agitation to prohibit the teaching of children under 18 of Moslem parents – whether or not the parents desire their children to attend a Christian school or church service – has been a hindrance to advance in some places. The Roman Catholic Mission has agreed not to give such teaching. Protestant societies have unitedly withstood the pressure. . . . \textbf{A vital principle – that of the right of the parent over the child – is at stake.} [\textit{emphasis as in the original}] Prayer is needed for this delicate and serious situation.\textsuperscript{474}

Specifically he mentions delays in opening a leper settlement in Bauchi because of this dispute. In fact, SIM felt so strongly about the matter that they threatened to withdraw entirely from leprosy work if the government forced the new policy through. Eventually, the matter was allowed to drop without any specific resolution.\textsuperscript{475} As

\textsuperscript{471} Each SIM missionary was clearly told what these restrictions were in the SIM Handbook. Cf. Anon., \textit{SIM Handbook}, SIM, New York., pp.42 – 43, 1946, SIMA.
\textsuperscript{473} Barnes, 2004, pp.62 – 81.
\textsuperscript{475} For further details see the following in SIMA, NG Box 11, File 4.
Playfair, G.W., \textit{Letter to The Chief Commissioner}, 6\textsuperscript{th} September 1939.
Adams, T.S., \textit{Letter to Mr Playfair}, 6\textsuperscript{th} November 1939, Government Ref: 26516/S.4/III.
Anon., \textit{Record of an Interview at Kaduna on 20\textsuperscript{th} May 1940 with H.E. The Acting Governor, Mr C.C. Wooley on the subject of religion in Lepor Settlements}.
Adams, T.S., \textit{Letter to H.G. Farrant}, 10\textsuperscript{th} December 1940.
See also SIMA NG Box 11 File 7B
Resident Patterson, \textit{Letter to G.W. Playfair}, 19\textsuperscript{th} October 1940.
Playfair, G.W., \textit{Letter to Resident Patterson}, 23\textsuperscript{rd} October 1940.
Playfair, G.W., \textit{Extract of Letter}, 14\textsuperscript{th} November 1940.
See also SIMA, SIM Correspondence BC1/BC2/#7 Correspondence: Bingham, Sept – Dec 1939.
Bingham, R.V., \textit{Letter to G.W. Playfair}, 15\textsuperscript{th} November 1939.
Ubah points out, referring to a 1951 plea by the Emir of Gwandu not to proselytise 16 schoolchildren with leprosy, “That such a plea was made more than ten years after the matter was first raised suggests that the freedom of the missionaries had not been effectively circumscribed.”

SIM leaders were apprehensive about post World War 2 developments, in particular African exposure to Western lifestyles and finances.

Money and all that it represents to our civilisation, has literally been thrown at the African during the recent years of the world war. . . . Many thousands of Africans went into the Forces and were sent overseas, while their wives received what was to them enormous allowances. Now the men are returning with what are to them huge bonuses.

As noted above, returning soldiers played a crucial role in developing nationalism in Nigeria: a development that SIM leaders feared. Beacham mentions the rise of nationalism and trade unionism fearing the former would result in the expulsion of missionaries along with the colonial government.

Mohammedanism has never been so aggressive. Heretofore it has been content to bear a passive testimony to its self-satisfying, sin-condoning, socially-gratifying faith. Today it is sending out its active propagandists among the pagans as well as to fortify its own followers. In the new political alignments, Moslem leaders actively jockey for position, not only for themselves, but to make their religion dominant in the country.

A year later Kirk, writing the 1949 report, feels that nationalism and trade unionism are a greater problem causing the Enugu coal mining riots of 1949. As for Islam, the worry is that divisions between North and South would lead to partition along the Indian/Pakistan model. Islam was reasserting itself, was united, and was “a mighty religious-political force in the world of today.” In Nigeria, it was using all of its political influence, and copying Christian missions in its evangelistic outreach. As far as SIM was concerned, its hope for the future of the church lay in the leaders trained in their institutions. The future of missionary involvement was too uncertain. In light of these uncertainties, Maxwell calls on missionaries to adopt his “born crucified”
message, die to their own racial prejudices, and mentor as many Nigerian leaders as possible in the limited time available.\footnote{Maxwell, L.E., ‘The Challenge of Missions Today, As I See It,’ \textit{SW}, May 1952, Vol. 28, No. 3, pp. 3 – 7.}

The development of educational and medical work marked the increasing institutionalisation of SIM missionary work, and the beginnings of a decline in direct evangelism and church planting. While SIM missionaries would continue to have considerable evangelistic contact with individual Muslims, this was usually in the context of their medical or educational work. The African Missionary Society (AMS)\footnote{Called the Evangelical Missionary Society (EMS) of ECWA, since January 1966.} would increasingly take on the role of itinerant evangelism and church planting. Started in 1948, it encapsulated the evangelistic work that Nigerian Christians already engaged in. It took for itself the vision that Stirrett had prayed for.

For forty some years he preached and prayed constantly that the Lord would through His Word bring millions of the Hausa speaking Moslems and millions of Hausa speaking pagans to a personal knowledge of the Lord Jesus Christ….We are convinced that it has been through his prayers that the African Missionary Society has been formed and that through its efforts millions yet will live eternally.\footnote{McElheran, C.K., ‘The African Missionary Society,’ \textit{SW}, May 1949, Vol. 25, No. 3, pp. 16 – 17. Cf. Hay, 1984, pp.176 – 180 discusses the genesis of the concept and reasoning given by the SIM Council for setting up the AMS.}

Recruits into the AMS were usually Bible School graduates, some from traditionalist backgrounds, and others converted Muslims themselves.\footnote{Wolfe, H.R., ‘Converts from Islam Preach Christ,’ \textit{SW}, May 1950, Vol. 26, No. 3, pp. 17 – 18.} They usually gained a better hearing than the white missionaries, speaking Hausa fluently, and understanding local cultures better. The Gospel message proclaimed by a fellow Nigerian often had greater authenticity than when an expatriate preached.\footnote{Rendel, G.D., ‘Before They Call, I will Answer,’ \textit{SW}, September 1950, Vol. 26, No. 5, pp. 10 – 12. Cf De La Haye, S., ‘Salamatu Again,’ \textit{SW}, September 1952, Vol. 28, No.5, pp. 7 – 8.} Humanly speaking the post-independence growth of the ECWA church owes much to these men. By 1950, twenty-five couples had been posted. This growth was not only a benefit evangelistically, but also reinvigorated the sending congregations.\footnote{Kirk, H.A., ‘Annual Report for Nigeria and French West Africa b,’ \textit{SW}, September 1950, Vol. 26, No. 5, pp. 3 – 9.} There were still heavily populated remote areas which were only nominally Islamic, but where Islam could be expected to consolidate within ten or fifteen years.\footnote{Nicholson, J.S., ‘Untold Numbers – Still Untold,’ \textit{SW}, March 1953, Vol. 29, No. 2, pp. 18 – 20. Many areas suffered extensive depopulation due to slavery, while remaining inhabitants who had been forced to convert to Islam resented their Fulani conquerors.}
Not only was SIM’s focus within Nigeria moving towards institutional work, but also across Africa its focus was moving from established Muslim work to new ventures, such as work among the Somali.\(^{488}\) It was felt that ECWA could and should take responsibility for evangelism in Nigeria. The SW reflects this shift. Initially published in Nigeria, with the approach of Nigerian independence, publication moves to North America, albeit with Douglas Percy, a former missionary to Nigeria, as editor. The format then changes from longer “prayer-letter” based articles to shorter newspaper-style columns from May 1954. News concentrates on technological changes.\(^{489}\) Thus, a report of SIM’s Liberia based Radio ELWA commencing broadcasting in the May 1954 edition with further coverage in the September-October edition. A few articles still focused on Nigeria. Blunt spoke of the wall of Islam and Bingham’s 1929 threat to preach in Kano market.\(^{490}\) Mooney wrote of Muslim fatalism.\(^{491}\) Interest developed on both sides of the Nigeria/Niger border in extending work to the Lake Chad basin and its Kanuri-speaking Muslims.\(^{492}\) Missionaries in Niger investigated further work among the Tuaregs,\(^{493}\) and the Fulani nomads.\(^{494}\) Eventually AN replaced the SW. It gave more details on the Civil War and the humanitarian work afterwards. It also carried on the wider geographical focus on Islam across Africa with an occasional mention of the Tuareg or Fulani nomads or of the Isawa. SIM’s publicity focus was no longer on Nigeria but reflecting the recruitment and publicity goals of the mission as a whole.

5. A Political Baby?

Front cover news in the January-February 1955 edition of the SW was the announcement of the formation of ECWA on the 16\(^{th}\) May 1954. SIM welcomed this event.

The Sudan Interior Mission views this great step forward as an historic event. The initial objective has been attained. Much of the land is yet to be possessed, but in


a very real sense our work now becomes in many parts of the field a ministry of teaching and training of the church.\textsuperscript{495}

On that same page, however, is also an editorial apprehensive of rapid changes across Africa. The combination of Islam and nationalism was threatening and a challenge for intensified evangelism while there was still opportunity.\textsuperscript{496} Olatayo, ECWA's first President and later General Secretary, thinks a major driving force in ECWA's formation was SIM's nervousness about Islam and nationalism:

\begin{quote}
From 1940 upwards there was a general trend towards political self-rule in Africa, especially in West Africa. There were agitations virtually everywhere. The agitation was so loud and widespread that the foreign missions were afraid of their future should these countries eventually become independent. The experience of what happened to China Inland Mission in China and that of SIM in Ethiopia; how these missions were expelled from those countries and their properties confiscated was fresh in mind and anticipated. The mission was wondering what would become of her properties should she be kicked out of Nigeria after she might have gained her independence. These thoughts coupled with the desire and request of the churches to have some of their national leaders ordained, as was being done in other denominations, prompted the mission to think of uniting the SIM churches with the purpose of forming them into one indigenous self-supporting, self-governing, and self-propagating, corporate organisation, legally recognized by the Nigerian Government. This would enable such an organisation to inherit the properties of the founding mission and continue the work in case of any expulsion of the mission from the country.\textsuperscript{497}
\end{quote}

A conference in Egbe in May 1954 constituted ECWA. It was a controversial decision for some. Fuller records Ray Davis pointing out how some pastors did not want to take on extra responsibility, and did not understand growing nationalist tensions.\textsuperscript{498} Some missionaries did not like the idea, either disagreeing with denominations, or alleging the exercise was a communist conspiracy.\textsuperscript{499}

The new church faced impossible odds.\textsuperscript{500} History and culture were against her. One of those opponents was Islam, and its discrimination against Christians and traditionalists. The lack of religious freedom in their areas concerned delegates

\textsuperscript{496} Anon, 'Whither Africa in 1955?' \textit{SW}, January – February 1955, Vol. 31, No. 1, p. 1. Logams, p.520ff discusses the Northern House of Assembly's 1949 Bello Dandogo motion seeking the expulsion of missionaries because they were causing religious confusion and disunity. Responding the British Governor pointed out the educational and social services missions provided, including glasses from SIM's Kano Eye Hospital for Muslim Assembly members.
\textsuperscript{497} Olatayo, 1993, p.21. Albeit Hay, 1984, implies that the church started as part of the natural maturing process, albeit the political context being significant. Helsel, (Circular Letter to SIM Family, New York, August 1959), wrote to encourage his missionaries as they faced all of these changes, that God was in charge.
\textsuperscript{500} Hay, 1984, p.152.
attending the 1956 ECWA General Assembly. The inclusion of a human rights clause in the Federal Constitution would provide legal safeguards. Sir Ahmadu Bello, the Northern Region’s Premier, was invited to address a joint ECWA/SIM meeting in Jos. He reassured all concerned promising no interference in mission work although Muslims would not be encouraged to convert.\textsuperscript{501} Linked to this was the on-going controversy over the demand for a Middle Belt state, mentioned previously, as well as the union of Northern Nigerian Yoruba with Western Region Yoruba. The Willinks Commission investigated people’s feelings. ECWA views seem mixed. Pastor Yusufu Pategi represented the Nupe people of Lafiagi – Pategi Division who wanted to remain in the Northern region. The Yagba people, another predominantly ECWA-associated ethnic group, were divided. At a hearing on the 2\textsuperscript{nd} February 1958, several prominent Yagbas, probably but not necessarily ECWA members, testified that the people they represented wanted union with the Western Region. However, at the next hearing on the 13\textsuperscript{th} February 1958 a Mr J Baba Egbe, the Chairman of the ECWA church at Mopa said he represented all of the missions in Kabba. They neither wanted a Middle Belt state, or to be united with the Western Region, preferring to remain part of the North.\textsuperscript{502} Representatives from the Sayawa and Rukuba ethnic groups held similar views.\textsuperscript{503} These divisions of opinion were to be expected with each province reflecting the differing circumstances peculiar to their own situation. In Plateau, people were concerned with the economic exploitation and mass immigration from Hausa areas linked to the tin mines and resultant political pressures for Hausa control of Jos. On the other hand, cross-denominational groups, with significant traditionalist support, in Southern Bauchi and in Adamawa wished to break free from domination by Hausa-Fulani Muslims in order to maintain their ethnic identity.\textsuperscript{504} The various permutations that Middle Belt political parties went through at this time were thus a reflection, not just of personal rivalries, but also of these sectional interests.

Churches were, however, just as concerned about the religious and political freedom of their converts in the far North of Nigeria as they were with the ethnic identities and freedoms of their converts in the Middle Belt. Thus at the Willinks Commission hearings in Zaria on the 27\textsuperscript{th} February 1958 the Anglican, TEKAS and ECWA

\textsuperscript{501} Olatayo, 1993, pp.39 – 41. The full text of a similar address to the heads of Protestant missions in Jos can be seen in Crampton, 1975, pp.214 – 217. cf. Transcript of speeches arising from Sir Ahmadu Bello’s meeting with SIM and ECWA leaders in Jos. 22nd November 1958, SIMA NG Box 85 File 7.


\textsuperscript{503} Bagudu, (ed.), 2003, pp.151 – 152.

\textsuperscript{504} Logams, pp.430 – 435. Colonial and local governments believed such groups were actively supported by both SIM and SUM, as converts applied their evangelistic training to political purposes.
churches produced a joint statement calling for guarantees of political representation, equality under the law, religious liberty, and equal rights to education, employment and promotion. The churches did not make any representation regarding a Middle Belt state: rather they sought constitutional guarantees. These were granted in 1959 when a Human Rights Declaration for the Northern Region was promulgated.

Despite these guarantees, there were post-independence worrying developments with a growing pattern of measures against church and mission interests. Firstly, there was the takeover of SIM/ECWA schools by local governments. The missionary Education Secretary sought to reassure the January 1966 General Church Council (GCC) meeting that there was nothing to fear:

since it was laid down in the law that ECWA had the right to maintain the religious tradition of the schools transferred to Local Education Authorities (LEA). . . . There would be continued SIM/ECWA supervisors to organize and supervise the religious aspect of curriculum of the schools, and to see to the engagement of teachers especially the headmasters and principals.

Yet almost all Northern delegates at this same meeting reported persecution and denial of human rights. “As a body and as individuals, members were denied rights which were granted to other citizens: rights to parcels of land to locate and build Church property and buildings respectively, denied freedom of proclamation of one’s faith and so forth.” The meeting also heard reports of an anonymous political leader’s threat to burn a church in a particular village if it opened for a service while he campaigned there. However, the leader, probably Ahmadu Bello, could not get to the village as “God intervened by sending out fire from his presence, the fire would burn up his car on the way to the village.” Not only does Olatayo believe that God answered prayer, but also that same night the Nigerian Army staged its first coup d’état resulting in Bello’s death and persecution subsiding. “Definitely God was in charge, and unknown to the mighty men involved in this world’s politics, rule and conflicts the Lord God, our God, is always, totally in control of human affairs. Hallelujah! God is in charge.”

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505 Bagudu, (ed.), 2003, pp. 220 – 238. Pressure for a Middle Belt state seems mainly to have come from ethnic groups associated with the SUM-related TEKAS church association.
506 Olatayo, 1993, pp.42 - 43
508 Olatayo, nd, p. 73.
509 Olatayo, nd, p. 73.
510 Olatayo, nd, p. 74.
The mission was slow to speak of the coup and its aftermath. There was no mention in the SW of the coup and associated casualties. Only later on in the year does an unsigned article discuss the 1966 anti-Igbo pogroms stating that Nigerian tribal tension was easing. While rioting occurred in the northern mainly Muslim cities, and many of the victims are described as southern and “Christian”, the article comes close to blaming the southerners because of their aggressiveness. Apart from regarding the riots as a reaction to the coup and the new government’s unitary policies, there is little attempt to discuss underlying causes. Rather, they are just a continuation of the 1953 Kano riots. Continued trouble brought another article in the next edition. This gives more details of what had happened, noting the trouble between the Muslim Hausa and the Igbos, the on-going conflicts since May 1965, and the return of refugees to their home regions. Rather implausibly, given Olatayo’s argument, it also highlights northern church leaders believing the trouble was ethnic in origin and not evidence of northern Muslim attacks on Christians. A third article discussed the plight of the Igbo refugees. A firmly pro-government line was taken by SIM: it helped that the then Nigerian Head of State, General Yakubu Gowon is a devout Christian.

6. Current Perspectives

Historical documentation is one thing, but current perceptions of that same history may be quite different. It is important to understand if the history summarised above actually has any contemporary relevance. In this discussion one examines the data as presented in Chapter Four seeking to answer the first research question which dealt with historical background. It read, “What was the social, cultural and theological context in which the ECWA church has developed and its leadership has been formed?”

The first two questions asked of ECWA leaders and members in this section were primarily control questions: namely the identity of the respondents and how they had

513 Lovering, K., ‘We are put to Concussion,’ SW, First Quarter, 1967, pp. 2 - 3. cf. footnote 447 for list of AN articles giving more details.
514 SIM’s caution was because Biafran and Roman Catholic propaganda had aroused anti-Nigerian feelings abroad. Nigerians, in turn were increasingly anti-missionary and anti-American. Accompanying a statement from ECWA for distribution in churches etc, in September 1967, Harold Fuller wrote a letter to SIM personnel in West Africa, warning them to be politically circumspect. Fuller, W.H., To SIM Personnel in West Africa, September 1967, SIMA NG Box 87, File 2.
become Christians. Through these means, one could demonstrate that responses were obtained from a broad range of respondents whether one determined such geographically, ethnically or by gender. Secondly, one could also try to determine the religious position of the respondent with most people interviewed or surveyed attesting to a specific conversion experience.

The first specifically historical question in this section asked about the individual’s knowledge of their own ethnic group: its history and development. Many responses indicated they knew their ethnic origin. ECWA leaders were all familiar with their respective heritages, and almost all of the DCC leaders bar one spoke similarly. However, when the ECWA laity answered the question one noticed that a little over fifty-three per cent knew little or nothing of their ethnic origins and heritage. All of the other Christian leaders bar one were also familiar with their ethnic origins and heritage. The question was obviously not relevant to the expatriate SIM group.

When asked about the impact of the Hausa/Fulani on their ethnic group ECWA denominational leaders primarily spoke of past inter-ethnic violence with most of their kinsmen repeatedly resisting conquest, or enduring Hausa/Fulani slave raids. Thus, for example, Bello Misal, Bauta Motty, Panya Baba and Zamani Kafang, discussed respectively the Waja, Kaninkon, Gbagyi and Kataf peoples being conquered, and of enslavement. Other significant responses were to do with the spread of Hausa language and trading links as well as Hausa/Fulani political rule accompanied by the spread of Islam. Others suggested the Hausa/Fulani had no impact given the remoteness of the mountain hideouts to which their ethnic groups had retreated to protect themselves from Hausa/Fulani attack. For example, Gopar Tapkida, and Danjuma Jacob, discussed the Ngass, and Tangale, to which they respectively belong, taking refuge from the jihadist cavalry in the hills among which they lived.

The DCC leaders, generally a younger group than the denominational leaders, spoke more of the spread of Hausa language, culture and dress, and conversions to Islam with some such as Bulus Galadima, and Ephraim Piyak from the Izere, and Gure peoples respectively professing no impact due to the mountainous existence of their ethnic groups. Of course, some among both denominational and DCC leaders were Hausa/Fulani themselves and spoke of the impact of Islam. Among the

515 Misal (29/12/2005), Motty (14/12/2005), Baba (30/04/2006), Kafang (11/04/2006).
516 Tapkida (08/02/2007), Jacob (03/05/2006).
517 Galadima (26/01/2006), Piyak (20/04/2006).
518 Barau, (28/05/2006), DanAmarya (31/01/2006), Garba (04/06/2006), Kogo (21/07/2006), Musa (02/05/2006).
ECWA laity the largest group of respondents asserted there had been no impact with others speaking of the (usually contemporary) spread of Islamic culture and Hausa rule, and some speaking of the _jihad_ and past slave raiding.\(^{519}\) Other Christian leaders' responses were much closer in nature to those of ECWA leaders with the greatest number of responses referring to inter-ethnic conflicts with the Hausa/Fulani, followed by Hausa/Fulani rule, the spread of Hausa culture and trade, and Hausa/Fulani slave raiding.\(^ {520}\)

Rather surprisingly, SIM missionaries tended to arrive in Nigeria rather ignorant about Islam with, at best, having touched on the subject in a World Religions class, or done some self-study usually on arrival in Nigeria. Carol Rutt, for example, who worked extensively in Northern Nigeria when asked about her memories of training in Islam at Moody Bible Institute stated: “I do not recall much teaching on Islam and if we did have it must have been in the Cults class and not extensive. In those days Islam was not a threat so I guess it was not dwelt upon.”\(^ {521}\) Her views were typical. Nor did their Hausa language studies help to remedy the deficit in knowledge of Islam or of the Hausa/Fulani impact. Some had little contact with Muslims working exclusively among traditionalists or Christians. Younger missionaries are conscious of the rise of radical Islam, of Muslim persecution of Christians and the formidable threat Islam posed to the Christian population.\(^ {522}\) However, few SIM missionaries, whether older or younger, seemed to know much about historical developments.

The impression is developing, therefore, that historical factors such as ethnic heritage and pre-colonial inter-ethnic conflicts are an important issue for denominational leaders, but not really for younger church leaders and especially for the women and youth church members who completed questionnaires. This pattern is repeated when considering colonial rule. ECWA leaders complained about British conquest and the pro-Islamic Indirect Rule system. Iliya Ari, Adamu Hassan, and Daniel Atiyaye spoke powerfully of a British massacre of their Kare Kare people.\(^ {523}\) However, they also acknowledged the economic, social, and material benefits emanating from the “_pax Britannica_”, especially Western education. These latter benefits were the subject of most of the responses from the DCC leaders, with the

\(^{519}\) Bage (03/03/2008), Butswat (29/05/2006).

\(^{520}\) Adamu (29/11/2006), Best (27/05/2007), Kwashi (16/05/2007), Lipdo (15/05/2006), Mutum (18/05/2007), Tsetu (11/05/2007).


\(^{522}\) Foute (31/05/2006). Jessurun (21/07/2006), Strand (09/11/2006).

\(^{523}\) Ari (24/04/2006), Hassan (15/05/2006), Atiyaye (15/05/2007). Cf. Kwashi (16/05/2007).
next most important response being complaints about Indirect Rule.\(^{524}\) ECWA laity, however, seemed to confuse the role of the British attributing to them both Western education and the introduction of Christianity in equal measure, followed by Western civilisation with only a minority speaking of Indirect Rule. Other Christian leaders spoke mainly negatively about British conquest and Indirect Rule, with some speaking about Western education and lifestyles. Retired SIM missionaries spoke somewhat nostalgically of the material benefits of colonial rule – railways that worked, law and order, good postal services etc. Most had little knowledge of the pro-Islamic biases of early twentieth century colonial rule. Such knowledge, in general, seems to have belonged to the generation before them.\(^{525}\)

The positive effects of colonial rule would last up to and possibly beyond the Civil War. Igbo accusations that they were resisting a *jihad* were controversial, and seemed not to garner much support at the time.\(^{526}\) It was not really until the mid-1970s or 1980 and the first Maitatsine riots that the cordial relationships existing between most Muslims and Christians in Northern Nigeria began to break down.\(^{527}\) It is perhaps, not surprising, therefore, that respondents found it hard to identify any teaching they had received from either SIM or ECWA on relating to Muslims. The over-whelming impression arising from all of the interviews and questionnaires is that no one expected the radicalisation and spread of Islam. Nevertheless, it is surprising to note that a mission and a church that focused so heavily on evangelising Muslims taught their converts and members very little about Islam. The majority of responses from denominational leaders stated that neither mission nor church provided much in the way of teaching. What teaching there was, stressed building relationships and evangelism through ECWA operated educational and medical facilities.\(^{528}\) However, if Yusufu Turaki’s analysis is correct this may well have been in part because SIM effectively had two missions, one aiming to convert non-Muslims from the Middle Belt.

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\(^{524}\) Galadima (29/05/2006), Piyak (20/04/2006).

\(^{525}\) The exception being Ian Hay who has not only studied such history, but as the son of John Hay, one of SIM’s pioneers, benefited from his knowledge and experience more than most other missionaries of Ian’s generation.


\(^{528}\) The following interviews are indicative of these views: Ari (24/04/2006), Asake (12/05/2006), Atyaye (15/05/2006), Awan (10/04/2006), Baba (30/04/2006), Bature (15/04/2006), Dadang (22/12/2005), Gaiya (12/02/2007), Ibrahim (19/04/2006), Kafang (11/04/2006), Korosi (14/07/2006), Kunhiyop (31/01/2006), Misal (29/12/2005), Olowola (20/01/2006), Para-Mallam (01/03/2007).
before they could be Islamised, while the other focused on the Hausa Muslims. SIM did not teach much about Islam to their non-Muslim converts allowing them to maintain their pre-colonial and usually anti-Muslim attitudes. With most denominational leaders currently coming from the Middle Belt it would not be surprising that they recalled little being taught. DCC leaders also stressed building relationships and use of institutions, although a number had no idea what either ECWA or SIM taught, while others categorised Islam as a false religion. Among ECWA laity, the majority stressed building relationships and evangelism. Nevertheless, among both denominational leaders and laity, a number stressed self-defence and avoiding Muslims. Other Christian leaders also spoke of building relationships as being the focus of mission and church teaching with the exception of a significant number who pointed out that not much was mentioned in the past about Islam as the number of Muslims in their areas only grew significantly after independence in 1960. Few said much about evangelising Muslims, with one respondent contrasting the emphasis on evangelism in ECWA to the lip service paid to evangelism elsewhere. The largest category of SIM responses also professed ignorance of SIM or ECWA teaching on relating to Muslims, or said that not much was taught. Occasionally in SW, there is mention of Samuel Zwemer’s works. However, as noted above, older missionaries, when questioned about their own training, spoke only of world religions classes. Their knowledge of Islam was acquired in Nigeria. Other SIM missionaries agreed with the ECWA leadership about building good relationships or practically interacting with Muslims in different ways. The smallest category in this section spoke of the threat from Islam.

Perhaps a reason for this ignorance among missionaries can be found in Dr Willem A. Bijlefeld’s guest article in SIM’s AN magazine in which he pointed out how after a 1913 conference in Germany which declared Islam to have lost Africa, many seminaries discontinued courses in Islamics. However, by 1963 he estimated Islam was increasing six times faster than Christianity. Bijlefeld called for a different approach focusing on God’s faithfulness in keeping his promises instead of fruitless arguments about the Trinity. Bijlefeld however was a consultant with the Islam in Africa Project (IAP now known as PROCMURA). He was the expert that SIM had

529 Turaki (08/12/2005).
532 PROCMURA stands for Programme for Christian-Muslim Relations in Africa. Currently based in Kenya, see www.en.procmura-prica.org for details. Unfortunately, IAP archival material stored at the Theological College of Northern Nigeria (TCNN) just south of Jos has been lost. Ecclesiastical politics hinders PROCMURA’s activity in Northern Nigeria. Cf. Interview with Mutum, (18/05/2007). Nwanaju,
wanted but never had.\textsuperscript{533} Indeed, SIM's sensitivity concerning World Council of Churches' sponsored ecumenism spilled over into suspicions about the IAP precluding any institutional involvement by SIM or ECWA, despite permitting VanGerpen's involvement and the later involvement of I.G. Shelley and Mai Kudi Kure.\textsuperscript{534} For all of SIM's dedication to evangelising Muslim Hausa, their inadequate training was having precisely the opposite effect. Panya Baba summarises the situation:

Most of the SIM missionaries were very, very limited with the Islamic knowledge. Most of the SIM missionaries at that time had not had cross-cultural evangelism studies. There were a lot of things that I can see that if they had done it, their approach would have been different. . . . Islam was a religion that Christianity has to preach and try to convert the Muslims to become Christians. I don't personally remember any training in Islam when I was in Bible School. There was teaching about comparative religion but the teaching of Islam was very limited. How much more about the cultural approach to Muslims in a cross-cultural way?\textsuperscript{535}

Thus, it is not surprising that SIM and later ECWA theological institutions have traditionally taught little about Islam, outside the world religions class.\textsuperscript{536} Thankfully that situation is now changing.\textsuperscript{537}

SIM missionaries were asked about what they had taught about Christian-Muslim relations. Some had never taught about Christian-Muslim relations, the majority spoke of Scriptural teaching about loving enemies and doing so in practical ways. A significant number spoke about the confusion in determining if a conflict is religious

\textsuperscript{533} Simon permitted VanGerpen to do a 3-month course with the IAP following which he wrote a monthly series of duplicated papers, entitled Notes on Islam, which circulated among SIM missionaries. Twenty-five editions were produced with some being assembled in booklet form, also called Notes on Islam (1974). cf. VanGerpen (21/03/2006). Also note West Africa Field Council Minutes, May 25 – 27, 1965, and November 16 – 24, 1965, SIMA ME Box 157b File 2b.

\textsuperscript{534} Bijlefeld, \textit{personal correspondence}, (01/04/2006). cf VanGerpen, (21/03/2006). Students at the Tofa Bible School reacted against VanGerpen's teaching about Islam, perhaps a sign of ECWA antagonism towards Islam? VanGerpen was dismissed from SIM in 1972 due to various personal allegations against him and his family. Cf. 'West Africa Council Standing Committee Minutes,' 3\textsuperscript{rd} July 1972 and, 'West Africa Council Meeting with ECWA,' 20 – 22 November 1972, SIMA WAFCNCL Box 1 File 5. Until Mai Kudi Kure’s membership of PROCMURA, links between SIM, ECWA, and the IAP/PROCMURA were few after VanGerpen's departure. Ken Lloyd, \textit{E-mail to W.P.Todd}, (25/03/2006) feels underlying this dismissal were fellow-missionary suspicions that he was too liberal, although by current standards his approach was quite conservative.

\textsuperscript{535} Baba (30/04/2006).

\textsuperscript{536} Maigadi (29/12/2005), Gabis (23/01/2006), DanAmarya (31/01/2006), Korosi (14/07/2006). The 1964 Igbaja Bible College catalogue includes Islam in a two-semester religions class among World Religions, Roman Catholicism, Modern Cults, and African religions. A post-1965 catalogue for Igbaja Seminary has two courses in evangelism but only mentions "Mohammedanism" in passing in an Early Church History course. A course on Muslim Theology was included by 1972. cf. 1964 Igbaja Bible College Catalogue, Post-1965 Igbaja Theological Seminary Catalogue, 1972 Igbaja Theological Seminary Catalogue, SIMA Box 055.

\textsuperscript{537} All undergraduate students take a course in Islam at the ECWA Theological Seminary, Jos (JETS) cf. 2004/2005 Academic Catalogue. Attempts have been made to develop a full degree course in Islamics but attempts to agree a curriculum were unsuccessful.
or secular, in how to stand up for civil and political rights, and in their role as outsiders encouraging Nigerian Christians to be faithful to Scripture. As for encouraging dialogue, there was a range of opinions. Some had no opinion on the subject, others had never had cause to think about it, the largest single group opposed dialogue thinking Muslims could not be trusted, while a number were in favour of bridge-building at least, and perhaps formal dialogue.

However, missionaries did try to teach Nigerians to stay away from politics. Missionaries, who were usually from working and lower-middle classes, were not used to political involvement in their home countries where the liberal, wealthy, upper, and upper-middle classes dominated politics. In addition, as noted above, their fundamentalist theological principles drove them to concentrate on evangelism: everything else was a distraction that would hinder the Great Commission and the return of Christ. Some of these fundamentalist principles were uniquely American in their formulation. Mark Noll, speaking of the political effect in the United States of the rise of Keswick Holiness and premillennial dispensationalism writes:

> Whatever account is made for the rise of these tendencies, their combined impact on evangelical politics was unmistakable. Under their influence, William Jennings Bryan’s optimistic prospects for reform and his support for active government gave way to cultural pessimism and a fear of governmental encroachment. Concern for political involvement was replaced with an almost exclusive focus on personal evangelism and personal piety.

In the Southern United States, where pre-millennialism was not as strong, another factor was also at work.

> A doctrine of “the spirituality of the church,” which held that bodies of believers in their corporate life should eschew political involvement, also had the effect of discouraging reflection on politics. . . . The most general attitude towards Christian political activity and, by implication, political reflection was illustrated by the words of a Methodist spokesman who in 1844 defended the creation of a separate southern denomination by claiming that the “peculiar mission of the Methodist Episcopal Church, South, is that it alone stands for the Christian principle of staying out of politics.”

It is, despite a lack of absolute proof that individual missionaries held to these positions, a fair assumption that they were influential, if only unofficially, in SIM missionaries’ thinking about political involvement. The net result was described by the Chief of Bajju, “They taught how to be Christians and how to live a Christian life.

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538 Cf. Calenberg (31/03/2006), Foute (31/05/2006).
539 For example see Foute (31/05/2006), Rutt (23/03/2006), Strand (09/11/2006).
They had very little to do with the people’s economy or social setting. Catholics were more involved with social issues than SIM.\textsuperscript{542} Today Nigerian Christians routinely complain that this anti-political stance by missionaries effectively permitted Muslim domination leaving Christians struggling to catch up and assert their civil and political rights.

Paradoxically, however, for people who eschewed political involvement, the missionaries’ actions enabled their converts to resist the Muslim authorities, an intensely political act. Bauta Motty mentioned Tete Burad, the first convert among the Kaninkon, who led opposition to Muslim feudal exactions. Missionaries’ actions, understood by the missionaries to be non-political, had very political results.

In the whole of southern Kaduna [State] there are many tribes which owe their existence to Christianity. Slave trade divided us leading to tensions even today. Christianity is the only religion that succeeded in bringing divided people together in work, dialogue, worship, and study.\textsuperscript{543}

Motty is not alone in his stress on the role of Christianity in preserving linguistic and historical differences, yet simultaneously uniting the disparate peoples.\textsuperscript{544} There is considerable anecdotal evidence in Nigeria of ethnic groups being absorbed into an over-arching Hausa Islamic culture and loosing in the process any sense of their own heritage, language, or culture. They have become part-and-parcel of the Islamic \textit{umma}. The rise of Christianity, drawing support from a wide range of ethnic groups, presents those working towards the Islamic domination of Nigeria, with a considerable political and religious challenge.

Christianity’s growth has been simultaneous with a resurgence of a better-educated and more radical form of Islam. The close proximity of two such dominant religious and political blocs would quite naturally lead to tensions. That those tensions have degenerated into occasional bouts of bloody conflict is a matter of record. It is not surprising, therefore, that most of the Nigerian respondents are agreed that relationships with Muslims are negative. Denominational leaders provide various nuances on this, mentioning anti-Christian discrimination or recognising that Christian hostility towards Muslims is not right. Some also mentioned some of the positive aspects of Christian-Muslim relations, factors easily overlooked when the emphasis is on what divides. Relatively few of the DCC leaders thought this way, their assessment being predominantly negative. The majority of the ECWA laity were also

\textsuperscript{542} Bature (15/04/2006).
\textsuperscript{543} Motty (14/12/2005).
negative, although a number recognised that Christians were also to blame. The majority of other Christian leaders also assessed Christian-Muslim relationships negatively albeit the extent of such negative relations depended on the interplay of various geographical, ideological, and socio-political factors.

6. Summary and Conclusion

This chapter set out to examine the social, cultural and theological context in which the ECWA church has developed and its leadership been formed. It noted that ECWA’s founders, the Sudan Interior Mission, developed out of the fundamentalist movement in North America. Missionaries were recruited primarily from the burgeoning Bible Institute/Bible College movement. In these institutions, they had been thoroughly taught the principles of premillennial dispensationalism and Keswick Holiness theology. Those beliefs encouraged them to shun engaging with the world concentrating instead on evangelism in anticipation of the imminent return of Christ. Yet as they arrived in Nigeria, and especially into its Islamic North few knew, or were formally taught anything about Islam.

Their initial evangelism among Muslims thus proved even more difficult than might have been expected. Soon they switched focus concentrating on evangelising ethnic groups that had not yet been Islamised. By this means, they built up a foundation of converts who could in turn assist them in evangelism further North. For, despite considerable colonial opposition, evangelising the Muslim Hausa was still their goal, although their militaristic language, perhaps written for the benefit of their supporting constituency, was idealistic and fanciful and if actually employed would have been counter-productive. Nor were their methods realistic. Their failure to adequately educate their converts, and inability to realise the economic hardships entailed in conversion drove many of them into the hands of other missionary bodies.

However, on being permitted entrance into the Emirates, their language moderated and their evangelistic methods became more realistic employing medical and educational services alongside their routine preaching and personal discussions. Missionaries still were not well educated in Islam and could often be bested in their arguments for the Christian faith. They still viewed Islam as a false religion and decried some of its features. However, the Muslims were no longer wholly other; friendly relations developed between missionaries and Muslim rulers. Those relations did not generally materialise into conversions. After an initial curiosity, Muslims
became increasingly resistant to the new faith, and sometimes hostile. Most conversions were among the traditionalists. The few Muslims converting inevitably faced various forms of persecution.

Relations with colonial authorities remained difficult. Colonial and Native Authority officials often looked on SIM’s converts suspiciously. The leprosy work nearly collapsed after the colonial authorities tried to restrict anyone under eighteen being taught the Christian faith, an argument that eventually died out. SIM leaders were quite apprehensive about the post-World War Two Nigeria anticipating that returning soldiers would not fit easily back into the pre-war society they had left. They were right as demands for political freedom grew, along with it considerable uncertainties about the roles of missions in an independent Nigeria. SIM responded through a combination of developing more institutional work – Bible Schools, radio, medical work – and entrusting more of the day-to-day evangelism into the hands of Nigerian evangelists.

SIM’s chief response, however, was the organisation of ECWA as an independent denomination in 1954. Should SIM be expelled from newly independent Nigeria, then its work would not die. However, in the meantime, there was the very real issue of ensuring the civil and religious rights of their converts in the new Nigeria and successful representations were made to the Willinks Commission and to the Nigerian political leaders.

Despite this, post-Independence developments were ominous with the nationalisation of ECWA/SIM schools, and the repercussions of Ahmadu Bello’s missionary activities. Already church delegates were complaining of anti-Christian discrimination, a feature the mission and church leadership ignored. One gets the impression that the subsequent coups d’états left SIM feeling very unsure of just how to react. Its aversion to politics meant it did not have the skills or the contacts in this highly dangerous world forcing it initially to try to ignore what was happening, and subsequently to clearly take sides.

One can thus conclude that ECWA was predominantly formed from non-Muslim converts who were evangelised by an inter-denominational mission that grew out of a classical North American fundamentalist background. The church that was formed reflected its founders’ beliefs adopting, as will be seen in the next chapter, a considerable amount of classical fundamentalist theology. However, as will also be
seen there was little attempt by SIM, or later ECWA to challenge the traditional world views most of its converts. ECWA, however, does not simply consist of converts to Christianity from traditional religions. There is also a relatively small but growing group of converts from a Muslim background. One must, therefore, when considering ECWA’s context, also take into account the perspective these people come from.

For the Islamic context to ECWA’s formation is as much a part of its history as the traditionalist background of the majority of its members. ECWA was formed in the context of a pro-Islamic British colonial state, an orientation which continued once the British withdrew and independence was granted. This pro-Islamic stance of regional and federal Nigerian authorities continues to pose challenges for the church as a whole. For it has given Muslim radicals relative freedom to advance their own cause at the expense of non-Muslims and less radical Muslim groups. The Nigerian state’s seeming inability to address this situation has allowed feelings to fester and divisions to grow. It is these current issues which are uppermost in people’s thinking, not the historical context.

Thus, while historical factors are important for denominational leaders, they are not that important for ordinary church members. The majority, coming from a non-Muslim background, know little or nothing of their ethnic heritage, with significant numbers believing that the Hausa/Fulani and Islam had made little impact on their ethnic group, and confusing colonial rule with the role of Western missions. One can speculate why this is the case. On the one hand it may be because traditionally the guardians of one’s ethnic heritage are older men, while most of the laity were youth and women and thus not expected to pay much attention to history. On the other hand, it may be because history feels remote and irrelevant whereas the current violent conflicts are a much more immediate threat. Panya Baba commenting on Hausa/Fulani slave raids among his Gbagyi people said: “The young generation have very little information about slave raiding. Those who hear from their grandfathers may hear. The idea of what the Hausa/Fulani did to their forefathers is dying out. It is not fresh in the minds.”

Yet Tapkida, a much younger man than Baba, when asked about young people’s lack of historical knowledge replied: “What is happening today is a hybrid or by-product of what happened in the past. They are a product of that past without knowing what happened.” He went on to quickly survey Nigerian history and the Muslim domination of much of its politics. However, changes made by the

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545 Baba (30/04/2006).
Christian former President Obasanjo threatened Muslim domination leading to the introduction in some states of Shari’ah law, with ensuing violent consequences. Tapkida concluded, “So to sum up, the grass roots don’t always see the historical connections as they are absorbed in the here and now, whereas the leaders often do.” Baba is right in pointing out that many of these issues are increasingly distant for the younger generation: they were issues faced by their grandparents or great-grandparents. However, Tapkida is also right in standing back and looking at the broad sweep of history, a standpoint that many young people and others are not familiar with.

SIM missionaries played a significant role in evangelising much of Northern Nigeria. Without their input, and the unsung evangelism of their converts, many of the ethnic groups in the Middle Belt would have continued in their traditionalist beliefs or have adopted Islam. And as noted above, the introduction of Christianity, while preserving the individual ethnic identities of many groups, also brought with it a supra-ethnic identification with Christians from other ethnic groups. This was to have profound political implications in independent Nigeria. Nevertheless, it does not appear that SIM missionaries significantly influenced their converts’ attitudes towards Muslims.

To begin with, one has already noted Baba’s comment above on how little knowledge of Islam SIM missionaries actually had. They relied on what they picked up in Nigeria, plus reading Samuel Zwemer’s works. Turaki’s suggestion of there being effectively two SIM missions, to traditionalists and to Muslims must also be considered. Many SIM missionaries, therefore, neither worked in strongly Muslim areas, nor had much contact with Muslims. There does not appear, therefore, to have been any perceived need to teach very much about Islam to converts from traditionalism. Kunhiyop, when asked about SIM and ECWA’s teaching about Islam and how Christians should relate to Muslims replied: “Nothing – they left that to the people. The Bajju are brought up to really resent Muslims and missionaries did not attempt to deal with the issue. If there is any clash or friction you just go to war.” He is not alone. Jacob and Misal speak of being taught to run away from Muslims and to burn every area where a Muslim sits down to get rid of the pollution. Yet it was from these same traditionalist areas that most of the converts came, from where most of its leaders hail, and where the church is currently strongest. SIM focused on teaching the Bible, and with it Biblical concepts of loving enemies.

546 Tapkida (08/02/2007).
547 Kunhiyop (31/01/2006).
548 Jacob (03/05/2006), Misal (28/12/2005).
Thus, during the years surveyed in this chapter SIM neither understood Islam, nor the deep-seated animosities inherent in many of the ethnic heritages of its converts. This was not for want of opportunity or lack of recognition of the need for specialist help. Such recognition and opportunity, however, was linked to the ecumenical movement, to which SIM was deeply opposed. Instead, SIM relied primarily on straightforward Biblically based evangelism hoping that such would be sufficient to bring conversions and with conversions changed attitudes. SIM during this period failed to recognise that effective communication of the Christian Gospel requires a comprehensive understanding of the recipients’ worldviews, and of the issues that help to construct those worldviews. Thus, SIM failed to teach its missionaries or its converts how to relate to Muslims, whether it was to confront the converts’ animosity, or to be more effective in evangelism or to stand firm for Christians’ civil and religious rights. For SIM hailed from that American fundamentalist movement which eschewed politics as a religious principle, a belief they did teach their converts, much to the converts’ regret.

Little wonder, then that ECWA, and other Christians, have been taken aback by the rise of radical Islam, and with it the bouts of violence that seem to grow in number and intensity. Having inherited its theological beliefs from SIM how has ECWA developed these to meet the challenges that it currently faces? This is the focus of Chapter Six.
Chapter Six
The Changing Face of ECWA

1. Introduction

Previous chapters have described how SIM’s evangelistic work brought about the formation of ECWA. The influence of North American fundamentalism on SIM has been profound. While Bingham steered clear of the “fighting fundamentalists” he accepted many of his recruits from fundamentalist colleges. Here they had been taught that combination of premillennial dispensationalism and Keswick holiness views that were so influential in motivating men and women to become missionaries and provided the ethos by which they lived and worked. They naturally organised their work by fundamentalist principles and taught these views to their Nigerian converts. Thus, while Islam fascinated SIM, its own fundamentalist presuppositions hindered its effectiveness in relating to and evangelising Muslims. Instead, partially out of fear of expulsion from Nigeria, it sought to bring ECWA into being as an independent denomination. Solomon wrote, “Train a child in the way he should go, and when he is old he will not turn from it.”[549] Would SIM’s heritage, its devotion to a conservative, fundamentalist understanding of Scripture, and its dedication to evangelism continue as ECWA grew and established its own identity?

2. New Life for All

As referred to above, the early missionaries had sought a self-propagating church and used Nigerian converts extensively in their evangelism. This developed further with SIM founding the African Missionary Society (later becoming ECWA’s Evangelical Missionary Society (EMS)) missionaries, reaching cross-culturally across Nigeria and into surrounding nations.[550]

By the 1960s, SIM however, seemed to lose sight of this evangelistic focus. Commenting on a drop in SIM numbers between 1965 and 1976 Hay, after speaking about the political upheavals sweeping Africa in the 1960s, writes:

At the same time, I am convinced that the reason for the personnel decline came not from these outward circumstances but rather from an identity crisis through which the Mission passed. For a time we were overly concerned with the

nationalization that surrounded us and in our concern for the development of the church, we tended to lose sight of the unreached peoples and the uncompleted task.551

This correlates with previous observations of SIM publicity focusing more on technological changes than on evangelism. It also fits well with a paper entitled The Future Ministry of SIM in West Africa.552 The anonymous author argues that ECWA should take primary responsibility for evangelism. It had the necessary people, the training, and the required cultural rapport. The paper envisaged SIM’s future role as concentrating on organisation and training, research, finance and, where needed, some supervisory back up. The author seems partly motivated by the upsurge in nationalism and, in particular, Muslim accusations that Christianity was a foreign religion. Indeed, some argued that Muslims had not converted because they saw Christianity as a missionary import. However, as missionaries backed off from direct involvement in evangelism they began to lose their close ties with Nigerian Christians and with the needs of the church. This growing gap would have serious consequences later as SIM Nigeria and ECWA struggled through some difficult times in their relationships with each other.

