Introduction

The previous chapters deal with general issues that form the background of the riots, issues that contribute to the explosive atmosphere so conducive to riots. The role of the Muslim community is analyzed, as well as that of the various governments. In this chapter, I emphasize more the sparks that set off riots, that is, the specific circumstances and causes as Christians see them. This division of materials, I am quick to acknowledge, is not always as neat as I would like, for every explanation of immediate causes almost always harks back to past issues or general situations in Christian minds. Nevertheless, associating the issues with specific riots will help develop a more concrete picture.

Not every riot described in Volume 1 will receive treatment here. However, all the issues will be covered, some perhaps more than adequately.

I begin with the reminder that, though our emphasis in this series is on the period from the 1980s into the early years of the new century, the terror Nigerian Christians complain about at the hands
of Muslims started long before that. “J. O.” already experienced it as a thirteen-year-old in 1966, few months after my arrival in Nigeria. He wrote, “I witnessed a holocaust, massive killings of the Christians then. I witnessed every church in the city we were living destroyed. I still remember the Anglican church across from our house where the members were worshipping and the Muslim thugs came in, drove them out and set the church on fire.” His letter closed with the question, “How much longer shall this continue?”

In 2003, thirty-seven years after “J. O.’s” early experience, we are still unable to answer that question.

**Focus on Kano**

1. 1982

The Kano 1982 riot, it may be remembered from Volume 1, centred on St. George’s Anglican Church in Fagge. It was the first of the major Christian–Muslim riot series treated in these studies. In response to this riot, CAN began the tradition of issuing memos to the government to present the Christian viewpoint, a tradition that continued over the decades as new riots erupted throughout the North.

This first major Muslim versus Christian riot in Kano, CAN declared, was primarily a religious event. An early paragraph states, “These religious disturbances were really persecutions directed at the Christian community by fanatical Muslims.” They reached their climax in the destruction of Christian church buildings. CAN has remained faithful to this religious interpretation throughout all the riots and has consistently rejected all attempts to deflect attention and blame from Islam as the culprit. Under the heading “The Essence of the Disturbance,” CAN declared that it “views this problem as one of a direct confrontation between some fanatical Muslims against the Christians.” It also viewed the conflict as “a challenge to the Constitution.” It was “only a symptom of a great
problem” that has been “gathering momentum for years in Kano.”

The immediate Muslim excuse about the location of a church being close to a mosque is torn to shreds with the information that the church was granted a Certificate of Occupancy way back in 1932. It has an expiration date in 2004. The mosque dates from 1968 only. Muslim objections to the nearness of the church really hold no water whatsoever.

Why, asked CAN, did Muslim youth go on a rampage? The answer was that they had been encouraged by the government itself. It has taken over Christian schools without compensation. Permission for opening new schools has been denied for “flimsy excuses.” Christians have been denied media programming. Church buildings have been denied and demolished while Christians have been molested. Christians are even denied adequate space for their dead. Youths, when they observe such skewed conditions, draw their own conclusions as to the place and rights of Christians. As CAN interpreted it, “The Muslim sub-culture and the upbringing of youngsters in Kano State encourages youngsters to hate Christians and tell them [the Christians] that they are unwanted; e.g., the name of a Christian in the mind and lips of an average Muslim is kafiri, arne.”

No one, whether in the community or in government, “considered the existence of the Christians to be anything to be reckoned with, since they are totally an insignificant minority.”

The Kano state government appointed a commission to investigate the causes of this riot. However, Christians objected to its composition—as they did in almost all subsequent cases for reasons already explained in the previous chapter. CAN’s 1982 Memo listed the names of the members appointed to investigate the 1982 crisis and found that only two of the eight were Christians. This imbalance, the Memo suggested, turned it into a vested interest body that could not possibly come to objective conclusions. CAN requested that, “in the interest of fair play and justice,” a new
and independent body be appointed that “will reflect fair and unbiased representation.”

Similarly, Haruna Dandaura, about the only Christian native with any potential clout in this context, expressed in his customary gentle language his doubts about the effectiveness of such an arrangement. The Kano government’s committee to whom Dandaura wrote his letter was, he pointed out to them, “made up of men of integrity, men, who although they comprise mostly Muslims, have been endowed with wisdom and impartiality.” And while he expressed happiness with the “total condemnation of the incident” by the state government, the governor, the emirate council and the emir, it “remains to be seen,” he wrote, “that the perpetrators are dug out and adequately punished. People must be made to understand that Nigeria belongs to everyone of us.”

Dandaura’s fears, it turned out, were legitimate. Christians were very upset about the majority report and the two Christian members presented their own minority version.

The Muslim majority reported causes on both sides of the fence. Muslim causes were the influence of provocative Iranian literature and the “intra-brotherhood squabbles among Muslims themselves.” Christian provocation included recent visits of both the pope and the Anglican Archbishop of Canterbury in quick succession, which had created anxiety amongst Muslims. The re-laying of the foundation stone of the new St. George’s Church added further fuel to the fire. The Christian push for secularism and their evangelistic methods had long been irritants. The fact that the CAN leadership in Kano consisted largely of southerners only proved to Muslims that CAN was merely a political bridgehead of the Christian south into the Muslim north.

The majority recommendation was to remove St. George’s and pay compensation, even though the church had been certified since 1932. This, according to Kukah, shocked Christians. The episode “revealed a deep-seated prejudice against Christians. They
... stopped short of legislating Christianity out of existence in Kano state.” They also advised that any new mosque or church should have the approval of the local community. The outcome of such a policy was obvious, with Christians being a small minority in most communities.

The minority report by the two Christians on the panel, Victor Musa and James Sofa, stated that the incident was merely symptomatic of the general anti-Christian attitude in the state. If the government wished to get to the source of the trouble, it should review the entire landscape of Christian–Muslim relations. They then proceeded to a discussion of all the forms of discrimination that Christians suffer, which are treated under their appropriate headings in previous chapters. In other words, to these Christian spokesmen, the general atmosphere was the main explanation; the specific provocation was not important when it came to solving the issue. In this respect the report was very similar to Muslim explanations.

2. 1991

The 1991 Kano riot centred on the coming of the German evangelist Reinhard Bonnke. The basic facts of the riot have been reported in Volume 1. The Kano State Branch of CAN submitted a memo to the investigative panel established by the state government. It reminded the panel that CAN had presented a similar memo after the 1982 Kano riot. The discouraging thing was