Countering this was the positive effect of the New Life for All (NLFA) evangelistic programme.553 This inter-denominational effort554 was the brainchild of Gerry Swank, SIM’s Evangelism Secretary. He adapted the Latin American Evangelism-in-Depth approach to Nigeria. Starting with a meeting of denominational representatives in August 1963, it initially focused on the Zaria and Plateau provinces throughout 1964. It sought to train and mobilise every member of participating churches to systematically witness to every non-Christian in their neighbourhood, and through evangelistic teams to unevangelised areas. Supported by extensive use of prayer groups, widespread literature distribution, publicity and evangelistic rallies and church parades as well as radio programmes and recordings, NLFA was a significant factor

552 Anon., The Future Ministry of SIM in West Africa, 1969, SIM WAFNCL Box 1, File 5. Gerry Swank, SIM’s evangelism strategist, may be the author. The failure to encourage SIM missionaries’ continued involvement in evangelism led to an ever-narrowing circle of institutional involvement, a lifestyle remote from most Nigerians, and increased misunderstandings between ECWA and SIM Nigeria.
553 Lageer, E., New Life For All: True Accounts of In-Depth Evangelism in West Africa, Moody Press, Chicago, 1969, is a popular account of the NLFA programme and its impact.
554 It took some effort to persuade ECWA leaders to get involved. The Gbagyi DCC was the last to agree, and to this day Panya Baba, then the DCC Chairman, felt that such inter-denominationalism was a retrograde step. (30/04/2006).
in the growth of Nigerian Christianity.\textsuperscript{555} For many years, Christian evangelism had featured missionaries in prominent roles, supported by Nigerian evangelists. With NLFA missionary involvement shifted to supporting roles helping Nigerians to take the lead.

The NLFA programme resulted in a significant numerical and psychological change in Nigerian Christianity. As an example of this, in January 1973, \textit{Africa Now (AN)} noted ECWA’s growth.\textsuperscript{556} In 1960, ECWA consisted of 14,000 baptised church members. By 1971, after seven years of NLFA-inspired evangelism, ECWA had grown to over 60,000 members worshipping in 1200 congregations with another 200 developing. The total ECWA community by then was at least 400,000.\textsuperscript{557} This substantial increase continued. While in 1964 NLFA only targeted Zaria and Plateau Provinces, it gradually spread right across Nigeria. Nor did it stop after the envisaged one-year programme. Thus, in January 1966 when the first \textit{coup d’"etat} took place, house-to-house visitation was just about to commence in Kano. Lageer writes that once the situation had settled down, the visitation went ahead and “the majority of those contacted gave clear evidence that they wanted to hear.” Later, after mentioning a trinket trader whispering that there were people in the vicinity who met secretly to read the Bible and pray, she writes, “It is true that a large amount of literature was discarded in Kano, but much of it too was accepted and read.”\textsuperscript{558}

It was an impressive programme. Dominy quotes George Peters as writing:

\begin{quote}
I am deeply impressed by the NLFA program. It is the most complete, dynamic, biblically-oriented, spiritually-motivated, and African-adapted movement that I have learned to know. I am profoundly moved by its quantitative and qualitative accomplishments under the gracious ministry of the Holy Spirit. It deserves to become an African continental movement.\textsuperscript{559}
\end{quote}

Peters went on to speak of the renewal implications of the NLFA programme for the church itself, and Dominy refers to Lageer’s highlighting four emphases: prayer, liberality in giving, a love for the Bible and a new desire to witness for Christ.\textsuperscript{560}

\textsuperscript{555} Kwashi (16/05/2007) speaks of the tremendous rise in evangelism from the 1970s with those young people who could no longer resist opposition from older church leaders decamping to the Pentecostals, while those who remained are now the church leaders.

\textsuperscript{556} Lovering, K., ‘Church Growth in Nigeria,’ AN, January – February 1973, p. 6.

\textsuperscript{557} Crampton, 1975, p.170 puts ECWA membership in 1970 at 48,101 with Sunday attendance at 202,000. As both Crampton and AN depended on Gerry Swank for information one can only assume that Crampton’s later figures reflected a more conservative reassessment of the scale of the changes.

\textsuperscript{558} Lageer, 1969, p.71.


\textsuperscript{560} Dominy, pp. 167 – 168 citing Lageer, pp.135 – 137.
These were themes that would not only benefit churches like ECWA that had been founded by the missions, but also would benefit the later development of Pentecostalism as it spread northwards in the 1970s and 1980s.

Opinion in SIM Nigeria leadership, however, was divided about NLFA, seemingly because of a fear of ecumenical involvement. Some suggested that once NLFA moved out of the SIM/ECWA area SIM should withdraw from it, making such withdrawal public knowledge among its supporting constituency. This was rapidly squashed: SIM missionaries were seconded to NLFA, and SIM helped to fund and accommodate it. In 1967, AN mentioned a NLFA evangelistic crusade in Jos. By 1968, AN carried a major article on NLFA arguing that it is a force for renewal in a context of second-generational Christian apathy. In 1971, there is mention of an ECWA-run evangelistic crusade in Sokoto using NLFA methods and people.

In one fashion or another NLFA continues to operate. Lying at the root of the substantial growth in Nigerian Christianity referred to above is this evangelistic emphasis. Gaiya, after lamenting the paucity of accurate statistics in Nigerian churches, estimates that ECWA grew to 2,500,000 church members by 2000. Springing from this renewed focus on evangelism has also been substantial growth in the number of Hausa/Fulani and Kanuri Christians, of all denominations. By 2004, their association claimed a membership of nearly 10 million. A considerable number of these have come from the Maguzawa background; Hausa traditionalists that SIM, CMS and Baptist missionaries had long sought to reach. By 2000 in Katsina State alone, there were 229 Maguzawa churches, 105 of which belonged to ECWA.

Increasing Christian numbers have affected political psychologies. Working together in NLFA broke down denominational barriers. Some participating churches were members of the Christian Council of Nigeria. Following SIM’s strongly anti-WCC

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562 West Africa Field Council Minutes, November 16 – 24, 1965 SIMA ME Box 157b File 2b.


stance, ECWA was not. Barriers began to break down as ECWA leaders realised that they could work together with others. In some ways, indeed, NLFA with its concern for evangelism and its breaking down of denominational barriers was one of the foundations on which Pentecostalism later built. Greater numbers and unity among Christians was also a threat to the traditional Hausa-Fulani ruling elites; this threat growing in proportion to church growth. As traditionalists became Christians, they challenged long-established Muslim domination. Even among the Muslim community, growing numbers have converted.

3. Theological Developments in ECWA

Alongside this major growth in membership, ECWA also became increasingly independent of SIM, and more theologically self-aware, prepared to develop its theological views independently of SIM. Whether or not these theological developments have adequately engaged with Northern Nigeria's changing religious context needs to be determined. In particular, the church was formed within a context where most people in Northern Nigeria were still Muslim or traditionalist in their beliefs. Christianity primarily remained the preserve of the mission-founded churches, growing rapidly after 1965 and, after the Civil War when Pentecostalism began to spread, undergoing tremendous changes in doctrine, worship style and practice.

Right away one is faced with the difficulty of determining what SIM and ECWA's views were, and tracing their development. There is a paucity of material, both for ECWA and SIM, explaining their thinking. Much of the subsequent discussion in this section, therefore, must rely on a number of church constitutions, the analysis of which can present a picture of the “official” position of the church. Of course, official positions do not always accurately reflect the views of church members or the clergy. Often these official positions are merely catching up with changes already extant in the churches and the wider community.\(^{569}\)

\(^{569}\) An analysis of “informal theology” in the guise of sermons preached or articles written in TC and other places might help to alleviate some of this. However, while doing fieldwork in Nigeria, I found it was quite difficult to source various individual’s personal papers, mainly because the papers had been mislaid or not properly filed in the first place. When combined with one’s own anecdotal experience of the lack of sermon preparation by many pastors, and their propensity for long meandering sermons, plus the historically poor educational levels among the clergy, analysis of theological insights from their sermons would be a difficult exercise beyond the scope of this study.
3.1 SIM Church Constitution.
The first of these constitutions is entitled Constitution of the S.I.M. Church.\footnote{Anon, Constitution of the SIM Church, typed copy, Jos, nd., SIMA Nigeria Box 021 ECWA Constitutions. The doctrinal statement was copied from the then SIM statement as contained in Anon, Principles and Practices of the Sudan Interior Mission, SIM, Toronto 1951, SIMA. SIM’s doctrinal statements go back to the mission’s 1898 organisation. Initially it was a short list of statements without Scriptural references. Scriptural references were added by 1910 and the format did not change until 1951.} It is a ten-page foolscap, typewritten document, presumably drawn up in the early 1950s as the title antedates the adoption of the ECWA name. Its doctrinal statement occurs under Article III, following the first two articles announcing the name and the purpose of the church. The Articles of Faith are as follows:

(a) The Divine authority and plenary inspiration of the whole canonical Scriptures as originally given. 2 Tim. 3:16, 17; 2 Peter 1:21.
(b) The doctrine of the Trinity. 2 Cor. 13:14; Matt. 28:19.
(c) The fall of man and his consequent total moral depravity and need of regeneration. Rom. 3:10; 5:12.
(h) The second coming of Christ and the resurrection of the dead. 1 Thess. 4:16 – 17; Acts 24:15.
(i) The eternal blessedness of the saved and the everlasting punishment of the lost. Matt. 25:46.
(j) The separation of Christians from the world and the things of the world. 1 John 2:15 – 17; 2 Cor. 6:14 – 18.

Most of these are standard conservative evangelical doctrinal beliefs with the exception of Article III (j) – the separation of Christians from the world and the things of the world. Whereas premillennial views are not explicit in this statement, Article III (j) clearly teaches a separatist view of the world, far more radical than the oft-mentioned phrase “in the world but not of it" that churches will use to describe Christian relations with the non-Christian world and its views.\footnote{The author often came across the Hausa term "muna ECWA" (we are ECWA) which was used as shorthand by older ECWA people to describe their attitudes of ECWA being somewhat superior or aloof from the rest of Nigerian Christianity: an exclusivity that can, perhaps be derived from this teaching.} As mentioned previously this is often one of the marks of fundamentalist-motivated teaching, and was a feature of SIM missionaries’ relationships both with colonial officials, and when other missions joined the WCC-linked Christian Council of Nigeria, with those missions.

Indeed, this preoccupation with separateness is evidenced elsewhere in the document. On pages 1 – 5, Articles IV to IX discuss forms of church government,
qualifications for holding office, and ordinances practised. Then from the bottom of page 5 to the bottom of page 9, Article X deals in depth with church membership stressing what may and may not qualify an individual for membership. After a yearlong catechesis, converts are required to declare their faith in Christ, and be able to read before they can be baptised and join the church. However, anyone who practices polygamy, participates in traditionalist or Muslim ceremonies, drinks alcohol, uses tobacco, goes to dances, cinemas, or theatres, plays cards or gambles, belongs to a secret society, is immoral, or refuses to recognize the Lord's Day as a holy day are disqualified from membership. There follows detailed regulations regarding marriage, divorce, pre-marital sexual relations, and church discipline. The list of sins requiring discipline include the list mentioned above plus theft, longstanding debts, poor giving to the Lord's work, lying, anger, quarrelling and fighting, legal disputes with fellow believers, all forms of marriage outside the church, causing an abortion. Excommunication is warranted for teaching false doctrine or schism, lapsing into traditional beliefs or Islam, bigamy or persistence in other grievous sins. The net effect of all of these detailed regulations, of this extremely legalistic document, is to re-emphasise this concept of separateness, this sense of being different from everyone else.

The balance of emphasis, however, is also revealing. While Article XIV ruled out any amendments to the Articles of Faith, nowhere does the constitution actually discuss or explain what those articles actually mean. Organisational structure, lifestyle, and separateness take up 9½ pages of the text, and thus must be regarded as, in practice, more important for the framers of this constitution than the more theoretical concepts of the Trinity, the necessity and process of salvation, or the hope of Christ's return. In addition, no attempt is made to relate any of these beliefs to the surrounding and competing religions. The closest that the constitution comes to doing this is when it forbids polygamy and excommunicates members for lapsing into traditional beliefs or Islam. However, these are the practical issues arising from conversion, and there is no effort to explain the underlying theological distinctions of Christian teaching in these areas, let alone Christian teaching on the Trinity or salvation.
3.2. ECWA Constitution 1954

In the process of drawing up the ECWA Constitution, the following doctrinal statement was adopted, as part of a Church Covenant, by the second ECWA General Assembly meeting in Lagos in January 1955. It not only became part of the Covenant but also an integral feature of the inaugural Constitution. Items (a) to (j) are the same as in the SIM Church Constitution above but there is also the notable addition of item (k):

(a) The Divine authority and plenary inspiration of the whole canonical Scriptures as originally given. 2 Tim. 3:16, 17; 2 Peter 1:21.
(b) The doctrine of the Trinity. 2 Cor. 13:14; Matt. 28:19.
(c) The fall of man and his consequent total moral depravity and need of regeneration. Rom. 3:10; 5:12.
(h) The second coming of Christ and the resurrection of the dead. 1 Thess. 4:16 – 17; Acts 24:15.
(i) The eternal blessedness of the saved and the everlasting punishment of the lost. Matt. 25:46.
(j) The separation of Christians from the world and the things of the world. 1 John 2:15 – 17; 2 Cor. 6:14 – 18.
(k) The doctrine of Missions. It is incumbent upon every believer to do his utmost to win the lost. Matt. 28:19 – 20; Mark 16:15; Luke 24:27; John 20:21; Acts 1:8; 1 Peter 2:9.\footnote{Olatayo, 1993, p. 36.}

It was David John, the acting SIM Field Director who presented the Covenant to the ECWA General Assembly, and who must, therefore, be regarded as responsible for the addition of item (k) on the doctrine of Missions. This is the doctrinal statement in the \textit{Constitution of the Association of Evangelical Churches of West Africa}.

However, there is a marked change in this Constitution when compared with the SIM Church Constitution. Instead of detailed prescriptions for conduct, this document sets out principles for admission to church membership, for the organisation and

\footnote{Anon, \textit{The Constitution of the Association of Evangelical Churches of West Africa}, SIM Headquarters, Jos, nd., SIMA Nigeria Box 021 ECWA Constitutions. While this document is undated, references within the text to the ECWA Trustees applying to the Governor-General for a Certificate of Incorporation, indicates that it dates from 1954 at the earliest as that was when Sir John Macpherson’s title changed from Governor to Governor-General and 1963 at the latest when Nigeria became a Republic. Thus, this was probably the initial ECWA constitution under which the church was formed as an independent body. Date estimates for ECWA Constitutions are approximate as printers failed to include revision or publication dates. However, ECWA normally revises its Constitution every ten years – the author was a member of the 1999 revision committee.}
government of individual churches, for the recognition and ordination of church officials, ordinances, and the handling of finances. Removed from the constitution and placed after it under “Rules and Regulations” are regulations regarding the appointment and operation of Trustees as well as processes for the handling of associated financial affairs. Right at the end are placed the church’s aims and objectives. Entirely absent are the detailed regulations regarding acceptable Christian conduct. The overall feel is markedly different from the SIM Church constitution, perhaps reflecting the influence of Clifford Edwards, the British missionary lawyer responsible for its preparation.

As before, most of the doctrinal statement is a standard evangelical doctrinal statement. It is biblically literalist. As mentioned above, it entirely fails to address key theological issues. These include contextual issues such as African understandings of the supernatural world or divine healing, and the person and continuing work of Christ in relationship to traditionalist and Islamic worldviews. Others are universal theological issues such as, bearing in mind that this statement is the theological foundation for a new denomination, the doctrine of the church. The Old Testament is ignored in any of the proof texts cited. Finally, it is unusual for a church’s doctrinal statement to have the priority of missions so clearly stated. This must reflect SIM’s focus on evangelism.

The net effect of this doctrinal statement is to present the essentials that an individual needs to believe in order to become and live as a Christian, perhaps even be a missionary. However, it is not a doctrinal statement meant to encompass a whole church. In this statement SIM seems to be trying to mould the new church into its own image. If, as they feared, the missionaries should be expelled after independence, then SIM leaders must have hoped that the new body would carry on doing exactly as SIM had. Indeed both of the constitutions so far mentioned retain, at least temporarily, a formal role for SIM in the affairs of the church, both at district and national levels. A side effect of this is that nothing in the constitutions mentioned restricted SIM’s long-established policy that each missionary was able to plant and develop churches in his district according to his own understanding of how churches should order themselves. Indeed as SIM District Superintendents retained their leadership of the ECWA Districts there was little in the way of a formal handover of

574 Many of these legalistic regulations remain part of ECWA practice, although they no longer feature in subsequent constitutions.
power. ECWA might be legally independent, but in reality was still subservient to SIM. 575

3.3 ECWA Constitution 1964.
The next edition of the ECWA Constitution576 retained the doctrinal statement above but reordering the layout of the document to emphasise the roles of the ECWA Executive,577 and the General Church Council. Whereas in the previous document the emphasis had been on local churches and districts, this change marks the beginning of a centralising trend, and of greater levels of bureaucracy. SIM continues to play a role at national and district level. However, instead of the SIM District Superintendent chairing the District Council, a Nigerian minister elected by his peers, and assisted by similarly elected DCC secretaries and treasurers, is Chairman. This is a clear move, probably taken in the context of the Nigerian Civil War, for missionaries to take a back seat as advisers and allow Nigerian ministers to take the lead. It would be a continuing trend culminating in SIM handing over control of all of its remaining work in Nigeria in 1976.578

3.4 ECWA Constitution 1970
The April 1970 revision of the ECWA Constitution579 clarifies the role of the Trustees, downplays the ability of SIM to appoint Advisors, explains in considerably more detail than before the roles of various ECWA Executive members, and also states in considerably greater detail the spiritual and educational qualifications of ministers and elders. It also brought in a number of restrictions on how finances and property could be handled. There was no change in the doctrinal statement.

576 Anon., The Constitution of the Evangelical Churches of West Africa, ECWA Headquarters, Jos, nd., SIMA Nigeria Box 021 ECWA Constitutions. It probably dates from the late 1960s.
577 The ECWA Executive is responsible for the day-to-day management of the denomination. Its members include the President, Vice-President, General Secretary, Assistant General Secretary and Treasurer. In this edition no provision was made for an Assistant General Secretary.
3.5 ECWA Constitution 1980

However, by late 1979 or 1980 some major changes did take place in that revision of the ECWA Constitution.\(^{580}\) This is especially the case with the Statement of Faith. This expanded from eleven items to fifteen. For the first time a coherent attempt is made to explain what each of the doctrinal statements actually means, albeit there appears to be little attempt to write such explanations to deal with contextual issues. Indeed, if contextual issues are addressed, it is primarily through the choice of topics covered, and not what is said about each of them. Thus the statement discusses the Scriptures, the person of God, Jesus Christ, the person and work of the Holy Spirit, angels, man, salvation, assurance, eternal security, sanctification, the church, ordinances, Christian life, Christ’s second coming, and resurrection of believers.

Removed from this statement are the previous items on separation and missions, which are replaced by a section on Christian life that more sensitively incorporates both previous concepts. Included is specific discussion of the person and work of the Holy Spirit, assurance of salvation and eternal security, the nature and purpose of the church, and a specifically pre-millennial dispensational interpretation of Christ’s second coming. Overall, one gets the impression from this statement of faith that ECWA is maturing and asserting its own denominational identity.

Of particular interest, in light of the growing Nigerian Pentecostal movement and subsequent developments in ECWA doctrinal statements, is the statement made by this constitution on the Holy Spirit. It stated:

THE HOLY SPIRIT is the third Person of the God-head who regenerates, indwells, baptises, and seals all true believers in Christ and fills those yielded to God. The Holy Spirit’s ministry is to glorify Christ in the life of the believers. He guides, instructs, empowers, and gives spiritual abilities to Christians for service. Some of the spiritual gifts listed in Scripture (tongues, healing etc.) were temporary sign gifts. However, any emphasis on possession of any of those gifts as a qualification for and evidence of salvation and service is unscriptural and is rejected (John 3:3-6; I Cor. 6:19; I Cor. 12:13; Eph. 5:18; John 15:13-14; Acts 1:8; I Cor. 12:11; I Cor. 14:22; Heb. 2:3-5).

This is a considerable expansion on the previous one line ascription of regeneration to the Holy Spirit. For it begins to explain the Scriptural understanding of the person and work of the Holy Spirit. However, it clearly understands the charismatic gifts to have been temporary in nature, and not for current use. In addition, the final

\(^{580}\) Anon., The Constitution of the Association of Evangelical Churches of West Africa, (ECWA), ECWA Headquarters, Jos, nd., SIMA Nigeria Box 021 ECWA Constitutions. See Appendix Three. I believe that it most likely dates from around 1979 or 1980. This is because, in contrast to all previous constitutions, no mention is made of any SIM representation at any level in ECWA, a feature entirely consistent with SIM handing over control of all work in Nigeria in 1976.
sentence prohibiting any emphasis on possession of those gifts can be understood as trying to put a clamp on those Pentecostals who looked down on their non-Pentecostal brethren. Moreover, this sentence can also be understood as deliberately blocking anyone from advocating or teaching the use of these gifts.581 Further related statements occur at the end of Article 5 on Angels stating, “A Christian cannot be possessed by demons,” and in Article 11, which states, “The Church, embracing all true believers, is the body and bride of Christ, formed by the baptism of the Holy Spirit.”

The rest of this constitution addresses various managerial issues. Members are now specifically permitted to transfer their membership. The role of the ECWA President is further strengthened, and the memberships of district and various local church councils are further defined. Given the restoration of democracy about this time a section is included restricting all full-time employees of ECWA from identifying with political parties, running for office, or seeking support for such parties, unless they resign their positions in the church. Qualifications for licensed pastors are devolved to the DCC’s while ordination regulations for senior ministers are relaxed.582 Some other organisational changes are made chiefly to do with financial management issues.

3.6 ECWA Constitution 1989
The 1989 constitution revision produced the most comprehensive collection of principles, rules, and regulations yet.583 The very name signified the biggest change. ECWA had moved from being the fairly loosely-knit Association of Evangelical Churches of West Africa into the much more tightly centralised denominational structure of the Evangelical Church of West Africa.584 Much of this booklet consists of

581 One came across anecdotal evidence of a number of ECWA pastors being defrocked, and expelled from the denomination because of their adoption of Pentecostal beliefs.
582 ECWA continues to practice a distinction between licensed and ordained pastors, which probably dates from when SIM started appointing men to the pastorate. Licensed pastors, who are called “Pastor”, can perform every pastoral function except marriages. Ordained ministers, called “Reverends” can perform marriages in addition to the other pastoral functions. Initially Nigerians were only appointed to the position of “pastor”, with the SIM missionary retaining the position of “reverend” and thus his leadership role. Instead of scrapping this distinction, ECWA has retained it, although more recently the numbers promoted to “reverend” have greatly increased.
584 One wonders if the fact that at the time Nigeria, despite its federal structure, was under a unitary military government influenced this move. There were a number of times when I was working as a missionary in Nigeria that I felt ECWA was being strongly influenced by external factors. This was one of them, while another was some discussion to adopt Episcopal structures. The Episcopal suggestion failed to gain sufficient support. However, ECWA’s employment and remuneration policies are clearly derived from Nigerian civil service policies and procedures and are just as bureaucratic!
detailed instructions as to who is qualified for positions, the composition of various boards and councils, how often they are to meet etc. There are lengthy sections on marriage rules, trying to bring them into conformity with national laws. There is also a, still controversial, section on financial accountability, ensuring that at least 25% of church offerings are sent for the support of DCC and ECWA Headquarters. All of these rules and regulations predominate with the Articles of Faith and Practice taking up just over three pages in an 82-page booklet. One gets a sense that organisation and bureaucracy are the overwhelmingly dominant factor in the official structures of the church.

When it comes to the Articles of Faith and Practice the bulk of these remain similar to those stated in Appendix Three. However, there are some significant developments in relation to the person and work of the Holy Spirit and to spiritual gifts. To begin with, the previous paragraph incorporating both the person and work of the Holy Spirit and spiritual gifts is replaced by two distinct paragraphs. These are:

THE HOLY SPIRIT. The Holy Spirit is the Third Person of the God-head Who regenerates (that is, gives new life to anyone who, dead in sins and trespasses, exercises saving faith in Jesus Christ – Rom. 8:11; Jn. 6:63a); indwells (that is, resides in everyone who truly believes in Jesus Christ – Jn. 14:16, 17; Rom. 8:9,11,15; 1 Cor. 6:19); baptises (that is, places every true believer into the Body of Christ, thus joining each believer to Christ in a mystical union – 1 Cor. 12:13; Gal 3:26, 27; Rom. 6:3,4); seals (that is, by the abiding presence of the Holy Spirit in the believer, the divine mark of ownership is eternally placed to indicate that the one indwelt is God’s own eternal possession – Eph. 1: 13 – 14; 4:30); and fills those who believe (that is, empowers those yielded to God in daily conduct and service – 2 Cor. 3:18; Eph. 5:18; Gal. 5:16, 22 – 25; Col. 3:17). The Holy Spirit’s ministry is to glorify God in the life of the believer as He guides, instructs, empowers, and gives spiritual abilities for service (Jn. 3:3 – 6; 1 Cor. 6:19; 12:13; Eph. 5:18; Acts 1:8).

SPIRITUAL GIFTS. These are bestowed freely as determined by the Holy Spirit on believers and not by the will or desire of man. These grace (unmerited favour) gifts are meant for the edification of the Body of Christ and for service to the glory of God. In this age God has given for the building up of the Church the following grace gifts among others: faith, administration, care, pastor/teacher, evangelist, wisdom, knowledge, discernment (Rom. 12:6; 1 Cor. 12: 4 – 11; Eph. 4:11). Some of the Spiritual gifts listed in Scripture, for example, tongues, healing etc were sign gifts. However, an undue emphasis on possession of any of those sign gifts as a means or prerequisite for salvation is unscriptural and is rejected. (Jn. 6:3 – 16; Jn. 16: 13 – 14; Acts 1:8; 1 Cor. 14:1 – 40).585

The paragraph on the Person and work of the Holy Spirit thus spells out in considerable detail ECWA’s views. It is clearly a non-Pentecostal understanding.

teaching that baptism, indwelling, sealing and filling by the Spirit are not the product of a second order experience accompanied by glossolalia, but the normal experience for all who come to faith in Christ and seek to follow Him in their daily lives.

The statement on spiritual gifts supports this non-Pentecostal understanding. There the church teaches that spiritual gifts are bestowed at the will of the Holy Spirit, and are not at the behest of any spiritual leader, or perhaps, even to be specifically sought. The church distinguishes between gifts for the building up of the church, and sign gifts. The former are viewed favourably while the latter, while not called temporary as before, are obviously viewed as belonging to a past time.

Elsewhere the paragraph on Christian Service has been expanded to read:

CHRISTIAN LIFE AND SERVICE. Men are saved unto good works (Eph. 2:10; Titus 3:8) and faith without works is dead (Jas. 2:17). Therefore, Christians are called to a holy life of service and testimony in the power of the Holy Spirit, which service includes the propagation of the Gospel message to the whole world. The Holy Spirit bestows by His own sovereign will, diverse grace gifts upon all who believe in Christ for enablement in service for God's glory. Christians will give account of, and receive rewards for their faithful service at the judgement seat of Christ (Acts 1:8; 1 Cor. 3:12 – 15; 2 Cor. 5: 9 – 10; Rom. 12:6; 1 Cor. 12: 4 – 11; Eph. 4:11; 1 Pet. 1:15 – 16).

This too reinforces this non-Pentecostal understanding of the person, work, and gifts of the Holy Spirit. This very act of expressing so fully what the church does believe is a response to the pressures the church is facing from the growth of Pentecostalism. By expressing itself so fully in this way ECWA was trying to distinguish what it believed Biblical teaching to be, in distinction from Pentecostal views. Yet it is by its nature a defensive move, which, does not really engage with Pentecostal theology or practice. Instead of looking at what Pentecostalism is advocating, much of it addressing issues raised by African culture and beliefs, one gets the impression that this statement is de-contextualised, being as suitable in its definitions to a Western context as it is to a Nigerian one.

3.7 ECWA Constitution 1999

In 1999, the Constitution and Bye-Laws were revised again. I was a member of the revision committee and an interim chairman at one stage during its proceedings. The main features of the committee's work were two long discussions concerning the

role of women in the church, and ministerial postings. In the former case, I sought, unsuccessfully in the end, to give women more of a say in the governance of the church, thus reducing the opposition to women holding some leadership positions. In the latter case, a report was presented,\(^{587}\) examining the issue of ministerial postings. ECWA DCC’s, and not individual congregations, are generally responsible for the employment, transfer and, if necessary, the dismissal, of their ministers. Those ministers not accountable to DCC’s are usually employed directly by ECWA Headquarters, or their departments. In all cases, ministers could be transferred at short notice. It became apparent from the paper that transfers were being used far too frequently, sometimes punitively, and often without due regard to the well-being of the minister's family, or the good of the individual congregation. This review set guidelines discouraging such over frequent and punitive transfers.

However, some revisions were also made to the Articles of Faith and Practice. While the statement on the person and work of the Holy Spirit remained the same as before, when it came to spiritual gifts some changes occurred. Thus, in the article dealing with Christian life and service the following was inserted: “The Holy Spirit bestows by His own sovereign will, diverse grace gifts upon all who believe in Christ for enablement in service for God’s glory.” Later in the article on spiritual gifts, the sentence on sign gifts has been changed to read: “Some of the spiritual gifts listed in Scripture, for example, tongues, healing, etc are sign gifts.” The accompanying footnote points out that: “. . the Church believes that such gifts are the prerogative of the Holy Spirit to use at whatsoever time He chooses whether in the past, the present, or the future.” This is a significant change. In the 1989 constitution, the relevant sentence on sign gifts read, “were” consigning such to the past. Changing the verb to “are”, especially when accompanied by this footnote, indicates an acceptance of the regulated use of such gifts for the church today. Elsewhere the Articles of Faith and Practice move in a Reformed direction holding, contrary to widespread Arminian tendencies within ECWA, to a Reformed view of salvation and assurance of faith.\(^{588}\) Likewise, the church's official understanding of the Lord’s Supper also moved in a Reformed direction.

\(^{587}\) The paper was written by Rev Professor Samuel Kunhiyop, another committee member and then Provost of the Jos ECWA Theological Seminary. Later published as, Kunhiyop, S.W., *The Practice and Impact of Transfer in ECWA*, Baraka Press, Kaduna, 2004.

\(^{588}\) Most of these theological changes reflect the influence of Professor Kunhiyop and I on this committee. However, many ECWA leaders continue to view “the doctrines of grace” as giving too much opportunity for people to sin, preferring members to “work out their salvation”.

211
ECWA by this stage was certainly responding to Pentecostal pressures, becoming more accepting of Pentecostal worship styles in some of its churches, and tolerant of the use of charismatic gifts within the church. However, this does not necessarily imply that ECWA was or has become a Pentecostal church. To judge just how much influence Pentecostalism has had on ECWA one needs firstly to highlight some of the major Pentecostal features.

4. Pentecostal Influences

The 1960s were a tumultuous period in Nigerian history. Following independence in October 1960, the rest of the decade was marked by political upheaval leading, as observed, to the Civil War. It also began a period of tremendous growth in Nigerian Christianity leading right through the 1970s into the 1980s. Total numbers grew and Pentecostalism also grew, building on the evangelical influences laid down in the 1960s. Pentecostalism developed both within the formal boundaries of the Pentecostal Fellowship of Nigeria (PFN), and in influencing historically non-Pentecostal denominations, such as ECWA or the Anglicans. Some of this influence was initially seen in attracting people from the non-Pentecostal churches to its membership. More and more, however, there is a fluidity of membership with some finding their spiritual homes in Pentecostalism, while others, with similar spiritual views, remain in their denominations and influence them in a Pentecostal direction.

As evidenced from discussing the development of ECWA’s formal theological views Pentecostalism has exercised a growing influence on ECWA. English-speaking churches, and younger people have been particularly influenced by Pentecostal music. Hackett identified gospel music as “one of the most important ways in which the charismatics construct their own identity and invade public space.” They learn about this kind of worship through attending various types of Pentecostal services which are always well advertised. Ojo writes,

Charismatic movements have brought worship nearer to the ordinary people, because the people play a significant part in spontaneous worship through singing, dancing, singing praises, consistent prayer sessions, etc. . . Although this is the area where the distinctiveness of the movements is clearly seen, yet it is the area that has caused much distaste for other Christians. Evangelical Christians have considered the enthusiastic charismatic worship as too emotional, and the claims to baptism in the Holy Spirit, speaking in tongues, and the manifestation of the Holy Spirit as not really Scriptural.

In addition, there is Pentecostalism's extensive use of the electronic media. Hackett writes:

With extended viewing audiences (nation or statewide as opposed to a single congregation) and the enhancement of the electronic medium, the evangelist who has a powerful message and a good dose of charisma may attract a much larger following. This may in part explain the development of the 'mega-church' in both Nigeria and Ghana in recent years. Younger people in particular are attracted to the evangelists who have developed modern media images of themselves and their churches. It allows the potential participant or member to make choices prior to direct participation or commitment.\(^5\)

The combination of music and media has clearly influenced English-speaking ECWA churches. ECWA young people in Jos forced the DCC leaders to allow the use of bands in their services by threatening to decamp wholesale to the Pentecostal churches. These same young people, however, are also taking a more active leadership role in the churches, going to theological colleges and seminaries to train for the ministry, or, as they age being elected into lay leadership. Increasingly ECWA clergy are adapting their preaching styles to what they see on T.V. or through videos or at conferences. With the music and the media also comes, usually without much theological reflection, Pentecostal theological beliefs. Thus, if by no other means than the pressure of circumstances and events, ECWA, at least in its English-speaking churches, is probably heading in a Pentecostal direction.

4.1 Nigerian Pentecostal Origins
Historians often attribute the origins of Pentecostalism to events that took place in Azuza Street in Los Angeles in 1906, arguing that from that base the movement spread across the world both as missionaries took the message, and as visitors returned to their homes inspired by their experiences. The resulting movement in Africa is then regarded as continuing to be American linked and inspired. All the more so as they trace current links in thought and practice, not to mention interchange of personnel and media programmes between North America and Africa.

Ukah suggests that scholars of Nigerian religion are divided over this theory. On the one hand, such as J.D.Y. Peel believe that Western missions introduced Pentecostalism in 1931 finding as they did so an already fertile soil in indigenous proto-Pentecostal movements. Others, such as Harold Turner, Ogbu Kalu, and Matthews Ojo believe Pentecostalism arose out of local innovations responding to

\(^5\) Hackett, 1998, p.266.
prophetic or spiritual movements developing in communities where non-Pentecostal missions had already planted churches.592

Thus, Matthews Ojo argues that while superficially African Pentecostalism may appear American, behind that, “there are hundreds of African charismatic organizations influencing millions of Africans in clearly indigenous ways.”593 Ojo traces Pentecostal origins in Nigeria to a combination of sources. In Western Nigeria, the first wave was associated with the Aladura movement from around 1910. In the 1930s, links developed with the British Apostolic Church. S.G. Elton, then an Apostolic Church missionary, then helped promote the Latter Rain movement. A third wave developed after Billy Graham’s 1960 Lagos crusade as other American evangelists followed in his wake. Not until the 1970s, however, did the modern Pentecostal/charismatic movement begin to take off among university students.594

Meanwhile, in Eastern Nigeria, the movement developed during the Civil War under the leadership of Bill Roberts, the British Scripture Union (SU) Travelling Secretary. Refusing to evacuate because of the war, he worked from his Umuahia base mainly among refugees and rural villagers. A significant movement developed under his ministry responding to the crisis they were experiencing. Burgess, also disputing claims of external links, wrote of the Eastern Nigeria revival, “It began as an evangelical revival associated with the Scripture Union but quickly acquired a Pentecostal spirituality as participants sought for practical answers to their current dilemmas.”595 After the war, the two movements united when Nigerian SU Travelling Secretaries took over.596 In the 1970s, the movements took off.

In addition, Kalu also identifies the Hour of Deliverance ministry that operated in Lagos before the civil war, the Hour of Our Freedom ministry that emerged in eastern

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593 Ojo, M. A. ‘Charismatic Movements in Africa,’ in C. Fyfe, and A. Walls (eds), Christianity in Africa in the 1990s, Centre of African Studies, Edinburgh University, 1996, p.92.  
596 Ojo, 2006, p.60.
Nigeria in the midst of the civil war in 1969, and Benson Idahosa’s ministry that linked Pentecostalism with American televangelists, as causative factors in the indigenous development of Pentecostalism.⁵⁹⁷

As the movement spread north, it met an already receptive audience among many Northern Christians. For this was the same area in which NLFA had originated and operated so successfully since the mid-1960s. Through its inter-denominational support base, and focus on evangelism, prayer, Bible study, and generous giving the NLFA had effectively prepared the ground for the later arrival of Pentecostalism. It is fair to surmise, albeit probably impossible to prove, that without the NLFA influence breaking down the denominational boundaries and uniting Christians along these four themes the spread of Pentecostalism may well have been slower and more difficult.

The first wave of the movement northwards was from 1974 until the late 1970s, when Christian graduates fulfilling their National Youth Service Corps obligations laid the foundation.⁵⁹⁸ Corpers, using English and occupying influential positions, were eager to spread their Pentecostal beliefs, and to evangelize, venturing into areas where other Christians could not go. Kalu writes:

University students from the south who joined the National Youth Service Corps in the north established vigorous evangelical programs that differed from the muted, accommodationist, quarantined forms of Christian presence symbolized by the mission churches located in enclaves known as "strangers' quarters." It is argued that Charismatic Pentecostal forces reshaped Christian-Muslim relationships in about ten ways. Their invigorated evangelical strategy that privileged the conversion of Muslims re-memorialized the temper of old evangelicalism that inspired the "Sudan parties" in the nineteenth century.⁵⁹⁹

Southerners built on this as they moved north for work from the late 1970s to early 1980s. Some founded their own churches or influenced their denominations. With high profile converts from Islam and various evangelistic projects, they had an increased impact on Muslim areas, provoking bouts of violent reaction such as the riots preceding the abortive 1991 Reinhard Bonnke crusade in Kano. By the end of the 1970s, resistance to Pentecostalism among most of the mainline mission

⁵⁹⁸ National Youth Service Corps is a one-year obligation on Nigerian graduates to serve and help unify the nation through working for minimal salary outside their state of origin. Corpers, as they are known, work in a variety of usually civilian contexts: teaching, business, civil service etc.
churches had begun to collapse. Accompanied by a wealthier membership this increased scope for Pentecostalism had important political consequences especially in its influence on the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) and Christian resistance to Muslim demands for a Federal Shari’ah Court of Appeal in the 1979 Constitutional Conference.

Finally, from the mid-1980s, Northern Christians began to lead the movement and thus to reflect Northern regional and cultural factors. Some of these were from ECWA. Ojo refers to Samuel Kujiyat and his friends who were expelled from the First ECWA Church in Kaduna because of their Pentecostal activities. Ojo writes:

The emergence of Northern indigenes as evangelists and leaders of charismatic organizations from the mid-1980s is very significant because it introduced elements of politics into the movement when some of these leaders had to address events that were unfolding around them. The 1980s was an era of political and religious ferment in Northern Nigeria and these events affected the character of the charismatic movements. Among these events were the rising tide of Islamic fundamentalism, frequent religious conflicts, and violence against Christians.

Northern Christian leadership of Northern Pentecostalism brought with it the experiences and memories of over a century of Islamic domination. Christianity gave them a cultural identity with which to resist and overthrow the past. A high profile assertive leadership was quite prepared to use the wealth, education, and prominence of their churches to these ends. In so doing, they ran headlong into a scandalised Islamic establishment upset at Christian assertiveness and evangelistic success, and radical Islam quite prepared to use the Christians’ methods against them, or to resort to violence.

4.2 Nigerian Pentecostal Beliefs
It is impossible, and indeed, unnecessary to analyse all of Nigerian Pentecostalism’s features for the purposes of this study. Thus while exciting worship, spectacular miracles, attractive TV programmes, and even aspects of the prosperity gospel that so characterise the popular image of Nigerian Pentecostalism are important in themselves, they are not that important for the purposes of this study. Of more importance is understanding the worldviews advanced by Pentecostals and how

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600 Ojo, 2006, p.64.
those impinge on ethics, politics and inter-religious relations. For it is at this deeper level that one can really assess just how far Pentecostalism has influenced ECWA. Miracles, lively music, and prosperity teaching are, in the long run, somewhat superficial, liable to change as fashions and trends hold sway. Presuppositions, worldviews, and core theological beliefs are much less likely to change drastically.

4.2.1 Worldviews

Kalu argues that:

Pentecostalism has grown because of its cultural fit into indigenous worldviews and its response to the questions that are raised within the interior of the worldviews . . . the indigenous worldview still dominates contemporary African experience and shapes the character of African Pentecostalism. Therefore, African Pentecostalism is the “setting to work” of the gospel in Africa, at once showing how Africans appropriated the gospel message, how they responded to the presence of the Kingdom in their midst, and how its power transformed their worldviews. 604

Thus, Pentecostalism’s engagement with indigenous religions and cultures, individual and community experiences helps to shape its form and character. In this, Kalu suggests, it seeks to “transform these cultures by contesting patriarchal ideology and the control exercised by the elders and “big men” of the village and clan.” 605 It transforms the old, replacing it with the new, delivering from demonic possession by refilling with “a healthier, clean spirit so that the person can become truly human and achieve the vaunted life goals of a community.” 606 Central to this transformed relationship is the concept of covenant. Just as God made binding covenants with human beings, so Africans made similar covenants with various deities. The mission churches, Pentecostals argue, failed to recognise this, and adopt the right counter measures, thus explaining “why the spirits that guard the gates of the communities have remained unconquered.” 607 By taking seriously the continuities in worldview from the indigenous religions to Christianity Pentecostals argue they can offer a deeper, more lasting transformation.

They start with the African perception of the world being inhabited by a multitude of deities and spirits. The Supreme Being has a number of lesser deities responsible for different aspects of nature. In turn, one can add to these ancestral spirits, guardian spirits, marine spirits, and various spiritual forces. Thus Kalu notes that a survey of

605 Kalu, 2008, p.171.
Nigeria’s Igbo people indicates a total of 615 spirits, although this number may vary according to the culture.

The challenge for Christianity is how one should witness the gospel in a highly spiritualized environment where recognizing the powers has not been banished in a Cartesian flight to objectivity and enlightenment. The power question is ultimate and suffuses an African primal worldview, demanding an answer from the new Christian change agent, and pointing to the need for continuity in change.\textsuperscript{608}

Pentecostals address these realities firstly through concepts of spiritual warfare: as the physical event is decided on the spiritual plane it is important to deal with issues on that spiritual plane first. Secondly, through the idea of covenants already alluded to. In these, the power of the spoken word can be immense. Christians, they argue, are given the power to speak the reversal of these covenants by using the name of Jesus, the blood, and the resources of the Holy Spirit. Ojo highlights this idea of power as follows:

\ldots the principal goal of the numerous Charismatic organizations is to deepen religious experience of their members, which I call piety, and secondly to empower these Christians to confront the difficulties of life and to resolve personal and communal dilemma in their contemporary society. \ldots I am convinced that nothing occupies the attention of Africans as much as power, particularly its manifestation, whether in the form of material wealth, political and social statuses, traditional privileges like chieftaincy titles, colonial heritage, etc.\textsuperscript{609}

Power is thus central to social relations affecting ethnic links, personal finances, family relationships, and business. Pentecostals offer the power not merely to cope with the trials of life, but to overcome them. Therefore, thirdly, they make use of the resonances between African and Biblical worldviews to extend the kingdom of God into areas not yet brought into submission, reworking theology to address their understanding of evil forces, and their consequences in the world around them.

4.2.2 Pentecostal Public Ethics

However, social scientists analysing African Pentecostalism have suggested links between its traditional apolitical nature, modernity, and social mobility to promote an “instrumentalist discourse, a discourse that explores how religion serves as an instrument to achieve other goals that provide political, economic, and psychological adjustments to new realities by vested interests.”\textsuperscript{610} They reject the use of supernatural language to explain social events in favour of economic, social or political factors, especially that of globalization. Hence Pentecostalism is linked

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{608} Kalu, 2008, p.178.
\item \textsuperscript{609} Ojo, 2006, pp. 88 – 89.
\item \textsuperscript{610} Kalu, 2008, p.187.
\end{itemize}
inextricably with modernity and is regarded as just another aspect of that Western-inspired globalization process.

However, Kalu, in keeping with a number of other scholars, points out that globalization is all very well, but it still has to be translated into the local context and understood through local cultural lenses. Kalu calls that process “glocalization” which he defines as:

A concept designed to explore the interior dynamics and processes of cultural contacts in contexts of asymmetrical power relations. It is not about globalized religion or increased homogeneity and sameness, but about how global, transnational cultural forms are set on wheels, domesticated, or refracted through the local cultural lenses. . . It emphasizes the initiative and creative responses and character of the local. Africa was not a tabula rasa on which foreign culture bearers wrote their scripts with abandon.611

Thus the new beliefs interact with long held worldviews, worldviews that originate within the indigenous religions, and which, as noted above, Pentecostalism seeks to transform. Kalu cites Andrew Walls as describing this change as “a shift from proselytism to conversion, a process whereby communities turned the very core of their cultures to the glare of the gospel.”612 Moreover, this flow of ideas and culture is multidirectional: the very globalization referred to has also enabled ideas and concepts to flow from south to north, east to west, south to south. Nor for ordinary individuals, concerned with their personal salvation, and with their need for power and protection in their daily lives, is this globalization all that relevant.

So if Pentecostalism is unlikely to be the product of Western globalization processes, how then does it impact on the African political scene? Kalu suggests a framework within which one can consider this question. Firstly, the boundaries of political engagement are far wider than overt party politics. Secondly, there is a magical substratum that underpins the political culture, with many political leaders openly or secretly relying on membership in secret societies and/or spiritual rituals to attain, or maintain political office. Thirdly, differing contexts bring differing responses: there is no homogeneous response. Fourthly, just as politics and religion are inextricably mixed in traditional societies so too are they inextricably mixed in the modern public space. In the past the strictures of the traditional religions and associated village mores kept the village political leaders in check. The emphasis has now shifted to the political leaders exploiting the traditional beliefs and rituals for their personal

611 Kalu, 2008, p.190.
advancement such that they now gain support for their illicit causes from the same people who in the past would have held them to account.

It is into this framework that Pentecostal organisations apply the power of the Holy Spirit to address these contemporary needs, empowering their adherents to survive and prosper in difficult socio-economic and political circumstances. Ojo highlights six ways Pentecostals offer this empowerment: individual conversion; empowerment of individuals; working with large groups of people; reforming non-Pentecostal denominations; and the Aladura movement, or delivering people from their traditionalist roots. In whichever way, therefore, that the individual wishes, the Pentecostal/charismatic movement offers divine power to change individuals, and societies. Given their enthusiastic publicity, they have made broad inroads into Nigerian societies, including Islamic communities.

4.2.3 Pentecostal Political Principles
In response to politicians’ reliance on secret societies and occult rituals for the attainment and preservation of their power, Pentecostals have been quite critical of the state. “Political leaders are portrayed as possessed and empowered by the spirits that they worship in secret.” Instead many Pentecostals have provided a socially active alternative, seeking to fill the gap between what the state promises and what it actually delivers. In so doing it is, by default, engaged in a profoundly political statement pointing out by its actions where the state is failing. In other words, they make use of covert politics, if not explicitly overt.

Kalu suggests four inter-locking themes for this kind of political action:

1. rebuilding the individual, thus bestowing the power to be truly human;
2. a predominantly covert form of social activism, attacking socio-political and moral structures;
3. an increasing assertion for the rule of saints and the politics of engagement;

614 Relying on 2 Chronicles 7:14 Pentecostals argue that Nigeria’s all-pervading social and economic problems, the result of the activities of Satan, his demons and individual sins, can be healed, if the nation would turn to God in prayer and repentance. Ojo, 2006, pp.204 – 205.
617 Kalu, 2008, p.211.
building the new Israel by empowering communities to participate in the foretaste of God’s reign. It thus breaks the dichotomy between the various categories – individual/society, private/public – using the resources of the gospel to weave a multifaceted and holistic response to the human predicament in the African ecosystem.\textsuperscript{618}

Rebuilding the individual means to give hope to the hopeless, not just the spiritual strength to cope with suffering, but the practical tools with which to empower and give hope. Starting from spiritual renewal it builds up all facets of the individual – physical, emotional, economic, political and social. This is far more than regarding God as a giver of good things on demand. There is hard work, self-help, and relevant instruction all expected or provided, as well as counselling to deal with the deeper spiritual and psychological issues that hinder progress. In doing this Pentecostals are working at the grass roots in holistic ministry covertly tackling the failings of the state in practical and relevant ways.

A second approach is through their understanding of land as a gift and as part of the covenant. This land has been lost through rebellion, neglect, idolatry and pollution. To recover it requires the creation of a new community that will recover the land from its hostile occupiers or the spirits and intentionally bring a renewed covenant into being. Only when the land is returned to its owner will peace and prosperity take hold. From among individuals who are converted and suitably spiritually equipped Pentecostals seek to form a spiritual army that will deal with the pollution caused by the occult practices of the predatory elite. They see themselves as a new Israel, and, with the aid of the Scriptures, are intent on regaining their lost heritage. Power is thus understood to be undergirded by a spiritual force; it is not confined to physical elements only. Deal with individuals’ spiritual needs, and when they are spiritually whole, then the opportunity exists to influence the whole nation.

Building these communities, and seeking to restore the land in the midst of economic collapse and stagnation, is accomplished through restored individuals who believe themselves to be called by God to get involved in the public sphere and trust Him for the resources to be faithful in that calling. Relying on such verses as Ecclesiastes 10: 6- 7 to explain the current unnatural state of affairs, they are to view themselves as sons and daughters of God, as citizens in the heavenly kingdom; they are to go forth in confidence, seeking to shine God’s light and bring His deliverance. Pentecostals and charismatics have thus:

\textsuperscript{618} Kalu, 2008, p.213.
... supported and strengthened individual political leaders as a way of expanding Christian influence in the competitive multi-religious society. A Christian upholding fundamental religious principles, brings up the image of the triumphant good God, while a bad government indicates the operation of evil forces to retard development and make Christians in particular suffer. [They have] created a new theological and ideological discourse by bringing the concept of evil and spiritual warfare onto the political agenda, and thus consolidating new forms of religious expression and political understanding.619

Evil spiritual forces, such as Islam, are to be expelled and replaced with new power to live victoriously. Ojo notes:

Christian evangelization was intensified as Islam was increasingly seen as part of the area of darkness that must be dispelled by the Gospel. Pentecostal spiritual warfare was not only fought against demons, both real and imagined, but was equally against sectarian religion and against Islam.620 (p.186)

The key weapons to be used are prayer, fasting, and research into the dominant spirits. However, while everyone can pray, only a certain number are equipped to be true intercessors: “one cannot fight the enemy if still in the enemy’s camp.”621 Intercessors are sent out to different sites to pray, and thus to recover those places from the powers that hold them in bondage. Networks have grown up, across countries and the continent, of people called to be intercessors, regularly setting aside the time to pray, and coming together for special times of prayer in difficult political situations.

4.2.4 Pentecostal Views of Islam
Kalu sees a combination of four views as encapsulating Pentecostal views on Islam.

Firstly, the aforementioned Ecclesiastes 10:6-7, “Folly is set in great dignity, and the rich sit in low place. I have seen servants upon horses, and princes walking as servants upon the earth.” (KJV) is regarded by Pentecostals as a description of an unnatural state of affairs. For years Muslims have controlled Nigeria’s government and it is up to the Christians to regain their lost position.

Secondly, there is Pentecostal teaching on Ishmael:

A second strand of the motif treated Ishmael as being outside the covenant, thus making Islam the illegitimate religion of the bondwoman. As Ishmael’s descendents constituted a threat to the children of Isaac so does Islam constitute

a threat to Christianity. This particular threat was a punishment because of lack of faith: Ishmael was born when Abraham’s own impatience tried to help God.  

Thirdly, Pentecostals query the identity of Allah, whom they believe was originally one of the 360 pre-Islamic gods contained in the Ka‘abah. He survived the Prophet Mohammad’s reorganization of the temple mainly because the Prophet’s father was the priest of Allah when he died. Pentecostal condemnation of this idolatry is then spread to other Islamic practices and beliefs including the significance of the sun and the moon, divination, magic, charms, sufi rituals and potions. Connected to this is a particular Pentecostal understanding of cosmology. God is in the highest or third heaven, whereas Satan and his followers were demoted to a second heaven after their rebellion. From here they control the lowest level of heaven, where the sun, moon and stars are located and the powers associated with these bodies to control individuals and communities. Thus the early morning calls to prayer from the minarets are calling on the princes of the air in the second heaven, and invoking power from the first heaven to control the nation. “Such prayers are actions in the political struggle for the soul of the nation.” Christians need to counter these through all-night prayer meetings, or early morning shouting that rebuts the competition for control of Nigeria’s air space and destiny.

The fourth issue is Christian Zionism. Many Nigerians have an affinity with the Middle East. Kalu points out that both his own Igbo people and the Yorubas believe themselves to be among the lost tribes of Israel, and many of the ethnic groups in central Nigeria believe they originated in the Yemen. Building on this, and David’s instruction to pray for the peace of Jerusalem (Psalm 121: 6-7) Pentecostals support Israel. The resonance of their cultures with that portrayed in the Old Testament, the marriages of Abraham and Moses to black women, and American Christian Zionist

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623 The Nigerian Bible Society recently held a seminar in Jos on the use of Allah. Linda Horlings explaining the rationale for it wrote:

. . . a number of ECWA pastors, and a few charismatics . . . are saying that “Allah” is the word for a pagan god and therefore when we use it to refer to the true God we are honouring Satan. In addition, they say Allah is not a Hausa word. However, no one knows the Hausa word for the high god, and if they did, it really wouldn’t be any different. We have told them that this happens in every culture, every language. As Christians we take the word for god and teach people who he really is. Many converts are very upset with this whole discussion (rightly so), and we as a translation team are certainly not considering removing Allah. But there are enough people for whom this is an issue, that we felt it only right to address it publicly and perhaps help people think it through. (Personal correspondence, 24/04/2008). Byang, D., ‘Question & Answer,’ Today’s Challenge (TC), No. 6, 1987 c, pp. 30 - 31 outlines arguments for and against a common Christian and Muslim identity for Allah. Byang believes they are not the same.
625 Kalu, 2008, p.244.
influences reaffirming their views come together in making this a central feature of their faith, and of their politics.

In doing this they present a clear political challenge to Nigerian Muslims who instinctively support Palestine and the Arab Muslim cause. Pentecostals believe that Muslims are conspiring to Islamize, and thus Arabize, the nation. External sponsorship of Islamic da’wah (evangelism), as well as construction of mosques and Islamic schools and universities, the introduction of Islamic banking, restrictions on building new churches in the far North, refusal to allow Christian broadcasts, or to employ Christian religious education teachers, as well as the Shari’ah restrictions are all seen as part of a conspiracy along those lines. The Shari’ah extension in the far North is the latest phase, discriminating against southern-owned businesses. Any time riots take place Southern owned businesses are also often targeted for destruction and looting.

4.2.5 Political Engagement
Thus, for Pentecostals the Nigerian state is an empty, corrupt sham resulting from its long domination by Islam. It is time for Christians to engage politically. Ojo contrasts the Muslim and Pentecostal visions of the state:

Islamic groups have favoured centralization because Islam has always thrived on power and authority, which is often effective in a centralized political system. Second, the absolutism of Islam as a faith requires convergence to the centre to guarantee orthodoxy and order. Pentecostal groups, on the other hand have favoured a decentralization of the political and social order. Such decentralization has in the past favoured religious creativity which has stimulated rapid Christian growth. Decentralization is more suited to Pentecostalism, which, with its emphasis on the personal empowerment of the Holy Spirit has created alternative centres of power for solving human needs against the background of the failure of the centralized state. More important, it is within this ambit of decentralization that the ability of the Pentecostal movements to simplify the complexities of modern life in more pragmatic ways has been realized.

In contrast, therefore, to the mission churches, Christians now believe they should be actively involved in politics, whether it is arguing for the secular nature of the

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626 That many of the businesses so discriminated against involved the sale of alcohol and providing cheap hotels that were often patronised by prostitutes seems to be overlooked.
Nigerian constitution, or restoring a moral basis to Nigerian politics, i.e. displacing the Muslim politicians whom Pentecostals and others argue have caused such disaster to the Nigerian state. This partially explains the Christian uproar when Babangida arranged for the secret admission of Nigeria to the OIC, and, in turn the ever more violent Muslim defence of their position. However, the more politicised religion becomes, the more of a destabilizing force it appears to be. The very nature of dogmatic religious claims to truth rules out the ability to compromise essential to the success of politics.630

The Pentecostal combination of the uniqueness of Jesus’ claim and the urgency of His mission blocks the development of an interfaith theology of dialogue. Few accept the possibility of being firmly rooted in one’s belief system and still being open to others. This explains the frustration of Muslims towards radical Christianity and the tendency to encourage violence as a means of coercing others, in spite of the claims to shared Abrahamic roots and moral concepts. In contesting for control of the public space, both face the dilemma of implementing religious laws and ethics into a contemporary state.631

Pentecostals and most other Christians do not, however, portray any understanding of how inflammatory some of their statements are perceived to be. Christians legitimately criticize Muslims for making inflammatory remarks, but there is little self-criticism by the Christian community. Some blame for this can be laid at the door of ECWA’s Today’s Challenge (TC). Ojo suggests that TC played a key role in uniting Christian opinion against Islamic fundamentalism and promoting Christian perspectives on major religious conflicts. In doing so it promoted the fear of an Islamisation project. “Consequently, by the mid 1990s, the magazine has been an important actor, creating and solidifying Christian attitudes to Islam, and creating solidarity among evangelicals and Pentecostals in the ongoing competition with Islam.”632 Hackett further suggests that between 1987 and 1996 TC demonized Muslims and, according to her, was biased in its reporting. Citing Musa Gaiya, an ECWA minister and university professor, she wrote:

He highlights the failure of the widely read magazine to recognize the insensitive provocation caused by Christians with their elaborate and expensive advertisements in Kano in 1991 for the Bonnke crusade, especially following the government refusal to allow the South African Muslim preacher Ahmed Deedat to come to Nigeria.633

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630 Consider the repercussions in Ian Paisley’s Free Presbyterian Church, and in his Democratic Unionist Party when this arch-fundamentalist who cried “No Surrender” for many years, hatched an agreement with Sinn Fein, and got on so well with his Sinn Fein Deputy First Minister Martin McGuinness that they were popularly known as “the Chuckle Brothers”. Paisley was eventually forced out of both his life-long Moderatorship of the church, and his leadership of the party.


Christians and Muslims have, therefore, clashed numerous times since the 1980s. The first of those highlighted by Ojo was the row, mentioned above, over Nigeria secretly joining the Islamic Conference Organisation (in Nigeria known as OIC). This was followed by Sheikh Abubakar Gumi’s statement that Muslims would never allow a non-Muslim to become Head of State or President, and that if such happened Muslims would seek to divide the country. In response, Christians in Kaduna, where Gumi made his home, joined forces in the 1988 local elections to install a Baptist minister as Chairman of the local government. This, in a city regarded as a Muslim stronghold! The 1987 Kafanchan religious riots spread rapidly across Kaduna State and led, Ojo believes, to Christians moving from a predominantly pacifist position.

This approach did not work in the context of Islamic fundamentalism because Muslims became more daring and violent against Christians. However, from mid-1988 Christians began to employ retaliatory, militant, and violent responses and to inflict damage on the Muslim attackers. This eventually changed the nature of Muslim attacks, causing them to take account of possible retaliation by Christians.

Increasing levels of religiously characterized violence post-December 1980 forced northern Christians to work together in CAN. They could champion their political and religious rights, organise various prayer sessions, and increasingly act as a common political bloc. “Eventually, the perception of Islam as a common enemy helped CAN to bridge the gap between the evangelicals and the Pentecostals in the North, and brought them together to form one solid bloc to counter Muslim fundamentalism.”

In turn, CAN helped to moderate Pentecostals’ negative perception of Islam due to its insistence on using dialogue to resolve disagreements with Muslims. Most indigenous Northern Pentecostal leaders now coming to the fore hailed from minority ethnic groups. For decades, these had experienced religious discrimination and the effects of the emirs’ feudal powers. Through CAN, they now had a political voice. As Ojo concludes:

Since religion is really the basis by which the existing social structures and identities in Northern Nigeria have been defined and maintained, Charismatic


Ojo, 2007, p.182.

Ojo, 2006, p.69.
movements have become politically relevant because they have provided a mechanism for wider linkage of opposition to Islamic fundamentalism. Yet Christian political unity and willingness to retaliate has not stopped the violence or the discrimination. Appendix 2 highlights some of the major religiously motivated violence right up until March 2010. Violence merely begets further violence. Is it really a clash of fundamentalisms?

4.3 Fundamentalist?

For some, Pentecostalism is merely another aspect of the spread of American influenced globalization. Christian fundamentalism, they allege, is spreading as part of a complex web of American-inspired modernization, globalization, and religious fundamentalism. This fundamentalism stresses religious conversion, infallible and inerrant Scriptures, strict standards of personal moral behaviour to the neglect of social justice, and a dispensational, pre-millennial view of history. Old-fashioned fundamentalist separatism is irrelevant as this movement is characterised by its dynamism and Pentecostalism. A variety of well-organised and effective institutions, offer a potent mix of material blessings and spiritual power. They are most effective in Third World countries enduring socio-economic collapse as they offer a spiritual warfare rationale for the problems, preach social orderliness, and target Islam as a threat. Of particular concern to Gifford and fellow critics of the spread of Pentecostalism, is how these religious practices serve social/political religious movements. Fundamentalists, they argue, believing the United States to be

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638 The term “fundamentalism” originated at the inaugural October 1919 “World's Christian Fundamentalists Association” conference.

639 Fundamentalism, evangelicalism, and Pentecostalism in Africa are inseparable, and all Africans are fundamentalist due to their Biblical literalism. See Brouwer, Gifford, Rose, p.155.

640 Reference is to Fuller Seminary’s School of Intercultural Studies built originally around Donald McGavran’s theories. See McGavran, D.A., Understanding Church Growth, Eerdman’s, Grand Rapids, 1980.

641 The Faith Gospel theology taught by some Pentecostals reflects American fascination with making money – formerly achieved through hard work but now through having faith.

uniquely spiritually blessed, seek to remake societies and cultures in America's image attacking all systems, forces, and people who stand in their way. 643

Such views are a substantial reworking of the original concept of fundamentalism. Marsden shows fundamentalism's roots to be in a coalition of forces defined by their opposition to modernist attempts to reinterpret Christianity. 644 This coalition included Moody's legacy of a network of alternative institutions to denominations, and his stress on evangelism, dispensational pre-millennialism, holiness teaching, and defending historic Christian values in public life. The coalition held its own until after World War 1 when an aggressive and widely supported theological modernism took hold. After the 1925 Scopes trial debacle, 645 fundamentalists retreated from the public arena concentrating on building the sub-culture of networks and institutions that is their foundation today. 646

Foreign missions were central to fundamentalist thinking. 647 Keswick-inspired holiness theology, 648 taught a repeated infilling of the Holy Spirit as essential for overcoming sin and equipping individuals for effective evangelism. 649 Most dispensational pre-millennialists believed that the quicker the gospel was preached to the whole world then the quicker Christ would return. 650 Moody helped to promote both views and his 1886 Northfield Conference spearheaded the development of missionary interest. As noted previously, it was from this context SIM emerged, and ultimately ECWA was constituted. Thus, while not part of the "fighting fundamentalists" SIM's origins, and source of many of its early missionaries, have been shown to be in this fundamentalist movement, inevitably influencing ECWA along the way. These are the beliefs of classical fundamentalism.

However, classical fundamentalism was initially entirely opposed to charismatic gifts. Kalu notes how classical fundamentalism deployed cessationism to reject Pentecostal beliefs, asserting that "spiritual gifts belonged to an older generation and

643 In other words, Christian missions seek to spread a rightwing American-inspired socio-political message.
644 Marsden, 1980.
645 For further details, see Marsden, p.184 ff.
647 Carpenter, 1990, discusses the relationship between fundamentalism and foreign missions.
649 Another branch of the holiness movement developed into the Pentecostal movement.
had ceased to be relevant," and quoting a resolution of the 1928 World's Christian Fundamental Association to that effect. While some beliefs were shared – Biblical inerrancy, opposition to modernism, and a dualistic theology - there was a considerable gulf between the two movements. Russell Spittler argues that, despite some resemblances, Pentecostals and fundamentalists differ for historical, theological, and sociological reasons. In short, they have different agendas: fundamentalists seek to rectify theological deviation while Pentecostals proclaim a personal religious experience! As Harvey Cox suggests the two main contenders in modern spirituality are fundamentalism and “experientialism.”

Nor is the concept of fundamentalism entirely correct when applied to contexts that are not traditionally Christian. Ammermann defines fundamentalism as “organised efforts to shape the future of a people in light of a past that is seen through the lens of sacred texts and authorities traditionally available in the culture.” When she explores the implications of such she discovers that the churches fundamentalists start abroad, while appearing to be fundamentalist can not, actually be such. The very act of adopting the new faith means they lose the ability to call for the restoration of traditional belief to the heart of society, which is the essence of her understanding of fundamentalism. Instead, the new churches use religious ideas creatively focusing on indigenous attempts at social and personal transformation, rather than the concerns of American missionaries.

Thus, in so far as classical fundamentalism is concerned there is a clear distinction between its beliefs and practices, and that of Pentecostalism, and also between churches in traditionally-Christian areas that can be accurately defined as fundamentalist and those newer churches of whom the term fundamentalist is strictly speaking inaccurate.

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However, as Kalu points out, the concept of fundamentalism has been given an “extreme makeover” uniting Pentecostalism and Islamic radicals in . . . stressing the inerrancy of their respective canons, nationalism, opposition to modernity, and minority consciousness. They both claim to be the authentic expression of their respective traditions; place stress on distinctive elements, activism, moralistic puritan ethics, and a combination of both intellectual and popular strands; and disagree with the supremacy of reason over revelation, de-emphasis of the supernatural, and the permitting of relativistic, universalistic ethics.  

It is in this context that Gifford et al are writing of the spread of fundamentalism/Pentecostalism. However, as has already been discussed the spread of Pentecostalism in Nigeria is not quite such a reflection of the spread of American culture and values as Gifford might wish to suggest. Indeed Kalu suggests that it is inaccurate to describe African Pentecostals as fundamentalists. To begin with, African expressions of Christianity may be described as conservative, but Kalu wonders what exactly it means to be conservative? Secondly, Cox’s description of Pentecostalism as experiential and charismatic-driven rings true in much of African Pentecostalism. “This enchanted worldview has shaped the concerns and character of African Pentecostalism.” Kalu describes how this perspective has “reshaped the religious landscape, catalyzed the charismatization of the mission-founded churches, and thereby transformed ministerial formation strategies.” Thirdly, the variety of theologies and practices defies easy labelling. Fourthly, and most importantly, African Pentecostalism does not display the same sense of political militancy and cultural ideology as the American Moral Majority. While it does have political import, it does not, Kalu believes, have a strong political agenda. By contrast, modern American fundamentalism is characterised as having a strong political and cultural agenda. 

What then of ECWA? SIM’s, and therefore ECWA’s origins owe much to classical fundamentalism. However, if Ammerman is right, ECWA is not technically fundamentalist in the classical sense of the term, albeit maintaining its separatist heritage through its somewhat aloof attitude towards other denominations. Furthermore, while ECWA owes its origins to SIM, it has increasingly defined its own identity in distinction from SIM, setting its own goals and seeking assistance, if necessary, from a variety of external bodies, not just SIM. Thus, for Gifford et al to argue that the spread of American fundamentalist missions necessarily results in the

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656 Kalu, 2008, pp.251-252
spread of American fundamentalism appears to be inaccurate. Furthermore, his identification of Pentecostalism with fundamentalism is called into question when one considers the very different theological and methodological approaches of the two movements. Freston believes Gifford is too one-sided and fixated on the American religious right.\textsuperscript{658} Perhaps, this is the real issue? As both fundamentalism and Pentecostalism can trace either American origins and/or current links it would seem relatively easy to merge them and assume a common identity. Yet when analysed there are clear distinctives between the two movements; they are not identical. In origin they are clearly distinct and even taking into account modern understandings of the concepts of fundamentalism or Pentecostalism, they remain distinct.

Nor does ECWA appear to be Pentecostal. From studying its doctrinal statements it has clearly moved from being opposed to Pentecostalism, to accepting the regulated use of charismatic gifts and worship styles. However, nowhere do its doctrinal statements present a worldview or a system of ethics as Kalu suggests the Pentecostalists do. Nor has there, to date been any serious attempt to do so. While Yusufu Turaki at the Jos ECWA Theological Seminary is joining forces with the University of Jos \textit{et al} in a major new study of Pentecostalism, by his own admission he is not aware of anyone in ECWA who has seriously engaged with Pentecostal beliefs.\textsuperscript{659} Samuel Kunhiyop is currently working on a new theology book and may attempt to do so.\textsuperscript{660} Until then, however, it appears that ECWA is in a transitional phase, caught between its evangelical heritage, and Nigeria’s rapidly changing religious context. It is not only with Pentecostalism, however, that ECWA has failed to engage. Traditional religions and Islam too appear to have been neglected.

5. ECWA Today

Does this preliminary picture of ECWA correlate to the images that respondents believe to be true?

5.1 Organisation and politics

The major picture that ECWA Interviewees present is of a church which has concentrated on organisational growth and development at the expense of spiritual


\textsuperscript{659} Turaki, Y., \textit{Personal correspondence}, 18\textsuperscript{th} February 2010.

\textsuperscript{660} Kunhiyop, S.W., \textit{Personal correspondence}, 17\textsuperscript{th} February 2010.
energy and unity. There have been positive results from these changes in terms of better-educated clergy\textsuperscript{661} and a wider range of church-based organizations. Yet this institutionalization seems to be at the cost of on-going church growth and evangelism, and indeed of imaginative responses to the on-going conflict situation.\textsuperscript{662} Given that ECWA inherited this evangelistic zeal from SIM, and for years was known for its emphasis on evangelism, this appears to be a disturbing trend. Respondents lamented the increase in ethnically based internal politicking and seeking after position in the denomination.\textsuperscript{663} Whereas in the past, prominent leaders, (Byang Kato was cited as one), had to be begged to take on national office,\textsuperscript{664} competition and the seeking after power seemed to dominate matters. While Pentecostalism’s prosperity gospel and its emphasis on “pastor’s welfare” has boosted the financial position of many pastors an undiscerning adoption of this approach leading to an over-emphasis on money and position disturbed some.\textsuperscript{665}

ECWA DCC leaders stressing organisational growth and development, which they saw as a mainly positive development, portrayed a broadly similar picture. Other developments this group saw were encouragement to get involved in politics, and the negative effect of increasing internal politics within the church.

Over the years ECWA, which teaches its members to tithe and donate to the church’s work, has become more self-reliant. Greater central control of finances and policy is having a positive effect in terms of accountability, and in ensuring that ECWA clergy and missionaries are better paid, and have a pension on which to retire.\textsuperscript{666} There continue, however, to be problems with fraud and corruption. Only when the current General Secretary dismissed his brother-in-law from ECWA employment over financial irregularities was this issue taken seriously.\textsuperscript{667} This lack of integrity has harmed the church’s reputation, especially among Muslims. Members of ECWA formerly enjoyed a reputation for upright conduct, moral behaviour, and

\textsuperscript{661} Garba (04/05/2006), Gaiya (12/02/2007), Kafang (11/04/2006), Kunhiyop (31/01/2006), Okezie (30/03/2006), Samaila (16/11/2006), Tapkida (08/02/2007).
\textsuperscript{662} Atiyaye (15/05/2007), Baba (30/04/2006).
\textsuperscript{663} Dadang (22/12/2005), DanAmarya (31/01/2006), Jacob (03/05/2006), Kafang (11/04/2006), Maigadi (29/12/2005), Misal (29/12/2005), Musa (02/05/2006), Olowola (20/01/2006).
\textsuperscript{664} Kafang (11/04/2006).
\textsuperscript{665} Atiyaye (15/05/2007), Dadang (22/12/2005), Ibrahim (19/04/2006), Kafang (11/04/2006), Kunhiyop (31/01/2006).
\textsuperscript{666} DanAmarya (31/01/2006), Musa (02/05/2006), Okezie (30/04/2006), Tapkida (08/02/2007).
\textsuperscript{667} Gaiya (12/02/2007).
absolute honesty. This has diminished with alcohol use, female dress styles, financial corruption, and immorality causing scandals.\textsuperscript{668}

There remains the danger of the church breaking up. Unspoken tensions between Pentecostal and conservative evangelical members of ECWA lie under the surface.\textsuperscript{669} In addition, for quite a number of years the Yoruba DCCs appear to have operated autonomously from ECWA Headquarters. This is particularly evident in financial affairs. As noted above, the ECWA Constitution requires that twenty-five per cent of all income received by churches and institutions is to be remitted to the DCC and ECWA Headquarters to cover administrative and pension expenses, and help centrally operated institutions. This policy was actually suggested by a Yoruba Finance Director. Yet, rather than follow denominational policy in this regards, the Yoruba DCCs ensure that any funds they raise are spent locally.\textsuperscript{670} There are regular ongoing tensions, especially when elections for the ECWA Executive are to be held, between the Yoruba DCCs and the other northern DCCs. Yoruba DCCs recall they were among the first areas to be evangelised by SIM, they were the first churches to organise and when ECWA commenced they provided the most prominent leaders. Yet much of the church growth in more recent years has occurred further to the east and north of their churches. It is, perhaps natural, for them to feel they are somewhat sidelined and isolated.\textsuperscript{671}

Other respondents are, perhaps, not as close to the organisational issues in ECWA as the interviewees and the DCC leaders, and their answers were more perfunctory. Thus, ECWA laity spoke in positive tones of Pentecostal worship styles, better organisation, and a general growth in leadership, church programmes, and missionary outreach. Significant numbers, however, were more concerned about the negative trends such as internal politics, accountability, ethnic divisions, and declining evangelistic zeal. The single largest group among other Christian leaders, however, spoke mostly about the rise of Pentecostalism. However, two smaller groups referred to the linked issues of greater Christian involvement in politics, and of Christian self-defence against attacks. Growth in Christian organisations and evangelism also attracted positive comment. More negatively some spoke of internal politics, nominal believers, and struggling to respond to the violence. As mentioned

\textsuperscript{668} Atiyaye (15/05/2007), Dadang (22/12/2005), Hussaini (20/07/2006), Ityavyr (09/05/2007), Iya (11/04/2006), Kafang (11/04/2006), Korosi (14/07/2006).
\textsuperscript{669} Gaiya (12/02/2007).
\textsuperscript{670} Musa (02/05/2006).
\textsuperscript{671} It takes about 11 hours to drive from Jos, where the ECWA Headquarters is, to Igbaja where the first ECWA Seminary is located in the heart of the Yoruba DCCs.
above, it is surprising that SIM missionaries mainly concentrated on ECWA’s organisational and numerical growth with a few speaking of greater political activity and hostility to Islam. Issues to do with evangelism, church planting, and spiritual development attracted less attention.

5.2 Influence of Pentecostalism

The influence of Pentecostal style language and worship on ECWA was the largest response by the ECWA interviewees when asked about other churches influencing ECWA. Similar perspectives were also held by ECWA DCC leaders, and by a majority of the ECWA laity, although a significant number of the laity did not believe that ECWA had been influenced by other churches.

Formerly ECWA was known for conservative worship styles, with no dancing, restrained singing, and the main musical instruments being the traditional instruments Women’s Fellowship groups used for accompaniment. Prayer meetings took the form of individuals taking turns to lead in prayer. Most services were in local languages, chiefly Hausa and Yoruba. The ECWA minister’s oratory was measured in tone with few of the rhetorical flourishes currently popular on TV. Interviewees felt that people knew and respected ECWA for what they described as its sound doctrine and orderly worship and organisation.672

English language churches in ECWA have grown substantially along with church bands. The accompanying Pentecostal music and worship styles are almost de rigueur.673 The new music appeals as exciting, lively, modern and yet rooted deep in African rhythmic traditions.674 Glossolalia increasingly takes place in the context of “praise-worship” – extended periods of congregational singing and prayer in church services.675 Dancing is increasingly common, and prayer meetings tend to follow the Pentecostal style in which everyone prays simultaneously with some shouting their prayers. Not everyone is impressed. Garba comments: “I think Church leadership had to allow disco-like music to stop the drifting of our youth to those so-called acrobatic churches that are full of sound and fury but signifying nothing.”676

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672 Baba (30/04/2006), Ibrahim (19/04/2006), Jacob (03/05/2006), Misal (29/12/2005), Motty (14/12/005), Samaila (16/11/2006), Tagwai (11/04/2006), Tapkida (08/02/2007). Mutum (18/05/2007) speaks highly of ECWA’s Biblical teaching influence on other denominations.
673 Tagwai (11/04/2006), Tapkida (08/02/2007).
674 Panam Percy Paul, with his recording studio in Jos, seems to be particularly influential.
675 DanAmarya (31/01/2006), Nache (24/02/2007), Olowola (20/01/2006), Para-Mallam (01/03/2007).
676 Garba (04/06/2006). A number who left ECWA frustrated at its conservative position now lead some Northern Nigerian Pentecostal churches. Cf. Dadang (22/12/2005), DanAmarya (31/01/2006), Ibrahim
The style of preaching heard in churches tends to copy Pentecostal styles, while theological views tend to an excessive Biblical literalism. Many Pentecostal groups owe much to the Arminian theologies of the Wesleyan/Holiness traditions. Thus as this Pentecostal movement has spread in ECWA one estimate is that about thirty percent of ECWA pastors no longer believe in eternal security.\(^{677}\)

Prosperity gospel teaching shows up from time to time:\(^{678}\) the ECWA General Secretary refused to endorse an appeal by the Governing Council of ECWA’s Bingham University for funds because it was couched in prosperity gospel terms.\(^{679}\) The idea of the blood of Christ being almost a magical tool with which to defeat and protect one against occult powers has spread. Piyak wrote:

Yes, by the way we pray using the Name of Jesus and the Blood of Jesus as a charm to get God to do what we want. ECWA youth no longer see the blood of Jesus as a redemptive element but something that scares the devil and sets God into action.\(^{680}\)

Indeed ECWA originally did not believe in spirits: now many ECWA members do.\(^{681}\) Healing and deliverance are increasingly common.\(^{682}\) From these responses it appears as if ECWA has, at least on the surface, become increasingly characterised by Pentecostal worship and practices.\(^{683}\)

Other Christian leaders also noted this move in a Pentecostal direction, although they also noted ECWA’s own influence on their churches in terms of upholding Christian moral standards and emphasising Biblical preaching, as well as ECWA’s stronger organisational and financial management skills. As for SIM missionary responses to this question tended to show a chronological division in their answers. Those who had left Nigeria some time ago spoke more of ECWA’s exclusivity and influence on other denominations. Those who left Nigeria more recently, or are currently working

\(^{677}\) Kunhiyop (31/01/2006).
\(^{678}\) Ityavyr (09/05/2007), Korosi (14/07/2006), Kunhiyop (31/01/2006), Misal (29/12/2005), Okezie (30/04/2006), Para-Mallam (01/03/2007), Tangbiuin (19/04/2007), Tapkida (08/02/2007).
\(^{679}\) Dadang (22/12/2005).
\(^{681}\) Ari (24/04/2006), Galadima (26/01/2006), Okezie (30/04/2006).
\(^{682}\) Kunhiyop (31/01/2006), Tapkida (08/02/2007).
there, spoke more of Pentecostal or Anglican influences, often arising out of the
greater cooperation among Christians in response to the violence.

It could be argued that with the spread of Pentecostalism practices and beliefs in
ECWA comes also the spread of Pentecostal attitudes towards Islam and politics.

5.3 Religious violence
The first of the two questions addressing religious violence sought to ascertain the
impact of this violence on individuals. How had they been personally affected is a
much more relevant question than simply repeating rumours and stories about the
violence.

All of the ECWA interviewees had experienced religious violence. Most could speak
of friends and colleagues who had been killed while a few mentioned the deaths of
their relatives. Some had lost all of their possessions as their homes were burned.
Some had narrowly escaped with their lives. Everyone knew of martyrs. Husseini
had the names and addresses of 1350 Christians killed in Kano. Some were
critical of the church’s response to this violence, while a few suggested taking some
more pro-active approaches to the violence. Responses from ECWA DCC leaders
indicated a similar breakdown of experience with deaths of family members and
friends, the emotional and spiritual consequences of the violence, loss of property
and narrow escapes all featuring. Up to eighteen responses among the ECWA laity
spoke of various effects from the violence including the deaths of family members
and friends, loss of property, and the economic effect of the violence in lost homes,
education or jobs. While the clergy had refrained from speaking of their personal
attitudes, some of the laity are quite antagonistic towards Muslims, although similar
numbers spoke of love and forgiveness. Other Christian leaders also spoke of
deaths, narrow escapes, loss of property, and also of trying to help refugees from the
violence and to open dialogue with Muslims to find a way out from the violence.
Meanwhile SIM missionaries were generally remote from the violence, with most

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684 Hassan (15/05/2006), Motty (14/12/2005), Okezie (30/03/2006), Samaila (16/11/2006), Tapkida
(08/02/2007).
685 Garba (04/06/2006), three times through divine intervention. Cf. DanAmarya (31/01/2006), Hussaini
(20/07/2006), Kogo (21/07/2006), Motty (14/12/2005), Samaila (16/11/2006), Yawus (28/05/2006).
686 Ari (24/04/2006), Asake (12/05/2006), Awan (10/04/2006), Audu (10/04/2006), Dadang (22/12/2005),
DanAmarya (31/01/2006), Gabis (23/01/2006), Gaiya (12/02/2007), Galadima (26/01/2006), Hussaini
(20/07/2006), Jacob (03/05/2006), Joseph (06/02/2007), Kafang (11/04/2006), Korosi (14/07/2006),
Kunhiyop (31/01/2006), Maigadi (29/12/2005), Misal (29/12/2005), Musa (02/05/2006), Nache
(24/02/2007), Okezie (30/03/2006), Olowola (20/01/2006), Para-Mallam (01/03/2007), Samaila
having no personal knowledge of people suffering, while a few spoke of knowing people who had been killed, or injured. More interesting was their perception of the effects of violence on the people they worked amongst describing some as traumatised, and others as wary and battle-hardened, ready to stand up for their rights and retaliate if necessary. A few spoke of greater reliance on prayer.

In other words, there is here an overwhelming indication that this violence is something that has affected ECWA people, and others, quite widely and very deeply. Many have lost relatives and friends, property, jobs, and prospects. Undoubtedly this has had a profound spiritual and emotional impact on them. Before turning to that, however, it is important to understand how they perceive the causes of the violence. News reports have often attributed the violence to economic issues such as poverty or to ethnic divisions often over land. How do these respondents, mostly drawn from ECWA members, understand the situation they face?

ECWA interviewees were almost equally divided in attributing blame for the violence to either politics or religion, with economic factors coming third and ethnic issues a distant fourth. ECWA DCC leaders were far more specific in their attribution of blame clearly attributing the causes of the violence to either radical Islam or to the political and economic machinations of the predominantly Islamic elite. Even those who cited poverty and unemployment understood such to refer to Muslims. ECWA laity gave slightly greater emphasis to economic factors and the propensity of the Muslim poor to loot from the seemingly wealthier Christians. But they also stressed religious and political factors almost equally. A few, however, felt that conflict was almost inevitable when two belief systems operate so closely together. Other Christian leaders also attributed the violence to religious, political or economic reasons, with religion often being viewed as the tool for ultimately political or economic reasons. Yet within the religious causes alone are sufficient issues to cause trouble, including such as long held grievances of past religious violence, the growth in radical Islam, or the spread of Shari’ah law. SIM missionaries primarily blamed the growth of radical Islam, followed by ethnic disputes, and political factors. However, many of them recognised the difficulties in differentiating between them.

These reactions would indicate, therefore, a far more complex array of factors behind the violence than would initially appear. Many respondents, for example, blamed greedy politicians exploiting the religious sentiment, poverty and ignorance of the mainly Muslim economically destitute to riot and loot, kill and burn, thus enabling the
politicians to benefit from the chaos. With many in Nigeria living on around U.S. $2 per day loyalty and action can be purchased cheaply. Yet the problem is wider than economic or political issues alone. Gaiya pointed out:

You have to look at the context in which the riots have happened. As you move from one incident to another, the factors change. Religion is a very, very important factor whether it is used to support political ambition, ethnic identity, economic security, or social inequality. It is very important. If you removed religion then the riots would trim down to almost zero. In almost every situation, religion becomes even much more a powerful force in the conflict than ethnicity, economic, political, or social problems.

When discussing religious factors, the perception among many Christians, both within and without ECWA, is that Muslim thinking has been radicalised, firstly through Iranian Shi'iite influence, and secondly through Sunni Wahhabism. Garba, an ECWA Trustee and himself a Muslim convert from Sokoto and a descendent of Usman dan Fodio, wrote:

Iran, with the full knowledge of our military government opened its borders to young Muslim scholars from Africa, especially Nigeria. Hausa/Fulani Muslims in their hundreds went to Iran between 1979 and 1982. Over one thousand returned to the north of the country in 1982, trained and well armed [to] introduce the Iranian brand of Islam. First, they started spreading hatred against Americans and other West Europeans residing in Nigeria. They wanted all "infidels", that is, white Europeans to leave the country. Next they turned to Christians who they began calling "Al-Yahud", that is, Jews. In Islam, Muslims must treat Jews as they would treat a dog. . . In one year, these Iranian indoctrinated Muslims had created enough hatred for Christians in the North and some parts of the Southwest. Every Muslim that does not want to be labelled as anti-Islam supported these new Islamic radicals because they killed Muslims who were perceived as not supporting them.

Gaiya, another convert from Islam, also spoke of the influence of Wahhabism through the late Sheikh Abubakar Gumi and his Izala followers. Whereas Ahmadu Bello wished for a gradual Islamisation of Northern Nigeria with non-Muslims supportive of his regime, Gumi and his followers "wanted to transform society ridding it of all secular ideas introduced through colonialism and non-Muslim groups." To

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687 Ari (24/04/2006), Asake (12/05/2006), Awan (10/04/2006), Baba (30/04/2006), Bature (15/04/2006), Dadang (22/12/2005), Gabis (23/01/2006), Hussaini (20/07/2006), Ityavyr (09/05/2007), Iya (11/04/2006), Jacob (06/02/2007), Joseph (06/02/2007), Kafang (11/04/2006), Kogo (21/07/2006), Korosi (14/07/2006), Motty (14/12/2005), Okezie (30/03/2006), Misal (29/12/2005), Musa (02/05/2006), Para-Mallam (01/03/2007), Shaba (26/04/2007), Tangbuiin (19/04/2007), Yawus (29/05/2006). cf. Ibrahim, 1991 discusses the theory that hidden figures manipulate the crises for their own political ends. News reports concerning riots in Jos in November 2009 following local government elections indicate political issues were a major factor behind this outbreak.
688 Kunhiyop (31/01/2006).
689 Gaiya (12/02/2007).
Gumi, Bello was “but a fellow-traveller of the colonialists allowing them to manipulate Shari’ah law to do what they wanted.”

Respondents allege that both groups have fostered an anti-Western attitude among Muslims, which combined with their traditional derogatory attitudes to non-Hausas, and their fear of losing power, a fear heightened by Christianity’s growth, has resulted in aggressive rejection of anything contrary to their religious and political views. Respondents believe this to be doubly alarming when coupled with repeated Muslim demands for the imposition of Shari’ah law, whether through Federal Shari’ah courts, or more recently, the adoption of Shari’ah criminal law in a number of northern states. They believe, therefore, that it takes little excuse for violence to erupt in such a charged atmosphere. Indeed some believe that Muslim aggression is part of an overall conspiracy to seize power. They reason that violence and the use of the occult has characterised Islam from its earliest days. Thus, there is a spiritual battle being fought that is far more significant than any physical struggle.

While ethnic divisions may not necessarily be the most important factors in respondents’ perceptions of the causes of violence, ethnic identity can be crucial in the actual conflict. Just as most Hausas are defined by their Islamic faith, so too Christianity is often the defining religion for most non-Hausa. The upshot can be that one’s ethnic group is where one finds security in times of trouble. As Kunhiyop said, “Security is not in religion but in ethnic identity: hence tribal meetings on Sundays are more important than church services.” Perhaps this is because, as Joseph argues, the church has largely failed to articulate a Biblical response to the violence: that violence and demonization is due to a failure of leadership.

Respondents strongly rejected the idea that Christians had ever started religious violence. However, self-defence is perfectly acceptable: as many Nigerian Christians say, “There are no more cheeks left to turn.” Baba felt the situation had moved

692 Audu (10/04/2006), Dadang (22/12/2005), Ityavyr (09/05/2007), Motty (14/12/2005).
693 Ari (24/04/2006), Baba (30/04/2006), Jacob (03/05/2006), Maigadi (29/12/2005), Musa (02/05/2006), Para-Mallam (01/03/2007).
694 Cf. Jacob (03/05/2006), Kogo (21/07/2006).
697 Joseph (06/02/2007).
beyond Christian persecution to religious war. Most did not accept that Christian aggressive behaviour might have provoked Muslims to violence. However, some felt the seemingly Pentecostal practice of aggressively responding to Muslim aggression was leading some Christians to call for pre-emptive action against Muslims. Misal, speaking of the Christian desire for revenge said, “We pray that Muslims will be saved, but deep down there is antagonism. For example, when Muslims were killed in the Shendam area we thought in our hearts that it served them right, even though verbally we said, “Let us pray for them.” All agreed that relations with Muslims had suffered considerably. Whereas once there had been friendly relationships between the two communities, now, especially in Northern Nigeria, there is a serious lack of trust. Forgiveness is extremely difficult. Asake said, “We have lost trust for one another. Before we ate together, went to school together, but today there is the lack of trust. I would fear if my son brought a Muslim friend home from school.” However, where state governments address problems constructively and fairly tensions die down. Yet, often over the years, it has seemed that those behind the riots have ensured that the authorities turn a blind eye to their activities.

How accurate are these perceptions? When asked for their understanding of the reasons behind the violence some Muslim leaders who were interviewed agreed that political factors play a major role. Sheikh Khalid Aliyu Abubakar said,

The religious class have allowed themselves to become surrogates of the politicians dancing to their tune and even doing their campaign in the religious places. A politician without credential, integrity and honour uses the cheap political campaign by grasping the religious difference in order to undo his opponent. . . Violence is a reaction to certain societal situations, the remote causes of which sometimes may not necessarily appear on the surface. It may be a reaction to dissatisfaction to bad governance and so on.

Muhammad agrees that religious rivalry is coincidental to the causes of the violence: he tends to see its roots also in politics and in economic issues given high levels of

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698 Ari (24/04/2006), Awan (10/04/2006), Baba (30/04/2006), Bature (15/04/2006), Dadang (22/12/2005), DanAmarya (31/01/2006), Kafang (11/04/2006), Misal (29/12/2005), Musa (02/05/2006), Para-Mallam (01/03/2007), Tapkida (08/02/2007).
699 Audu (10/04/2006), Hassan (15/05/2006), Korosi (14/07/2006), Misal (29/12/2005), Nache (24/02/2007). Note Onamusi’s (20/07/2006) rejection of such. Best (27/05/2007), a COCIN leader, argues the radicalisation of Islam has counter-radicalised the Christians in Nigeria.
702 Asake (12/05/2006).
703 Misal (29/12/2005).
704 Iya (11/04/2006), Tapkida (08/02/2007).
705 Para-Mallam (01/03/2007).
706 Abubakar (09/05/2006).
unemployment among the Muslim youth.\textsuperscript{707} Musa attributes the violence to political and ethnic factors: fear of domination by the other, fear of loss of control of resources, the ongoing quarrel between Plateau indigenes and the Hausa settlers.\textsuperscript{708}

Nevertheless, how influential are Muslim fundamentalists – the root troublemakers, according to some Christians? Muhammad spoke of the Muslim Brotherhood originally drawing their inspiration from Egyptian-based Sunni Muslim radicals like Sayyid Qutb, but have shifted their theological allegiances to the Shiite views from Iran. He said,

The Shiites’ major concern is to transform Nigeria into an Islamic state, while the Izala are more concerned with eradicating innovations within the Muslim community. Izala’s attitude towards non-Muslims is a little bit harsh, and to my own idea they have contributed to the crisis in Jos unlike the Sufi’s attitude. The Shiite attitude, even though not very harsh, looks at non-Muslims as a group they do not want to have to do with, or as unimportant.\textsuperscript{709}

Musa suggests that the Izala are the second largest Muslim group, with 40\% of Jos Muslims adhering to their views and 50\% of Kano Muslims. His employers, the Ja’amatu Nasril Islam (JNI), are meant to screen and monitor all foreign Muslim scholars who are invited to lecture in the country. However, some manage to enter by other means, and propagate their views. It was impossible to keep track of everyone.

Whereas Christians tend to view Muslims as trouble makers, these scholars held up a mirror to the Christians. They didn’t always distinguish between different groups of missionaries, and appreciated that Western missionaries did not always understand the political undertones to events. However, Sheikh Khalid could not help but wonder if the missionaries were, somehow still steering Nigerian Christian responses. “When you look at one of the most serious crises that bedevils Northern Nigeria: Christians see it as the introduction of Shari’ah. The ECWA angle of Christianity is more at war with it than other Christians."\textsuperscript{710} Musa felt comfortable with ECWA, the Baptists and the Catholic church. But he described COCIN as follows: “I do not feel comfortable with COCIN, the most worrisome denomination within Christianity.” He accused COCIN of preaching violence, although he had arranged some cooperation with COCIN people in regards to the Aids crisis. ECWA he thought of as different.

\textsuperscript{707} Muhammad (17/05/2006).
\textsuperscript{708} Musa (24/07/2006).
\textsuperscript{709} Muhammad (17/05/2006).
\textsuperscript{710} Abubakar (09/05/2006).
Before the Jos crisis ECWA was different from other denominations. It was non-discriminatory in the hospitals and schools established by ECWA missionaries. Islam became more friendly with ECWA from the beginning. It was only ECWA that applied for land and it was approved by Muslims. It is the leading denomination within Christendom that has a place in the Muslim community.\textsuperscript{711}

Muhammad is a bit more critical accusing the Plateau State Christians of both ECWA and COCIN of using the churches to fight Muslims. “If you ask Muslims in Jos who are the trouble makers among the churches, they will say ECWA and COCIN.”\textsuperscript{712} He pointed out that ECWA’s Evangel Hospital was, albeit with no evidence that he could find, accused by the Izala of trying to kill Muslims and of storing weapons during the 2001 Jos crisis. The Catholic church, however, was perceived as being above the quarrels between Plateau indigenes and the Muslim community. Like Christians he regretted the distrust and mutual suspicion: he had grown up with Christians and used to have friends among them. He was not the only one to express such views.

\textbf{5.4 Changing attitudes}

ECWA interviewees were unanimous in accepting that, as a result of the violence, attitudes had changed towards Muslims. Suspicion and distrust had grown as had Christians’ willingness to assert their civil and political rights. Some highlighted Christian hatred of Muslims, viewing the conflict as religious war. An equal number, however, spoke of love and forgiveness, to which were added comments by others of finding solutions through dialogue and the creation of peace committees.

ECWA DCC leaders were even stronger in their descriptions of changing attitudes using adjectives like distrust, fear, hatred, living separately, retaliation, and fighting for political rights. Also subscribing to these opinions were ECWA laity: segregation, distrust, retaliation being the chief words used. Increasingly people live separate lives, perhaps mingling at work, but retreating to separate neighbourhoods at night.\textsuperscript{713} Apart from some with Muslim relatives, few people have friends across the religious barriers: respondents and others related a number of instances of Muslims violently betraying long-established friendships.\textsuperscript{714} Yet, surprisingly among the laity some also spoke of living in peace, of prayer, of the convicting work of the Holy Spirit and of needing to build relationships with Muslims.

\textsuperscript{711} Musa (2407/2006).
\textsuperscript{712} Muhammad (17/05/2006).
\textsuperscript{713} Ityavyr (09/05/2007), Maigadi (29/12/2005), Tangbuin (19/04/2007).
\textsuperscript{714} Garba (04/06/2006), Para-Mallam (01/03/2007).
Distrust was the chief characteristic mentioned by other Christian leaders, with only a few suggesting ways forward like learning to handle disputes better, or the Christian struggle between the need for justice on the one hand, and on the other Christian teaching about loving your enemy. SIM missionaries who commented noted the breakdown in social relations between Muslims and Christians, the distrust, the deep weariness with all of the conflict, the increasing Christian antagonism towards Muslims as well as Christian willingness to defend themselves. Yet in the middle of all of this Muslims were becoming Christians, and some Christians, despite the cost, were prepared to become missionaries to the Muslims.

Sometimes it is what is not said, or attracts only a minority response, is just as telling as what is said. Only four ECWA interviewees spoke of evangelism, for example. Yet, as noticed above, this was the distinctive heritage left to ECWA by SIM. There had even been considerable church growth in ECWA especially in the far North among the Hausa. Siman Ibrahim, a former ECWA General Secretary, recalled how, at the first national gathering of Local Overseers, he had put to them the needs of the Maguzawa people. As a result, pastors were drafted from all over the church to spend up to a year in evangelism and church planting resulting in hundreds of conversions and many churches being established. He felt the same methods could be used among Muslims, but he doubted that anyone was prepared to do so. Church leaders, he felt, had become complacent and seemed to be more interested in acquiring academic qualifications.

This reluctance to commit to evangelising Muslims reflects the years of religious conflict across northern and central Nigeria coupled. Dadang said,

The majority of Christians no longer take evangelism seriously at all. They don’t care at all about reaching Muslims with the gospel. In the past, the primary responsibility was to reach Muslims: there is no live example from the Christians, as Christians tend to live like worldly people.

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715 DanAmarya (31/01/2006), Baba (30/04/2006), Gaiya (12/02/2007), Kogo (21/07/2006), Para-Mallam (01/03/2007).
716 The Maguzawa are Hausa people who never fully converted from traditional religions to Islam. Many have now become Christians.
717 Hassan (15/05/2006), Ibrahim (19/04/2006).
719 Dadang (22/12/2005).
Initial responses to Muslim anti-Christian pogroms were to evangelise even more. Ibrahim said, “Paul Gindiri was my friend and was an apostle to Islam.”  

In the 1980s when Muslims began to burn churches, our initial reaction was to confront them with evangelism.”  

Ibrahim went on to say that now Christians do not pray for Muslims anymore. It is extremely difficult to conduct any form of open discussion of the Qur’an and the Bible or appeal to Muslims as such will invite violence. While some Pentecostal groups have a vision for evangelising Muslims, increasingly respondents suggested the average individual Christian sees Muslims as enemies rather than needing salvation. Korosi said, “Some Christians will say, ‘Leave them alone and let them go to Hell!” SIM’s approach up to 2009 involved promoting Christian training in befriending and witnessing to Muslims. Some felt, however, that while many sought the training, it is hard to measure progress. Training is one thing; practical action is another.

The violence, however, has not been the only reason for the decline in evangelistic interest. Many churches have been preoccupied with building bigger and fancier church buildings, leaving little money or energy to be used in evangelism and missions. The church has become much more institutionalised. Maigadi said, ECWA has changed in terms of its vision. Before 1980 ECWA was driven by mission: reaching out to non-believers. There has been a gradual shifting from that vision. The reason is that ECWA has become an institutionalised church . . . and has established structures that are taking away her attention to the main vision.

Some believe there is an attitude that evangelism is the prerogative of EMS. However, those specialising in Muslim evangelism felt that EMS missionaries lacked sufficient training. The two weeks training they spent was not long enough. Even when trained they were just as likely to be posted to a traditionalist area as to a Muslim one. Missionaries with EMS were conscious of their lack of training, and one

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720 Until his death Gindiri, a lay evangelist and businessman, led NLFA. His family remain heavily involved with it.
722 Okezie (30/03/2006).
723 Hussaini (20/07/2006).
724 Atiyaye (15/05/2007).
725 Korosi (14/07/2006).
726 Hussaini (20/07/2006). Jessurun (21/07/2006) noted the apathy towards training in Muslim evangelism in the main English-speaking ECWA church in Kano, a sign of the growing antipathy between ethnic minorities and the Muslim Hausa. SIM Nigeria more recently has been forced by dwindling finances to close down this training ministry.
727 Itayvyr (09/05/2007). Bill Foute noted that for “a church preoccupied with the prosperity gospel and building cathedrals, suffering is anathema. Martyrdom doesn’t fit their theology.” (31/05/2006).
729 Ari (24/04/2006).
researcher found them too scared to evangelise Muslims, especially the newer better-educated fundamentalist Wahhabi-influenced Muslims. Indeed, during 2004 three EMS missionaries were reported to have converted to Islam.  

As a result, these specialists, all members of ECWA, were developing different approaches to Muslim evangelism, sourcing their funding separately from ECWA, and posting their own people, but working within the context of ECWA. One approach involved training and placing evangelists in different places around Kano, and bringing those evangelists into Kano on a regular basis for further training. A different approach involved posting missionaries who as far as possible would adapt to the Islamic culture, and would build contacts with Muslim leaders in the hope that as these men converted they would also bring with them their followers. At the time of the interview, this seemed to be moderately successful although this organisation had to be extremely security conscious. An approach already mentioned involved 24-hour prayer chains supporting a low-key radio programme. Responses to a mobile phone number have been quite encouraging. Several others spoke of different ways that Christians built bridges through culturally relevant forms of Christian witness, personal contacts, and showing Christian love. Despite that, when Muslims did convert it was but the start of a long process of teaching and training that Muslim converts needed to go through. To them, Islam operated very much like a cult whose former adherents need to be de-programmed.

It is also noticeable from the responses above that relatively few people spoke of Christian love, of forgiving their enemies, or of building relationships. Eight responses among the ECWA interviewees mentioned love and forgiveness, and a further six mentioned creating peace committees and dialogue. ECWA DCC leaders failed to mention any of these concepts, while only seven responses spoke of living in peace, prayer, and building relationships. These concepts, which are central to the Scriptures, and to the Christian life, appear to have shrunk to being merely minority interests. Is ECWA, therefore, somewhat hypocritical in its approach to Christian-Muslim relations?

Opinion was divided among the ECWA interviewees. Some felt it was, expressing frustration with the church’s internal politicking or inconsistent lifestyles. Others were

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730 Bakfwash, Y.B., pp.24 – 31; Shaba (26/04/2007).
731 Atiyaye (15/05/2007).
732 Kogo (21/07/2006), Onamusi (20/07/2006).
more charitable allowing for mistakes but not accepting that anyone was being deliberately Machiavellian. Among ECWA DCC leaders the largest response was that hypocrisy was not surprising given the repeated waves of violence. A further seven responses did not even give that excuse, defining ECWA as hypocritical. ECWA laity are more varied in their responses. The biggest single category accepts there was some hypocrisy, often on both sides and seen to be inevitable. Some felt that the church was not hypocritical with leaders doing their best but being human, prone to fail. A couple suggested that leaders may be doing their best, but that doesn’t mean their followers accept their lead. Some stressed spiritual perspectives: loving enemies and that only God knows peoples’ hearts. One got the sense that other Christian leaders were doing their best to be very diplomatic in their responses to this question! Many gave ambiguous answers recognising the varying effect of different contexts; others spoke of both sincerity and hypocrisy being contained within the church.

6. Summary and Conclusion

This chapter has sought to answer the question, “In what ways has ECWA’s theological and political attitudes developed and changed over the years?” In answering this question a number of topics have been addressed.

Beginning in the 1960s, just as SIM was running down its direct involvement with evangelism, SIM helped to develop a wider inter-denominational movement called the New Life for All. As this movement spread across the country it mobilised and trained Nigerian Christians to take the Gospel to their non-Christian friends, relatives and neighbours. Some even went further getting involved in evangelistic teams that usually crossed ethnic boundaries seeking converts among ethnic groups where the Gospel had not yet penetrated. It was a jolt in the arm for Christianity in Nigeria, and ECWA benefited from this more than most as this was the means of substantial growth in ECWA membership and numbers of churches.

This evangelistic heritage was a prominent feature of early ECWA constitutions. Perhaps placed there by SIM design in case SIM was expelled from the country after independence, for a number of years an integral part of ECWA’s Statement of Faith was the missionary imperative. Even when replaced it was a characteristic that was rarely lost sight of. Other Christians will testify that ECWA has consistently been known in the past for its evangelistic emphasis.
However, as ECWA grew two other characteristics grew to greater prominence. The first of these was an emphasis on organisational development. Right from the days of the SIM Church constitution, proper order and structure has been a major feature of ECWA. Other churches, indeed, profess to have learned a lot from ECWA’s emphasis on organisation and financial accountability. However, organisational development, internal politicking, and bureaucracy has become the overwhelming characteristic of ECWA. Some of this has been needed. Successful evangelism results in massive church growth. This, in turn, brings with it major organisational challenges. How are thousands of new converts to be effectively taught, and formed into new churches? How are such churches to be organised and cared for? How are ministers to be trained, and assigned to these churches? However, when organisational development becomes the chief characteristic of a church, even by its own members and leaders’ estimation, then one must call this emphasis into question. More time has been spent, for example, catering to demands for the creation of new DCC’s, than has been spent on evangelism or on the various theological challenges facing the church.

Thus, when SIM finally handed over control of its ministries in Nigeria in 1976, a church had been established capable of taking responsibility for a wide variety of work. It was a large and growing denomination with a wide range of congregations scattered across Nigeria. It was also responsible for extensive medical work including three general hospitals, a specialist eye hospital, a pharmacy, and a large number of clinics. There was a range of secular and theological education; schools scattered across the country, and a hierarchy of theological education from the vernacular Bible Schools to seminary level education. A successful literature arm running the largest chain of Christian bookshops in Africa supported these, as well as publishing *Today’s Challenge*, then Nigeria’s most widely read Christian magazine. Soon to develop was the Rural Development work comprising a network of extension officers, a central feed mill and chicken hatchery, and veterinary services. Simply finding the personnel to run these institutions takes time and effort. Little wonder ECWA is not known for its theological reflection. Its best leaders are thrust into major management positions that leave them little or no time for study or writing. Indeed these are the paths to success and promotion, not academic learning.

Yet it is at the theological level that the most profound challenges have yet to be faced. The major Christian theological change that has taken place in Nigeria during
this period has been the unstoppable rise of Pentecostalism. Yet aside from some limited responses to the pressure of those attracted by the lively worship, the promise of answers for their social and economic needs and the miraculous, ECWA has failed to engage with Pentecostalism. Two of its leading theologians may be about to do so, but to date, no one has engaged with Pentecostal teaching on traditional worldviews, on political involvement or on Islam. Theologically speaking ECWA seems to have been left behind: not, I might hasten to add, in that the theology it teaches is wrong, or its Biblical roots should be doubted. Rather, ECWA has failed to take its understanding of the Scriptures and seek to explain its perspective on what others are saying. The race has started and ECWA is just approaching the first hurdle, while far away the Pentecostals are rounding the bend for the home straight.

The same could also be said about ECWA’s engagement with Islam. It simply hasn’t happened. Yet this is one of the most important issues facing the church. With good reason its members are weary of the incessant violence; the constant fear of the Muslim almajirai. They distrust Muslims to the extent that some hate them. Segregation is increasingly common across towns and cities. Few talk of love and forgiveness, let alone of building bridges or evangelism: the latter has become very much a minority interest. Many grieve the loss of loved ones, of jobs, homes, possessions, and opportunities. Politicians are blamed for exploiting the situation, and ethnic groups are relied on for security: the church cannot or will not provide it.

For the church has failed to articulate an adequate theology of suffering, or worked out how Christians should respond to these regular bouts of violence. Young people look for revenge based on their doctrine of “no third slap”. No one accepts that Christians may have inflamed Muslim opinions through intemperate use of language, through the use of rumour and suspicion, or through the denial of political and human rights. Instead ECWA, in common with some other churches, seems caught in a constant cycle of responding to violence, picking up the pieces, rebuilding its churches, and calling, often pointlessly, for state or federal governments to provide justice. How can ECWA contribute to a solution of the Christian-Muslims divide in Nigeria?
Chapter Seven

Complexity of Views

“ECWA has no policy on Islam,” said Dr Salihu Garba. An ECWA Trustee and convert from Islam, he was speaking at the ECWA/SIM Joint Committee in a discussion on evangelising Muslims. He felt this lack of policy was surprising given ECWA’s geographic context. SIM did not escape his criticisms either, as he believed its ethnically focused evangelism policy would be more effective if it incorporated these groups into an Islamic-focused evangelism policy. Given the fifty million people in Nigeria’s Islamic North, Garba called for a specific, targeted evangelistic focus on the Muslim community.

Garba over-simplified what actually was happening. As ECWA’s General Secretary, Rev Mipo Dadang pointed out ECWA had a long history of involvement in Islamic evangelism, and a number of organisations within the ambit of ECWA were involved in different forms of evangelism among Muslims. Yet, as this author identified to the meeting, while such was taking place, there also seemed to be a lack of vision and co-ordination.

In reality, there are a range of attitudes and actions towards Islam within ECWA. Views differ according to geographical location, ethnic origin, historical background theological beliefs, and political influences.

1. Policy Background

Devising a policy, however, necessitates an agreed and hopefully accurate understanding of the problem. This is not always possible. Ogbu Kalu sets out what he identifies to be the five main positions on the Christian-Muslim conflict in Nigeria. Kalu makes the point that none of these categories are necessarily exclusive.

1.1. Conflict Model

This model suggests that religion is itself the cause of instability. Passions evoked by adherence to one or another religion lead to the exclusion of others who do not share

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734 Tait, P., ECWA/SIM Joint Committee Minutes, 30th August 2006.
this belief. The certainties of belonging to a faith can lead to identifying those who do not belong as “other”, to discriminating against them, or worse. Some religious teaching encourages the use of force to sustain the religion. Moreover, violence that seems to be religiously motivated can create an atmosphere in which religious violence becomes acceptable.

Kalu identifies a couple of other issues, which can exacerbate the above religious factors. To begin with, there is the historical burden of territorial and ethnic divides. Often these can be motivating issues in modern political competition, but just as quickly can become hindrances in the search for solutions. Secondly, religion can become an identifier, a prominent feature of the Hausa-Fulani brand of Islam, for example, which is not the case among the Yoruba, about 50% of whom are Muslim.

Proponents of this view, would argue, therefore, that to understand the conflict one must examine the systemic propensities towards violence inherent in the religions concerned, rather than treat each violent outburst in isolation. However, a lot of modern violence is directed more towards different categories of people, not so much because of which religion they follow. Nonreligious ideologies can also produce violence. The violent acts themselves can almost be a religious experience giving a sense of purification and restoration in the face of corruption and desecration, or identifying and blaming scapegoats and exacting revenge on these people for attacks elsewhere e.g. the Danish cartoon riots. Yet the motivation for this violence may not necessarily be religious. Other reasons for violence are also proposed including the militarization of society and associated lack of democratic outlets, economic breakdown, or the rise of politically sponsored violent cults often linked to occultic practices. Yet still, Kalu believes, there is a role for religion. “Many argue that, in spite of the political and ethnic dimensions in religious violence, the specifically religious dimension should not be ignored precisely because religion looms so large at our ideological core, buried deep within the human psyche.”

1.2. Instrumentalist/Manipulation Model
This regards class as the underlying catalyst of conflict. Its proponents, drawn from socialists, Western-educated younger Muslim leaders, or secular commentators, believe that it is competition and struggle among the elite that compels the manipulation of religion.

The elite who pose as devotees and defenders of Islam are not what they pretend to be; they are driven by more mundane interests such as power embedded in the political arrangements, the strains in operating a federal structure, and the sharing of resources in a constitutional arrangement that allocates a great deal of authority to the center. Meanwhile the economic collapse, the long period of military rule (that vitiated the federal structure by imposing the military unitary command), legitimacy crises, and the scourge of poverty increased the level of competition in the public space.\textsuperscript{737}

The Muslim concept of power aspires to serve and preserve religion, denying the Christian argument for the separation of powers and the two swords/two kingdoms doctrine. However, the other side of this is that the state can use religion to gain legitimacy. Muslim scholars, as noted above when discussing Shari’ah, have tried to steer a middle course wary of allowing the state to control religion. However, some argue that the Muslim elite are already using the Nigerian Islamic religious leaders to whip up the masses, especially the unemployed and many unemployable youth, against the infidels and their perceived slights.

The solution proposed by those suggesting the instrumentalist/manipulation model is a combination of adequate economic resources, good governance, and fair distribution of wealth. Such would ensure that everyone lives happily together. Kalu notes a point to their argument, but points to religious riots among university students in 1987 that do not fit this argument. Nor, he believes, does the argument fit at least ten ethno-religious conflicts that occurred in northern Nigeria between 1980 and 1992, including the Zangon Kataf conflict mentioned later.

### 1.3 The Rainbow Model

This model looks for ways to build relationships between the main religious groups. One of the main ways to do so is to appeal to the shared origins and ethical beliefs of the Abrahamic religions. From these shared beliefs, about such things as peace, love, and the sanctity of human life, it is possible to build a model that encourages peaceful coexistence through respect for each other’s humanity. A notable recent example of this is the approach to Christian leaders by a number of Islamic leaders in the \textit{A Common Word} declaration. This builds on shared commandments concerning the unity of God and the believers’ requirement to love God wholeheartedly to suggest working together towards a peaceful co-existence.\textsuperscript{738} As will be seen below,

\textsuperscript{737} Kalu, O., 2008, pp.235 – 236.

\textsuperscript{738} Ababakar, M.S. \textit{et al}, \textit{A Common Word Between Us and You}, available from \url{http://www.acommonword.com/lib/downloads/CW-Total-Final-v-12g-Eng-9-10-07.pdf} 13th October
there is considerable suspicion among evangelical and fundamentalist Christians towards this approach. Nor is it always accepted among Muslims. Thus, Kalu points out that despite the late M.K.O. Abiola’s use of this kind of approach to build his powerbase for presidential elections in Nigeria, it did not help him overcome entrenched resistance from northern Muslims more suspicious of his Yoruba ethnicity than of his Islamic credentials.

Another approach, advocated, Kalu suggests, by secular-oriented/reformist Muslims, emphasizes the indigenization of religions. Both Christianity and Islam are foreign imports with a lot of associated baggage. They both need indigenization to meet the specific needs of Africans. Thus, Muslim laws developed in Arabia differ prominently from the needs of contemporary Nigeria. A proper understanding of Islam’s historical context might help to create a healthier atmosphere in Nigeria today. Indeed, if Nigerians were left alone, without destabilising foreign interference, especially from the Arab world, then they could solve their religious problems. Thus, Islam has grown rapidly in certain areas due to its greater toleration of traditional customs. On the other hand, others argue that Shari’ah laws restricting alcohol consumption lead to a better society than the Christian toleration of such.

A third approach arising out of indigenization is to stress religious pluralism. Kalu believes the viability of this approach depends on the relevant context. In some contexts, there are possibilities for cooperation and constructive mutual endeavour. In other contexts, growing tensions are replacing harmony. People respond in different ways, with some determined to build bridges, while others are confirmed in their prejudices and suspicions. In a third context, there is open hostility between adherents of the two faiths. The first requirement, therefore, is to identify the context, and develop an appropriate strategy. Growing religions naturally compete, with newer religions jostling for space over against older religions seeking to maintain their dominance. All of this, in Africa, in the context of an authoritarian central government controlling the economy and seeking to maintain its legitimacy over against the alternative visions proposed by the religions. Often the only solution seems to be adherence to state secularity on the understanding that only in this way will minority religious interests be protected.

2007, (DOA 21/03/2010). Six prominent Nigerians who are predominantly Islamic religious establishment figures, led by the Sultan of Sokoto, are among the signatories to this document. None of Nigeria’s more radical Islamic leaders are signatories. Of Christian responses to it that are listed on the website, none come directly from any Nigerian church.
1.4. Competing Fundamentalisms

Some argue that the best model for understanding these conflicts is that of competing fundamentalisms. It is argued that the growth of Pentecostal and radical Islamic groups, which are defined by Gifford and others as fundamentalist, has resulted in increasing conflict.\footnote{Note the mainly theological arguments in Chapter 6 against identifying Pentecostalism with fundamentalism. These do not necessarily preclude clashes developing between two groups both advocating conservative, expansionary, and non-dialogical religious views.} As Pentecostalism has spread, Muslim radicals have reacted ever more violently to the increasing threat. Kalu refers to the riots associated with the 1991 Bonnke evangelistic crusade in Kano as an example of this argument.

Kalu notes the Pentecostal tendency to demonize Islam and their lack of any concept of dialogue let alone actual practice of such and feels this has hindered and harmed conflict transformation. More fundamentally, however, there are two clashing worldviews. On the one hand, there is the Muslim territorialisation, creating “sacred spaces and boundaries against the infidel,”\footnote{Kalu, O., 2008, p.241.} in an effort to preserve their land and people from alien incursions. On the other hand, Pentecostals and others reject the mission-church compromises and see no reason why Muslims should be free to operate in non-Shari’ah states while Christians are restricted in the Shari’ah states. Thus they use the Sabon Gari’s (New Towns) located on the outskirts of ancient Islamic cities like Kano, where southerners and middle belt people tend to live as commercial and ecclesiastical centres, to reach out into the traditionally Islamic territories.

1.5. State Discourse

Growing media competition by both Muslims and Christians has brought the religious conflict into the public space. In particular, this has affected territorial allegiances. As competition surges, violence is easily resorted to.

In the new democratic dispensation, northern, non-Islamic ethnic groups started to assert their autonomy, recover years of battered identity, and reject the politics of cultural domination and exclusion. They adopted Christianity as their cultural signifier and mark of identity, just as their opponents employed Islam. A number of issues became flash points: chieftaincy matters, pilgrimages, equal allocation of time and space in state-owned media, and the share of political offices all caused much debate. The unislamized communities revisited the imposed concept of One North and insisted that Muslim leaders would no longer govern them.\footnote{Kalu, O., 2008, p.242.}
The youth were recruited to serve as the vanguard in the battles that took place, whether on the streets or in the educational institutions. Among them developed the “no third slap” doctrine arguing that the Bible only permits the Christian to turn the cheek once. The Bible’s silence, thereafter, allegedly permits the Christian to avenge himself.

In light of these different approaches, how do ECWA leaders and members understand their context and frame their responses? In Chapter Six ECWA leaders and members tended to blame politicians for causing the conflict. On the face of it, this would imply that the instrumentalist/manipulation model as presented by Kalu is the most credible among ECWA members. Yet, as Kalu himself points out, this model does not always fit what is actually happening on the ground.

Another approach to understanding ECWA views would be to critically examine ECWA publications such as *Today’s Challenge (TC)*, its main magazine during this period, and other archival papers, setting such against the context supplied by various histories. In turn, this gives a context with which to evaluate responses received from interviews and questionnaires. Right through this period *TC* attempts to voice the fears and concerns of Middle Belt Christians. As such, it is not impartial or neutral. It is a voice for those who felt marginalised and oppressed blaming their predicament on a combination of the Islamic elite and their political and military colleagues sometimes referred to as the Kaduna Mafia. Thus, there is no attempt to hold up a mirror to those same Christians asking if their speech, their actions, and their attitudes are exacerbating the situation. It does not ask what Muslims thought, or suggest any form of dialogue. Nor does it propose any other solution beyond repeated calls on the authorities to enforce constitutional law and order. Despite these weaknesses, using *TC* is a valid exercise, for, while various isolated documents and analyses exist, there is no other similar collective body of material reflecting ECWA’s views on the situation.

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742 This originated as an SIM publication called *African Challenge*. Cf. Fuller, W.H., ‘My Pilgrimage in Mission,’ *International Bulletin of Missionary Research*, Vol. 34, No. 1 (Jan 2010), pp.37 – 40, for an account of its early years. In the mid-1970s when ECWA took over ownership, the name was changed to its current title. Initially published monthly, deteriorating finances forced a bi-monthly publication schedule, and even then only when funds were available. It was not possible for the author to access a complete collection of *TC*. The SIM International Archives had copies from 1980 to early 1993. Sabastine Abu, the current editor, found some 1996 and 1997 copies. Publication was suspended in 1999. It recommenced monthly publication in January 2006. While sufficient editions are available to examine certain crucial outbreaks of violence some key events are missing, hence the reliance on other sources.

2. The Case for Self-Defence.

There is a long tradition of resisting Islamic pressure in Nigeria. As already noted, in pre-colonial days minority ethnic groups fought to maintain their independence from the Sokoto Caliphate through a combination of military resistance and flight into inaccessible territory. Later the mission societies, jointly and independently, resisted pro-Islamic colonial biases until the colonial authorities opened up the Islamic areas of Northern Nigeria to missionary work. In the build-up to independence, Nigerian Christians took on this policy of resistance, gradually getting involved on an ecumenical basis in the political struggles, whether it was for a Middle Belt State, or for the incorporation of guarantees of civil and religious rights into the Constitution. Attention shifted during the 1960s to the political struggles culminating in the Civil War. The basis, however, for further resistance to Islamisation was already being laid in the impact of the NLFA and later the Pentecostal movement, both of which saw large numbers of people becoming Christians, simultaneously creating Christian militants who were quite prepared to stand firm for their beliefs.

2.1 Trust in God . . .

Trusting God summarizes TC’s attitude towards violence and problems in the early 1980s. From its foundation, ECWA leaders had been concerned about religious discrimination and violence. They had used the political rights open to them to protest such, but in essence trusted God to solve the problems, concentrating instead on evangelism and conversion. Hitherto ECWA and SIM had been known for their evangelistic outreach, which had not attracted the kind of violent attacks that were beginning to be experienced. True there was localised opposition that might be violent towards individual converts from Islam, but generally, there were peaceful relations. Thus in December 1982 DanBauchi, a Muslim convert, wrote of the superstitious practices he learned as a Muslim almajirai (student). After a pilgrimage to Mecca, he began studying the Qur’an’s teaching on Christ’s birth, death and resurrection. This persuaded him to become a Christian. He had suffered for doing so, but there was no talk of general persecution.\(^{744}\)

However, the idea of trusting God, and protesting against discrimination and violence was to come under increasing strain. To begin with, the scale and extent of the

violence was already unlike anything the church had experienced before. Nor did the church propose any constructive solution. Prayer and protest seemed the limit of their imagination. In Chapter Two we have already noted Sanneh’s comment about “Christians wheeling and dealing on a stage Muslims have constructed for their own purpose”\textsuperscript{745}. Thus in the first of two articles in TC’s March-April 1983 edition, Christians demanded equal treatment with Muslims including subsidised religious pilgrimages. The article, however, suggested that in doing so Christians were conforming to an Islamic conception of the state and of social status.\textsuperscript{746} The second article discussed the October 1982 anti-Christian riots in Kano and Kaduna.\textsuperscript{747} The article clearly distinguishes between the Maitatsine riots and these, alleging that these riots exploited the mayhem created by the Maitatsine riots to achieve their own purposes. A number of churches and other private property were destroyed in Kano, while in Kaduna Muslims were provocatively constructing mosques, Islamic schools and centres, complete with powerful public address systems adjacent to long-established churches. It is not immediately clear what lay behind these riots. On the one hand, the article speaks of ‘jihadists’ and ‘Muslim fanatics,’ as well as Islamic conspiracies to cause trouble for churches. On the other hand, it blames the authorities for creating an anti-Christian space in which these events could take place. Thus, in Kano, CAN challenged the State government concerning: nationalisation of church schools and associated refusal to employ Christian Religious Knowledge teachers; anti-Christian bias in the media with the refusal to allow Christian broadcasts; and the refusal or revocation of church Certificates of Occupancy (C of O’s).\textsuperscript{748} On both the international stage and within Nigeria’s universities the article alleges an anti-Christian conspiracy.

Abikoye, however, continues to encourage Christians to be faithful to the old methods of trusting God and maintaining their guard. He reminds them,

\textldots while the Bible enjoins us to repay evil with good and leave vengeance to God (Romans 12:17 – 20), it does not forbid us to assert our civil rights as enshrined in the nation’s constitution. (See Acts 16:37 – 39; 22:25 – 29; 25: 8 – 12). \ldots After all is said and done, may we lift up our eyes “to the hills \ldots our help comes from the LORD who made heaven and earth” (Psalm 121:1, 2). If we put our ways right with the LORD, and are sincere in our prayers and fasting unto Him, we can trust Him to change the order of the day. \ldots And while we pray, let us be led along by

\textsuperscript{745} Sanneh, 1997, p.218.  
\textsuperscript{748} The government owns Nigerian land. Farmers access agricultural land via traditional land-holding rights. C of O’s are a form of long-term lease by which organisations and individuals can obtain, and develop land. They are used for commercial, as opposed to subsistence agriculture, industry, commerce, religious organisations, and private dwellings.
faith, and not by fear. For our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ is true to His promises: “... I will build my Church, and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it.” (Matthew 16:18).\textsuperscript{749}

Despite this, early in 1984 just after the General Buhari-led coup d'état, Abikoye complained about some of ex-President Shagari’s pro-Islamic decisions. Shagari, he alleged, was secretly trying to advance Islam’s cause while deceiving Christians. Abikoye hoped the new military regime would be different. “For, in the absence of religious freedom and tolerance, all that we hold dear as a nation will be short-lived.”\textsuperscript{750}

By the end of 1984, churches linked to NLFA protested the military government’s handling of Muslim violence through restricting open-air preaching.\textsuperscript{751} Why restrict Christian open-air preaching because of Muslim-inspired violence? This was a sore point as Muslims regularly overflowed mosques praying, without police harassment, in large numbers on streets surrounding mosques every Friday, while the police harassed Christians whenever they held open-air services. The churches argued that Christians responded patiently, despite continual Muslim provocation, repeated discrimination, and denial of their civil and political rights by Muslim-dominated authorities. What was needed was government action to ensure that the Muslim perpetrators of the violence are suitably punished. Meanwhile, in foreign affairs, Christians complained of far too much weight being given to Arab opinions and interests rather than to Nigeria’s long-term interests and the secular nature of the Nigerian state.\textsuperscript{752}

The storm broke in 1986, radically changing the thinking of both Christians and Muslims. Nigeria’s secretive entrance into the OIC attracted strong Christian condemnation in 1986.\textsuperscript{753} Given the background of anti-Christian violence, and the government’s perceived pro-Islamic bias Christians were greatly alarmed at this decision. TC called the OIC a “mess of pottage,” accused the military government of

\textsuperscript{749} Abikoye, 1983, p.25.
\textsuperscript{751} Cishak, L. et al., ‘Muslim Atrocities: Christian Leaders Protest. The Position of New Life for All on Government Restriction on Religious Preaching,’ TC, November – December 1984, pp. 8 – 9, 27.
\textsuperscript{753} Oluniyi believes this was the crucial decision, taken by Babangida to improve his flagging popularity, which sundered previously positive Christian-Muslim relations, pp.149 – 152. See also discussion in Chapter 2.
behaving deceitfully and highlighted the OIC’s commitment to Islamisation contrary to Nigeria’s secular constitution. Economic arguments in favour of the OIC were dismissed for ignoring the religious subjugation, which TC believed, membership would inevitably entail.754 Sule and Turaki, raised the very substantial fears of a religious war breaking out over the OIC issue, and degenerating into a tribal war that would result in Nigeria’s disintegration. They urged Christians to stand firm, to pray and fast, confident that God would deliver them, and if not that they should be prepared to follow Christ’s example in dying for truth and human liberty.755

Later that year, however, Byang, after speaking of the necessity of a pluralistic approach to guarantee fair treatment for both Muslims and Christians, gave warning that Christian patience was running thin.

The protagonists of Sharia and work-free Fridays for Muslims must know that Muslims in this nation have got more than enough preferential treatment in almost all aspects of our national life. Non-Muslims who form the teeming majority of the populace of this nation have, with enduring grief, tolerated all the impositions of Islam so far.756

Nevertheless, Abikoye’s belief that Christians should trust God to help them through the problems remained TC’s position while he was editor. No one, however, passively accepted the situation. Stephen Baba accused the government of deceiving the nation, both in the decision to become an OIC member and the later justification of such. Membership of the OIC threatened Christian faith and religious liberty. Christian complacency about the OIC was unrealistic and a sign of spiritual coldness and compromise with sin. However, Baba is not impressed with self-defence arguments. Fighting on its own will not succeed. “The fact is, no matter which way we fight back, whether by arguments, legislations or otherwise, we will be defeated unless we are reconnected to our only source of power, who is Christ.

Jesus." If Christians returned to God, they would see their lives changing, bringing inner peace, and other blessings.

This change will be noticeable in many ways. For instance, it won't be us trying to protect ourselves, but Christ definitely protecting us. Christians won't be under the delusion of fighting for Christ anymore. Christ never needed us to fight for Him. In Matthew 26:51 – 53 Peter tried to fight and defend Christ. But Christ rebuked him and told him God was capable of defending Himself. If we only return to a sincere relationship with Christ, we can then count on His numerous promises to protect us and all our interests.

Yet Islamic pressure continued to grow and in response, TC reiterated its calls on Christians to stand up for their rights. Abikoye encouraged Christians not to allow Muslims to dominate and destroy the education, health, and agricultural sectors. Ambassador Jolly Tanko Yusuf, a prominent Christian politician and diplomat, attributed the rise in anti-Christian discrimination to the unrestrained ambition of those who thought they were born to rule. He called on Christians to stand up for their beliefs and their religious and political liberties, not allowing Arab influences to impose their views on an independent Nigeria.

The reasoning in most of the articles cited so far has implied an instrumentalist/manipulation model. If only there was good government, they imply, these problems would be no more. What is not explained is why those already in authority would need to indulge in such manipulation. A broader analysis seems to be required which, at the very least, includes the instrumentalist/manipulation model as well as the conflict and the state discourse models. Muslims, convinced of their faith, and with a history in certain parts of Islam, of using violence to extend and maintain both faith and territory are coming face to face with ethnic minorities no longer willing to accept Muslim rule and using Christianity as their identification. Muslim government leaders, often notorious for seeking their personal gain over against the welfare of the country, would be in a weak position to resist pressure from some of their co-religionists bent on preserving and extending their faith and their territory. Simultaneously, Christian-dominated ethnic minorities were intent on

761 Not that the Christian officials in government were that much better. Just that often there were more Muslims in government positions, and that Muslims tended to occupy most of the important jobs during this period.
throwing off what they regarded as oppressive Hausa-Fulani i.e. Muslim rule. None of this is reflected in the TC articles. Apart from a reference to pluralism in the context of the Shari'ah debate, the only focus is on the need for good government. There is no further enquiry as to why the violence was occurring. One gets the impression that church leaders are boxed into one approach, and need to stand back and take a wider view.

2.2 . . . and keep your powder dry.
From March 1987, the Christian response to violence perceptibly changed. Calm, prayer and fasting, the policies of the early 1980s, gave way to the Mosaic principle of an eye for an eye. Christians were no longer prepared to accept peacefully whatever fate Muslim rioters had for them, but began to defend themselves and their property. As a subtext to these violent bouts, there is the continual pro-Islamic pressure right through the 1980s in such areas as civil rights, territorial claims, education, resource allocation, pilgrimages, and foreign policy.\footnote{Falola, T., 1998, pp. 163 – 174.}

What follows is consideration of a number of these violent outbursts. It is impossible to consider all of these riots individually, although an attempt is made to list as many as possible in Appendix Two. The choice of which conflicts to discuss depended on a combination of which riots seem to this author to have been significant, and the availability of relevant ECWA documents to critique. A different author and differing documents may well produce a different selection of conflicts to examine.

2.2.1 Kafanchan Riots
The March 1987 riots that started in Kafanchan and spread across Kaduna and Kano States marked the shift from quarrelling about discrimination and legal niceties to the ethno-religious turbulence that would repeatedly criss-cross the country. Reflecting on them, TC moved from a pacifist response to violence to an unrestrained apologia for the Christian case and their demand for justice in the face of undeserved attacks.\footnote{Byang, D., ‘The Ball in Government’s Court,’ TC, No. 3, 1987 a, p. 15.} This coincided with Byang assuming the editorship, a position he held until the end of 1990.\footnote{By 2005 Byang was the pastor of his own Pentecostal church, the Shekinah Global Gospel Ministries Inc. and editor-in-chief of its magazine, entitled Blunt Truth. The magazine’s format and preoccupation with Islamic threats is very similar to that of Today’s Challenge when Byang edited it.} Interestingly, TC increasingly spoke on behalf of the Christian population as a whole and not specifically by or on behalf of ECWA. Ben Kwashi, the current Anglican Archbishop of Jos, and then a rector in Zaria with personal...
experience of Muslim attacks, was more likely to be interviewed in TC than most ECWA church leaders.

At the centre of this particular dispute, however, are events in the College of Education, Kafanchan, during a Christian evangelistic crusade.\textsuperscript{765} This crusade took place a week after the Muslim Students Society held uninterrupted meetings.\textsuperscript{766} The magazine suggested that they were the result of an unprovoked attack by a Muslim student on a Christian evangelist who had converted from Islam. In the course of his sermon one evening, in which he was instructing Christians about the Muslim faith, and not seeking to evangelise Muslims, he quoted from the Qur’an, and a female Muslim student who overheard him, slapped him. This obviously annoyed the Christians, but obeying the instructions of their staff, their actions were restrained. Muslim students, however, disobeying the instructions of Muslim staff, rioted, and, as they were outnumbered on campus, retreated to the town for support.\textsuperscript{767} Then TC glosses over what happened next.

\textit{..... and in an attempt to mobilize sectarian sympathy, set off the tribal/religious time bomb that has been lying dormant in the area. According to reports, the Muslim Hausa/Fulani settlers, though a tiny minority of the population, initiated violent attacks, and arson on church establishments and residential houses. This direct provocation triggered a chain reaction, in which all manners of dangerous weapons were freely used in the resulting squabble between the “natives” and “settlers”.}\textsuperscript{768}

A considerable amount of property was damaged; many were injured and between nine and eleven people died. One gets the impression from TC of a relatively minor fight in Kafanchan that Muslims deliberately escalated into widespread anti-Christian violence elsewhere, especially in Kaduna and Zaria where Christians suffered considerable losses in lives and property. Christians were portrayed as the innocent victims of Muslim persecution.

However, Kantiyok Audu, a retired police superintendent and a District Head in Kafanchan, gives a far more disturbing report of that time.

\textsuperscript{765} A good account of this conflict is available in Falola, T., 1998, pp. 179 – 192.
\textsuperscript{766} It is important to examine what happened in Kafanchan as it is an area where ECWA is very strong. What happened here gives important clues as to ECWA attitudes.
Muslims suffered without food. No one went out to sell food or firewood. Hostility was great with continuous roadblocks to check if Muslims were in vehicles. No one can tell how many were killed. Some were killed and thrown in water or cisterns, or killed in the bush, and no one knew. All the tribes converged on Kafanchan blocking Muslims way out.\textsuperscript{769}

Although radical Muslim students had originally started the Kafanchan riots, the violence in Kafanchan had quickly changed into a predominantly ethnically based attack on the Hausa-Fulani. Now, despite government appeals for calm, a violent Muslim backlash arose against Christians elsewhere in Kaduna State, as well as in Kano State. Falola records 152 churches destroyed across the region, as compared to five mosques. In addition, Christian owned businesses, and housing were burnt. Commerce was paralysed, educational institutions were closed, and as people fled, transport costs rose five times. It could have been worse except that Christians began to mobilize themselves into defensive vigilante groups.\textsuperscript{770} This spread of violence across Kaduna and Kano states, was, despite government denials, clearly religious in origin. Christians were attacked on the basis that they were Christians. Thus, TC highlights the eruption of anti-Christian violence in Zaria\textsuperscript{771} alleging this was a by-product of deliberate planning and careful coordination by Muslims bent on destroying Christianity in the city, and using the opportunity afforded by reaction to the Kafanchan riots to do so. Not for the first time was the Federal Radio Corporation of Nigeria, Kaduna accused of biased and inflammatory coverage! The police and other authorities ignored warnings of impending trouble, and failed to intervene when trouble developed, resulting in "Christians suffered the most damage in Zaria, where the Muslims overpowered and devastated them."\textsuperscript{772}

It was on this latter violence that the ECWA leadership focused its attention. At no time did TC question the actions of the ethnic groups in Kafanchan. Nor do other ECWA documents. The ECWA Headquarters submission to the Donli Panel investigating the whole incident focused on the 14 destroyed ECWA churches in Kaduna and Zaria, and long-standing Christian grievances about the pro-Muslim bias of Federal and State Governments. There was no mention of what actually happened

\textsuperscript{769} Audu, 10\textsuperscript{th} April 2006.

\textsuperscript{770} Falola, T., 1998, p.185.

\textsuperscript{771} Byang, D. & J. Tsado, ‘Muslims in Zaria Threaten to Impose Islamic Praying Grounds on Church Premises,’ TC, No. 3, 1987 a, pp. 12 – 14, 31, highlight some of the Christian complaints about Muslim discrimination in Zaria prior to the riots. Cf. Gamba, Y., The Unfortunate Role Played by Traditional Rulers in Zaria Crisis, unpublished paper, nd. Zaria, who accuses traditional rulers in Zaria of at least shirking in their duties to control and protect strangers in their territories, and possibly of conspiracy in the riots.

\textsuperscript{772} Falola, T., 1998, p.185.
in Kafanchan. A later letter by Yohanna Gamba, a senior ECWA administrator, argues the Kafanchan riots were the result of an unsuccessful Muslim plot. He suggests that in ensuing reaction across the country, Christians did not retaliate but looked to the Lord for deliverance, thus winning the admiration of their enemies, as well as renewing the evangelistic zeal, and political co-operation of the Christian community. He does not mention the widespread fighting in Kafanchan, nor the growing reliance on vigilante groups by certain groups of Christians. Instead, TC argues that the trouble developed out of deliberate attempts to forcibly Islamize Nigeria, blaming inflammatory and deceptive comments by Sheikh Abubakar Gumi and Mallam Ibrahim Sulaiman in which they had called for the establishment of an Islamic state.

An editorial in TC stated:

And while the government is entitled to its coup plot theory, we maintain that this incident [in Kaduna, Zaria etc] is only a clear manifestation of the intolerant disposition of many Islamic leaders towards other segments of the population, and a foretaste of more sinister plots should government lack the will to deal decisively with the situation.

Nor did the resulting investigation lead to any positive conclusions being effectively dismissed by TC as a pro-Muslim whitewash which failed to properly identify the culprits.

Christians undoubtedly were the innocent victims in Kaduna and Zaria, and initially were probably such in Kafanchan. Muslim leaders had uttered provocative statements, and Muslim actions indicate a possible Muslim plot to cause trouble underlying the whole affair. Despite all of this, there are too many unanswered questions concerning the activities of those in Kafanchan who claimed to be Christian. Both TC’s and Audu’s comments indicate an ethnic aspect to this violence, with local ethnic groups, “indigenes” rising up against the Muslim Hausa “settlers”. Neither elaborates. The church’s silence concerning what happened in Kafanchan is strange. Matters seem to have gone well beyond the self-defence decried by

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775 Oluniyi, 2006 sees evidence of a Muslim conspiracy in the way these riots spread.
778 President Babangida spoke of the riots as a civilian attempt at a *coup d’état* seemingly blaming a shadowy group of Northern political, military and economic leaders, known as the Kaduna Mafia, for the outbreak. Ironically, according to Falola, he was probably the prime beneficiary, using the insecurity to consolidate his own position. Cf. Falola, T., *Violence in Nigeria*, 1998, p.189.
Stephen Baba a year earlier. Nor was this the only incident. As will be seen, in later incidents, the same pattern of portraying Christians as solely the innocent victims, ignoring potentially embarrassing questions, would return.

2.2.2 Tafewa Balewa Riots
The Tafewa Balewa riots occurred in April 1991. For some time, there had been tensions in the local government mainly between long-established staff who owed allegiance to traditional rulers based in Bauchi, and the newly elected councillors, with the former trying to cause trouble for the latter. There were also tensions over access to a public abattoir with Muslim butchers denying access to Christian butchers. The spark was lit, however, when a Muslim Fulani refused to pay for some barbecued meat on the grounds it was not halal. Initially the police calmed tensions, but a couple of days later, TC suggests the Muslims started agitating around the Central Mosque. The predominantly Christian Sayawa people, who are in the majority in the area, quickly took up the fight against the Hausa-Fulani. They had long sought autonomy from the prevailing Hausa-Fulani feeling that, despite their education and hard work they were oppressed, and denied work because they were not Hausa-Fulani Muslims.

The police decision to transport Muslim corpses in open pickups from Tafewa Balewa to Bauchi incited a lot of tension. Quickly, well-organised Muslim rioters began to attack indigenous and non-indigenous Christians. From Bauchi, violence spread across the state with rioters only sparing those who could repeat the Kalman shahada (Islamic Declaration of Faith). Falola suggests that twenty churches in Bauchi were destroyed, the only one spared being the ECWA church close to the army barracks. When the rioters did try to attack it, the army killed them. As usual, the security forces’ response was extremely slow; Nigerian police have a poor reputation for riot control. All the while TC alleges the state’s Muslim military governor was misleading his superiors thus preventing the early deployment of troops. The governor, police commissioner and the Emir of Bauchi were responsible, according to CAN, for the high level of casualties. Falola estimates from mortuary reports 500

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people killed, often quite brutally, with thousands injured and hundreds hospitalised. 783

In 1995, the trouble returned. For a while, a Christian military governor had administered Bauchi State. He had sought to include the Sayawa by appointing one of their members to be a commissioner in the state government. However, TC alleges that Muslims successfully conspired to remove this governor replacing him with a Muslim. The new governor, a Muslim, promptly replaced the Christian with a fellow Muslim. Sayawa civil servants were taxed to provide funds for a reception party for this new commissioner. This idea proved so unpopular it was dropped, but Muslims were annoyed. Muslims set the central market in Tafewa Balewa and other houses in the town as well as thirty villages outside the town on fire in July 1995. Over two hundred died, including thirty-six women and children sheltering in a church. Seventy-seven churches were burnt. The twenty-four Muslims arrested for these deeds were suddenly freed, their places in prison being taken by a number of Sayawa leaders who were put on trial for these very same deeds. Christians complained about the irregular constitution of the tribunal handling the matter, as well as the blatant discrimination against the Sayawa on the part of the police and the Bauchi Emirate Council. The agenda seemed to be similar to that taken in 1992 against the Kataf people in Kaduna State: revenge and the ethnic cleansing of the area of all Sayawa. 784

2.2.3. Kano Riots 1991

In Kano CAN had invited Reinhard Bonnke, a German Pentecostal evangelist, to stage an evangelistic crusade in October 1991. 785 They had obtained the necessary permissions and booked Kano Racecourse as the venue. The Federal Government surprisingly, had granted a visa, having just turned down Ahmed Deedat, the South African Islamic apologist. Under pressure from the Muslim community, however, the State Government cancelled the venue telling CAN to find an alternative. Rumours spread around Kano, exacerbated by the crusade’s high profile publicity (which kept mentioning the Racecourse despite the cancellation), of Bonnke’s miraculous powers. Eventually, on 14th October, before the crusade opened, a riot broke out led

by Muslim fundamentalists. It lasted 2 days leaving up to 500 dead. Oluniyi writes of the Christian response:

As the rioters moved from street to street, killing people, setting vehicles and houses on fire, a new dimension was introduced. As had never happened in previous riots, the Christian community showed an unwillingness to turn the other cheek. They mounted barricades and formed vigilante groups to defend the non-indigene enclave of Sabon Gari . . . Sabon Gari became a well-defended fortress, the fundamentalists moved to other pockets of non-indigenous settlements and houses in other parts of the city and rounded the people up.

2.2.4. Zangon Kataf Riots

In 1992, open warfare broke out in southern Kaduna State around the town of Zangon Kataf. A Hausa town located in the middle of the Kataf (or Atyab) ethnic group since pre-colonial days, due to British policy since 1902 it had functioned as the centre of the Zaria Emirate’s rule over the area. Its’ Hausa inhabitants derisorily called the Kataf people arna (unbelievers), seized Kataf land, and at times enslaved the Kataf. Duniya mentions revolts against Hausa rule in 1904, 1922, 1946, and 1953. Although the churches discouraged revolts, the British blamed the churches for them. Gradually, however, the Kataf had asserted their numerical superiority, firstly, and much to the fury of the Emir of Zaria, with the appointment of an indigenous District Head in 1967, and later, following the restoration of political activity, an indigenous Local Government Chairman. They still wanted complete freedom from Zaria rule and in the early 1990s applied for such. Their application was unsuccessful as Dabo Lere, the new civilian governor in Kaduna State, was the nephew of Alhaji Mato, a prominent Hausa leader in Zangon Kataf in whose house he had grown up. Both fought to retain Hausa-Fulani political and economic hegemony over the Kataf.

Tensions rose, over the location of the overcrowded Hausa-controlled market. As James points out, it was the last vestige of the Hausa-Fulani’s former political and economic domination of the area. Their control of the market, however, restricted the

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786 However, Harurna Wakili argues that the rioters were a mix of leaderless youth, the poor and the unemployed etc targeting wealthy strangers, mainly Igbo, but also, for the first time, Northern Christian minorities. It was then fuelled by widespread rumours, government inaction, and the Igbo desire for revenge. Cf. Wakili, H., *The Phenomenon of Revolts and Riots in Kano, 1893 – 1995: An Historical Perspective*, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Bayero University, Kano, 1997.

787 Olunuij, 2006, p.132.


789 Most Hausa were Muslims, while the Kataf are predominantly Christian, with ECWA the largest denomination among them.


791 Duniya, p.33.
Kataf people’s freedom to trade and ability to operate as the business equals of the Hausa-Fulani.\textsuperscript{792} It was much more than an economic issue, however. As Falola points out, for the Kataf control of the market was central to recovering their dignity, their culture, and their independence.\textsuperscript{793} Thus, the Kataf-controlled local government developed a new site due to open on the 6\textsuperscript{th} February 1992. Trouble broke out when Hausa-Fulani youth tried to stop people going to the new market. The Kataf retaliated and, according to James, 85 people were killed with widespread destruction of Hausa-Fulani property.\textsuperscript{794} Tensions continued to rise, with a Muslim youth group threatening \textit{jihad} in a letter sent to the Sultan of Sokoto on the 10\textsuperscript{th} March 1992.\textsuperscript{795} Conflict broke out on 15\textsuperscript{th} and 16\textsuperscript{th} May 1992. This time, both sides were prepared for trouble with TC alleging that the Hausa had stockpiled sophisticated weapons and imported mercenaries.\textsuperscript{796} The Hausa-Fulani alleged the exact opposite.\textsuperscript{797}

Neither James, who is an ECWA member, nor TC mention what actually happened during the fighting. Just as in Kafanchan, ECWA drew a veil of silence over the events that took place. It is Falola, a neutral scholar, who writes:

\begin{quote}
By noon on the 15 May, the clashes had consumed eighty-five lives and incapacitated the local police, and the violence continued unabated for another day. By 16 May, the town had been completely destroyed and hundreds of its residents killed. For three days, the police and the government had done nothing, allowing the people to destroy themselves. By the time three truckloads of mobile police arrived on the afternoon of 16 May, the war had burned itself out. Over found hundred corpses littered the streets, and most of the houses were burned to the ground.\textsuperscript{796}
\end{quote}

Each side alleged the stockpiling of modern weapons, and the use of mercenaries or retired soldiers. Stories are told of people nearby hearing artillery fire. Others suggest that the Kataf resorted to occult powers for assistance.\textsuperscript{799} Whatever took place, it was a complete success for the Kataf as they drove the Hausa-Fulani out of the town.\textsuperscript{800} Again, one cannot help but wonder why ECWA, which has such a strong presence in the area, chose to ignore what actually happened in Zangon Kataf, despite Tsado's “true story”.

\textsuperscript{793} Falola, T., 1998, p.216.  
\textsuperscript{794} Falola, T., 1998, p.217 states 60 were killed.  
\textsuperscript{796} Cf. James, p.21, Duniya, p.34.  
\textsuperscript{798} Falola, T., 1998, p.217.  
\textsuperscript{799} Gaiya (14/02/2007), Misal (29/12/2005), and Samaila (16/11/2006) allege Kataf reliance on occult charms.  
\textsuperscript{800} Tsado, J., ‘Zangon Kataf Riots: The True Story,’ TC, No. 3, 1992 a, pp. 4 - 11.
The trouble in Zangon Kataf quickly transformed from an ethnic dispute, in which religion and ethnicity helped to define the participants, into a wider set of riots in which Christians, who had nothing to do with the original problem, suffered. Reactions to the Zangon Kataf fighting were swift, widespread and probably on a greater scale than the events in Zangon Kataf itself. The conflict immediately spread across the state with large-scale anti-Christian violence in Kaduna and Zaria cities, and in other Kaduna State towns. While retaliatory attacks on the Kataf in and around Zangon Kataf might have been understandable, the attacks elsewhere were an inexcusable general attack on all Christians no matter their ethnic origin. There was widespread burning of churches and other property. In Kaduna City two ECWA ministers, an ECWA elder and two other ministers were killed. A particular blow to ECWA was the death of Tachio Dunyio, the senior of the two ECWA ministers, who had previously been the denomination’s Vice-President. Overall how many died is difficult to ascertain. A conservative estimate suggests, “471 persons were officially confirmed killed in the May disturbances, with 250 and 188 of these deaths occurring in Kaduna City and Zangon Katab respectively.” By contrast, James believes that despite the Muslim attacks on Christians, the Hausa-Fulani suffered the greatest losses of the 4,000 to 4,500 he estimates killed.

The riots in Kaduna were not all one-sided. Falola writes, “The Christians and southerners fought back in self-defence. The Yoruba and Igbo held solidarity meetings, strategized, and took up arms. They attacked and destroyed mosques, even damaging the national headquarters of the JNI.” Many southerners fled for all had become the focus of Muslim attacks. Muslims regarded them as more in sympathy with the Kataf. Further, many southerners failed the Muslim tests of being able to recite the Qur’an or speak Hausa with a clearly Hausa accent. “Over a thousand people lost their lives in this way.” Some of the killings were particularly gruesome.

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801 ECWA lost a total of U.S. $590,000 value of property including three churches, 5 houses, and a nursery school in these Kaduna riots. This figure didn’t take into account the destruction of private property, or the need to take care of families of the deceased and those who were injured, the former being estimated at somewhere between 33 and 50 in number. Cf. Foute, B., Kaduna Relief Needs, Memo to Emmanuel Isch, 10th June 1992; Foute, B., Kaduna Relief Funding, Memo to Jack Phillips, 24th June 1992, SIM Nigeria files.
803 James, p.22.
Summarising what happened, TC stated:

In the past, Muslim fanatics have seized every opportunity to embark on a massacre of Christians and the destruction of their churches and property. The present violence unleashed on Christians in Kaduna and Zaria is not unconnected with this penchant of the fanatics to open *jihad* on Nigerians at the slightest excuse.

This form of unbridled lawlessness has now assumed a predictable pattern: A quarrel arises between Muslims and their non-Muslim neighbours in a certain remote place; the quarrel results in clash, which results in deaths on both sides; the Muslims carry their dead bodies and injured ones all the distance to the cities where the sight will provoke those of their faith into rage; consequently a vendetta is unleashed on innocent and unprotected Nigerians.\(^{806}\)

In an attempt at ethnic cleansing, state and federal authorities launched a full-scale crackdown on the Kataf people. A Muslim sole administrator replaced the elected Christian-dominated local government, and about 400 Kataf men and women were arrested, with some being put on trial for their lives. Legal processes were repeatedly manipulated to ensure the verdicts the government wanted. Thus, the Okadigbo Tribunal primarily consisted of Hausa-Fulani members. No appeals from its verdicts were permitted. When prisoners were likely to be acquitted for want of evidence, they were promptly re-arrested and fresh charges were brought.

By contrast, despite federal orders, no Hausa people were arrested. Instead, considerable attention was focused on the Hausa refugees with President Babangida rushing to bring them aid. As Catholic Archbishop Peter Jatau, the Chairman of CAN (North) noted,

> The so-called actions and pronouncements of government is one-sided and discriminatory. We have had similar recent cases of religious and communal riots in Taraba, Bauchi and Kano States, but I am not aware of government rushing in relief. But now that government thinks the tide has turned against the Hausa Muslims, it is treating the situation with bias.\(^{807}\)

Ascribing the riots’ origins primarily to political issues, he advocated the rights of minority ethnic groups to autonomy, to have the freedom to have their own chiefs. However, while political in origin, the riots were religious in their implementation. Governments were slow to react and biased in their intervention consistently favouring the Hausa/Fulani. Thus, while,

> It is the duty of government to protect these rights, but where the government becomes unwilling or unable to do this, then Christians have no choice but to


\(^{807}\) Tsado, 1992 a, p.10.
defend themselves. Christians have a right to find proportionate means to protect themselves and their property.\textsuperscript{808}

In the meantime, a tide of revenge affected all the Kataf with widespread arrests, and dismissal from jobs across Kaduna State. All levels of civil servants were affected, the only criteria being that they were Kataf.\textsuperscript{809} It was clear political victimisation.\textsuperscript{810}

The root of the ethnic problem in Kaduna State, and often elsewhere in the Middle Belt, was the refusal of the Muslim-dominated state government to grant autonomy to the predominantly Christian ethnic groups.\textsuperscript{811} This was coupled with preferential treatment for Muslim Hausas in politics, education, employment and development, and access to land for religious purposes. Both in these contested Middle Belt states, and further north in overwhelmingly Muslim states, non-Muslims were often denied their constitutional rights.\textsuperscript{812}

Thus, the decision by the Okadigbo Tribunal to condemn a number of Kataf leaders to death for their alleged part in the riots was no surprise as it was consistent with the authorities’ actions since the violence had occurred. The decision was widely derided as a “mockery of justice”. An ECWA statement put it like this:

We call upon the Government to see and understand that in consequence, the Justice Okadigbo Tribunal turned out in the end not to be an instrument of peace, justice and reconciliation but an instrument of entrenching the will and the wishes of the strong and the privileged and has also enlarged the human gulf and fanned the embers of violence and hate between the warring communities of Zangon-Kataf and is at the moment on the verge of plunging the whole nation into a serious socio-political and religious crisis.\textsuperscript{813}

Eventually the government, taken aback by nationwide hostility to the verdicts, succumbed to pressure and released the Kataf leaders.

Such was the anger among Christians generated by the Zangon Kataf situation that \textit{TC} had to issue the following statement on its letters page:

The mission of \textit{Today’s Challenge} is not to preach violence neither does the Bible encourage violence. Our mission is to pursue the cause of holiness,

\textsuperscript{808} Tsado, J., ‘Christians have a right to defend themselves,’ \textit{TC}, No. 3, 1992 c, p.15.

\textsuperscript{809} Tsado, J., ‘Fall-outs of Zangon Kataf/Kaduna Riots,’ \textit{TC}, No. 4, 1992 d, pp. 4 - 9.

\textsuperscript{810} Tsado, J., ‘Lekwot’s Detention Politically Motivated,’ \textit{TC}, No. 4, 1992 e, p. 6.

\textsuperscript{811} Suburu, 1996, pp.61 – 65.


righteousness, and justice in this country by proclaiming the truth, uncovering falsehood, and highlighting the light of the downtrodden.\textsuperscript{814}

Self-defence was the minimum response Christians had advocated. As happened earlier in Kafanchan, around Zangon Kataf Christians and Muslims had graduated to full-scale war. If James’ mortality figures are correct then warfare had spread to Kaduna and Zaria as well. While Christians did not advocate violence, when it was thrust upon them they were no longer restrained in their responses.

### 2.2.5. Kano Riots 2004

Oluniyi draws attention to Ibrahim Shekaru, the Kano State Governor’s role in the May 2004 riots, ostensibly in response to the Yelwa massacre with which this study began. Despite advice that due to Kano’s volatile nature he should not allow street protests, he not only gave permission but also delivered an inflammatory speech. The result was violent attacks on Christians and other southerners.\textsuperscript{815} Agreeing with Oluniyi, Hussaini noted that Shekaru, wanting to garner the support of the unemployed Muslim peasantry who are always anxious to loot, had secretly given strict conditions for the protest. These were violated resulting in 1360 Christian deaths. Muslims also suffered, as compensation promised to Muslim property owners ahead of the riot was not paid and poor Muslims, who live from hand to mouth, were unable to work or purchase food.\textsuperscript{816}

### 2.2.6. Danish Cartoon Riots

Muslim fundamentalist protests at the Danish cartoons were mentioned in a preliminary article in TC’s February 2006 edition. By March 2006, protests in some parts of Nigeria had deteriorated into violent riots. In Maidugari, where the most violent riots took place leading to 45 Christian deaths, TC accused the state government of at least negligence, if not actual complicity in promoting the violent riots, despite warnings from security agencies. An investigatory committee set up by the state government was dismissed as a cover-up. Elsewhere in Katsina, Gombe, Bauchi, Potiskum and Kontagora mobs used whatever excuse they could to attack

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\textsuperscript{814} Tsado, J., ‘Editor’s Note,’ TC, No.4, 1992 c, p. 3.
\textsuperscript{816} Hussaini, (20/07/2006).
\end{flushright}
Christians. In response to attacks on their fellow Igbos in these towns, Igbos in the southeastern city of Onitsha attacked and killed a number of Muslim Hausa. After a second round of incidents in Gombe, CAN warned that in future Christians would retaliate violently if attacked. They saw this as self-defence. Thankfully, in Jos various measures were in place that allowed a peaceful Muslim protest to take place. For these riots were unique in Nigeria: there was not a local contributing factor. Instead of being about local politics, or land use, they were purely religious in nature, with all of the victims being innocent and having no conceivable say in what happened. ECWA was entirely justified in protesting the Danish cartoon riots and the on-going discrimination that Christians suffered in many northern States.

2.2.7. Jos Crisis November 2008

There has been considerable tension in Jos since the weeklong September 2001 riots when several thousand people were killed. At the heart of those riots was the conflict between largely Christian indigenes such as the Birom and Muslim Hausa-Fulani settlers. The former sought to retain control over local government, and the traditional rulership of Jos. The latter are mostly immigrants from Kano and Bauchi but include some who have lived in Jos for generations. They have sought to Islamise the chieftaincy, take control of local government in areas where they are strong, and eventually force state governments to give them greater prominence. The relative calm since 2001 did not hide the shock and anger felt by Christians at what they viewed as the premeditated attack on them by Muslims. There has been a new militancy about Christianity since then.

Thus when local government elections were held in November 2008 there was much to play for. In large part, the elections across Plateau State were peaceful. Muslims expected to win these elections in Jos North. When they did not, apparently because the non-Muslim population in the area joined forces, they alleged fraud and began attacking Christians and churches. About 400 died, including a number of ministers, one of them being an ECWA pastor. Ten thousand were made homeless. Considerable property damage included the destruction of forty churches, three of which belonged to ECWA. In a statement on the ECWA website, Farinto and Dadang

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819 The Chief of Jos is known as the Gbong Gwom, a Birom title. In early colonial days the chieftaincy was known as the Sarkin Jos and was held by a Muslim Hausa.
traced the history of unprovoked Muslim attacks on Christians in Jos, and explained the work the churches had done to calm situations in the past. Much of this incident, they alleged, was, as the 2001 crisis, pre-planned using mercenaries albeit this time with sophisticated weapons. The political dispute was merely the excuse for pre-meditated attacks. "As always, every crisis in Jos begins from the Muslim dominated area where Muslim youths would usually begin by attacking the few Christians within their area."820

This same pattern has also been noticed in a subsequent riot in Jos in January 2010, as well as in follow up incidents to the south of Jos. The January riots, which erupted out of on-going unresolved tensions from November 2008, led to over three hundred deaths, many wounded, and much property damage. The follow up incidents south of Jos have resulted in over five hundred deaths. As before, Christians believe that these are not sporadic outburst of violence, but centrally planned and organised making use of mercenaries, and with clear political, ethnic, and religious goals.

When one compares the Jos riots with the earlier incidents, it becomes apparent that the causes of these riots vary. Kaduna State, for example, was known for repeated outbreaks of civil conflict. The incidence of such has dropped dramatically once the state government conceded the demands of the predominantly Christian ethnic minorities for autonomy from Muslim traditional rule. Meanwhile in Plateau State, which is Christian-dominated, and for decades has rejected Muslim Hausa-Fulani rule, the intensity of the conflict has increased as the Hausa-Fulani press for power. Other incidents such as the Danish cartoon riots, the riots in Kano in 1991 and 2004, and the more recent Boko Haram conflicts seem to reflect more a Muslim rejection of Western or Christian influence, and a declaration of the sanctity of Islamic territory and beliefs. In other words, returning to the categories summarised by Kalu one could say that these incidents reflect a mixture of the State Discourse model (mainly Kafanchan and Zangon Kataf origins), the Conflict model (the aftermath of Kafanchan, Zangon Kataf, as well as Danish Cartoon and the two Kano riots), and the Instrumentalist/ Manipulation (Jos riots). As Kalu also said, none of these are necessarily exclusive. Thus, the 1991 Kano riot could be understood as reflecting the Competing Fundamentalisms model given that it was centred on Reinhard Bonnke’s proposed crusade. However, as he had yet to commence preaching, it seems more

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accurate to suggest it was more to do with Kano Muslims wishing to preserve their territory and identification than with any message preached.

3. Responding to Violence

At the beginning of these riots, Christians responded to violence by expressing their trust in God, through prayer, and making representations to the appropriate authorities. The more often bouts of anti-Christian violence broke out, however, interspersed by an atmosphere of threat, persecution and uncertainty, the more likely Christians were to search for some other solution. The process of doing that has been characterised by uncertainty, confusion, and division.

Nor have events been stable long enough for Christians to work out their responses. One dispute rapidly seemed to follow another. Particularly long running has been the Shari’ah issue, which returned to political prominence with the convening of a Constituent Assembly in 1988. This brought the issues of Nigeria’s secular status and the role of Shari’ah law to TC’s attention. As discussed in Chapter Two, Christians distinguish between secularity and secularism, the former being neutrality between religions, and the latter hostility to religions. Muslims fail to see the difference stating that anything secular is a by-product of Christianity and does not reflect their understanding of Shari’ah law governing all of life. Christians scoffed at Muslim assertions that non-Muslims would not be affected by the introduction of Shari’ah, pointing out how they were already being affected. Christians argue that the pressure for Shari’ah was the beginning of the Muslim Islamisation agenda, with the final goal being the declaration of the Islamic Republic of Nigeria. It proved impossible, despite strenuous efforts to reconcile the differences at the Constituent Assembly, with Assembly members on the verge of open conflict. Eventually the military government intervened and ordered the assembly to cease their discussions on Shari’ah law. The military then imposed a compromise restricting the creation of Shari’ah courts to those states legislating for such, and restricting the jurisdiction of Shari’ah law to Muslims.

821 See Appendix 2 for details.
However, this military compromise opened the way for the Shari’ah issue to resurface in 2000. This time, instead of the dispute occurring at Federal level, it occurred at State level. As discussed in Chapter Two different states sought to adopt variations of Shari’ah criminal law. Extensive riots broke out over the introduction of Shari’ah law in Kaduna in 2000 resulting in widespread destruction and loss of life.\(^{824}\)

Almost annually, it seemed some form of violent reaction would break out, usually from the Muslim community. By the time of this research from 2005 to 2006, one got a sense among respondents of weariness, and a loss of hope that the situation would improve.

### 3.1. A Failure of Options

The problem for Christians was whether they should respond violently or peacefully to Muslim discrimination and violence. Christians were rapidly concluding, when confronted with Christ’s command to “turn the other cheek,” that they had “no more cheeks left to turn”. Four options presented themselves.

In 1988, responding to a question about the inevitability of religious war, Byang took a middle line. He said that Muslims’ inflammatory language and repeated acts of discrimination and violence were sufficient reason for war. Christians, however, should not seek war: their weapons are not physical. However, Byang closed his response with a warning.

That is not to say though, that in the event of any uprising Christians will lie down like rams to be slaughtered. And at this juncture we have to alert the complacent Christians to be better prepared for the worst. There may be wisdom in the saying that, “The best way to ensure peace is to prepare for war.” The days of running away are over.\(^{825}\)

Others were impatient. Also in 1988, Amunkitou Dolom felt CAN’s pleading for justice in the wake of anti-Christian violence was useless given the economic and political conspiracy between the government and wealthy Muslims. If something more vigorous was not implemented sooner rather than later, Christians would be eliminated. His solution was contained in two statements: “What CAN and Today’s Challenge should do now is to ask Christians to return fire for fire,” and “No heavens

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\(^{824}\) Cf. Yusuf, H.B., ‘Managing Muslim – Christian Conflicts in Northern Nigeria. . .’ for a Muslim account of these riots. She attributes the riots to CAN leaders’ use of inflammatory language.  
\(^{825}\) Byang, D., ‘Question & Answer,’ TC, No. 5, 1988 b, p.31.
will forgive you for inaction because the prayer now is ‘FATHER, FORGIVE THEM NOT FOR THEY KNOW WHAT THEY DO.’

Along these lines the attempted coup d’état by Gideon Orkar in April 1990, was welcomed by many Christians, and allegedly sponsored by a wealthy Pentecostal businessman. Orkar failed, however, as his attempt to excise from the Nigerian Federation five Northern Muslim-dominated states, swung some prominent military officials behind the Babangida government out of concern for the preservation of national unity.

On the other hand, Chris Abashiya, a leading Hausa-Fulani convert from Islam, a year later spoke more gently. Reacting to his daughter's conversion to Islam, he spoke of his vision of love in Christianity.

It is only in Christianity I have read this statement, “Love your enemies, and pray for those who persecute you.” . . . The cornerstones of Christianity are love and faith. The Bible says “God so loved the world that he gave his only Son to die for us.” Another place says that it was while we were still enemies of God that Christ died for us.

Again, he spoke of St Paul's teaching in Romans 12:18, “If it is possible, as far as it depends on you, live at peace with everyone.”

The Bible says, “Vengeance is mine, says the Lord.” It is for God to take vengeance if and when He wants to. If He doesn't we will still praise the Lord. That was the mark of the faith of the three Hebrew exiles in Babylon when they faced the furnace of fire. Christians must endeavour to follow their footsteps.

He contrasted that with the violence and threats characterising Islam; that held Muslims to their faith for fear of the law of the infidel. Nigerian Christians who became Muslims did so, he believed, because of earthly inducements, the opposite experience of Muslims converting to Christianity. It is contrary to Scripture and the ethos of Christianity to respond to Muslim plans to Islamise Nigeria through violence and injustice, with the same coinage.

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826 Dolom, A., ‘CAN: Beyond Rhetorics,’ TC, No 6, 1988, pp. 11 & 15. Readers’ opinions were sharply divided over this article. Cf Nwanaju, pp.425 – 426 where he responds to this confrontational attitude that he alleges was a problem with CAN at the time through a combination of New Testament references and Roman Catholic teaching.

827 Best (27/05/2007) argues that since then evangelical Christians have become more aggressive in resisting Muslim attacks than Pentecostals. Defensive militias, improved security and fire-resistance of churches, and other self-defence measures are ensuring churches will not be driven out.


The fourth option was confrontation. The death of Paul Gindiri, the NLFA leader, provided an opportunity to eulogise one whom Minchakpu (TC’s new editor) and others saw as a courageous Christian leader.

Paul Gindiri was no doubt, an instrument which our Lord Jesus Christ used in wreaking havoc on the kingdom of darkness. The name of our Lord Jesus Christ from the lips of Paul Gindiri usually sent the devil and his agents scampering for cover. . . Paul Gindiri suffered untold hardship while serving our Lord Jesus Christ. He led the Gospel teams of New Life for All Gospel Ministry to every nook and cranny of Nigeria. He was persecuted, stoned, arraigned before Courts, and not because of anything, but for proclaiming Jesus Christ as the Lord and Savior.

Gindiri’s evangelism was confrontational, antagonising Muslims, and discomforting other Christians who felt there must be a way to build bridges with Muslims. As Siman Ibrahim points out, Gindiri’s approach reflected the times.

In the 1980s when Muslims began to burn churches, our initial reaction was to confront them with evangelism. Paul became confrontational just because Islam had become destructive. NLFA became confrontational along with everyone who was in sympathy with Paul’s method. He went to Kano and Maidugari and preached in the palaces of the Emir of Kano and of the Shehu of Borno. Many went in thousands to support him. Whenever there was a NLFA meeting many came out.

In the short term, Gindiri’s confrontational approach proved extremely popular, and was but a short step away from actual retaliation. Yet as we have also seen, the motives for the violence differed thus calling for different responses. Yet the possible responses offered here, do not. The church does not appear to be critically differentiating between the different types of violence or responding to each incident as appropriate, let alone taking action to forestall violent outbreaks. At its 2006 General Church Council meeting ECWA again called for religious freedom and tolerance condemning the repeated bouts of religiously-inspired violence of the year before. It called for an end to the religious discrimination practised by Muslim-dominated state governments in Northern Nigeria. However, in an eight page statement dealing with national issues the council failed to propose any solutions beyond calling for federal and state governments to do their jobs properly.

Yet, as noticed above, the Instrumentalist/Manipulation model this assumes is not the only valid explanatory model; other episodes described reflects one or more different conceptual models. One gets the impression that ECWA at the time saw itself as

830 Lloyd (01/04/2006) notes this often seemed to be the default evangelistic method adopted by Christians during the 1960s and 1970s, i.e. before the major rioting started.
832 Ibrahim, (19/04/2006).
somewhat aloof, more preoccupied with its own internal issues than with practically addressing the problems around it. One also got the impression that its leaders, while hard working and compassionate, were shortsighted or intellectually lazy in failing to analyze the situation rigorously enough. It really has only been when state governments have been willing to take action that problems have been resolved.

Thus where state governments and traditional leaders have been proactive in addressing problems, tensions have eased considerably and with it violent incidents.\(^{834}\) Useful comparisons in this respect are the actions of the Governments of Kaduna and Plateau States between 1999 and 2006. Ahmed Makarfi, then Governor of Kaduna State, learned painful lessons from the Shari’ah riots of 2000, and the Miss World riots of 2003. To the dismay of some fellow-Muslims, he addressed the underlying tensions in southern Kaduna State by granting each ethnic group their own autonomous chieftaincy. No longer could the Hausa-Fulani Emirs of Zaria and Jema’a control those territories that were predominantly Christian. Coupled with a pro-active approach to equitable development, good communications and active intervention in potentially violent disputes, the incidences mentioned in the TC articles above have greatly reduced.\(^{835}\)

By contrast, Joshua Dariye, former Governor of Plateau State, never did get to grips with the underlying religious tensions in his state. In and around Yelwa, where the atrocity mentioned in Chapter 1 took place, and in the 2001 Jos riots, hundreds of people lost their lives. Instead, Dariye devoted most of his attention to his personal financial affairs, running into problems with the London police over money laundering allegations, and currently facing trial in Nigeria on corruption charges.\(^{836}\) A similar picture also emerges in Muslim-dominated states where politicians also exploit religion for their own ends.\(^{837}\)

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\(^{834}\) Kwashi (16/05/2007) noted the Sultans of Sokoto have consistently been fair thus ensuring good interreligious relations.


\(^{836}\) Kunhiyop contrasts the two states pointing out how people in Kaduna, where he comes from, have learnt to work and compromise, while Plateau was making mistakes. One gets the impression that the efforts of the current Plateau State government led by Jonah Jang to move the state forward have been stymied by repeated bouts of violence originating from Muslim sources.

\(^{837}\) Best (27/05/2007).
3.2 The Search for Power

Discussion of the Kafanchan and Zangon Kataf riots has revealed ECWA’s tendency to gloss over what actually happened in those towns. The focus has concentrated on the sufferings of innocent Christians elsewhere, or on the activities of the Muslim rioters who started the trouble. Yet when questioned about occult involvement in Yelwa, a number of ECWA interviewees not only acknowledged the truth of the Yelwa rumours, but also suggested that other riots including Zangon Kataf, the 2000 Shari’ah crisis in Kaduna, and the 2001 Jos crisis had also featured occult involvement. They noted the prevalence of the problem in Plateau State, and the repentance of some who were involved, and had been counselled by ministers.

Several explained that Muslims generally refer to Christians and traditionalists as arna (unbelievers) and thus the media lump them together calling them all Christians. They suggested that usually those most involved in violence are, at best, nominal Christians, and probably traditionalists. Many attend church with little understanding of the Gospel. Ityavyr said,

I am not aware of that, but in a given church, only about 30% or less would be faithful Christians who would believe the Bible and only 10% would practice the dictates of the Bible on a daily basis. Those who go to church in ECWA can do anything: even in Plateau, people have consulted mediums. If they are doing this in a church where you think they are born again then they can easily buy charms. I am not surprised.

Atiyaye concurred,

...it is a very simple issue; they are not Christians. In the 1960s and 1970s, 80% of ECWA church members knew the Lord Jesus Christ. Unfortunately, now maybe 20 to 30% of church members know their Lord. There is a great drop in knowledge of who the Lord is.

Thus when confronted with what they see as a war situation they turn to traditional remedies. Para-Mallam noted,

Not the right thing to do. But it is also something that is expected. As far as some of the local people are concerned, they looked at this as a war situation. When there were wars in the past how did they normally fight wars? They relied heavily on traditional practice, called on all kinds of evil spirits. If there is war today then even in Jos people will go back to such practices to survive.

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838 Dadang (22/12/2005), DanAmarya (31/01/2006), Gaiya (12/02/2007), Jacob (03/05/2006).
839 Korosi (14/07/2006).
840 Nache (24/02/2007).
841 Asake (12/05/2006).
845 Para-Mallam (01/03/2007). cf. Garba (04/06/2006), Hassan (15/05/2006).
He went on to suggest that nominal Christians would respond to a crisis in an entirely different way to genuine believers. More fundamentally, the incident drew attention to the lack of Biblical depth among many “Christians”. Genuine believers would have looked to God for help, and not have responded in such a violent way. As Samaila put it, “This is a kind of syncretism.”

The majority of DCC leaders reflected the same views, as did ECWA laity, and other Christian leaders. Respondents thus explain the problem as being the fault of traditionalists or nominal Christians. How accurate is this? Adeyemo et al in the Kairos document addressing the related issue of those Christians who have killed Muslims, asked; “Fellow Christian leaders, is it safe to hide behind any patronising justification that those were not true Christians?”

The situation is, therefore, complex, and working out who are genuine Christians and who are not is beyond any human being’s ability. One’s own impressions are drawn from thirteen years of interviewing applicants for Bible College and seminary entrance, and from eighteen years of observing participation rates in ECWA Communion services. From these anecdotal sources there appear to be substantial numbers of people, perhaps even up to fifty per cent of those attending an average urban ECWA church on a Sunday morning, who claim to be Christian, but, for one reason or another, have not come to a personal faith in Christ – the standard evangelical understanding of who a Christian is.

Even if the allegation that those resorting to occult powers are not true Christians is accurate, this in turn raises further questions. In the first place, why are people resorting to occult powers? A common perception in Nigeria is that one could easily identify the early converts by their zeal and integrity, and willingness to withstand often-severe persecution. What has happened since? It is not just a matter of resorting to war situations. There is a deeper issue at stake. Para-Mallam suggests:

This lack of biblical depth, people are not deeply rooted in Christ, because if they are I doubt if they will fight back the way this has been witnessed during the 2000 Shari’ah crisis in Kaduna, and in Jos 2001 and Shendam/Yelwa in 2004. If people are not deeply rooted in Christ and they are exposed to danger then they look for

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850 Strand (09/11/2006) suggests in her experience reliance on the occult, not solely for power in battle, is quite widespread in ECWA.
where they can get help; if the spirits and ancestors will help so be it. It boils down to how much of a personal walk these “Christians” have with the Lord.\textsuperscript{851}

Why then do people feel the need to turn to traditional religions for spiritual power? In Chapter Five, Turaki described the flat condemnation by SIM missionaries of traditional religions and culture, “The whole way of life, religion, customs, and social values of a pagan society all stand to be redeemed, and liberated by the Gospel of Christ.”\textsuperscript{852} Kunhiyop adds to this attributing the core problem at Yelwa, and by implication elsewhere, to a combination of mission and church.

This is part of not going into serious dialogue with traditional religion. All missions asked for was to verbally leave the traditional religions, but that is not enough just to say without discussion as to what changes to make The church hasn’t addressed the issue as to how to respond when attacked.\textsuperscript{853}

The majority of the SIM missionary respondents recognised this, feeling that SIM could have handled these matters better. Some suggested what was needed was more contextualised Bible teaching, or individual one-on-one discipleship more than the theological institution building approach that had been taken.

In other words, until the issue of traditional religions is properly addressed incidents like Kafanchan, Zangon Kataf and Yelwa are likely to recur. These can only be properly resolved when there is proper analysis of the traditional beliefs, and Christian teaching and preaching addresses the issues raised. This will require people trained in both theology and anthropology. Speaking of theology, however, raises a further problem. In Chapter Six, SIM’s evangelistic legacy was noted along with ECWA’s preoccupation with organisational development. Theological development, however, lagged behind. While ECWA’s doctrinal statements have developed considerably, it was noted that ECWA has not really engaged theologically with the growth of Pentecostalism, or with Islam, or developed an adequate theology of suffering. As such, while church members’ rote memories of Biblical passages can be impressive, their level of understanding and application of such is less so. Adequate teaching, however, requires proper attention to Biblical doctrine, to good preaching, as well as to sound evangelism. However, one wonders if the current dispensational thrust of ECWA’s theology is adequate to the task. In an

\textsuperscript{851} Para-Mallam (01/03/2007).
\textsuperscript{852} Turaki, Y., An Introduction . . . , Jos 1993 b, p.75.
\textsuperscript{853} Kunhiyop (31/01/2006). Cf. Shadrach (17/05/2006). See also Foute (31/05/2006), Ken Lloyd (01/04/2006) et al who regretted SIM’s inability to grapple with the traditionalist worldview. Stanley (01/04/2006) felt more use of the Old Testament is required engaging with the traditionalist worldview teaching a more inclusive faith that addresses current life as well as the next.
Islamic context where Islam embraces all of life, as do traditional religions, surely Christian theology must do likewise. There needs to be:

. . . a gospel that speaks to all aspects of life (just as Islam claims) but which presents a Biblical world view concerned with body, mind, and spirit, that is less about escapism and more about stewardship and engagement in God’s world past, present and future. . . This would have better equipped people to understand power struggles and the complete adequacy of Christ. 854

The dispensational tendency to compartmentalise belief gives room for compartmentalised responses to evangelism, to doctrinal beliefs and to moral behaviour. If ECWA is to meet the challenges of traditional beliefs and of Islam there needs to be some deep theological thinking, and a significant change in ethos from organisational growth and politicking.

Some people in ECWA, however, have begun to think more theologically by examining the “turn the other cheek” attitudes and explaining what Scripture says. Dadang accepts that Christians have sufficient cause for a just war. However, he reminds his listeners, that the same God of war is the one who was crucified, who commands his followers to work for the good of all and to love their enemies. Christians should,

. . . refrain from killing, not because they are ordered to, but because they recognize something of God in everyone, and realize that what we do to the best of these – our enemies – we do to God. . . non-retaliation is not a matter of doctrinalism but of discipleship. . . non-retaliation is at the very heart of the gospel, and the church’s task is to attempt to spread this feast unto the life of the world.” 855

Shaba, a Muslim convert, also finds no Biblical rationale for responding violently to persecution. Passages where Christ spoke of taking up the sword speak of protection from armed robbers while travelling. Christ himself demonstrated a non-violent response to persecution.

Despite threats to his life, he would not cease to speak the truth. He never led a revolt but protested the unjust treatment of his people, preached against the hypocrisy of the ruling class and religiosity of the Pharisees and Sadducees that leave out the people.

On what is non-violence based? This position is based on the teaching of Christ in Matt 22:37-40 which says: “Love the Lord your God with all your heart, and with all your soul and with all your mind. . . Love your neighbour as yourself. All the law and the prophets stand on these two commandments,” (cf. Mark 12:29-31). 856

854 Stanley (01/04/2006)
Kunhiyop, the former Provost of JETS, outlines what he sees as valid Christian engagement with the State, and how Christians should respond to violence. In the former, he repudiates SIM’s strict separation of church and politics. Citing former ECWA President Olowolo, he argues it is the Church and Christian’s duty to be actively involved in politics and government. Nigerian experience shows political involvement as necessary to safeguard civic and religious freedoms and to promote community development. There is a moral dimension to politics, particularly as the Church witnesses to truth, justice, and righteousness in personal and public conduct. God has created government in order to maintain order through the restraint of evil, the promotion of justice and permitting men and women to exercise their God-given right to freedom. Being called to be salt and light in the world (Matthew 5: 13 – 16) implies that Christians should get involved in the government of that world. Differing values and morality will ensure, however, that Christians stay distinct (Jn17:16; Rom. 12:2; 2 Cor. 6:17), but they will seek to transform the world around them. “Passages such as Romans 12:2 and Colossians 3:1 – 5, among others, encourage the believer to have a renewed mind, a mind focused on eternal matters. Changed lives will have an effect on choices that believers make and this will have an enduring effect on the world.”

Violence, however, produces more violence. “Africa must heed this warning. Violence has never produced peace. It may force a semblance of peace but violence will eventually erupt again. Governments that come to power through violent revolution will eventually end up in a violent coup d’état.” Kunhiyop answers the “we have no more cheeks left to turn” attitude by examining each of the relevant passages. Christ was not advocating pacifism, but a constructive, non-violent resistance compatible with self-defence. Scriptures clearly forbid the exacting of vengeance whether through violence or civil courts. Turning the other cheek is not a passive submission but an active assertion of one’s dignity and value as a human being. No longer can the oppressor scorn or treat the oppressed as insignificant. However, when the government is not able to ensure the maintenance of law and order it is appropriate to adopt means of self-defence.

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858 Kunhiyop, 2004, p.133.
When one is outside the protection of armed authority, possession of arms for protection of family and the weak is appropriate. This is the clearest position on self-defence. Self-defence is proper. A position of nonviolence in dealing with oppression and injustice does not contradict a position of self-defence or defence of family or even one’s church.

In Nigeria, where the enemy has targeted families and churches for destruction, it would be appropriate for a person to take up the sword and protect himself and his family. It is unwise and irrational not to protect one’s household if it is being attacked by armed bandits.861

Nevertheless, Christians should keep the door open to reconciliation, to the search for justice, to love and to forgiveness. An essentially non-violent response allows for dialogue and reconciliation when feelings subside. Reconciliation takes place when everyone feels their grievances have been resolved, when they know justice. There can be no reconciliation without achieving justice. However, none of this is possible without implementing the Biblical command to love your enemies and with that to forgive them. “Only love of the enemy and the determination not to use force or violence will win conflicts, wars against injustice and win the enemy. Hatred and war have never solved problems.”862

3.3 Love

Unanimously, every ECWA interviewee agreed with the Biblical imperative to love your enemy no matter what the circumstances. The bulk of the DCC leaders thought similarly, albeit with some raising the political nature of the violence. Similar responses were received from ECWA laity. The majority of responses from other Christian leaders were similar. One got a sense that this was a well-taught belief, but that not many respondents had done much practical working out what loving your enemy involved.863 Thus, when other Christian leaders were asked if ECWA was showing love to its enemies, there was a wide spread of opinions. Some agreed it was, some did not know what ECWA’s position is, and some felt that it was not. Other suggested the real issue is the individual Christian’s maturity, and some felt that the real issue is the war of obliteration that Muslims are engaged in, in which forgiveness is extremely difficult.

Garba outlined the Biblical teaching well.

The Bible teaches that: (i). We must not repay anyone evil for evil. (ii). We must be careful to do what is right in the eyes of everybody. (iii). As far as it depends on us, we must live at peace with everyone. (iv). We must not take revenge but leave room for God’s wrath. (v). Vengeance belongs to God. When we take revenge, we usurp God’s function. (vi). We must not be overcome by evil, but overcome evil with good. (vii). We must love our enemies, feed them when they are hungry, and give them drink when they are thirsty. (Deuteronomy 32: 35; Proverbs 25: 21, 22; Romans 12: 17-21). 864

Tapkida referred to Christ’s teaching in the Sermon on the Mount, and the ministry of reconciliation in 2 Cor. 5:18f. “We have experienced agape: the undeserved kindness and love of God which others have not experienced. If we are like our Father in heaven we would extend agape to these people as well even though they don’t deserve it.” 865

“This is where theory and practice are two different things. It is expected that the teaching will be to love enemies as yourself; to prefer the other. Theoretically the teaching is being done. But when it comes to practice I am not sure there is much to be showcased.” 866 Para-Mallam’s comments encapsulate the quandary. Repeated riots in Jos and Kaduna, for example, have effectively led to a religious/ethnic cleansing of certain areas. In Kaduna, most Christians live in the south of the city. In Jos, Muslims have left areas like Tudun Wada and Rayfield concentrating, for example, along the Bauchi Road instead. How can friendships be built and love shown when most Christians and Muslims live entirely separate lives, meeting only when at work or shopping?

All the Nigerian respondents suggested that seizing opportunities to build relationships would help cross these barriers. Some cited personal examples of how they had helped Muslims in need. One or two had Muslim friends whom they sought out after the 2001 Jos riots. Others spoke of the considerable impact of the social services that ECWA inherited from SIM – clinics, hospitals, rural development programmes, and schools – all of which Muslims had benefited from in the past, and to an extent still do. Visiting neighbours and sharing in their lives, as well as community projects was also mentioned. Many of these ideas mentioned, however, did not require much personal effort on the part of the individual suggesting such. Someone else was doing the action for which the individual was not responsible.

864 Garba (04/06/2006).
Only one ECWA leader\textsuperscript{867} was working with Muslims showing practical love to the destitute.

Surprisingly, praying for Muslims attracted little comment from other Christian leaders, was only mentioned along with evangelism by about fifty per cent of the ECWA laity and ECWA interviewees, and was not mentioned at all by DCC leaders. Undoubtedly, most of these people pray daily. Yet the lack of mention of prayer in relation to these communal conflicts when all would assert that prayer is at the heart of the Christian life is troubling. For prayer is a key way for Christians to express their love for God, and their concern for others, trusting in God to change hearts and attitudes, and bringing their own thinking and desires into conformity with the will and purposes of God. Given the increasing physical barriers to actual contacts with Muslims presented by the cantonisation of many cities, towns and villages, surely, this is one way through which Christians could relatively easily begin to bridge those barriers?\textsuperscript{868}

The cantonisation of the cities did not entirely erode opportunities. The Life Challenge training course formerly offered by SIM, for example, not only trained Christians in evangelising Muslims, but also just as importantly helped them understand where Muslims are coming from. In Kaduna, Imam Muhammad Ashafa and Pastor James Wuye, a Pentecostal pastor, lead the Muslim–Christian Dialogue Forum. To worldwide acclaim, they have pioneered reconciliation and dialogue.\textsuperscript{869} Rather, as discussed in Chapter Six, many ECWA members are not interested, finding life safer to stay within the confines of one’s own community.\textsuperscript{870}

For Christians are confused how to reconcile the Biblical injunction of loving your enemy with protecting your family and defending your civil rights. Kunhiyop expressed the dilemma well.

I think that the Bible asks us to love our enemies but this has to be put in context. . . loving the enemy will have to be put in concrete terms. It doesn’t mean denying my own existence or that he can destroy my family and I just watch. We need to break down what this love of the enemy really means. If Muslims want to destroy JETS what does loving the enemy mean? Does love of enemy mean that I sell my birthright? It doesn’t mean that I cease to be logical or human. We have not been able to deal seriously with what love of enemy means in our own context. If in an

\textsuperscript{867} Motty (14/12/2005).
\textsuperscript{868} Muslims pray publicly five times daily thus showing how important prayer is in their lives.
\textsuperscript{870} In the same way over the last 40 years in N. Ireland Catholics and Protestants have increasingly lived separate lives only mixing when at work, or shopping. It has often proved safer, and less troubling to live completely separately and educate children entirely separately.
election someone wants to buy all our votes or be killed does love of enemy mean that I surrender all of my political rights? If someone slaps me because I want to preach the gospel in Zamfara then I don’t slap back. But then try to get him to understand religious freedom and freedom of speech. It is right to appeal to my rights as a Nigerian, but to use his religious rights to deny my rights as a national of the country – that is where issues are confused.  

Ari described the problem, “What happens in Nigeria sometimes becomes a war situation. If it is a war situation you would not expect somebody just to lie down for somebody to kill him. Either he runs away or you put him out of action before he puts you out of action. . . This is instinctive, this is part of us.”  

Maigadi summed it up.  

It is a situational thing here: our theology is gradually becoming situational. When we are pushed to the wall, we align with the existing situation and interpret Scripture to suit us. Difficult and complex: how does one stand when defending one’s family? Is the crisis political, or is the crisis based on my faith? These are the struggles we have. If someone comes to attack me for political reasons then I need to defend myself. If it is a faith issue then I have to face the issue of me sacrificing myself for the sake of the unbeliever. The parallels with persecution in the early church are not exact: it is different here. Hence, Christians and non-Christians are involved in the crisis.  

Solutions are not easy, but “where there is no vision the people perish”. Tapkida and Tangbuin spoke of their opportunities in the TEKAN churches to teach peace theology and establish a Peace office, so concerned were those churches to promote peace and reconciliation. However, after one semester of teaching peace theology in JETS, the course was pushed aside for something else. This may well have been for legitimate reasons, yet the course’s abolition gives one the impression of an organisation unable or unwilling to proactively engage with one of the most pressing issues in Northern Nigeria.  

3.4 Evangelism  
The Joint Committee mentioned above decided to look afresh at ways to better co-ordinate evangelising Muslims. A number of agencies connected to ECWA were identified, and it was agreed that a proper Missions Department should co-ordinate their work, and do some strategic thinking about future developments. In the past  

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872 Ari, 24/04/2006.  
873 Maigadi, 29/12/2005.  
874 Proverbs 29:18 KJV  
875 Tapkida (08/02/2007), Tangbuin (19/04/2007).
ECWA relied on EMS as a *de facto* Missions Department; however, the Committee recognised EMS was not capable of functioning in this way.

Evangelising Muslims has not been a high priority for the bulk of ECWA people. There remains, however, a minority interest in evangelism, which is increasingly effective as a cross-fertilization of ideas between ECWA members and outside agencies interested in Muslim evangelism takes place.

### 3.4.1 SIM Efforts

A natural progression of the NLFA outreach was evangelising the Fulani nomads through whom Islam arrived in Hausaland in the fifteenth century with the Toronkawa group settling in Hausa towns and villages, devoting themselves to the study of Islam and eventually providing the leadership for dan Fodio's *jihad*. The remaining Fulani remained nomads blending a syncretistic mix of Islam and traditional beliefs. In November 1969, NLFA held a seminar in Sokoto to examine better ways of evangelising the Fulani. It found that Fulani evangelism is difficult, both because of their nomadic nature and because of the high missionary casualty rates. Yet VanGerpen, in conclusion, emphasised their receptivity to the Christian message. In 1968, he surveyed 80 people across Northern Nigeria who had converted to Christianity from Islam. Nineteen of those converts were Fulani of whom seven were women, a relatively high proportion when compared to other Muslim women converts.

SIM Nigeria, which was already seeking to evangelise the Fulani, has continued to recruit missionaries to specialise in Fulani evangelism ever since. However, it has never proved possible to maintain a viable missionary team. Low numbers, isolation, and ill health have been constant problems, reflecting the spiritual opposition this work entails. It was this ethnic-focused approach that Dr Garba, himself a member of the Toronkawa, questioned, suggesting the time had come to view Islam and not ethnicity as the unifying focus of evangelistic outreach.

VanGerpen, using Islam in Africa Project training, had earlier developed a series of duplicated information sheets. Called *Notes on Islam* they were dispatched monthly...

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876 NLFA, *Fulani Seminar*, SIM Sokoto, 5<sup>th</sup> – 7<sup>th</sup> November 1969, SIMA Box 044.
878 Tait, P., *ECWA/SIM Joint Committee Minutes*, 30<sup>th</sup> August 2006
from SIM Headquarters in Jos to SIM missionaries. In these notes, he illustrated from the Apostle’s Creed the differences between Christianity and Islam. He then discussed different issues, such as whom God is, Jesus Christ, sin, salvation etc, exploring similarities and differences between each religion’s understandings of the issues, before recommending how best a Christian can witness to a Muslim in light of that particular explanation. VanGerpen concludes in No. 25 when he highlights the basic difference between Islam and Christianity. Besides doctrinal and ethical differences, he sees the core distinction being over the nature of spirituality. For the Christian, the true meaning of the physical is in the spiritual, whereas VanGerpen argues that for the Muslim the true meaning of the spiritual is in the physical. For the Christian

The meaning of the spiritual is Divine Personality Who expresses Himself in goodness, truth, beauty, and most of all, love. Man was created a spiritual being, capable of becoming a child of God. . In this sense, both God and man are spiritual beings. Because of this, man can relate to God, and for the Christian, this personal relationship does, in fact exist.

Islam does not acknowledge this kinship. God and man are kept separate. Muslims are like the Jews who were to love the Lord with all their heart, but instead kept Him only in their phylacteries on their arms and foreheads (Duet. 6:4 – 9). And when God spoke to them through Jeremiah “I will put my law in their inward parts and in their hearts will I write it,” they couldn’t understand what He was saying.880

On leaving Nigeria, Gerry Swank headed up SIM’s Outreach Ministries Office facilitating SIM’s evangelism. This largely entailed research into ethnic groups and geographical areas where Christian allegiance was minimal, often due to Islam’s influence. This in turn facilitated various consultations on Muslim evangelism in which SIM was involved. In September 1977, SIM held a consultation, which preceded a wider consultation held by the Lausanne Continuing Committee in October 1977. In his preparation for these, Swank’s train of thought is clearly moving in a contextual direction as he asks questions about making the Christian message culturally relevant to the potential convert.861 In a background paper prepared for the October consultation, Swank compared the growth of Christianity and Islam in sub-Saharan

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879 See bibliography for a full list of these Notes as available in SIMA.
881 Swank, G.C., Consultation on Islam. Letter and Briefing Paper to Ian Hay, 22nd August 1977, Islam Box 1, File 3-c, SIMA. In so doing, he appears to be adopting McGavran’s homogeneous unit principle that states, “Men like to become Christians without crossing racial, linguistic or class barriers.” McGavran, D.A., 1980, p.223.
Africa. He first examined Muslim awareness of Christianity accompanied by the very limited plans by Christian missions to evangelise Muslims. There followed a series of case studies in which Swank argues that,

The impact of Christianity across sub-Saharan Africa has met this Muslim advance head-on and has brought it to a standstill. Christianity on the whole is now making more converts from the traditionalists than Islam is. Islam continues to grow by biological growth but Christianity is growing far faster at a rate of something above 6% per annum on average.  

None of this was easy. Work among Nigeria’s Nupe people required long-term commitment before any response could be expected. The Maguzawa were similar, resisting Christianity for many years. Nevertheless, just as the mainly traditionalist Maguzawa were becoming responsive to Christian evangelism so too, Swank felt, were the Isawa Islamic sect, and the Fulani nomads.

Among Hausa Muslims, however, Swank estimated that less than a thousand had become Christians, and most of those lived in Niger. Many more were aware of Christianity, but very few really understood the Gospel. Through Christian social services, many Muslims had grown to trust Christians and acknowledge that their message was true. However, social pressures prevented conversion. Others never really understood, despite hearing the Gospel preached numerous times. Muslim preconceptions, prejudices, and distorted views filtered out the message.

Swank’s actual presentation to the October consultation followed similar lines analysing statistics about Christian missionary work amongst Muslims and using a communication model to analyse the effectiveness of missionary work in terms of the source of the message, the message communicated, the receiver’s comprehension and the static that gets in the way. Swank again majors on evangelism among the Fulani, and the Isawa. These groups were deemed more responsive to the Gospel than other Islamic groups. Increasing numbers of Fulani attended ECWA Bible Schools, and he described concrete measures taken by NLFA to train rural Nigerian Christians in evangelising the Fulani nomads who wandered through their districts.
Coupled with radio broadcasts, and cassette tape distribution, he hoped for an authentically Fulani church right across West Africa.

3.4.2 SIM-COME  

Brant took over from Gerry Swank as SIM’s Outreach Co-ordinator later becoming Deputy General Director. He argued that Peter Wagner and other Western missiologists were wrong to think that by 2000 Africa would be a Christian continent. Nor did he agree with Gerry Swank’s argument that the spread of Christianity had stopped the southward march of Islam and Christianity was growing faster than Islam’s biological growth. Brant, using statistics from David Barrett, argued that, between 1970 and 1980 Islam was growing faster than evangelical Christianity in all but two of thirteen countries surveyed. Analysis by David Skinner, from the University of Santa Barbara, of the situation in Nigeria, Ghana, and Sierra Leone suggested that Islam’s rapid growth was linked to increasing urbanisation. To support his theory Brant relied on his survey of thirty SIM missionaries. They reported a flood of funding and personnel for mosque and Islamic centre construction, copying Christian missionaries’ use of literature and videos, and behind the scenes activities to limit the effectiveness of Christian work, jamming radio broadcasts and restricting Bible importation. Brant saw the OIC controversy in Nigeria as the latest symptom of Islam’s threat. “If and when these countries put Shari’ah law into effect, it will be curtains for missions as we know it today for it will make propagation of the Christian Gospel illegal.”

Brant was being a little disingenuous. He accepts that Christianity overall has grown more rapidly than Islam, but what matters to him is that very little of that growth is the result of the work of conservative evangelicals. However, such a restrictive definition of Christian growth smacks of fundamentalism. Are the only real Christians those who are members of evangelical denominations? What of Pentecostalism’s growing numbers, or the growth of the charismatic movement in mainline denominations? What of those in the mainline denominations who are not comfortable identifying themselves with the charismatics? Many of these people have also undergone a

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887 Known as SIMCOME I – SIM Consultation for Muslim Evangelisation I.
conversion experience and are little different to those belonging to exclusively non-charismatic evangelical denominations.

In light of Brant’s fears, in January 1987 twenty-two SIM missionaries and seven consultants gathered in Liberia to discuss how to improve evangelistic effectiveness. The report they produced was adopted by SIM for use in all countries where it worked amongst Muslims.\(^{890}\) Muslim evangelism required spiritual depth and cultural sensitivity, not something that could just be organised into being. Disassociating themselves from any form of syncretism, universalism, or liberation theology, they affirmed a conservative, evangelical theological position with Christ being “the ultimate in God’s revelation to mankind,” implying that Christian and Islamic theologies are irreconcilable. Despite this, the meeting stressed a bridge-building approach using, for example, the lives of men of faith common to both religions as well as Old Testament themes that find their fulfilment in the New Testament. Contextualised lifestyles would also serve to build bridges as would thinking-through ways to sensitively help converts adapt their own lifestyles and worship styles to their new faith. Above all, building long-term relationships with Muslims, and using a chronological approach to explaining the Bible were central to this emphasis.

A key ECWA participant in the Liberia meetings was the late Iya Garba Shelley. An Islamics specialist, he argued that much of the Islamic agitation current in the 1980s\(^{891}\) was due to Arab racism and colonialist attitudes towards Black Africans. Northern Nigeria, because of its Islamic links, has been more Arab than African in its identity. Thus:

> The so-called major tribes in Northern Nigeria have used the religion to exploit, discriminate, segregate, and to eliminate other tribes from participating fully in the government, as free citizens and indigenes of the state. This has also been the antithesis of the workable agreement for peace and tranquillity among the different religions and tribes in Northern Nigeria. The paper . . . sees tribalistic and un-Islamic attitude which for centuries has hindered the progress, peace and acceptability of Islam by many other tribes in the North. Instead, the politics has replaced the religion and the religion has encouraged the political domination and enmity. This is the problem which many good Muslims including the government have seen, but have no courage to voice.\(^{892}\)

Behind many problems in Northern Nigeria, therefore, lies this attitude of superiority and tribalism. Shelley does not believe the problem is with the competing religions _per se_, but with ethnic relations. Islam in Northern Nigeria, he argued, is declining

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\(^{891}\) He died suddenly in 1988.

rapidly because of these attitudes, as non-Hausa-Fulani Muslims turn away from Islam in disgust.

It may not be long that non-Hausa-Fulani Muslims may have to decide where they stand, either to tolerate being second class Muslims or to re-unite with their tribes and leave Hausa-Fulani Muslims alone. The latter is very optimistic. . . Hence, the enemies of Islam in the North are not Christians nor people of traditional religion but Hausa-Fulani Muslims. 893

This decline, in turn, was making Muslims “as angry as a leopardess which has been deprived of its kitten,” 894 For Islam was increasingly intolerant. As Wahhabism and Shiite beliefs grew, Shelley wondered if Northern Nigeria would become as strife-torn as Lebanon. A number of factors had come together such as the OIC controversy; the riots; the well-organised nature of Muslim attacks on Christians after the Kafanchan riots; anti-Christian media programmes; as well as Muslim literature he had access to. 895 In light of these and other factors, Shelley shares the Christian unease with both traditional rulers and government believing that in some way they foster the violence.

Rather than retaliate he called on Christians to pray for the peace of Nigeria. Many problems could be resolved if people were prepared to dialogue with each other. “Most of the religious conflicts in Nigeria are mainly tribal and sectional. Ignorance plays the most important part in destabilizing peace; we need knowledge to minimize the confusion and to re-establish the relationship and strong Nationalism.” 896 Christianity and Islam had a long period of interaction in Arabia with Christianity influencing Islam in a number of ways. Thus:

It is interesting to know that the Qur’an does not claim to have brought a new religion, but that of Ibrahim and the prophets. This should give us a new thought, unlike what some Nigerian Muslims who say, “Mutamaki Allah Kashe Kafirai,” (Let’s help God kill the infidels). This is exactly what brings the religious disturbances in the country.

The peace and progress of Nigeria does not depend only on industrialization as the economists make us to think, but on the true understanding of the teachings of the religions. There we learnt to respect the rights of each other, to be true citizens of our country through patriotism. . . Each Government can succeed in its administration if it does not interfere into religious matters of its citizens except

894 Shelley, 1987 b, p.9
895 In particular, he mentions Shaykh Abdal-Qadir Al-Murabit’s The Sign of the Sword, (Madina Press, 1984) that applies Umar Ibn Khutub’s fundamentalist Islamic approach to eliminating Christians; an approach he says Muslims followed exactly in the Kafanchan riots.
where human rights are denied or where tribalism has come in, or human life is in danger.897

Christians wishing to evangelise Muslims, therefore, need to carefully analyse the people they are seeking to reach. Shelley divides Muslims into five different types: the rich educated; the rich illiterate; the radical educated; the Qur’anic, and the educated in Qur’anic but poor.898 Each has specific spiritual needs that must be addressed in evangelism. Seeking to help people, respecting them as equals, practical help through social services, medical and educational work, and contextually appropriate approaches all help to bridge those barriers dividing Muslims and Christians.

3.4.3 SIM-COME II

This contextual approach, so evident in the Monrovia consultation, was also the main feature in SIM’s second consultation on Muslim evangelism held in Charlotte, North Carolina (its acronym was SIM-COME II).899 The report recounts a variety of innovative approaches that missionaries used. Several features relate to Nigeria: the late Mai Kudi Kure, then EMS Director, being a key participant. All those attending the consultation were very conscious of the spiritual cost of their work. Islam rejects vehemently, and occasionally violently, any attempts to convert Muslims. While advocating a contextual approach in general, the consultation felt limits needed to be placed on using the Qur’an and the Hadith in direct evangelism: Kure suggested the only credible use of the Qur’an is by a converted Muslim. Once a Muslim has converted there then needed to be a considerable period of re-orientation so that he looked to the Bible alone, and not to the Qur’an or the Hadith, for his answers.900

Kure spoke of the challenges of evangelising Nigerian Muslims. The upsurge in Islamic-sponsored violence made him feel like Jonah wishing for the destruction of his enemies. However, he realised that God requires the Christian to love his enemies. The strength of Christian rejection of the government’s OIC membership

897 Shelley, Eclipse., p.15. cf. Nwanaju, p.382 where Procmura’s General Adviser commenting on Shelley’s sudden death said, “Rather than confrontation, he favoured cooperation between Christians and Muslims in respect for basic human rights.”
had forced the government to retreat. Islamic fundamentalism's agenda was still clear, however, and it behoved Christians to have a clear understanding of the Muslims' historical, geographic, and cultural origins. It was not easy evangelising Muslims, but it could be done: he referred to some important Muslims comparing the Bible with the Qur'an with some among them ready for baptism. Dialogue did not seem to work well, “...dialogue between Muslims and Christians, investigating the religions together is not the best way to reach them. This often leads to heated debates, increased hate between the groups. There is nothing wrong in discussions concerning the religions but not debate.”

The difficulty Kure faced, working within ECWA's confines, was that he was bound by ECWA rules. Such forbade, for example, baptising polygamists. Following contextual principles would have provided a temporary solution to this problem. As an ECWA member, however, he did not have that option. Common to all, however, was the long, patient, sometimes-difficult process of befriending and witnessing to Muslims prior to baptism, followed by carefully training and encouraging the new convert in his faith. This took a lot of prayer, cultural sensitivity, and awareness of the individual's educational level. Not everyone in ECWA understood this. Thus while SIM-related churches such as ECWA were very conscious of the increasing challenges posed by Islam, they were not always prepared to be adaptable in their outreach to Muslims, in part because many did not fully understand what was needed.

3.4.4 Recovering an Evangelistic Vision
A contextual approach, however, will not work if Christians have lost the vision for evangelism. Addressing that problem was Panya Baba, Kure’s predecessor as EMS Director. In his Presidential Address to the Thirty-Ninth ECWA General Church Council, Baba reminded his colleagues of their spiritual heritage in Christ. In particular, he spoke of the gospel of reconciliation.

It is only the Church of Jesus Christ in the unity and love of Christ that can bring healing and peace to our segregated and torn societies in Nigeria and indeed the whole world. We need to be converted from tribalism, racism, and ethnicism. We

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902 Often inherited directly from SIM. Whereas SIM’s perspectives have changed over the years, ECWA's often have not, leading to the paradox of the founding mission being more flexible in its approach than the church it began.
need a new conscience and a new heart recreated and made anew by the Cross of Christ.\footnote{904}

Nigeria needed to hear this gospel of reconciliation. Only through it, could there be real peace and justice. Most people were fed up with incessant violence. Prejudice, discrimination, misgovernment, and divisive politics were among the factors Baba identified as causing the violence. The government itself seemed to be part of the problem. “We have observed with great disappointment that the State cannot put an end to such incessant social violence and crisis because those who man and control the State machinery are themselves biased towards these sub-national, tribal, and religious sentiments and interests.”\footnote{905}

It is to this situation that the gospel of Jesus Christ brought a message of peace and justice. In it, Baba declared, is true equality before God, and the true formula for peace and co-operation among all sorts of people. The State, as God’s representative on earth, is charged with “creating and making equal all groups and people before it.” The State, however, has been partial in its handling of the divisions in Nigerian society. But:

In Christ Jesus, all walls of tribal, ethnic, racial, and sectional divisions have been destroyed and abolished. All have been made one in Christ. In Christ, tribal, ethnic, racial, and sectional weapons and walls of divisions are done away with. They have no place in the new humanity created by Christ. And this is our message to our dear country today.\footnote{906}

However, while this is the heart of the Gospel, it was not a message the Nigerian church had proclaimed properly. In an oblique criticism of ECWA’s evangelistic zeal Baba called for renewed vigour in Gospel proclamation.

The deep-seated mistrust, conflict, and hatred that is brewing up between Muslims and Christians and also between ethnic groups need to be addressed seriously by the Church in Nigeria. We have the message of peace, of justice and of hope.

We need to present to our nation a message that will unite the people, create and make equality out of unequal peoples, and groups and bind them together in the bond of human brotherhood, and solidarity and peace in both Christ and God. We need to present a message that will become a bridge between people, and a network of trusted relations between groups and people.\footnote{907}

All of this is theologically correct. Ultimately, as Panya Baba outlined, for Christians the only way of true reconciliation is through the Gospel. Christians believe that Islam

\footnote{904} Baba, P., \textit{The Presidential Address of Rev Dr Panya Baba to the Thirty-Ninth General Church Council of the Evangelical Church of West Africa (ECWA)}, 4th – 8th July 1992, Jos, p.3. SIM Nigeria files.  
\footnote{905} Baba, p.5.  
\footnote{906} Baba, p.6.  
\footnote{907} Baba, p.6.
subjugates free will in obedience to Allah and Shari’ah law. In so doing, however, Islam buries resentments and problems allowing them to fester and explode in recurrent bouts of hatred and violence. The Christian approach through the transformation of the individual’s mind and heart is held to be ultimately more successful. Transformed emotions lead to changed perspectives and attitudes thus building a longer lasting peace. Officially, therefore, ECWA sees evangelism as the main remedy for the problem of religious violence. The 2004 GCC made evangelising Muslims one of its top priorities. The aforementioned joint committee discussed different types of evangelistic outreach some of which was referred to in Chapter Six.

Chapter Six also discussed complaints from church leaders about the church members’ declining interest in evangelism. The chapter noted that another factor militating against evangelism is ECWA’s bureaucratic superstructure and fascination with politicking. This quashes evangelistic vision and action in a blizzard of committee meetings, fund-raising, and pushing paper. Different groups are quite successful so long as they retain their autonomy from ECWA bureaucracy. Some specialise in actual evangelism, some in training and mobilising Christians to evangelise, and others in pastoral care and reorientation of Muslim converts. They find in ECWA a conservative evangelical church that provides a foundation and framework for their work, and a ready pool of dedicated personnel who share their vision. However, they feel that the closer to the ECWA bureaucracy one gets, the less there is of this evangelistic vision. For example, for years EMS has struggled with its administration and financing despite the commitment and dedication of many prominent ECWA congregations. As mentioned previously, EMS missionaries’ poor levels of Islamic training have hindered their work. The net result, therefore, is a stifling of vision and frustration of effort.

Some of this is because non-Muslims do not understand the Islamic mind-set; some because evangelism has not been targeted properly relying on the mistaken idea that work among the Fulani nomads with their syncretistic Islamic faith was of the same nature as reaching the devout core of the Hausa Muslims. Thus, Hussaini felt he had to move to Kano and take hands-on responsibility for training and supervising thirty

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908 Samaila, (16/11/2006). Evangelism and church planting is listed as the first strategic priority in the ECWA Strategic Plan, 2006 – 2015. The plan puts considerable emphasis on training, mobilisation, and planning.
909 Tait, P., (30/08/2006).
910 Stephen P Baba, the current EMS Director, formerly pastored a church in Abuja that supported 30 EMS missionaries.
missionaries in the Kano area. The church, he felt, was resting on its laurels, caught up in its bureaucracy. If only, he felt, ECWA would capitalise on its good reputation among the Hausa Muslims.\textsuperscript{911} Hassan agreed, speaking of the ECWA system as killing vision because those holding the vision did not fit into the system, because of where they came from, or that they did not belong to the right clique.\textsuperscript{912} Kogo called for a new approach to evangelism.

. . . ECWA has been saying that EMS missionaries are the backbone of ECWA but I don’t see that. ECWA is just maintaining what has been in the past. There is now more fanaticism, more aggressive approach against the Gospel, taking a new form of fanaticism. But, ECWA is maintaining the old ways, but by now ECWA should have come up with new methods, for example, tent making, involving new people etc. If today ECWA can support 1000 missionaries in Kano State there are places where they can be placed and they will be given a special training. They can work either as a missionary, or in a small-scale business with the aim of reaching the people. . . I have found Muslims very ignorant of Christianity, and if secretly told about the Gospel they will respond. . . With the radio half-hour the number of calls we have been receiving shows that people are ignorant of the Gospel and want to hear about it more and more.\textsuperscript{913}

3.4.5 Developing Relationships

However, while ECWA definitely needs to renew its vision for and its thinking about evangelism, thought also needs to given as to how ECWA relates to the Muslim community. A common accusation is that Christian evangelism is a major cause of Muslim resentment that in turn develops into violence. The implication of such an accusation is, of course, that peace will only be restored when Christians cease evangelising Muslims.

Indeed, a net effect of the repeated violence, as noted above, is the cantonisation of Nigerian cities, the forcible separation of Muslim and Christian communities, hindering contacts and Christian motivation for evangelism, and thus preserving the Islamic community and territory from Christian incursions. Some of the violence, therefore, can be regarded as the Muslim community retreating into itself, rejecting the outside world, and trying to safeguard its territory from incursions by Western or Christian (the two concepts being identical in popular Islamic thinking) influences.

\textsuperscript{911} Hussaini (20/07/2006).
\textsuperscript{912} Hassan (15/05/2006). cf. Atiyaye (15/05/2007).
\textsuperscript{913} Kogo (21/07/2006). Kwashi (16/05/2007) and Tsetu (11/05/2007) both felt ECWA had a large pool of Hausa-Fulani converts who could be better utilised in Muslim evangelism.
However, Kalu writes; “The d’awaah and the great commission are like hypnotic drums calling followers to a modern form of a crusade.” He goes on to point out how charismatic refusal to compromise or to accept Islamic territorialisation as lying behind both vigorous evangelism and violent responses. Yet, as shown in previous discussion, the violence emanates from a multiplicity of reasons, with ethnic and political factors having more of a role to play in causing the violence than specifically religious factors like evangelism. Moreover, while Muslims resent Christians evangelising Muslims, an essential feature of Islam is da’wah or evangelism. For both Christianity and Islam are essentially evangelistic in their very nature. When both religions are engaged in missionary work, it is deeply unfair to blame the evangelism of one as a primary cause of tension and violence between their adherents. Nor is the focus of the tension all in the one direction. Ahmadu Bello’s misuse of his prestige and status in trying to spread Islam in the early 1960s caused considerable upset and apprehension among non-Muslims. Currently Christians feel very aggrieved by the aggressive language and arrogant attitudes adopted by certain sections of the Islamic community.

What is needed, on both sides of the religious division is some realistic thinking and mutual respect. To begin with, as McCain earlier pointed out, the most successful Christian evangelistic campaign is unlikely to witness the conversion of 50 million Nigerian Muslims. It might possibly see over a long period a large number of conversions, but not in the short term. Similarly, Muslim radicals must realise that the Christian community will not be forced to submit to dhimmi or second-class citizen status in an Islamically dominated state. This is not to deny either the right to peacefully propagate their views and seek to win converts: it is merely recognising realities on the ground.

Secondly, Christian churches, such as ECWA, need to consider the form their evangelism takes. Those groups connected to ECWA that are seeing evangelistic success work quietly on an individual basis or through tactful radio programmes and discreet follow-up of enquirers. For this approach to successfully continue, and to spread, will require from ECWA leadership continued focus, careful thought, coordinated action, and financial commitment. The alternative is to allow bureaucracy and crisis management to capture their attention and resources.

This is an entirely different approach from the mass, evangelistic campaigns such as Reinhard Bonnke has undertaken in southern and central Nigeria, or from the high-profile television programmes using airtime purchased by the new Pentecostals. Nor is it the confrontational approach adopted by the late Paul Gindiri that was mentioned above. These approaches, which command enormous popular appeal among Christians generally, quite understandably raise tensions and give rise to the Competing Fundamentalisms model mentioned above. Moreover, these high profile evangelistic encounters are, in the end, counter-productive as the tensions they raise invariably lead to violence, in turn discouraging evangelism.\footnote{915}

Therefore, ECWA’s expectation that evangelism resulting in mass conversion will lead to the resolution of Nigeria’s inter-religious problems is unrealistic. McCain’s call for a consensus approach on both sides makes sense.\footnote{916} Kure, and others since, misunderstood what Shelly was calling for in dialogue. Without compromising both religions’ evangelistic responsibilities, Nigerian religious leaders need to find ways to build bridges between the communities so that both groups can live, work, and worship peacefully. To do this, however, will need both political vision and courage in order to withstand popular opinion and bureaucratic obstacles, and educate church members. It will also require a broader, more active approach to inter-religious dialogue both at the ECWA Headquarters level as well as among relevant DCC officials than has hitherto been evidenced.

### 3.5 Dialogue

Inter-religious dialogue is a vast and complicated theological discussion that ranges far beyond the scope of this study. Sufficient for this work’s purposes is an examination of any historical and contemporary perspectives on dialogue relating to ECWA. The theological heritage SIM left ECWA was limited, with major gaps relating to interactions with other religions.\footnote{917} This reflected the limited theological training of many SIM missionaries, as well as their hostility to both Islam and any form of ecumenism. Inter-religious dialogue, therefore, has never been a favoured, let alone a prominent, aspect of SIM’s work.\footnote{918}

\footnote{915} Besides which, crusade type evangelistic events may attract publicity for a year or two, but usually run out of steam after a couple of years.\footnote{916} McCain, D., ‘Which Road Leads Beyond the Sharia Controversy? A Christian Perspective on Sharia in Nigeria,’ in P. Ostien, J.M. Nasir and F. Kogelmann (eds) \textit{Comparative Perspectives} . . ., 2005, p.8.\footnote{917} Cf Mboedwam’s (02/05/2007) criticisms of ECWA.\footnote{918} Albeit Hall (18/01/2006), Foute (31/05/2006), Warkentin (16/02/2006) and Fuller (20/01/2007), for example, all expressed some cautious approval of such.
3.5.1 Theological Differences

Central to any SIM thinking about dialogue are the major theological differences between Christianity and Islam. In September 1977, Harold Fuller commended to Ian Hay an article written by Bruce Nicholls. In the article, Nicholls noted that evangelism is integral to both Christianity and Islam, and discussed the resurgence of Islam. The World Council of Churches (WCC) was exploring Christian – Muslim dialogue in an effort to resolve violent conflicts between Christians and Muslims across the world. In doing so, Nicholls alleged,

. . . a new Biblical hermeneutical principal, in which cultural factors become normative, is replacing the traditional hermeneutic of textual exegesis. This situational hermeneutic emphasises the relative rather than the absolute in God’s self-revelation. The unity of the Bible is fragmented into many cultural gospels.

The WCC had led the way in developing dialogue, a direction in which few evangelicals at the time dared to venture. Nicholls, however, asks two key questions. First, “how far is a change in communal relationships possible without a spiritual change of reconciliation to God through the Cross?” Secondly, “will dialogue become an alternative to evangelism?”

The same concerns still predominate. Walter Gschwandtner writes,

Institutional efforts in dialogue may prove helpful for reconciliation and peace building. It is certainly commendable to seek mutual understanding and negotiate towards peace and acceptance between communities in volatile areas such as Northern Nigeria, Sudan and many other hot spots on our continent. But, such meetings also carry with them the danger of theological compromise, and a denial or betrayal of given realities, especially in the suffering and injustice done to the Christians in various settings. Yet the greatest trick of the devil may be a minimization, or almost complete failure of the church’s mandate for evangelism among Muslims. It also causes great irritation and disorientation to many Christians about Islam and Muslims in general.

Gschwandtner suggests that, while dialogue is helpful in certain situations, there is also a strong case for proper apologetic debate. This he carefully distinguishes from polemics, which he regards as pointless. From a Christian viewpoint, apologetic debate serves to challenge Islamic assertions concerning the Bible and Christian

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921 Nicholls, p.2.
922 Nicholls, p.4.
faith and practice, simultaneously strengthening the Christian believer in his own understanding of the faith and courage in proclaiming it. It thus helps preserve Christians from compromising too far on the doctrine of God.

Gschwandtner expresses a core SIM concern. VanGerpen discussed the doctrine of God pointing out that Muslims believe God and Allah are identical as Islam is a successor religion to Christianity. Some “uninformed” Christians, VanGerpen states, share this idea of their common identity. While there are areas of mutual agreement, much depends on how both faiths define their terms. For example, both hold that God is one, but define “oneness” in different ways with Christians referring to the Trinity while Muslims stress the singularity of God. Thus, Islam denies a core element in the Christian understanding of God: the Trinity and with that the deity of Jesus Christ. As the two concepts of God are, therefore, quite distinct, despite some overlap, can they really be understood as identical?

The same approach seems evident in TC. Chris Abashiya distinguished between God and Allah when reacting to the conversion of his daughter to Islam. Danjuma Byang set out arguments against and for identifying Allah as the same God for both Christians and Muslims. He pointed out that a shared name does not necessarily imply a common identity, and secondly, the Christian understanding of the deity of Christ. In favour of a common identity is the idea that Muhammad was misinformed of the true nature of God and that non-confrontational explanations can reduce tensions and open doors for Muslims to embrace Christ. Byang clearly prefers the first view.

G.J.O. Moshay’s book, Who is this Allah? (stocked by ECWA’s Challenge Bookshops) advances this distinction. The book examines Islamic claims, practices, and shortcomings. Moshay stresses the distinctions between the religions including the suspect origins of the Qur’an, the violent nature of Islam dating from Muhammad’s day but also including recent terrorism, Muslim confusion over the Trinity and the deity of Christ, different visions of heaven, and who is eligible for entrance there. The Western world, Moshay believes, has ignored Islam’s real nature viewing the al-Qaeda organization and its sympathisers as an extreme minority view

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924 VanGerpen, E., ‘Who Is Allah?’ Note 2, Notes on Islam, Kano, nd, SIMA Box 045.
925 VanGerpen, E., ‘The Qur’anic Concept of Jesus,’ Note 3, Notes on Islam, Kano, nd, SIMA Box 045;
926 Byang, D., TC, No. 2, 1989;
928 Moshay, G.J.O., Who is this Allah? Bishara Publishers, Houston, 2002. The Crusades were thus primarily political wars fought on a religious pretext by nominal Christians.
when their views are, he believes, mainstream. Not that Christians should take up arms against Muslims. “Christianity is warfare. But its warfare begins and ends at the cross of Christ, and the victory announced at His resurrection.” Given, therefore, the differences between Islam’s different understanding of the person and character of Allah and Christians’ understanding of the person and character of God, Moshay concludes that Allah is not the proper name for God. He believes that Christians, despite the historical preferences of those converted from an Islamic background, should also abandon the use of the word.

This kind of reasoning lies behind the recent Nigerian Bible Society initiative to examine the use of “Allah” in the Bible. At least two of the participants disputed Moshay’s thinking, pointing out the differing terms for God already in use in the Scriptures, the long and cherished history of the term among Hausa Christians, and its key role in evangelising Muslims. While the understanding of the personality of Allah is quite different, that did not invalidate the continued use of the term by Christians.

One wonders, too, just how accurate Moshay’s assertions are. It is relatively easy to opt for clear distinctions when the true situation may be more nuanced. Abubakar Dawud Muhammad, when asked about Islamic relations with other faiths, pointed out:

When you take the relationship and that is what brings a little problem within the Muslims. Sometimes in the Holy Qur’an, harsh words are used against Christians and in some places are verses that use soft tones in considering the Christians. When you meet scholars, they say these are influenced by situations when they were revealed. But some Muslims are confused by this, for example depending on the harsh verses etc. Thus most of the Sufis, who look at the interpretation of these verses as beyond common understanding, are softer than the people like the Izala who look at the verses on a superficial level. For instance, myself, I cannot abuse a Christian as I look at it that the relationship between the two religions is a close relationship. Also I grew up and lived with Christians, and I can’t deny that we do not benefit from one another. But this perspective can’t be understood by other Muslims. They will not even accept it.

Umar Faruk Musa holds similarly, “Whomsoever you find to be your neighbour, you should hold to be your brother.”

930 Akaazua, S., Removing Allah, paper presented at Nigerian Bible Society’s Seminar on the Use of Allah in the Hausa Bible, Jos, 28th June 2008.; Garba, A., My Opinion on Removing the name Allah in the Hausa Bible, paper presented at Nigerian Bible Society’s Seminar on the Use of Allah in the Hausa Bible, Jos, 28th June 2008.
931 Muhammad, 17/05/2006.
932 Musa, 24/07/2006
SIM-related missionaries in Asia have also tried some innovative approaches. Rod Cardoza, who formerly worked with SIM in India, spoke of the C5 or Insider Movements. He wrote of how his participation in an International Study Programme in India studying Urdu and doing ethnographical research had made him aware of “realities among Muslims that didn’t line up with the myopic narratives I was hearing about Muslims from other Christians, including SIMers.” Essentially, he represents an approach that draws lessons from the early church’s incorporation of the Gentiles into what had previously been a totally Jewish church. Instead of ensuring the prior conversion to Judaism of the Gentile converts, the Apostle Paul fought to have them accepted as Gentiles with minimal cultural changes. The approach of the Gentile church to missions since then, however, has been perceived as the Christianization of nations, when the Scriptures speak of discipling the nations to obey Christ. Cardoza writes:

This position of Christianizing/proselytizing the nations reveals a Christian ATTITUDE about Islam and Muslims that is peace breaking, not peacemaking. It says loud and clear that Christians don’t accept the core identity of Muslims. It often blames Mohammed for all the excesses and unbiblical beliefs of Muslims today. Yet Christians don’t often consider how inconsistent this is with biblical history. Did Jesus blame Moses for how misguided Jews were when he began to correct their misperceptions of Torah (i.e., the book attributed to Moses)?

And because most SIMers go no farther than what Parshall calls C4, even SIM efforts at being "culturally sensitive" will not douse the fires of conflict among many Muslims, because such Christians can ultimately not accept any kind of Muslim identity as acceptable before God. . . Insider Missiology essentially liberates Christians from the peace breaking presumption that faithful Christians are obligated to 'convert' Muslims to some kind of 'Christian' identity in order to have any hope of heaven over hell. Focusing instead on discipling nations, what Jesus commissioned his disciples to do, is far more consistent with a classic understanding of Islam (submission to God), and therefore less likely to cause such intense conflict.

The challenge for these missionaries is to get beyond the Christian identity that Muslims perceive, perhaps by adapting the Messianic Jewish Christian model, which has cultural and ritual similarities with Islam, to enable Muslims to hear and understand the Christian gospel without the Western Christendom baggage that they perceive to be attached. However, this approach has attracted serious criticism, especially over the dangers of syncretism. Whether or not it would work in a Nigerian context has also been questioned. Dean Gil liland, a former missionary in Nigeria, believes that an attempt to try a similar approach in Nigeria collapsed due to the secrecy and clandestine nature of its leaders. Whereas this approach has been somewhat successful in countries where Muslims are the overwhelming majority, in Nigeria, as noted above, there is a substantial Christian church. Gilliland does not believe that Nigerian Muslim converts to Christianity would ever call themselves Muslims.

Therefore, the Nigeria situation is **totally different from** the one in “Islampur”. In Nigeria the churches are almost apostolic in their boldness before and among Muslims. Form contextualization (except in the far North) is seen as a kind of imitation of the Muslim way and therefore is looked upon as neither necessary nor desirable. Christian-Muslim confrontation saturates the life of Nigerian people – socially, politically, and religiously.

### 3.5.2 Trust

A combination, therefore, of historical prejudices, contemporary discrimination, perceptions of Muslim Hausa/Fulani arrogance, and SIM’s conservative theological heritage has left ECWA members reluctant to dialogue or debate with Muslims. When ECWA people are casually asked about dialogue the response often is that it is useless. In part, this is because either, they mistake dialogue for polemics, or that usually dialogue quickly degenerates into polemics.

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937 Responses to one’s own enquiries concerning this approach indicated that the expatriate missionary involved was being defrauded and deceived by members of the Izala sect.


939 Cf Turaki, 2005 where he believes dialogue is pointless as ultimately Muslims are part of a monolithic oppressive faith that demands total control and obedience.

940 Note the separate efforts of the Lutheran Church of Christ in Nigeria and of the Roman Catholic Church in promoting dialogue. The former, led by Archbishop Most Rev, Dr David Windizibiri held five international conferences between 1993 and 2005 the proceedings of which are noted in the bibliography. Occasionally an ECWA member attended in an individual capacity. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Jos, Most Rev. Dr. Ignatius Kagama wrote *Dialogue of Life*, (Fab Educational Books, Jos, 2006) in which he wrote of his own and the late Pope John Paul II’s attempts to build better relations between Christians and Muslims.
Eighteen of the ECWA interviewees opposed dialogue. Three did not state a reason for this but for fourteen, a lack of trust was the major problem. Of ECWA DCC leaders, eight opposed dialogue for broadly similar reasons. Seventeen of the ECWA laity also opposed dialogue, again for similar reasons, and thirteen other Christian leaders agreed with them. Some pointed to Islam officially discouraging its adherents from befriending non-Muslims. Too often, however, Muslims have broken their word, and cases from religious riots were cited where Muslims turned on their Christian friends and/or benefactors, or where Muslim leaders made all sorts of promises in official meetings only to renge when the meetings were over. Muslims, they state, want power and will use whatever means available, to obtain it. Kogo stated:

From the side of the Christians when there is dialogue, in most cases Christians have no problems. . . . If today Muslims will accept peace, Christians will live in peace with them. In most religious crises, Christians are being deceived in some places that there is no problem, but they are planning to go ahead and destroy Christians and their properties. Sabo da kaza, baya hanna yanka (because you are familiar with the chicken that you rear that will not stop you from killing it). In other words, no matter how tight your friendship is with a non-Muslim that will not stop you from killing him. Muslims are good at propaganda because they can tell lies: Christians tend not to tell lies. Lies are accepted in Islam for the progress and protection of Islam.

Okezie reflected:  
No. Because we have held several meetings. The Muslim comes to the meeting with his mind made up. This is Islam, you either accept it or leave it. So whatever anyone else says, I have not been in any meeting where they have shifted their position to accommodate any other opinion.

Sookdheo gives some understanding on the Muslim practice of *taqiyya* (dissimulation) which lies at the heart of this distrust.

It is important for non-Muslims to be aware that in classical Islam Muslims are permitted to lie in certain situations, one of which is war. This kind of permitted deception is called *taqiyya*. . . . Although supposedly only for emergencies, *taqiyya* has in practice become the norm of public behaviour among all Muslims – both Sunni and Shi’a – whenever there is a conflict between faith and expediency. It is also a useful device in times of conflict and war, and has obvious relevance in times of peace treaties and negotiations.

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941 Each respondent was asked, "Do you think that if Christians discussed their differences with Muslims in the hope of achieving peace that they would be successful?" No attempt was made by the author to further define the extent and depth of such discussion.
942 Kogo (21/07/2006).
943 Okezie (30/03/ 2006).
945 Sookdheo, pp.196 – 197.
Sookdheo shows from the Qur’an and the Hadith the justification for this practice. It occurs mainly among the Shi’a, but the Sunni also accept many of the supporting texts. In short, one is permitted to tell lies to one’s wife, in time of war, or in reconciliation. A Muslim can pretend to be friends with non-Muslims if that will advance the Islamic cause. Gschwandtner explains further the principles governing Sunni Muslim behaviour:

Sunnis who do not mindfully practice taqiyya--because it is not verbalized in their culture that way--practice different kind of stratagems, which are similar to taqiyya.

1- War is deception: established by Muhammad during the battle of the trench.
2- Necessities allow the prohibited: A fiqh role . . . allows Sunnis to break Islamic laws in order to avoid certain threats, not only when being persecuted . . . but also in extreme situations when someone’s life could be in danger.
3- Infidel’s self and possessions is spoils of war: this is newly re-introduced to the Muslim strategies by militant Islamic groups who believe that infidels and their possessions are owned by Muslims as they are spoils of war.
4- Ends justify the means: It is widely accepted in Islam to use any stratagem to reach one’s goal and bring glory to oneself and the ummah.

Returning to the interviews and questionnaire, five ECWA interviewees theologically disagreed with dialogue, one DCC leader felt the same, as did six of the ECWA laity, and three other Christian leaders. The only real answer was Muslim conversion. Without such, dialogue was a waste of time. Onamusi stated:

I don’t think that this attitude – ie of PROCMURA would work. We are not worshipping the same God. We need to tell them of the truth and live the Christian life. That is the way out.

Atiyaye advocated:

No, that is not an option at all. It is not a debate. We have light and life. They don't. So what are you going to compare with them? The issue is that Christians should be obedient to the command. God so loved the world. We should love and go to tell them about Christ.

Hassan agreed:

I think that PROCMURA has a dialogue approach to many things and some people talk of tolerance. The Bible doesn't teach tolerance but of loving your enemies. The issue of tolerance doesn't even arise. We know our position but it is the world that will hate us. We are to love those who will hate us. It is a matter of belief. The major premise is that there are people who hate us, and the Bible tells us to love those who hate us. The issue of dialogue and tolerance do not arise. It is at the secular level that compromise is tried but not in the Bible. If we reduce our status to the worldview of doing things then we lose our spiritual focus.

946 Refers to secondary Islamic laws developed from other sources to address situations the Shari’ah does not pronounce on.
947 Gschwandtner, W.E., E-mail to W.P.Todd, 29th September 2008. ummah is the Muslim community.
948 Onamusi (20/07/ 2006).
949 Atiyaye (15/05/2007).
950 Hassan (15/05/2006).
Other informants were open to the idea of dialogue. Ten ECWA interviewees cautiously thought that the idea might work, as did five of the ECWA DCC leaders, and two of the ECWA laity. Seven other Christian leaders felt similarly. For some it was worth a try, or might provide a temporary solution. It all depended on which groups discussions were held with; how honest people were going to be, and whether or not there was going to be outside interference. When asked if he thought discussing problems with Muslims would be successful, Maigadi replied:

Not complete success. Muslims have their own agenda. We may have relative peace but not absolute peace. What is happening in Nigeria has international connections; external influences coming in, especially from the Arab world. We may be working towards having peace with one another but the influences coming from outside will always deter that kind of process.  

Ityavyar, who has promoted Christian-Muslim dialogue, was also sceptical. To a reasonable extent, there would be temporary peace but not a lasting one. Discussing with Muslims would be a reasonable activity, but the root cause must be discussed. The root cause is honest confessions by politicians and their confession that truly they have been using religion to manipulate people and get their own interests... The root causes, sensitisation by the church leadership and taking religion out of the arena of politics and campaigns and political parties so that it will be truly independent – that would be more useful.

Thirteen ECWA interviewees supported dialogue, as did eight of the ECWA DCC leaders and eleven of the ECWA laity. Three other Christian leaders were in favour of dialogue. Several saw dialogue as a non-offensive means of explaining Christian beliefs, removing misunderstandings and clearing the air. Others saw dialogue in a broader socio-political context. Some noted the benefits deriving from government-sponsored committees promoting dialogue, although a few were more sceptical. All wanted to see dialogue further developed. Para-Mallam remarked, “It would be a step forward. The Chinese proverb is that the journey of 1,000 miles begins with one step. I support such.” Joseph, who promotes dialogue through his Centre for Peace Advancement, remarked:

Yes... On both sides, the majority are for peace. Unfortunately, the few people who are for violence have the upper hand. The media overemphasise negativity and thus compound the problem. Mainstream Muslims are the majority, and are moderate. In this organisation, we try to create a platform and a bridge that

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951 Maigadi (29/12/2005).
953 Ityavyar (09/05/2007).
954 Para-Mallam (1/03/2007).
connects the people on both sides who are willing to work for peace. It is that bridge that is lacking.⁹⁵⁵

ECWA minister Tapkida, who co-ordinates the Mennonite Central Committee’s West African Regional Peace Network, agreed, “I think so. We would have a better understanding of each other. The more we interact then the more we reduce the high level of suspicion. People tend to build high defence mechanisms and interaction reduces such.”⁹⁵⁶ His colleague Tangbuin spoke of the inter-religious Jos Emergency Preparedness and Response Team. Initially a relief organisation, it evolved into preventing violence through highlighting the consequences of offensive behaviour, promoting reconciliation, settling land disputes, and acting as election observers. Each team member is contactable by mobile phone so they can swiftly avert problems.⁹⁵⁷

Kunhiyop learned a lot from his participation in high-level dialogue. He explained,

People are beginning to realise that we present our theologies mainly in exclusive ways as if others do not exist: we don’t listen to them. Muslims have the same fears and suspicions about us. . . . Dialogue is important, being able to understand, what are they saying and not saying; what are we saying that they are not hearing. All of them [at the dialogue he attended in Sokoto] believed that all of the religions are equal. But we went thinking that Muslims think of themselves as superior. The Christian belief of the Imago Dei helps to develop dialogue.

We got our orientation from SIM, in other words, to preach the gospel, convert people from Islam and that way there will be unity and peace. There was no point in dialogue or in listening to them. But my own view is that we do not live in a theocratic society; we live in a multi-religious society and we need to listen to one another.

We will never reach a point where the differences will be erased. But we get a better understanding of who we are. Dialogue will help us to go to another level to know who we are and the things we believe in. If there is a dialogue then I can call a Muslim leader and discuss the problem.⁹⁵⁸

All three Muslim interviewees were also positive about dialogue. One got the feeling that they also faced a lot of scepticism about the value of dialogue from within their own community. Musa noted how he had been suspended from JNI for eight months because of the extent of his links with Christians, but was now getting some support and understanding from his colleagues for his bridge building efforts.⁹⁵⁹ Muhammad

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⁹⁵⁵ Joseph (06/02/2007).
⁹⁵⁶ Tapkida (08/02/2007).
⁹⁵⁷ Tangbuin (19/04/2007).
⁹⁵⁸ Kunhiyop (31/01/2006).
⁹⁵⁹ Musa, (24/07/2006).
acknowledged the frustration the Christians feel about dialoguing with Muslims, but pledged for such to continue.

Muslims are not making any effort towards dialoguing with the Christians. I understand that the Christians are tired as they have tried. But we need to continue efforts, even though most of the Muslims are not making any efforts towards dialogue. If you want the peace to reign you must hold the hand of your partner and show that person the way to peace. Some Muslims are interested but suspicions keep them apart. Dialogue should go beyond conferences to the market and even to our houses. We need to have Christian and Muslim friends who we can share food and drink with. In such situations you can discuss mutually beneficial things. Not just dialogue at leadership level but one that goes down deep to the grassroots.

4. Summary and Conclusion

The chapter sought to answer the question, “How can ECWA contribute to a solution of the Christian-Muslim divide in Nigeria?” In order to do this, it first considered the variety of models proffered as explanations for the violence. In turn, a selection of different conflicts was analysed. However, none of the conflicts fitted easily into any particular model, showing the complexity of the situation.

The chapter traces how ECWA has swung from a pacifist response to Muslim-inspired violence to accepting self-defence in the context of what some see as a religious war. Closer examination has shown ECWA ignoring the ethnic origins, and occult nature of some of the violence preferring to present either the very real sufferings of innocent Christians caught up elsewhere in the ensuing backlash, or the authorities’ bias as they occasionally seem to have been intent on ethnic cleansing. ECWA, and other churches have been left reeling by the violence, unsure how to respond.

Responses have varied including warnings of self-defence, radical calls to retaliate, confrontational evangelism, and talking of Christ’s love. The church, however, has not adequately analysed the causes of each incident, nor has it developed an adequate response to violence. It has also been criticised severely for being remote and aloof from the fray. Indeed, state governments, not churches, have calmed the violence, resulting in attitudes to Islam differing according to geographical context.

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960 Muhammad, 17/05/2006.
961 Several other church leaders felt ECWA H.Q. to be rather aloof, not mixing well with other Christian leaders, except in the context of CAN, and not being proactive in addressing conflict situations. Cf. Danfulani (10/02/2007), Mbodwam (02/05/2007), Mutum (18/05/2007). Lipdo (15/05/2006) felt ECWA H.Q. was remote and unsupportive of its own people in Islamic areas.
The violence and Islamic pressure have exposed the lack of teaching and theological depth in some parts of Nigerian Christianity. Some of this is due to the poor theological heritage bequeathed by SIM and its lack of adequate engagement with traditional religions. Some is also due to a suspect theological method needing replaced by a more holistic approach to theology. Church leaders are, however, beginning to provide relevant teaching confronting tendencies towards circumstantially controlled theology. There is a will among some to do more, with the majority of ECWA interviewees and the other Christian leaders suggesting a range of research, teaching and bridge-building measures that ECWA theologians could address to confront the problem. ECWA DCC leaders did not have a clear idea of what theologians could do, while the majority of ECWA laity also called for bridge building and dialogue.

As an initial step in this direction, some thought could be given to the principles set out in the afore-mentioned Kairos Document. This calls on Christian leaders to call their church members back to New Testament Christianity, to emulation of Christ, and to turn away from the “Fire for Fire” approach. It strongly recommends a passive resistance model as pioneered by Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King. In 2005 when CAN called a two-day period of national mourning and strike, nothing happened. However, when tried in Niger State it was remarkably successful, and the State Government noticed. The authors are well aware that this approach takes time and is not without cost. However, it is the kind of approach, along with prayer, that is Christ-like. Christians themselves, need to change. For Christians strength comes in weakness and dependence on God, in honesty and integrity, and in commitment from Christian leaders to resist evil.

Danny McCain also has some pertinent words to say. He is not an SIM missionary, having formed his own missionary organisation and working independently as Professor of Biblical Studies at the University of Jos. Nevertheless, he has many contacts with SIM missionaries and with ECWA leaders and churches. His invitation to give the recent Byang Kato Memorial lecture at the Jos ECWA Theological Seminary is, perhaps a sign that what he had to say reflected the message those in ECWA leadership are wishing to promote. He reflected on the crises he has experienced in the twenty-one years he has lived in Jos and called on Christian leaders.

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leaders to set some clear guidelines for the conduct of their members. Respect for life, fostering relationships, upholding justice and the rule of law, making full use of civil and political rights, forgiveness and prayer for others, obeying Christ's commands, personal integrity and holiness, accepting the reality of persecution, and trusting in the sovereignty of God all featured. The most recent problems in Jos indicated to him that Nigerian Christians could no longer rely on the state for answers. It was time for Christian leaders to take the initiative in being pro-active and practical in their efforts to break down barriers and build relationships that result in peace. This ties in with the observations above that whereas many could point to Biblical teaching, few actually practiced it. Even prayer for Muslims, a core practice of the Christian faith, seemed to attract little attention.

Others follow SIM's approach of concentrating on evangelism believing that the only solution for Nigeria's problems is in the Gospel of reconciliation. There has been a growing, and increasingly successful evangelistic work, especially around Kano and in southern Katsina State. This work, when carried out in a low-key, contextually appropriate manner, may well provide ECWA with new challenges relating to church structure, worship styles, and acceptable marital relationships. However, this will only happen if ECWA is willing to adopt new methods and renew its evangelistic zeal. Church leaders complained of a decline in evangelistic zeal while Nigerian evangelists complained of the overwhelming bureaucracy and quashing of evangelistic vision from the headquarters.

While a small majority of ECWA leaders and members oppose dialogue, a significant number of ECWA leaders recognise that evangelism on its own will not resolve all of the problems. They feel this justifies some investigation of a form of dialogue. The danger of theological compromise especially about the nature of God and the necessity of conversion remain cautionary concerns. So too does a serious lack of trust, the main reason advanced by those against dialogue. Nevertheless, enough significant leaders felt dialogue was worth exploring. Despite considerable misgivings they felt that measures to build contacts, and reduce tensions could only help to provide a stable basis for peace and security.

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Chapter Eight
Summary and Conclusion

To conclude this thesis a simple question provides the framework. “What has been learned from this research?” Answering this will entail summarising the historical background and the three main research questions, before attempting to define what ECWA’s attitudes towards Islam are.

1. Historical Background

The over riding impression here is how deep-seated the interreligious conflict is. In its roots, although not necessarily in its current form, it is an ethnic conflict predating the arrival of Christianity or British colonial authorities. Ethnic minority groups joined together in resisting the Hausa-Fulani conquest and enslavement that followed dan Fodio’s jihad and the creation of the Sokoto Caliphate. The prejudices arising from these struggles remain deeply felt. Ethnic minorities continue to complain of Hausa-Fulani pride and arrogance, and their perception of continued oppression lies close to the surface.

The white man’s arrival had two distinct effects. British conquest, while initially welcomed by some ethnic minority groups, was to prove disillusioning. Lord Lugard’s promises not to interfere with Islam, because he needed the literate Hausa-Fulani to assist in his “Indirect Rule” government, were interpreted as an excuse to prevent the expansion of missionary work into areas claimed by the Muslim emirs. Afraid of Mahdism; and lacking both resources and understanding to rule the minority groups, or to protect other white people, the British depended on the Muslim aristocracy’s support. Most colonial officials were university educated, middle class, and nominal in their religious beliefs. In common with educated opinion in Britain, many believed Islam to be a perfectly suitable intermediate religion for their African subjects. Thus emirate rule over the ethnic minorities, which had hitherto been quite tenuous, was consolidated, legitimate trade by the Hausa flourished under the pax Britannica, and Islam spread as never before.

Drawn from wider social classes and a more international constituency than the colonialists, missionaries viewed Islam as evil, and in their preaching taught the
equality of all men before God. A number of missions, such as the CMS and SIM, arrived in Northern Nigeria simultaneously with the British, and did not feel particularly beholden to them. Their call was from God and it was to Him they answered, not colonial officials. Their hope was that colonial expansion would open the doors for their evangelistic work – a hope denied until the 1930s. For many, especially in the early days of SIM, the saving of souls was primary, with the colonial desire to develop Nigeria paling into insignificance by comparison. Because of these social and cultural differences, and the revolutionary message they preached, many colonial officials disliked and distrusted the missionaries.

Initially missionaries followed British instructions to concentrate on the traditionalist ethnic minorities. Having established their work there, they pressed for permission to move into the emirates. This was not only to evangelise Muslims, whom they over-optimistically thought would respond quickly to their preaching, but also to reach the surviving traditionalists before they converted to Islam. Only in 1931 with Sir Donald Cameron’s appointment as Governor, did the pro-Islamic colonial policy in Northern Nigeria begin to change to a more nuanced understanding of minority ethnic groups’ needs.

The Phelps-Stoke Commission’s report, *Education in Africa* (1922), and the *Fraser Report* (1927), both highly critical of Northern Nigerian educational provision, spurred on changed attitudes by both government and missions to missionary involvement in social services. The missions signalled their willingness to cooperate, and after protracted negotiations, were permitted entrance to the emirates, using medical and educational work as a basis. In addition, missions were permitted to establish other more general evangelistic stations, using medical care to attract people to the station – the only place where missionaries were free to preach.

Fear of Muslim domination marked the missions’ reactions to post-World War Two constitutional developments leading to redoubled evangelism, and leadership training. Converts also networked and quickly political movements developed uniting ethnic minorities. While still a minority among their own ethnic groups, many of these Christians were natural leaders. As in Islam, so also in Christianity, ethnicity and religious adherence began to merge. Various political permutations ensued, mostly reflecting Middle Belt demands for their own region distinct from the Muslim-dominated Northern Nigeria. To forestall this, the British instituted the Willinks Commission. The missions however, obtained guarantees of civil and religious rights.
and reassurances from Ahmadu Bello, the Premier of the Northern Region. Afterwards, however, he began a series of missionary tours among the ethnic minorities. This considerably destabilised the country, and, coupled with problems elsewhere provided the backdrop for the first military coup.

Quickly Nigeria spiralled downwards towards civil war with the rebellious Biafra controversially alleging the Northern Nigerian anti-Igbo pogroms had been the beginning of an anti-Christian *jihad*. Nigeria’s post-civil war history has remained unstable with successive military governments interspersed by civilian rule. Most governments have been pro-Islamic, up until the Obasanjo presidential election in 1999, and in fits and starts since. Simultaneously there has been a marked upsurge in mass riots, usually originating from some section of the Islamic community. In response, Christians have abandoned pacifism for self-defence, and in some quarters, seek revenge. Suspicion, antagonism, ethnic and religious cleansing have ensued. Mortality rates have been horrendous, with little attempt to enumerate those injured or to cost the destruction. When one talks to survivors, or their friends and relatives, it is quickly evident that the scars run deep. Christians accuse Muslims of being behind these attacks. Muslims, pointing to widespread Muslim casualties, imply that Christians are responsible for these.

In Nigeria today boundaries between ethnicity, religion, and politics often overlap. For many the merging of ethnicity and religion predetermines political allegiances, attitudes to the nation’s legitimacy and acceptance of power structures. Within this questioning of the overall framework lie the ongoing micro-struggles with state creation, the search for ethnic autonomy and indigeneity. People owe loyalty to family, to ethnic group, and to local area rather than the state. These loyalties determine social constraints, and associated patronage obligations, thus creating opportunities for fraud and abuse of power elsewhere. However, the wealthy elite no longer feel restrained, seeking power and advantage wherever possible. Often this is through spiritual means, whether through occult practices, or in radical expressions of Christianity or Islam with their alternative visions of the state.

Differences over the state’s role have practical implications. On the one hand, Christians argue for a religiously neutral secular state where all have freedom to worship. Politically their instincts are to diversify and rely on common consent to achieve their goals. On the other hand, British colonial policy, Muslim thinking, and military influence has sought central domination, using coercion to achieve their
purposes. Muslims argue that secular neutrality is a Christian concept. All of life is to be submitted to Allah and the Shari'ah law. In this argument, each side have clashed repeatedly, not only in elections and Constitutional Assemblies, but also occasionally in bloody street confrontations. Linked to this dispute, the country nearly divided over tensions resulting from admission to the OIC. Both sides find it difficult to extricate themselves from the corners they occupy as neither is willing to accept the other’s position. Perhaps a middle way, embracing principles drawn from both traditions, enforced without favour by a judiciary willing to stand up to the corrupt political elite would be a solution. As Lamin Sanneh suggested above, a secular state supported by moral principles would guard the state from becoming its own god, and would safeguard religion from taint by the world.

2. ECWA’s Historical Context

This section reflects on the first of the three research questions, namely, “What was the social, cultural, and theological context within which the ECWA church was formed, and acquired its early leadership?”

The Sudan Interior Mission was part of that interdenominational “faith mission” movement pioneered by Hudson Taylor and his CIM. Siding with early fundamentalists in their rejection of modernist theology and in a greater or lesser adherence to premillennial dispensationalism, it avoided the fighting fundamentalists, stressing evangelism and not controversy. Most SIM missionaries were from lower middle and upper working classes. Few had university qualifications, and many came from rural backgrounds. There was little academic sophistication, indeed there was an anti-intellectual stance reflecting the religious culture they hailed from. Overly simplistic Biblical literalism, dogmatic leaders, and a fascination with Biblical prophecy mattered more than engagement with or reflection on the world around them.

Initially trying to evangelise the resistant Muslim Hausa-Fulani, SIM found traditionalists were more receptive, recording significant growth among such diverse groups as the Yagba and the Tangale. SIM said little, however, of these minorities’ histories, cultures, and religious beliefs. Historically, for example, many of these groups had bitter experience of slave raids and conquest by the Sokoto Caliphate, leaving many feeling that the Hausa-Fulani were their mortal enemies. By contrast,
Christianity gave them an identity through which they gained respect and freedom. Instead of confronting these negative attitudes, SIM’s general approach seems to have been to ignore them hoping their converts would divorce their old cultures, adopt a new, Biblically based culture, and leave their past behind. In so doing, SIM not only failed to realise the integral nature of culture and history to everyone’s psyche, but also missed the chance to teach on forgiveness and relying solely on God’s power when under attack, or when dealing with violent persecution.

The missionaries remained fascinated by the Hausa whose literacy and culture were more appealing than the illiterate and relatively backward traditionalists. Perversely, while attracted to the literate Hausa, SIM was initially unwilling, beyond basic literacy classes, to provide the education the traditionalists needed to succeed. Afraid of converts backsliding, all SIM wished for was itinerant farmer-evangelists. SIM totally failed to understand the socio-economic dynamics involved in conversion forcing many who converted, and did not wish to be evangelists, to seek employment, education, and training elsewhere. Eventually SIM changed its policies, but not before considerable damage was done.

Andrew Stirrett, SIM's key leader in Nigeria, was central to the focus on the Hausa. He believed Christian missions to be in a battle against Islam’s evil, and a number of his early colleagues, at least in articles destined for their supporters in Britain and North America, agreed with him, expressing their views forcefully. However, as younger SIM missionaries had more regular and a wider range of contacts with the Hausa their language grew more sympathetic. Fascinated as SIM was with evangelising the Hausa, few of its missionaries were suitably trained in Islam, with most learning about Islam along with their Hausa language studies during their first year in Nigeria. Government permission to work in the emirates was eventually granted, enabling SIM to develop work across the Muslim emirates, on a medical and educational foundation. Undertaking these social services also enabled SIM to open more general mission stations, often using medical care as a point of contact with the local populace.

Conversions among Muslims mainly occurred among the relatively captive audiences of the leprosaria and the schools. Elsewhere, missionaries sometimes established friendly relationships with Muslims, but increasingly encountered indifference or hostility. In face of such, they spoke of the positive implications of Christ’s life, death, and resurrection. Muslims were individuals who needed Christ. Missionaries gleaned
some encouragement from the stories of individuals coming to faith despite tremendous opposition, or the conversations occasionally struck up along the streets or in homes.

While SIM missionaries engaged in public preaching, or in medical or educational work, Christian converts from among the non-Muslim minorities were more effective evangelists. Established mission practice was immediately to incorporate new converts into evangelising their own people, while sending others cross-culturally, supported by their home churches, to assist in Muslim evangelism. Many of these evangelists were anonymous, subsumed into mission station reports, with the Western missionary, who often needed to be taught by these Nigerian converts, emerging as the hero or heroine.

Despite permission to work in the emirates, relations between the colonial authorities and the missions remained difficult. Just before World War Two, unsuccessful attempts were made to stop SIM evangelising young people and children resident on the leprosaria. There also continued to be a pro-Muslim bias in the governance of such non-Muslim areas as Kagoro that only began to ease when an SIM convert was elected to be the local Chief. In addition, the government closely controlled which missionaries were permitted to reside in the emirates.

Following World War 2, nationalist agitation for independence grew apace. The CIM’s expulsion from China, along with more aggressive Islam, increased agitation by trade unions, and opposition to white domination made mission leaders very apprehensive. As part of this process, minority ethnic groups, now influenced by Christians, were also eager to throw off Hausa-Fulani rule agitating unsuccessfully for their own Middle Belt State. SIM retreated from frontline evangelism working instead through institutions, and entrusting the AMS to spearhead evangelism as a Nigerian’s Christian witness was more authentic than an expatriate’s was. Eventually ECWA was created to carry on SIM’s evangelistic work should the mission be expelled. They were small beginnings, with great challenges, not least complaints right from the start of anti-Christian discrimination by Muslims. ECWA members had mixed opinions when it came to testifying before the Willinks Commission. Some favoured boundary changes. Others did not. Officially, SIM and ECWA preferred constitutional safeguards for human and religious rights. Despite this, post-independence Islamising tendencies created alarm, cut short by the overthrow of Ahmadu Bello and his NPN governments.
Current ECWA members are somewhat confused about this history. Generally, older men are familiar with the histories of their ethnic groups and with colonialism’s effects, while women and youth are not. Current attitudes to Islamic therefore, will have multiple sources, with older men reflecting both the history and current events, with younger men and women reflecting mainly the current events.

What the research has revealed, however, is how little teaching there was about Islam or relating to Islam, whether from SIM or from ECWA. No one expected Islam’s radicalisation or how widely spread it has become, appearing in areas that fifty years ago were far from any Islamic presence. This is surprising given the focus of both SIM and ECWA on evangelising Muslims, a focus that was not so evident among other Christian denominations. It is unclear why there was so little teaching on Islam. In part, it must be because of SIM missionaries’ own ignorance, perhaps due to the mistaken Western belief that Islam was declining. Other suggestions include SIM’s unwillingness to alert Nigerians to the relatively incorrect forms of Islam they were then practicing, or that the bulk of SIM missionaries did not work among Muslims and therefore did not see the need to teach their converts about Islam. What SIM and ECWA teaching there was, focused on building relationships and evangelism through ECWA hospitals and schools. However, by the time missions generally began to be aware of Islam’s growth, and cooperate through the IAP in training Nigerians and others to build bridges and evangelise, SIM’s fear of ecumenism precluded much involvement. Moreover, as missionaries continued to dominate ECWA’s theological training for many years, they perpetuated their own ignorance of Islam among their students, ECWA’s future and now current leaders.

In addition, instead of properly analysing the needs of the new nation for godly leaders, SIM missionaries discouraged their converts from political involvement. This reflected the customs and practices of many of their supporting churches in America, as well as the low expectations of the missionaries’ social classes. SIM missionaries did not realise their converts’ needs to defend their civil and political rights, nor how political their converts already were in resisting Hausa-Fulani hegemony. This aversion to politics perhaps lay behind SIM’s extreme caution when describing the anti-Igbo pogroms or the eruption of the Civil War. SIM publications usually took a firm pro-Federal Government line, but only mentioning the situation some time after the event was more widely known elsewhere. One gets the feeling of an organisation feeling its way along very unfamiliar paths.
It is little wonder, in light of the failings of this history that the ECWA denomination as a whole keeps repetitively calling for government action to deal with the recurring bouts of violence. There seem few other mental, theological, or relational resources already developed, with which they can chart an alternative course. The upshot is an overwhelmingly negative perspective, despite a few shafts of light, on current Christian-Muslim relations in Nigeria.

3. Changing Times

This section reflects on the second of the research questions, namely, “As the church has grown numerically has its theological and political views changed? What factors have influenced these changes?”

The establishment of the interdenominational NLFA evangelistic body did much to boost Christianity’s numbers across the country. ECWA membership particularly seems to have been increased by this outreach. NLFA seems to have provided a foundation on which Pentecostalism later built, and was also significant in the rise of Christianity among the Hausa-Fulani and the Kanuri. Many of the hitherto resistant Hausa Maguzawa sub-group have converted to Christianity from their traditional beliefs. In turn, the numerical growth and the lowering denominational barriers have enabled greater Christian co-operation, and, as far as Muslims are concerned, raised the threat of Christianity to a higher plane than before. Previous Islamic domination has been challenged as never before.

Organisational and theological development followed numerical growth as ECWA moved from a loose fellowship of churches to a centrally controlled denomination, and from a decidedly non-Pentecostal understanding of the person, work, and gifts of the Holy Spirit, in a Pentecostal direction. These changes are charted through successive church constitutions. Initially, under the SIM Church Constitution, ECWA inherited many of its views from SIM, adopting SIM’s fundamentalist doctrinal statement as its Articles of Faith, and long lists of separatist rules and regulations governing conduct. Yet the constitution failed to explain the Articles of Faith listed at its beginning. Nor was any explanation contained in the inaugural ECWA Constitution of 1954. While many of the rules and regulations were removed, the chief change was David John’s addition of an unusual article on the necessity of missions – surely

964 Albeit still followed in large part even up to the present day.
a sign of SIM's fear of expulsion and its desire to perpetuate itself should that happen.

It was not until the 1980 constitutional review that the Statement of Faith began to be explained. The most notable changes were a more sensitive explanation of the issues of separation and missions, and some decidedly non-Pentecostal discussion of the person and work of the Holy Spirit. It also formally asserted a premillennial dispensational view of prophecy.

The chief features of the 1989 constitutional revision were organisational changes reshaping ECWA into a centrally controlled denomination. To meet the Pentecostal challenge, ECWA's non-Pentecostal beliefs on the person and work of the Holy Spirit and on spiritual gifts are further explained. Baptism in the Holy Spirit is part of the Holy Spirit's normal work. Sign gifts are referred to in the past tense, and along with grace gifts are given entirely at the behest of the Holy Spirit, primarily for evangelism and church development.

Further changes came with the 1999 constitutional review. Most of this review concentrated on organisational changes. Doctrinally however, the previous cessationist understanding of sign gifts was abandoned. While the church was not becoming Pentecostal, it was trying to be more tolerant of the use of charismatic gifts and worship within the church. In this, the church was recognising a fait accompli as Pentecostal media has had an enormous influence on ECWA, especially its English-speaking congregations.

Pentecostalism's rise has been Nigerian Christianity's most significant religious change. Of indigenous origin, it has subsequently made contacts overseas with which it exchanges personnel and ideas. As it moved into Northern Nigeria, Pentecostalism built on foundations laid by the mission churches and the NLFA movement. Eventually Christians from northern ethnic minorities came into leadership. The combination of Pentecostal boldness and the cultural and historical traditions of the northern ethnic minorities has brought an increased evangelistic impact, in turn provoking a more violent response from increasingly radicalised Muslims.

While many are attracted to Pentecostalism by its vibrant worship, promise of miracles and prosperity gospel teaching, at its heart Pentecostalism proclaims a
transformational gospel replacing the old ways' patriarchal and occultic domination with divine power available through the person and blood of Jesus, and the work of the Holy Spirit. Lives of individuals and communities are transformed, and God's kingdom extended. Communities turn their very cores to the glare of the gospel, and in so doing, previously accepted customs and beliefs are exposed.

This transformation and exposure provokes vigorous reactions from those with stakes in the old ways, such as politicians and traditional rulers. Traditionally there is no clear division between secular politics and religion: the one informs the other, the spiritual empowering the secular, and rewarding the secular's allegiance. Whether through traditional beliefs, or Islam or Christianity religion is the context within which politics operates. Pentecostals share this understanding of the religious basis to secular power. However, instead of relying on the old ways, which they believe have resulted in the state's failure, they offer a new way, transforming individuals, addressing the socio-political and moral failings of the state, asserting the rule of the saints, and building new communities. Despite their teaching on miracles and the prosperity gospel, Kalu argues Pentecostals place more stress on people acquiring the necessary skills to make a success of their lives, and on networking with others to get ahead. A new community is built through faith, hard work, and enterprise.

This new community, however, cannot be successful as long as the land remains alienated from its rightful owner through evil covenants made with spirits and other powers. Recovering the land is achieved through spiritual warfare, in the form of prayer, fasting, research, and vocal assertion of God's power. Individuals, confident that there are in a privileged position as a child of God, can then actively engage with the world around them. One of the evil forces that have alienated the land from God is Islam. For years while Muslims have controlled Nigeria's government, Nigeria has become a byword for corruption, violence, and insecurity. Islamic rule is held to be synonymous, therefore, with all that is wrong about Nigeria. It is up to Christians, the children of God to expel them, and restore righteousness. Various other arguments are used against Muslims, including: accusing Muslims of spiritual descent from Ishmael and thus being outside God's covenant, and that Muslim reliance on various occult practices is evidence that Allah is merely the surviving deity from pre-Islamic Arab paganism. Muslim support for Palestine when the Bible teaches blessing comes through support for Israel, and the anti-Christian discrimination in Nigeria's far north are also cited. Pentecostals believe, therefore, they must present an alternative
vision of the state, to the centralising, oppressive, and failing state created by the Muslim-dominated, and often military governments. They make a compelling case.

It is not surprising that this worldview provokes vigorous reactions, especially when compromise and dialogue are alien concepts. Thus, while Christians legitimately criticize Muslims for inflammatory remarks and for stirring up violence, there is little self-criticism by the Christian community. Thus, ECWA’s TC helped, during the 1980s and 1990s, to unite Christians against the perceived threats of Islamic fundamentalism, but did little to portray a balanced picture. As the spiral of rhetoric, suspicion, and hatred grew, eventually violence was inevitable. What pressure for dialogue and political compromise there is, reflects more the influence of the Catholic and Lutheran churches in CAN than of the conservative evangelical churches like ECWA, which have yet to develop any alternative approach than that offered by Pentecostalism.

Nor is the conflict at heart a clash of fundamentalisms. Paul Gifford et al argue that the modern Pentecostal movement is a complex web of American-inspired modernization, globalization, and religious fundamentalism. Conservative religious and moral views are promoted as the answer to the state’s failings, and are emphasised at the expense of social justice. In so doing, Pentecostalism seeks to refashion the state in America’s image. However, this argument fails to take into account the clear differences between Pentecostalism and fundamentalism. They have different goals, for a starter. Pentecostalism stresses spiritual experience, while fundamentalism stresses correcting theological errors by returning to older forms of Christianity unsullied by modernism. Nor is fundamentalism exportable: a return to the old ways in countries where Christianity is not an historic faith would entail returning to traditional religions. Gifford is also wrong in asserting that Pentecostalism is an American export. It might be in some places, but as far as Nigerian scholars are concerned, it is of indigenous origin.

Returning to ECWA, SIM owes its origins to classical fundamentalism, and thus ECWA derives its origins similarly. However, it has subsequently developed in a non-fundamentalist direction allowing for the regulation of Pentecostal gifts, and through its involvement in CAN, and its leaders seeking further training in a range of evangelical theological seminaries, opening itself to a wider range of theological influences than many of the original SIM missionaries would have been happy with. Yet ECWA has not yet engaged with the Pentecostal worldview or ethical system,
whether by wholesale adoption, or refutation or adaptation. Nor has it adequately engaged theologically with Islam or the traditional worldview. The best that can be said of ECWA is that it is in a transitional phase unsure of its future direction.

It is this intellectual challenge that ECWA needs to address. Many ordinary members like the Pentecostal worship styles and teaching that they see in the media, and press for in their churches. Others question this trend. In addition, despite officially being “Reformed” in theological persuasion, increasing numbers of the ECWA clergy, perhaps reflecting Pentecostalist views, are actually “Arminian” in their views on salvation. What is needed is some clear intellectual direction. This has been lacking, as ECWA in recent years has been better known for its organisational growth and development. Increasingly financially self-reliant, its strong system of financial controls, and accountability have brought with it considerable benefits – regular salaries, pensions, and subsidies to institutions. It has been at the cost, however, of clear intellectual leadership.

Has this trend towards Pentecostalism affected attitudes towards Islam and the violence? The violence has had an overwhelming effect on many: every Nigerian respondent had either personally suffered or knew those who had suffered, from the violence. No one was unaffected. Clergy tended to refrain from expressing their personal attitudes, but some of lay respondents were more open speaking both of anger and hatred, on the one hand, and of love and forgiveness, on the other. SIM missionaries, more remote from the violence, spoke of the trauma and sense of weariness among the people they knew. Undoubtedly, these experiences have had a profound spiritual and emotional impact on ECWA people.

Christians primarily blamed the violence on a mixture of politics and religion, to some extent on the economy and to a much lesser extent on ethnic issues, (which was not so much a cause of conflict as a means of protection in conflict). These respondents blamed the Muslim community for physically starting most riots. Behind the Muslims’ actions, however, they see greedy politicians, manipulating the Muslim poor to riot, loot, kill, and burn, and hoping to benefit from the chaos. Yet there is also a strong sense that Islamic radicalism is the fuel that enables the violence to take root and spread. Iranian Shiite influences and Saudi Wahhabi views have fostered an anti-Western attitude among Muslims, which combined with their arrogance, and their fear of losing power, a fear heightened by Christianity’s growth, has resulted in violent rejection of anything contrary to their religious and political views. With
passions whipped up by Muslim pressure for Shari‘ah law, or alleged insults to Islam or their Prophet Muhammad, violence can occur at any moment. Christian respondents believed that violence is integral to the Islamic identity reflecting a spiritual battle that is more profound than any physical one. Muslim respondents, however, downplayed the role of Islamic fundamentalists blaming the problem on politicians and poverty. They also held up a mirror to the Christians in the Jos area, blaming COCIN and to some extent ECWA for being troublemakers. Perhaps this reflects the seemingly Pentecostal-inspired aggressive response to violence that some ECWA respondents questioned?

Attitudes have undoubtedly changed with a considerable rise in suspicion and distrust, and some talk of hatred. Only a few spoke of love and forgiveness, and of building relationships – central concepts from the Scriptures that have become very difficult to uphold, and primarily minority interests. Feelings among district church leaders and laity were even stronger than among the senior leaders. They used adjectives like distrust, fear, hatred, living separately, retaliation, and fighting for political rights. Little wonder that increasingly Muslims and Christian live separated lives with few relationships across the religious barriers. Concern for self-defence and advocacy of such has replaced ECWA’s formerly pacifist approach. Only a few spoke of living in peace, of prayer, of the work of the Holy Spirit and of building relationships. Respondents were quite divided when asked if ECWA was hypocritical in its relationships with Muslims.

It was telling how few spoke of evangelism, or referred to it in the past tense. While the initial reaction to the violence had been to redouble evangelistic efforts, those feelings had gone. Instead, for some Muslims are viewed as enemies better off in Hell. Evangelistic training efforts by SIM were useful, but some questioned how many actually made use of this training. Evangelistic interest had also diminished because of greater ECWA institutionalisation. There seems to be more interest in building bigger buildings than in evangelism and mission. While the training and employment conditions of EMS missionaries are improving, for years they have been undertrained and underpaid. Those ECWA people concerned with Muslim evangelism tend to operate independently developing their own, often-imaginative methods, and sourcing funds separately.

One gets a picture, therefore, of a church that has grown numerically and organisationally. However, it has failed to engage theologically with the rise of
Pentecostalism, or with Islam. It responds to outbreaks of violence with Christian compassion for its members. Nevertheless, its former hallmark of evangelism and mission is slipping as few of its people have anything to do with Muslims or have a burden to witness to them. Muslims are more the enemy, rather than objects of Christian love and forgiveness. The church does not appear to be able to respond proactively to the cycles of violence, reacting to each fresh episode with futile calls on federal and state governments to uphold the law.

4. Current Relationships

This section reflects on the third of the research questions, namely; “How has the church applied its background to its relationships to Islam today?”

The challenge in studying this area is to find a framework by which to evaluate the events and measure responses to them. Ogbu Kalu in his *African Pentecostalism* suggested a helpful range of possible inter-religious relationship models. These include the conflict model blaming religions for provoking conflict, the instrumentalist/manipulation model blaming politicians and calling for good governance, and the rainbow model that tries to build bridges across the religious divides. Others included the competing fundamentalist model discussed above, and the state discourse model where religion describes one’s political and ethnic identity and goals.

The long tradition of resisting Islamic domination in Central and Northern Nigeria has taken various forms, involving ethnic minorities, mission societies, and Nigerian Christians responding to the challenges of their day. Sometimes resistance was violent, at other times diplomatic or political, or even religious. Thus, when it came to the initial bouts of violence in the early 1980s resistance was the instinctive response, but it was religious in tone. For several years, TC taught Christians to trust in God for deliverance, to pray and fast that God would restore peace and justice, a position it maintained despite increasingly loud protests from the Christian community at the repeated injustices and violence they suffered. The assumption always was that the solution lay in God acting on the government to ensure justice, in other words, the instrumentalist/manipulation model. Thus, TC hoped the Babangida military government would be more even-handed than the pro-Muslim Buhari military government had been. The OIC debacle dashed that hope, opinions hardened, and civil war threatened.
The instrumentalist/manipulation model continued to be the sole model envisaged. Yet the incidents noted call for a wider understanding of the conflicts bringing also into consideration the conflict and the state discourse models. Unfortunately, such breadth of thinking is not evident in TC. It contented itself with repeated calls for good government. There is no mention of an enquiry as to why the violence is occurring; church leaders seemed boxed into one approach only.

The magazine began to take a more assertive position from March 1987 onwards with the commencement of the Kafanchan riot, and its repercussions across Kaduna and Kano States. Reflecting on them, TC presents an unrestrained apologia for the Christian case and their demand for justice. While the riots in Kafanchan itself started from a religious basis, they quickly involved the predominantly Christian ethnic minorities seeking to liberate themselves from Hausa-Fulani rule. There was considerable damage and some loss of life as a result. However, rioting spread north to Kaduna, Zaria and up to Kano, where Muslim rioters attacked Christians simply for being Christian. In these places, there was considerable destruction of churches and Christian-owned businesses as a result. Worse would have happened except that Christians began forming self-defence groups. Reacting to the crisis ECWA and TC passed over the Kafanchan origins quite quickly, preferring to concentrate on the massive losses in Kaduna, Zaria, and Kano where innocent Christians had been attacked. This was, despite evidence that events in Kafanchan were worse than officially reported. Instead, a pattern began to develop of portraying Christians as innocent victims and ignoring potentially embarrassing questions.

The 1991 Tafewa Balewa riots was another example of an ethnic minority rebelling against the Hausa-Fulani ruling classes. It started over whether or not a piece of barbecued beef was halal. Ethnic tensions quickly rose and Muslims died in the ensuing violence. The police decision to take their corpses to Bauchi in open pickups, instead of following the Islamic practice of immediate burial, raised tensions in Bauchi and well-organised attacks took place on Christians across the state. CAN alleged the governor, the police commissioner and the emir deliberately delayed military intervention to restore order. Later in 1995, fresh trouble broke out ending in the Muslim military governor trying to rig the judicial system in favour of his co-religionists.

The 1991 Kano riots sparked off by Muslim protests at the anticipated Reinhard Bonnke evangelistic meetings, not only left 500 dead but were also marked by the
refusal of the Christian minority to turn the other cheek. They effectively barricaded Sabon Gari where many lived and fought off their attackers.

Even more violent were the Zangon Kataf riots in 1992 marking the culmination of long and bitter disputes between the Kataf and the Hausa. At issue was the control of land, trade, and local politics. While the Muslims threatened trouble, when fighting broke out they were expelled from the town. Hundreds died, and much of the town was totally destroyed. However, TC fails to mention what went on in Zangon Kataf despite it being a strong ECWA area. Instead, ECWA’s attention concentrated on the aftermath when Christians in Kaduna and Zaria were attacked, and an anti-Kataf pogrom ensued with many being sacked from their jobs, thrown out of their homes, and their leaders charged with murder.

The 2004 Kano riots are said to have taken place with the then Governor’s secret blessing, in order to protest the Yelwa riots in Plateau State. Predictably, they got out of control and many died. Similarly out of control were the 2006 Danish Cartoon riots, especially in Maidugari where CAN accused the Governor of connivance. These cartoon riots were unique, being purely religious in focus. No one in Nigeria was responsible for the cartoons. Christians were attacked simply because they were Christians, and thus were identified by Muslims with the West.

The 2008 Jos riots arose from the struggle for political power between the indigenous and mainly Christian Birom ethnic group and the Muslim Hausa-Fulani settlers. Hundreds died and a considerable amount of property was destroyed. ECWA argued, however, that this riot was not a spontaneous outburst of Muslim protest over the elections, but was pre-planned, using mercenaries and sophisticated weapons. Politics was the excuse for an attack on Christians. Similar arguments were also applied to the equally bloody 2010 Jos riots.

There are, therefore, varieties of reasons for the various riots. Using the categories suggested by Kalu, these riots reflect a mixture of the State Discourse model (mainly Kafanchan and Zangon Kataf origins), the Conflict model (the aftermath of Kafanchan, Zangon Kataf, as well as Danish Cartoon and the two Kano riots), and the Instrumentalist/ Manipulation (Jos riots). Of course, as Kalu also pointed out, none of these are necessarily exclusive, but they are indicative of the different factors at play. If different conflicts can be attributed to different models then likewise the range of solutions needs also to vary. ECWA’s continual reliance on the
instrumentalist/manipulation model with constant appeals for good governance is an inadequate answer to the range of issues presented.

So how has ECWA reacted? Bouts of anti-Christian violence have increased in frequency and severity, interspersed by an atmosphere of threat, persecution, and uncertainty. The church has begun to search for alternative solutions, but the process of searching has been characterised by uncertainty, confusion, and division as the situation rapidly changes before an effective response can be developed. The net result has been a sense of weariness and a loss of hope.

At one stage, TC presented four options on how to respond. The first was to be prepared for war, but do nothing to provoke it. The second was to fight fire with fire, to take direct action. The third option was to respond with love and forgiveness, the essential core of the Christian faith. The fourth option was to confront Muslims with the Christian message. None of these options, however, distinguishes between the different rationales for violence. Nor has ECWA evidenced much thinking along these lines. Its 2006 General Church Council statement on national issues reiterated the instrumentalist/manipulation model with a fresh call for good governance. ECWA has failed to analyse the various situations rigorously enough to present viable solutions. Indeed, as already noted, it has only been when state governments have taken up the task that solutions have been found.

Another response involves the search for power. There are accusations of occult involvement in the Yelwa, Kafanchan, Kaduna, and Zangon Kataf riots. Neither ECWA nor TC has mentioned this, stressing the sufferings of innocent Christians elsewhere, or the activities of Muslim rioters. Some respondents tried to explain or excuse these incidents either, as confusion over terms, or reflections of nominal Christianity. Yet other Christian leaders wonder if these are merely excuses? Nominal Christianity is widespread in Nigeria, as it is in Europe or America. Whether such is an adequate explanation for reliance on the occult is another matter entirely.

Perhaps the reason for reliance on the occult is due to the search for spiritual power highlighted in the discussion on Pentecostalism above. There seems to be a discrepancy between memories of the dedication, zeal, and spiritual power of early SIM converts and the disparaging anecdotal comments by modern ECWA members of their contemporaries. Is this because the SIM missionaries, while winning converts, failed to convert the culture? Certainly some suggest that SIM merely flatly
condemned all traditional religion without engaging with it, and showing how the Christian gospel met those deep-felt needs for power, security, and meaning. It can be argued that until ECWA, and other churches address the issue of traditional religion, incidents like Yelwa, Kafanchan and Zangon Kataf are likely to recur.

This will require theological and anthropological insight. Yet, as already noted, ECWA’s strength is in her organisational development, not so much in her theological insight. Engagement with traditional religions, with Islam, and with Pentecostalism, as well as the development of an adequate doctrine of suffering, all need addressed. In so doing a much more rounded theology needs developed, one that moves away from the compartmentalisation of dispensationalism that allows room for separating off Christian beliefs from deeply rooted traditional beliefs.

Some ECWA leaders are looking for fresh approaches. Dadangs criticises the “no third slap” approach of many Christian youth. Shaba points to Christ’s non-violent approach to persecution. Kunhiyop shows that Christ was teaching a constructive non-violent resistance compatible with self-defence, and open to dialogue and reconciliation when feelings subside. For reconciliation to take place, the Biblical command to love and forgive enemies must first be obeyed.

All the respondents knew the Biblical commands to love and forgive. The question at stake was whether it was actually being done. Many respondents could point to instances of Christian love in action. However, with the repeated riots forcing an ethnic and religious cleansing of certain areas, one got the impression that many could well live their lives with little contact with Muslims, and not many were making any effort to cross those barriers. While prayer is one way Christians believe these barriers can be crossed, only fifty per cent of ECWA interviewees and laity mentioned it, and others hardly mentioned it at all. This is surprising given the centrality of prayer in the life of the believer. Has ECWA given up praying for their Muslim neighbours and enemies? At issue is how to love enemies while simultaneously protecting your family and preserving your civil rights. Distinguishing between religious persecution and civil and political rights is difficult, if not impossible.

While not currently a high priority for many ECWA people, evangelism is a traditional way of relating to Muslims dating back to SIM interests. SIM and ECWA have made various attempts at this, most recently in attempting to evangelise the Fulani. Their continued failure in this has prompted suggestions to focus on Islam as a whole. This
has been tried in the past. In the early 1970s, Emory VanGerpen produced a series of duplicated *Notes on Islam* trying to help SIM missionaries and others understand Islam better. Gerry Swank not only set up NLFA but later shifted SIM’s thinking on evangelism in a more contextual direction.

Howie Brant, Swank’s successor brought together various SIM missionaries and other participants in 1987 at SIM-COME I. This discussed various evangelistic methods. While clearly holding that Christian and Muslim theologies are irreconcilable they settled on a bridge-building approach through developing Old Testament themes, living contextualised lifestyles and building relationships. The late I.G. Shelley was a key ECWA participant. He argued that Islam in Nigeria is declining as many are disgusted with its racism and arrogance. This rejection of their beliefs enrages the remaining Muslims, even more so as the influence of Saudi Wahhabism and Iranian Shiite beliefs grew radicalising and hardening Muslim opinion. Prayer, dialogue, and careful analysis of the kind of Muslims Christians were wishing to evangelise was essential. A similarly contextual approach was also advocated at SIM-COME II that took place in 1991. Here the late Mai Kudi Kure was a key ECWA participant. He spoke of the challenges of evangelising Muslims given the level of anti-Christian violence in Nigeria. Christians needed to be aware of Islamic fundamentalism’s agenda, but, pointing to a number of important Muslims on the verge of conversion, not give up hope. Dialogue, however, was not the answer as he felt it merely led to heated debates and increased hatred. Kure, of course, had to follow ECWA policies in his evangelism. Others at the conference could be more flexible allowing for a contextual approach, for example over polygamy. The problem for ECWA, therefore, that while being aware of the increasing challenges of Islam, it was not always prepared to be as flexible as needed in its outreach to Muslims.

A contextual approach, however, requires an evangelistic vision. Panya Baba sought to help ECWA recover this in his Presidential Address at the ECWA General Church Council in 1992. He called on his audience to renew their evangelistic zeal proclaiming a gospel of reconciliation as the only means to true peace and justice. Yet ECWA’s bureaucratic structure militates against this renewed evangelism. Those interested in evangelism among Muslims find that the closer to ECWA bureaucracy they get the less effective they become. Far better to retain some spiritual links with ECWA and work autonomously, relying for funding and oversight from elsewhere. They felt that ECWA needed both a new sense of purpose, and the employment of new approaches to evangelising Muslims.
Yet evangelism on its own is an inadequate response given the scale of the problem. Relationship building is essential, not just to enable evangelism, but for wider community relations. Some accuse Christians of creating unease through their evangelism, implying that peace would return if evangelism ceased. The cantonisation of a number of Nigerian cities, however, has already limited the contacts that Muslims and Christian have with each other. Moreover as already noted, religious reasons are not the sole cause of the violence with riots being explained by a variety of Kalu’s models. Nor is it fair to blame Christianity’s evangelism when both religions are equally evangelistic, and Christians are just as upset and angry with Islamic comments and actions as Muslims are with Christian.

Rather, both sides need to engage in some realistic thinking and develop some mutual respect. Neither is likely to convert all of the other, nor force the other to submit to their will. ECWA’s evangelism, for example, is most successful and least aggravating when it operates discreetly, working on a one to one basis, or through tactful radio programmes and discreet follow up of enquirers. This approach, however, requires some strategic thought and financial commitment on behalf of ECWA. It also means avoiding large-scale evangelistic crusades, flamboyant TV programmes, or confrontational approaches. These are extremely popular with Christian laity, but are counter-productive as they serve to heighten tensions that in turn give rise to violence.

Building relationships, however, not only means avoiding needless provocation, but also talking to one another. ECWA does not have a lot of experience with this, given the ethnic hostilities of many of its members, and its inadequate theological heritage. The challenge, for ECWA, is how to go about doing this.

There are, firstly, theological concerns. Evangelicals fear compromise, often understanding dialogue as allowing cultural factors to supersede Scriptural revelation, thereby minimising the evangelistic imperative, and the reality of the suffering of the saints. Thus, some prefer apologetic debate defending Christian beliefs from Muslim assertions, especially on the person and nature of God. SIM and ECWA have traditionally followed this approach, denying a common identity between Islamic and Christian understandings of who God is. It is a view also common among some Pentecostals and popularised by Moshay’s *Who Is This Allah?*
Secondly, there are methodological approaches. While examining Islam from the outside makes it appear as a monolithic bloc dominated by hard-line violent opinions, Muslim interviewees spoke of differences of opinion among Muslims, and of their personal unwillingness to abuse Christians. SIM-related missionaries in Asia also spoke of how their own opinions changed as they built relationships with Muslims. This, in turn, forced them to rethink their approach to evangelising Muslims, and their own theological presuppositions. Looking afresh at Christ’s Great Commission to disciple the nations\textsuperscript{965} some suggest that just as the Jewish church permitted the Gentile church’s growth and development, so the modern Gentile church should encourage a church to develop from an Islamic background, reflecting Muslim culture and avoiding Western Christian cultural baggage. They see a model for this kind of approach, one that is much more sympathetic to Islamic culture, in the modern Messianic Jewish approach. Others, such as Gilliland doubt that this approach will work in Nigeria. He points out that an unsuccessful attempt at something very similar was attempted. Nor is the Asian context the same, with the large and vigorous Nigerian churches quite able to stand up for their beliefs.

Theology and methodology require most of all a willingness to change. In this regard, the recent Kairos Document is encouraging. Produced by a number of church leaders, including several ECWA leaders, it calls on the churches to return to New Testament Christianity, and away from reacting to “fire with fire”. It strongly supports the Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King passive resistance model, and reminds Christians that their strength is in weakness and dependence on God, in honesty and integrity, and in resisting evil. Similarly, Danny McCain’s recent Byang Kato Memorial Lecture at JETS called on church leaders to set guidelines for the members’ conduct, and to take the initiative in being pro-active and practical in their efforts to break down barriers and build relationships that result in peace.

Many ask, however, if dialogue is worth the effort. Can Muslims be trusted? When asked about dialogue fifty-six respondents opposed the idea and most of this opposition was because their experiences led them to distrust Muslims. Some had tried forms of dialogue but felt that either Muslims came to such meetings unwilling to dialogue meaningfully or that as soon as any meetings were over Muslim leaders reneged on their agreements. People who had befriended Muslims were reported to be the first to be targeted in any riots. The Shiite principle of \textit{taqiyyah}, and similar

\textsuperscript{965} Matthew 28: 19 – 20.
principles in Sunni Islam that allow the use of deception in the cause of Islam, appear to be insurmountable obstacles. Others opposed dialogue on theological grounds. Christians have the truth of the gospel and it is simply a matter of ensuring that every Muslim has a chance to hear and respond meaningfully to that message. The Bible teaches Christians to love those who hate them, not to debate or dialogue with them, or to exercise tolerance.

However, twenty-four respondents were prepared to explore the idea, depending on the context and the honesty of the participants. A further thirty-four respondents were even more firmly in favour of using some form of dialogue. They felt it would be a useful way of explaining Christian beliefs, removing misunderstandings, and clearing the air. It was a means to build bridges and break down barriers. Both parties need to listen to each other. Muslim respondents, who also faced considerable scepticism about dialogue from within their own community, supported this. The majority of Muslims opposed dialogue but it was the only way for peace to reign.

5. ECWA’s Attitudes

In coming to a conclusion on what ECWA’s attitudes towards Islam are, we must first consider the context.

ECWA was founded, and has grown substantially, primarily among ethnic minority groups in Central Nigeria, spreading more recently in the far North and the south of Nigeria. These are people who for generations have resisted, and still resist, the Hausa-Fulani spread, and with it the spread of slavery and of Islam. They have also had to cope with sixty years of British pro-Islamic colonialism, leading to mostly Islamic-dominated governments over the following fifty years. Regrettably, Nigerian independence is closely linked with violence, instability, and corruption. ECWA members, usually honest, hard-working people, daily suffer the effects of this failure of the nation state: a failure effectively linked by Pentecostalism to the dominance of Islam.

For ECWA members have not historically been among the ruling classes of Nigeria. From fiercely independent and often oppressed ethnic minorities, they found their spiritual and physical salvation in the Christian gospel preached to them by SIM missionaries and their converts. The Christian faith was a valid alternative religion that, in addition to its spiritual benefits, provided these minorities with an alternative
community to belong to, a progressive world-view to which to aspire, and self-respect and status instead of Islam’s scorn. They were far more effective evangelists than most SIM missionaries were. They seized with both hands the opportunities for education and progress that SIM eventually brought, seeing in such a way out of poverty and oppression. Through education, they have since made their way in the world, mainly as civil servants or in medicine or education. In recent years, having set aside SIM’s mistaken disapproval of political involvement, they have begun to get involved politically, and have had the chance to influence the governance of their societies.

A slightly less important influence on ECWA was that of SIM. It was through SIM’s evangelism that the early members of ECWA were converted and formed into a church. ECWA members also gained through SIM’s provision of education, health care, and rural development. ECWA leaders learned their theology either directly from SIM or through SIM scholarships in Britain, America, or Canada. It was a theology dominated by classic fundamentalism, linked closely to premillennial dispensationalism, and the Keswick “Holiness” movement. These theological views provided a major impetus to missionary expansion, but they did not lend themselves to intellectual enquiry. While strong on personal holiness and looking forward to the return of Christ, there was little in the way of engagement with traditional cultures and beliefs, let alone with Islam.

Initially SIM was most successful among the traditionalists, to which groups the British had encouraged them to go. Large numbers converted, and strong churches were built, in turn joining with SIM in evangelism both locally and in sending their own members cross-culturally, some joining with SIM missionaries in evangelising the Hausa. In general, however, SIM neither educated these converts on how best to evangelise Muslims, nor on how to relate to them in a Christian way. Negative attitudes towards Muslims were not challenged. For SIM did not engage effectively with the traditional religions. Missionaries sought individual converts, but left their core cultures and beliefs untouched, unrealistically trusting that the converts would develop a Biblically based culture instead. Opportunities were thus missed to teach on forgiveness, and reliance on the power of God. Thus, in general the traditional history and values of the ethnic minorities has probably remained more influential in crises than the gospel brought by SIM.
Despite their fascination with the Hausa, SIM’s knowledge and understanding of Islam was inadequate. The consistent aim of SIM has been the conversion of the Hausa Muslims. Yet many of the missionaries recruited to work in Nigeria arrived in Nigeria with inadequate theological training let alone knowing about Islam. Most learned on the job. Some early missionaries thought the Hausa would quickly convert to Christianity, and hoped that Christian itinerant farmer-evangelists would have a key role in this. They were mistaken on both counts. Later, when the mission was better organised, and had the experience of substantial medical, educational, and evangelistic work in the emirates, its own fear of ecumenism hindered any networking with the IAP and other churches and missions on how best to reach Muslims.

The NLFA helped ECWA to begin a substantial period of numerical growth. However, it also laid the foundations for the growth of Pentecostalism that has proved to be a major challenge for ECWA. Initially following the classic fundamentalist model set out by SIM the denomination has gradually developed theologically becoming more accommodating of the Pentecostal views that are now prominent among its English speaking churches. However, Pentecostalism not only attracts people for its music and worship, and the prosperity gospel, but it also presents a transformational message – transformation of individuals, of their cultures, and of the nation. Nigeria has faced a simultaneous grab for power and wealth by the political elites many of whom are prepared to use the occult and/or Islam for their personal benefit, whether that means tolerating radical Islam, or stirring up the Muslim peasantry to violently press their case. Pentecostalism’s condemnation of such is attractive. Here are people standing up boldly for their faith, without compromise, offering the hope of positive change in a country that too often lurches from one crisis to another.

ECWA is thus left, somewhere in the middle, in the process of transitioning from a fundamentalist background to the possibility of a Pentecostal future. It has developed theologically, but its theologians quickly get absorbed into managing organisations leaving little time or energy to give an intellectual and spiritual lead. Pentecostalism thus fills the void left by this absence of intellectual and spiritual leadership. ECWA’s pride in its past evangelistic successes is justified. However, more recently evangelism has taken a back seat to organisational development and financial management. One got a sense of a large organisation living on its reputation without a strong direction and vision that proper intellectual leadership might provide. In May 2007, the ECWA General Church Council approved a ten year Strategic Plan that
seeks to address failings in evangelism, discipleship, mission, and organisational matters. This was only beginning to be implemented by the time I left Nigeria in June 2007, yet it still failed to address the intellectual and theological leadership gaps. Theological engagement with Islam, with Pentecostalism, or even with traditional religions, at best, is only beginning to be addressed.

This has left ECWA with few intellectual resources with which to intellectually deal with the reality of Islamic violence. Everyone has been affected by the violence. Most attribute it to politics and religion, specifically to greedy politicians and radical Islam. Pacifist views have given way to self-defence, with many articulating their suspicion, distrust, and hatred of Muslims. Not surprisingly, evangelism has dropped in importance. The minority who remain interested prefer to operate independently from the ECWA bureaucracy. Instead of prioritising evangelism, for a long time the church’s main priority seemed to be constructing new buildings. Just as worrying is how little emphasis there appears to be on Christian love, forgiveness, prayer, and building relationships. All of these are key aspects of the Christian faith. While there is considerable Christian compassion for those affected by the violence, ECWA has not shown much in the way of proactive approaches to dealing with the violence. That burden keeps being placed on the secular authorities, often the same people whose misrule is at the heart of the problem.

Kalu’s five models are a useful tool with which to analyse much of the violence. Surveying TC and other documents, it became apparent that ECWA consistently, and probably unconsciously, adopted an instrumentalist/manipulation model depending on good government to resolve the issues. As a subtext, initially ECWA resisted the attacks through prayer and fasting. Later the focus switched to self-defence, albeit ignoring the details of how various ethnic minorities took their revenge. Yet the actual riots surveyed appear to be due to a variety of factors, not just the scheming of politicians.

ECWA appears, therefore, still to be searching for viable answers, a search not helped by the relatively rapid succession of crises that have induced a sense of weariness and loss of hope. TC outlined several options. These included; be prepared for war, but not provoke it; fight fire with fire; show Christian love and forgiveness, or confront the enemy. Instead of taking any of these up, however, the

church kept appealing for good government. It has abdicated, therefore, any constructive role in finding a solution in favour of government actions. Where government has acted, there has been peace; where it has not, violence continues.

This is regrettable since there is a spiritual issue lying behind much of this violence – the search for power. The church has not adequately addressed this issue. It is actually a more profound question than Pentecostalism’s promise of prosperity and health, or of how to cope with the desire of some Muslims for political, economic, and religious domination. The Christian gospel proclaimed by ECWA promises salvation and eternal life. The Bible also speaks, however, of knowing God’s power to live on a day-to-day basis. Yet when asked about some people’s reliance on occult powers to fight their battles, the stock answer is to deplore such, and assume that these people are nominal Christians, if at all. That does not appear to be always the case. Some are not Christians, but others claim to be. Nor has the church addressed the wider social problem of the political elite’s greed for power and wealth that lies behind some of the violence.

To address these issues will involve a number of actions. To begin with, it involves shining the gospel into the underlying cultures and traditions, converting the cultures. When SIM brought the gospel, it sought to convert individuals; it failed to convert the cultures from which these individuals come. Pentecostalism’s rise shows the vacuum that this approach has left. Using theology and anthropology, it is time for ECWA to go beyond the compartmentalised theology left by SIM, and to look afresh at its own theological presuppositions asking what the cross of Christ has to say for Nigeria today. In this regards Croatian theologian Miroslav Volf, at the end of his Exclusion & Embrace, makes four very suggestive points about the significance of the cross in the context of violence – in his case reflecting on the wars that broke up the former Yugoslavia. They could well serve as a foundation for further thought. Thus, Volf argues, firstly, that the cross breaks the cycle of violence. Christ took on the aggression of his persecutors, and broke the cycle of violence by absorbing it. He refused to be conformed to his enemies’ violent image. Secondly, he suggests that the cross lays bare the mechanism of scapegoating. Jesus was deliberately chosen as a scapegoat. By exposing how this was done the Gospels help to bring the secret schemes of his enemies to light, removing the possibility of this path being trodden easily again. Thirdly, the cross is part of Jesus’ struggle for God’s truth and justice. “Active opposition to the kingdom of Satan, the kingdom of deception and oppression, is therefore inseparable from the proclamation of the kingdom of God. It
is this opposition that brought Jesus to the cross; and it is this opposition that gave meaning to his nonviolence.” Finally, the cross is a divine embrace of the deceitful and the unjust. In Christ God did not ignore sin, but he told the truth about sin, and atoned for it. “The cross of Christ should teach us that the only alternative to violence is self-giving love, willingness to embrace the other in the knowledge that truth and justice have been, and will be, upheld by God.”

It also involves thinking through how Christian believers are to interact with Islam. As we have noticed, some ECWA leaders have begun to be more assertive, not accepting the “fire for fire” approach mentioned, and preaching clearly in favour of passive resistance instead of violence. However, speech and theory are insufficient when praxis is called for. Respondents only appeared to pay lip service to showing Christian love and forgiveness, and prayer for Muslims was less than enthusiastic. There are physical and emotional hurdles created by the violence, but practical action can surmount them.

One of ECWA’s distinguishing features has been its heavy involvement in evangelism. Since the 1970s SIM has encouraged building bridges to Muslims and contextual evangelism. Baba realised, however, that a contextual gospel is not much help if there is no vision to communicate it. Some of those currently involved in evangelising Muslims also complain of this lack of vision: the further away they are from ECWA bureaucracy the freer they feel to do their work. Evangelism, however, also requires building relationships. In turn, relationships force one to be realistic, and to be respectful about the other. Needlessly aggravating the other only raises tensions and gives opportunity for violence. In these circumstances, the Christian faith is best explained discreetly and tactfully, not through mass evangelism or high profile media events.

Effective relationships presuppose some form of dialogue. Some in ECWA have unsuccessfully attempted this. However, distrust of Muslims, coupled with worries about theological compromise, or fears that dialogue belittles the suffering of innocent victims, means there is considerable opposition to renewed attempts. Yet, despite respondents being only marginally in favour of dialogue, there needs to be a fresh approach as the current impasse cannot bring peace. Muslim respondents pointed out that Islam is not such a monolithic entity as outsiders might suppose.

SIM-related missionaries in Asia have explored alternative approaches to Islam using ideas derived from Messianic Judaism. While these may not be feasible in Nigeria, the fresh thinking contained in the Kairos Document’s advocacy of passive resistance or McCain’s call for the churches to be proactive and not wait for the governments needs to be explored.

So what are ECWA’s attitudes towards Islam? In short, complicated. Decades of unresolved ethnic animosities, the hurt, grief, and anger resulting from unprovoked violence, the failure of governments to provide justice, and the failure of SIM and ECWA to address adequately the underlying issues of power, identity, and worldview all play a part in the construction of these attitudes. Evangelism has declined, and the main concentration of many is self-defence, guarding their own neighbourhoods from attack. Safety is more important than expressing love or forgiveness, let alone witnessing to one’s faith. In lieu of ECWA taking a lead, Pentecostal beliefs offer an attractive perspective for some, but not for all.
Appendix One
Interviews and Questionnaires

ECWA Leaders and Church members.

Research Question 1 “Setting”
What was the social, cultural and theological context in which the ECWA church has developed and its leadership has been formed?

1. Can you give me some personal details about yourself – your name, what your occupation is, and where you come from?
2. How did you become a Christian?
3. Can you tell me about your tribal origins and history?
4. Tell me about the impact of the Hausa/Fulani and Islam on your people.
5. What impact did the British colonial masters have on your people?
6. What did SIM and later ECWA teach about Islam and how we should relate to Muslims?
7. What is the current relationship between Christians and Muslims in Nigeria?

Research Question 2 “Effect”
In what ways has ECWA’s theological and political attitudes developed and changed over the years?

1. “No condition is permanent”. Assuming this statement is true, how has ECWA changed since 1980?
2. Have other churches influenced ECWA’s beliefs and practices? If so, how?
3. Since the early 1980s there has been a lot of violence between Christians and Muslims in Nigeria and many people have died. How have you, and those you know, been affected by this violence?
4. What do you think are the reasons for all of these religious riots?
5. When you compare the attitudes of Christians towards Muslims before the violence started and now have there been any changes? If so, why do you think these changes have taken place?
6. “If you want to find out what I really believe watch what I do and not what I say” How would this statement apply to the leaders and members of ECWA when considering Muslim-Christian relations?

Research Question 3 “Solution”
How can ECWA contribute to a solution of the Christian-Muslim divide in Nigeria?

1. In the recent trouble in Yelwa there are stories of Christians resorting to traditional religion for the power to attack the Muslims. What do you think of this idea?
2. ECWA prides itself that it believes and teaches the Bible. What does the Bible teach about how Christians should relate to their enemies?
3. Do you think that if Christians discussed their differences with Muslims in the hope of achieving peace that they would be successful?
4. Was the late Abubakr Gumi right to suggest that the only solution for Nigeria is to divide it into Christian and Muslim countries?
5. How can ECWA theologians contribute to a solution to this problem?
6. In what practical ways can ECWA leaders and members love their enemies?
7. Have you any other suggestions?
Questionnaire for Non-ECWA Christians

Research Question 1 “Setting”
What was the social, cultural and theological context in which the ECWA church has developed and its leadership has been formed?

1. Can you give me some personal details about yourself – your name, what your occupation is, and where you come from?
2. How did you become a Christian?
3. Can you tell me about your tribal origins and history?
4. Tell me about the impact of the Hausa/Fulani and Islam on your people.
5. What impact did the British colonial masters have on your people?
6. What did the missionaries and later your church teach about how Christians should relate to Muslims?
7. What is the current relationship between Christians and Muslims in Nigeria?

Research Question 2 “Effect”
In what ways has ECWA’s theological and political attitudes developed and changed over the years?

1. “No condition is permanent”. Assuming this statement is true, how do you think churches in general have changed since 1980?
2. Are any of these changes specific to ECWA? Have other churches influenced ECWA in these directions? Has ECWA influenced other churches in any specific direction?
3. Since the early 1980s there has been a lot of violence between Christians and Muslims in Nigeria and many people have died. How have you, and those you know, been affected by this violence?
4. What do you think are the reasons for all of these religious riots?
5. When you compare the attitudes of Christians towards Muslims before the violence started and now have there been any changes? If so, why do you think these changes have taken place?
6. Are ECWA leaders and members sincere when they speak of loving Muslims – or are they really hypocrites?

Research Question 3 “Solution”
How can ECWA contribute to a solution of the Christian-Muslim divide in Nigeria?

1. In the recent trouble in Yelwa there are stories of Christians resorting to traditional religion for the power to attack the Muslims. What do you think of this idea?
2. What does the Bible teach about how Christians should relate to their enemies? Does ECWA practice this?
3. Do you think that if Christians discussed their differences with Muslims in the hope of achieving peace that they would be successful?
4. Was the late Abubakr Gumi right to suggest that the only solution for Nigeria is to divide it into Christian and Muslim countries?
5. How can ECWA theologians contribute to a solution to this problem?
6. In what practical ways can ECWA leaders and members love their enemies?
7. Have you any other suggestions?
Questions for SIM Missionaries

Research Question 1 “Setting”

What was the social, cultural and theological context in which the ECWA church has developed and its leadership has been formed?

1. Can you give me some personal details about yourself – your name, where you come from, and the places and jobs you worked in as a missionary?
2. Can you tell me about your church background before you became a missionary?
3. Which Bible College and/or seminary(s) did you attend? What were their theological distinctives?
4. Can you remember anything of what you were taught about Islam when you were a student in Bible College or seminary?
5. When you got to Nigeria what did you learn about the impact of the Hausa/Fulani and Islam on the people groups you worked among?
6. What impact did the British colonial rulers have on the people groups you worked with?
7. What did SIM and later ECWA teach about Islam and how Christians should relate to Muslims?
8. ECWA prides itself that it believes and teaches the Bible. When you were a missionary in Nigeria what did you teach and preach about how Christians should relate to their enemies?
9. When you were in Nigeria what position did you hold on Christian-Muslim dialogue?

Research Question 2 “Effect”

In what ways has ECWA’s theological and political attitudes developed and changed over the years?

1. “No condition is permanent”. Assuming this statement is true, how did ECWA change up until the time you left Nigeria permanently?
2. Did you ever detect the influence of other churches on ECWA’s beliefs and practices? If so, how?
3. Since the early 1980s there has been a lot of violence between Christians and Muslims in Nigeria and many people have died. How have you, and those you know, been affected by this violence?
4. What do you think are the reasons for all of these religious riots?
5. Did you detect any changes in the attitudes of Christians towards Muslims between the violence starting and the time you left? If so, why do you think these changes took place?

Research Question 3 “Solution”

How can ECWA contribute to a solution of the Christian-Muslim divide in Nigeria?

1. The pull of traditional religions in Nigeria is still strong – especially when people are looking for spiritual power with which to defend themselves from or attack their enemies. Is there anything that SIM could have done differently to guard against such a pull?
2. Is there anything that you wish that you had taught or done differently related to Muslim-Christian relations?
3. How can SIM help ECWA develop solutions to this problem?
4. Have you any other suggestions?
## Appendix Two


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Deaths</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May 1980</td>
<td>Zaria (Kaduna State)</td>
<td>Christian owned property destroyed</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 – 19 December 1980</td>
<td>Yan-Awaki Ward in Kano, (Kano State)</td>
<td>Maidatsine riots. Many killed, extensive property destruction</td>
<td>4,177 – 4,179 killed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 – 30 October 1982</td>
<td>Bullumkutu, Maidugari, (Borno State)</td>
<td>Kala-Kato &amp; Maidatsine sects. Extensive property destruction</td>
<td>118 killed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 – 30 October, 1982</td>
<td>Fagge, Kano</td>
<td>Muslim rioters burn down Christian churches</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>Rigassa/Tudun Wada, Kaduna (Kaduna State)</td>
<td>Maidatsine sect. Extensive property damage</td>
<td>53 killed</td>
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<tr>
<td>27 February – 5 March, 1984</td>
<td>Dobeli Ward, Jimeta-Yola (Gongola State)</td>
<td>Maidatsine sect. Extensive property damage</td>
<td>105 – 586 killed</td>
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<tr>
<td>26 – 28 April, 1982</td>
<td>Pantami Ward, Gombe, (Bauchi State)</td>
<td>Maidatsine sect. Extensive property damage</td>
<td>105 killed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>Usman Dan Fodio University Crisis, Sokoto, (Sokoto State)</td>
<td>Muslim students versus Christian students. Extensive property damage.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1986</td>
<td>University of Ibadan, (Oyo State)</td>
<td>Demonstrations by Muslims leading to burning the figure of the Risen Christ, in Chapel of Resurrection, University of Ibadan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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968 This table is constructed mainly from the following sources:  
Various copies of *Today’s Challenge*, Jos, ECWA Productions, assorted dates.  
Exact mortality rates are difficult to obtain given deliberate government under-reporting and exaggerated reports from elsewhere.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
<th>Casualties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>March 1987</td>
<td>a. Kafanchan, (Kaduna State)</td>
<td>Muslim-Christian riots at Kafanchan College of Education. Loss of life &amp; burning of mosques by Christians &amp; local tribes.</td>
<td>9 killed?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>Student religious clash, Queen Amina College, Kaduna.</td>
<td>Female Muslim students wanted Islamic school uniform. Attacked Christian staff &amp; students.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 1988</td>
<td>Kaduna Polytechnic, Kaduna</td>
<td>Religious riots, ostensibly among students, destroyed the foundation walls of the Christian Chapel.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 1990</td>
<td>Religious riots in Bauchi State secondary schools</td>
<td>Muslim Students Society attack Christian staff and students in 20 schools. Extensive property damage</td>
<td>2 Christians killed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b. Tafewa Balewa, and Bauchi</td>
<td>Quarrel between Fulani man &amp; a Sayawa meat seller in Tafewa Balewa, escalated into religious war in Bauchi. Shi‘ite led. Several lives lost &amp; extensive property damage.</td>
<td>84 to 200 people in Bauchi, or up to 3 million+?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 1991</td>
<td>Kano</td>
<td>Peaceful protest against Reinhard Bonnke crusade becomes violent. Extensive property damage.</td>
<td>500+? Killed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Event Description</td>
<td>Casualties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1992</td>
<td>Zangon Kataf, Zaria, Kaduna &amp; Ikare</td>
<td>Kataf v Hausa feud becomes Christian v Muslim war across Kaduna State. Many killed. Extensive property damage etc.</td>
<td>100+ ? killed – church leaders targeted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 1993</td>
<td>Funtua</td>
<td>Kalakato sect assaults village head. Lives &amp; property lost</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 September 1994</td>
<td>Potiskum</td>
<td>Muslims attack Christians. Extensive property damage</td>
<td>3 Christians killed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 1995</td>
<td>Tafewa Balewa</td>
<td>Muslims attack Christians. Market + 30 villages &amp; 77 churches burned</td>
<td>200 + killed, Christians blamed, ethnic cleansing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b. Retaliatory riots Onitsha &amp; elsewhere in south-east Nigeria</td>
<td>Attacks on Muslims provoked when Igbo corpses returned for burial from Kaduna</td>
<td>Hundreds killed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 2001</td>
<td>Jos, Plateau State</td>
<td>Extensive Muslim-Christian rioting. Major property damage &amp; displaced people.</td>
<td>2000+ killed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 2002</td>
<td>Miss World riots in Kaduna &amp; Abuja.</td>
<td>Muslim-Christian clash after newspaper article 20,000 – 30,000 displaced. Extensive property damage.</td>
<td>250 killed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 February 2004</td>
<td>a. Yelwa, Plateau State</td>
<td>Muslim attack on Christians. Part of ongoing attacks.</td>
<td>75 killed, 48 at worship.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 2006</td>
<td>Danish cartoon riots in Maidugari, Gombe, Katsina, Bauchi, Potiskum, Kontagora. Also Onitsha</td>
<td>Extensive property damage. Churches targeted.</td>
<td>140 + Christians killed in Northern Nigeria. 80 Northern Nigerians killed in Onitsha in retaliation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 2008</td>
<td>Jos North post-election riots</td>
<td>Extensive property damage. 16 churches destroyed &amp; pastors targeted</td>
<td>500 – 1000 killed. 4 pastors killed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Event Description</td>
<td>Casualties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 – 26 July 2009</td>
<td>Bauchi, Maidugari &amp; Kano</td>
<td>Boko Haram riots. 20 churches destroyed. Other property damage &amp; internal refugees</td>
<td>1000+ killed. Christian men specifically targeted for forced conversions or beheading</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 - 20 January 2010</td>
<td>Jos and nearby area</td>
<td>Extensive property damage including destroyed churches</td>
<td>Fake soldiers &amp; secret killings. 300+ killed, 800+ wounded, 3000+ refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 February 2010</td>
<td>Kazaure, Jigawa State</td>
<td>7 churches burned as Muslim mob reacts to police brutality</td>
<td>No deaths from mob violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 March 2010</td>
<td>Zot, Dogo Na Hauwa &amp; Rastat villages near Jos</td>
<td>Extensive property damage including churches.</td>
<td>500 Christian Berom killed by Fulani nomads – mainly women, children and old men</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix Three

Statement of Faith

The Articles of Faith and Practice of the Church are:

We believe:

(1) THE SCRIPTURES. The sixty-six books of both Old and New testaments are the inspired Word of God, without error in the works of original writings, the complete revelation of His will for the salvation of men, and the divine and final authority for all Christian faith and life (II Tim. 3:16; II Peter 1:21; I Cor. 2:13).

(2) GOD. There is one God. The Creator and Preserver of all things, infinite in being and perfection. He exists eternally in three Persons – the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, who are who are equal in power and glory. (Duet.6:4; Matt.28:19; II Cor. 13:14; Heb. 1: 1 – 13).

(3) JESUS CHRIST is true God and true man, having been conceived of the Holy Spirit and born of the virgin Mary. He lived a perfect, sinless life. He died on the cross, a sacrifice for our sins, according to the Scriptures. He rose bodily from the dead and ascended into heaven, where He is now our High Priest and advocate at the right hand of the Majesty on High (Luke 2:3 – 35; Phil. 2:5 – 8; 1 Cor. 15: 1 – 4; Heb. 1:3).

(4) THE HOLY SPIRIT is the third Person of the God-head who regenerates, indwells, baptises, and seals all true believers in Christ and fills those yielded to God. The Holy Spirit's ministry is to glorify Christ in the life of the believers. He guides, instructs, empowers and gives spiritual abilities to Christians for service. Some of the spiritual gifts listed in Scripture (tongues, healing etc.) were temporary sign gifts. However, any emphasis on possession of any of those gifts as a qualification for and evidence of salvation and service is unscriptural and is rejected (John 3:3-6; I Cor. 6:19; I Cor. 12:13; Eph. 5:18; John 15:13-14; Acts 1:8; I Cor. 12:11; I Cor. 14:22; Heb. 2:3-5).

(5) ANGELS. God has created an innumerable company of sinless, spirit-beings, known as angels. They are messengers of God to help his people in all ages. One angel, high in rank, however, sinned through pride, thereby becoming Satan. A great company of the angels followed him in all his moral fall, some of whom became demons, active agents of Satan. They became active agents of Satan known as demons (Is. 14:12 – 17; Ezek. 28:11 – 19; I Tim. 3:6). A Christian cannot be possessed by demons.

(6) MAN. Man was created in the image and likeness of God, but in Adam all mankind fell into sin with the result that all men are sinners, hopelessly
sinful in themselves, apart from the grace of God (Gen. 1:27; Rom. 5:12; Eph. 2:1).

(7) SALVATION is received by faith alone in Christ, apart from works. Christ died as a substitutionary sacrifice to redeem us from our sins and rose again. His shed blood and His resurrection provide the only ground for justification and salvation. Only those who receive Jesus Christ are born of the Holy Spirit and those become children of God. (Acts 4:12; Jn. 3:7; II Cor. 5:21; Jn. 1:12).

(8) ASSURANCE is the confidence that God gives us through His Word that without a doubt our sins have been totally and eternally forgiven when we trust Christ as our personal Saviour (Col. 2:2; Heb. 6:11; 10:22).

(9) ETERNAL SECURITY. God will keep for ever, by His power, all those who have accepted Jesus Christ as their Saviour (Jn. 5:24; 10:28; Eph. 1:11 – 12; I Peter 1:5).

(10) SANCTIFICATION is three-fold: positional, progressive, and ultimate sanctification. The ultimate sanctification will only be ours when we enter into the Lord’s presence (Heb. 10:10, 14; 12:10; John 17:17; Eph. 5:25 – 27; 1 Jn. 3:2).

(11) THE CHURCH, embracing all true believers, is the body and bride of Christ, formed by the baptism of the Holy Spirit. The local church is intended to be a local, organised representation of the body of Christ, and should be composed only of true believers (Eph. 1:22 – 23; 1 Cor. 12:13; Phil. 1:1).

(12) ORDINANCES. The ordinances of the Church are the Lord’s Supper and Water Baptism which are to be observed by the Church during the present age. They are, however, not to be regarded as means of salvation. (Acts 8:36 – 38; I Cor. 11:23 – 26).

(13) CHRISTIAN LIFE. Christians are called to a holy life of service and testimony in the power of the Holy Spirit, which service includes the propogation of Gospel message to the whole world. Christians will give account of and receive reward for their faithful service at the judgement seat of Christ. (I Pet. 1:15 – 16; Acts 1:8; II Cor. 5: 9-10; I Cor. 3:12-15).

(14) THE BLESSED HOPE. The blessed hope of the Church is the personal, imminent and pre-millennial coming of the Lord Jesus Christ, which is the rapture of the believers. This hope has a vital bearing on the personal life and service of the believers (Titus 2:13; I Thess. 4:13 – 18; Rev. 20:1-6; John 3:2-3; II Peter 3:11).

(15) RESURRECTION. All the dead will bodily resurrected, the believers to everlasting blessedness and joy with the Lord, the unbelievers to judgement and everlasting conscious punishment (John 11:25-26; I Cor. 15:20-22; Rev. 20:11-15; Matt. 25:46).
Appendix Four

Article IV: Articles of Faith and Practice

We believe:

1. THE SCRIPTURES. The sixty six books of both Old and New testaments are the inspired Word of God, without error in the works of the original writings, the complete revelation of God’s will for the salvation of men, and the divine and final authority for all Christian faith and practice (2 Tim. 3:16; 2 Peter 1:21; 1 Cor. 2:13).

2. GOD. There is one God, the Creator and Preserver of all things, infinite in being and perfection. He exists in three Persons – Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, who are co-equal and co-eternal (Duet. 6:4; Matt. 28:19; Heb. 1: 1 – 13; Col. 1:15, 19).

3. JESUS CHRIST. Jesus Christ is very God and very man, having been conceived of the Holy Spirit and born of the virgin Mary. He lived a perfect, sinless life. He died on the cross, a sacrifice for our sins, according to the Scriptures. He rose bodily from the dead and ascended into heaven, where He is now our High Priest and Advocate at the right hand of the Majesty on High (Luke 2:3 – 35; Phil. 2:5 – 8; 1 Cor. 15: 1 – 4; Heb. 1:3; 1 John 2: 1-2).

4. THE HOLY SPIRIT. The Holy Spirit is the Third Person of the God-head Who regenerates (that is, gives new life to anyone who, dead in sins and trespasses, exercises saving faith in Jesus Christ – Rom. 8:11; Jn. 6:63a); indwells (that is, resides in everyone who truly believes in Jesus Christ – Jn. 14:16, 17; Rom. 8:9,11,15; 1 Cor. 6:19); baptises (that is, places every true believer into the Body of Christ, thus joining each believer to Christ in a mystical union – 1 Cor. 12:13; Gal 3:26, 27; Rom. 6:3.4); seals (that is, by the abiding presence of the Holy Spirit in the believer, the divine mark of ownership is eternally placed to indicate that the one indwelt is God’s own eternal possession – Eph. 1: 13 – 14; 4:30); and fills those who believe (that is, empowers those yielded to God in daily conduct and service – 2 Cor. 3:18; Eph. 5:18; Gal. 5:16, 22 – 25; Col. 3:17). The Holy Spirit’s ministry is to glorify God in the life of the believer as He guides, instructs, empowers, and gives spiritual abilities for service (Jn. 3:3 – 6; 1 Cor. 6:19; 12:13; Eph. 5:18; Acts 1:8).

5. ANGELS. God originally created an innumerable company of sinless, spirit-beings, known as angels. They are messengers of God to help his people in all ages. One angel, high in rank, however, sinned through pride. He is known as Satan. A great company of other spirit beings followed suit in Satan’s fall. They became active agents of Satan known as demons (Is. 14:12 – 17; Ezek. 28:11 – 19; 1 Tim. 3:6).

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970 Taken from The Constitution and Bye-Laws of the Evangelical Church of West Africa (ECWA), ECWA Headquarters, Jos, 1999, pp. 4 - 11.
971 The change here substitutes “eternally” which appeared as “He existed eternally” with “co-eternally”.
972 1 John 2: 1 – 2 is added to the Biblical references.
(6) MAN. Man was created in the image of God and likeness of God, but in Adam all mankind fell into sin with the result that all men are sinners by nature and action, are depraved and without hope apart from the grace of God (Gen. 1:26,27; 2:17; 6:5; Rom. 3:10 – 19; Jn. 3:6, 16).

(7) SALVATION. Salvation is received by faith alone in the God-man Jesus Christ, apart from works. Christ died as a substitutionary sacrifice to redeem us from our sins if we believe in Him. His shed blood and His resurrection provide the only ground of justification and salvation. Only those who receive Jesus Christ are born of the Holy Spirit and are truly Christians, even children of God. There is no salvation for those who die outside of Christ (Acts 4:12; Jn. 3:7; 2 Cor. 5:21; Jn. 1:12; Rom. 5:8; John 2:18; John 3:18).

(8) ASSURANCE AND ETERNAL SECURITY. Everyone who truly believes in Jesus Christ's atoning work and has appropriated this benefit personally to life is assured of salvation both now and forever. Those so assured are eternally kept saved due to the abiding presence of the Holy Spirit unto the day of redemption (Col. 2:2; 1 Jn. 5:13; Heb. 6:11; 10:22; Jn. 5:24; 10:28; Rom. 8:29; Heb. 7:25; 1 Jn. 2:1,2).

(9) SANCTIFICATION. That is, believers’ setting apart unto God is three-fold: positional at the point of conversion; progressive on a daily basis as we walk the Christian pilgrim way; and ultimate which is experienced in the hereafter when each believer enters into the presence of the Lord (Jn. 17:17; 2 Cor. 3:18; 7:1; Eph. 4:24; 5: 25 – 27; 1 Thess. 5:23; Heb. 10:10, 14; 12:10; 1 Jn. 2:15 – 17; 3:2).

(10) THE CHURCH. The Church, embracing all true believers, is the Body and Bride of Christ, formed by the baptism of the Holy Spirit (that is, the placing of individual believers in the Body of Christ). The local church is intended to be a local, reorganised representation of the mystical Body of Christ, and should be composed only of true believers (Eph. 1:22 – 23; 1 Cor. 12:13; Phil. 1:1; Eph. 1:20 – 23; 4:3 – 10, 30; Col. 3:14 – 15).

(11) ORDINANCES. The Ordinances of the Church are the Lord’s Supper and Water Baptism by immersion which are to be observed by the Church during the present age. These are designed to strengthen the believer spiritually and to be a public witness to the Lordship of Jesus Christ. They are not a means of salvation (Matt. 28:19; Lk. 22:19 – 20; Acts 8:36 – 38; 10:47 – 48; 16:32; 18: 7 – 8; 1 Cor. 11:23 – 26).

(12) CHRISTIAN LIFE AND SERVICE. Men are saved unto good works (Eph. 2:10; Titus 3:8) and faith without works is dead (Jas. 2:17). Therefore, Christians are called to a holy life of service and testimony in the power of the

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973 The Council concerned to strengthen this article in light of the increasing prevalence of memorial services. It thus added "there is no salvation for those who die outside of Christ" and two references – Romans 5:8 & John 2:28.

974 ECWA recognises that the only mode of baptism is by immersion in water of born-again believers. Baptism from other churches may be recognized as long as it is "in the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit" and the mode of such baptism is in conformity with ECWA. Infant baptism, sprinkling and effusion are not recognized as proper modes of baptism. Nor does the church recognize any baptism that is not in the name of the Trinity as given above.

975 To more adequately express what the Church believes about the sacraments, and remove any sense of undue mystique surrounding the sacraments due to Roman Catholic influence the following words were added. "There are designed to strengthen the believer spiritually and to be a public witness to the Lordship of Jesus Christ. They are not a means salvation."
Holy Spirit, which service includes the propagation of the Gospel message to the whole world. The Holy Spirit bestows by His own sovereign will, diverse grace gifts upon all who believe in Christ for enablement in service for God's glory. Christians will give account of, and receive rewards for their faithful service at the judgement seat of Christ (Acts 1:8; 1 Cor. 3:12 – 15; 2 Cor. 5:9 – 10; Rom. 12:6; 1 Cor. 12:4 – 11; Eph. 4:11; 1 Pet. 1:15 – 16).

13) SPIRITUAL GIFTS. These are bestowed freely as determined by the Holy Spirit on believers and not by the will or desire of man. These grace (unmerited favour) gifts are meant for the edification of the Body of Christ and for service to the glory of God. In this age God has given for the building up of the Church the following grace gifts among others: faith, administration, care, Pastor/teacher, evangelist, wisdom, knowledge, discernment (Rom. 12:6; 1 Cor. 12:4 – 11; Eph. 4:11). Some of the Spiritual gifts listed in Scripture, for example, tongues, healing etc are sign gifts. However an undue emphasis on possession of any of those sign gifts as a means or prerequisite for salvation or mark of spiritual superiority is unscriptural and is rejected. (Jn. 6:3 – 16; Jn. 16:13 – 14; Acts 1:8; 1 Cor. 14:1 – 40).

14) THE BLESSED HOPE. The blessed hope of the Church is the personal, imminent and pre-millennial second coming of the Lord Jesus Christ, which is the rapture of the believers, both the living and the dead. This hope must have a vital bearing on the personal life and service of the believers (Jn. 14:1 – 3; 1 Cor. 15:51 – 52; 1 Thess. 4:13 – 18; Titus 2:11 – 14; 2 Pet. 3:11).

15) THE TRIBULATION. In the end times shall come a period of divine judgement upon the whole world which, day after day, continues to ripen for judgement (Matt. 24:15 – 21; Jer. 30:7; Dan 9:27; Rev. 6:1 – 17; 19:21).

16) RESURRECTION. All the dead will eventually resurrect bodily at the end times, the believers into everlasting blessedness and joy with their Lord, the unbelievers into judgement and everlasting conscious punishment (John. 11:25 – 26; Luke. 16:19 – 26; 23:42; 1 Cor. 15:20 – 22; 2 Cor. 5:8; 2 Thess. 1:7 – 9; Rev. 20:11 – 15).

976 “Prayer” is not a sign gift but the right of every believer. In addition “were sign gifts” was changed to “are sign gifts” signifying that the Church believes that such gifts are the prerogative of the Holy Spirit to use at whatsoever time He chooses whether in the past, the present, or the future.

977 To counteract the attitudes of some charismatics the clause “or mark of spiritual superiority” was inserted in this sentence.

978 The references to Revelation in the former Constitution were incorrect and have now been corrected.
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| Rev. James Gabis, EMS of ECWA Director | 23rd January 2006 |
| Rev. Professor Musa Gaiya, Professor of Church History, University of Jos | 12th February 2007 |
| Evangelist Saleh Hussaini, ECWA Kano DCC | 20th July 2006 |
| Trustee Rev. Dr. Siman Ibrahim, former ECWA General Secretary | 19th April 2006 |
| Professor Dennis Ityavyr, Professor of Sociology, University of Jos, and Director, International Centre for Gender & Social Research | 9th May 2007 |
| Mr Musa Iya, District Head of Fadan Kagoro, Kagoro Chiefdom | 11th April 2006 |
| Rev. Danjuma Jacob, former ECWA Vice-President | 3rd May 2006 |
| Mr. Yakubu Joseph, Director, Centre for Peace Advancement in Nigeria | 6th February 2007 |
| Rev. Dr. Zamani Kafang, Provost, ECWA Kagoro Seminary | 11th April 2006 |
| Rev. Samaila Kogo, Associate Minister, ECWA English Church, Kano | 21st July 2006 |
| Rev. Dr. Peter Korosi, former ECWA Education Director | 14th July 2006 |
| Rev Professor Samuel Waje Kunhiyop, former Provost, JETS | 31st January 2006 |
| Rev Dr Barje Maigadi, Deputy Provost, JETS | 29th December 2005 |
| Rev. Bello Misal, former ECWA Vice-President | 29th December 2005 |
| Rev. Dr. Bauta Motty, former ECWA General Secretary | 14th December 2005 |
| Rev. Dr. Victor Musa, former ECWA President | 2nd May 2006 |
| Rev. Philip Nache, Director, Household of Agape Services | 24th February 2007 |
| Rev. Gordian Okezie, former ECWA Assistant General Secretary | 30th March 2006 |
| Rev Professor Cornelius Olowola, former ECWA President | 20th January 2006 |
Elder Dele Onamusi, Nigeria Coordinator, Call of Hope 20th July 2006
Mr Gideon Para-Mallam, IFES Associate Regional Secretary
   for West Africa 1st March 2007
Rev. Nahor Samaila, Former EMS Director 16th November 2006
His Royal Highness Sambo Tagwai OFR, Chief of Mororoa 11th April 2006
Mr Matthew Tangbuin, MCC 19th April 2007
Rev. Gopar Tapkida, Coordinator, MCC (Mennonite Central Committee)
   West African Regional Peace Network. 8th February 2007
Rev Professor Yusufu Turaki, former ECWA General Secretary 23rd June 2006
Rev Jonathan Shekari, ECWA Kagoro DCC 21st May 2006
Mrs Liyaratu Yakubu, ECWA Kano DCC 21st July 2006

4.5.2 ECWA Questionnaires
Rev Adamu Abba 28th May 2006
Rev Sunday Abutuk, ECWA Zagun DCC 28th May 2006
Rev Ibrahim C Abwo, ECWA Miango DCC 29th May 2006
Mrs Esther Adams, ECWA Gombe DCC 27th December 2006
Rev Dr Sunday B Agang, JETS 25th January 2006
Miss Gloria Anche 23rd December 2006
Anonymous from Borno 29th December 2006
Anonymous, ECWA Seminary Church, Jos 15th May 2007
Anonymous from Kaduna x 4, ECWA Goodnews Church, Ungwar Rimi,
   Kaduna Central DCC 3rd March 2008
Evangelist Yusufu Garba Argungu 23rd December 2006
Mrs Kande Nana Bage, ECWA Goodnews Church, Ungwar Rimi,
   Kaduna Central DCC 3rd March 2008
Mr Daniel Adamson Bakka from Zangon Kataf 29th December 2006
Mr Mamman Banlingi, ECWA Tangale DCC 29th May 2006
Rev Bala Barau 28th May 2006
Rev Silas G Butswat,
   Christian Education Coordinator, ECWA Jos DCC 29th May 2006
Mr Raphael Chibuike, ECWA Seminary Church, Jos 15th May 2007
Mr E.O. Dayale, ECWA Tangale DCC 29th May 2006
Mrs Tassalla Danladi Dogo, ECWA Goodnews Church, Ungwar Rimi,
   Kaduna Central DCC 3rd March 2008
Rev. Dr. Bulus Galadima, Provost of JETS  
Rev Daudu S Galadima, Secretary, ECWA Bauchi DCC  
Trustee Dr. Salihu Danlami Garba  
Rev Nanyak Goifa, ECWA Jos DCC  
Rev Monday Tamin Gopep  
Rev John Hassan, Chairman, ECWA Zaria DCC  
Mr L Y Ibrahim, ECWA Goodnews Church, Ungwar Rimi, Kaduna Central DCC  
Mrs Lydia Amos Inyang, ECWA English Church, Kano DCC  
Mr Joseph Bwayili Ishaya  
Miss Esther John, ECWA Goodnews Church, Ungwar Rimi, Kaduna Central DCC  
Mr Alphia Jonah, ECWA English Church, Kano DCC  
Rev Yunusa Kallah, Secretary, ECWA Waja DCC  
Mr Abednego M Kam, ECWA Theological Training Institute, Bayara  
Rev Barnabas Kano, Chairman, ECWA Tangale DCC  
Mr Sulmane Maigadi, ECWA Seminary Church, Jos  
Rev Lot Sabo Maiganga, Secretary, ECWA Keffi DCC  
Mr Anthony Alalfa Mamdam from Langtang  
Mr David Mayaki, ECWA English Church, Kano DCC  
Rev Davou Nyam, Chairman, ECWA Bukuru DCC  
Mr Bulus Omar, ECWA Gombe DCC  
Mr ThankGod E Onoji, ECWA English Church, Kano DCC  
Rev. Ephraim Y Piyak, Secretary, ECWA Gure DCC  
Mrs Umoru Rakiya, ECWA Goodnews Church, Ungwar Rimi, Kaduna Central DCC  
Mr Abdul Salami Saidu, ECWA English Church, Kano DCC  
Rev Samaila Sallau, ECWA English Church, Kano DCC  
Rev Adamu Sambo, former ECWA Vice-President  
Rev Yunana Gani Tanimu, Secretary, ECWA Zonzon DCC  
Mr Elisha Thomas, ECWA Church Rantya-Jos  
Rev Professor Yusufu Turaki, former ECWA General Secretary  
Rev Isa Uba, ECWA Kumo DCC  
Rev Chillahe M Waziri, ECWA Keffi DCC  
Rev Micah Bulus Yaute, ECWA Gombe DCC Assistant Secretary  
Rev Jonah N Yawus, Secretary, ECWA Pankshin DCC
4.5.3 Other Nigerian Church Leaders
(mostly interviewed, questionnaires marked *)

Dr Theresa Adamu, Deputy Provost, Theological College of Northern Nigeria

Pastor Ajang Daniel Atsen*

Mr Sargwak S. Baple*

Dr Shedrach Best, Director, Centre of Conflict Management & Peace Studies,
University of Jos

Rev Professor Umar H.D. Danfulani, Professor of Comparative Religions and
Head of Religious Studies Department, University of Jos

Pastor Ayuba M.K. Elkanah*

Rev Father John Goar, Director, Jos Provincial Institute of Pastoral Affairs

Mr Andrew K Ibi*

His Grace, Most Rev Ignatius Kaigama, Catholic Archbishop of Jos

Most Rev Benjamin Kwashi, Anglican Archbishop of Jos

Mr Mark Lipdo, Programme Manager of Stefanos Foundation

Mr Dick Mbodwam, Director & Liaison Officer for Communications with
Lutheran Church of Christ in Nigeria

Rev Kefas Ali Mshelia*

Right Rev. Simon Mutum, Anglican Bishop for Nomadic Peoples,
Rev Akintayo Sunday Olayinka

Rev David Pofi,* Coordinator COCIN Community Missions

Rev Caleb Shadrach, Special Assistant for Religious Affairs to the then
Plateau State Governor

Rev John Sinang*

Rev. Bulus Tsetu, Assemblies of God Pankshin District Superintendent,

Rev Daniel Saje, Associate Pastor, Evangel Chapel, ETS, Jos &
Chaplain in Evangel Seminary

Rev Dr Pandang Yamsat, COCIN President

Mr Cirman Nanshal Zhipar*

29th November 2006
17th December 2006
15th December 2006
27th May 2007
10th February 2007
17th December 2006
10th May 2007
17th December 2006
16th May 2007
16th May 2007
15th May 2006
2nd May 2007
23rd December 2006
18th May 2007
15th February 2007
17th December 2006
17th May 2006
3rd May 2007
11th May 2007
11th May 2007
20th November 2006
17th December 2006
4.5.4 SIM Responses
(mainly via e-mail, those interviewed marked *)

Dr Phil Andrew, former ECWA Director of Medical Services 30th April 2006
Mr Trevor Ardill, former SIM Bookshop Manager 11th June 2006
Rev Brian Butler 27th April 2006
Rev Dr Richard Calenberg, former Acting Director, SIM Nigeria 31st March 2006
Dr Ruth Cox 1st April 2006
Rev Bill Foute,* former SIM Nigeria Director 31st May 2006
Miss Carrie Fox 13th March 2006
Rev Dr Harold Fuller, former SIM Deputy General Director 20th January 2007
Dr Don Hall 18th January 2006
Miss Margaret Hall 14th August 2007
Rev Dr Ian Hay, former SIM General Director 10th August 2007
Rev Harold Hide 19th February 2006
Mr Tom & Mrs Heidi Jessurun* 21st July 2006
Mr Ken Klay, former ECWA Rural Development Director 30th April 2006
Miss Phyllis Lawson 21st March 2006
Miss Lavona Lee 11th June 2006
Mr Ken Lloyd 1st April 2006
Mrs Phyllis Lloyd 6th April 2006
Dr Stan Myers 13th August 2007
Dr Bill O'Donovan 13th June 2006
Rev John Pickett 19th February 2006
Mr John Price 10th August 2007
Rev Art Redekop 1st April 2006
Mrs Carol Rutt. 23rd March 2006
Mrs Martha Seger 15th August 2007
Mr Gordon Stanley, former SIM Deputy General Director 1st April 2006
Miss Judy Strand* 9th November 2006
Rev Harvey Stromme* 25th January 2006
Mr Stanley Todd 11th June 2006
Mr Elmer Warkentin, former SIM Nigeria Personnel Manager 16th February 2006
4.5.5 Muslim Leaders
Mallam Abubakar Dawud Muhammad 17th May 2006
Mallam Umar Faruk Musa 24th July 2006
Sheikh Khalid Aliyu Abubakar 9th May 2006

4.5.6 Other Missionaries
Rev Clint Bowman 8th May 2007
Rev Emory VanGerpen 21st March 2006

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Central Intelligence Agency
Economic and Financial Crimes Commission,
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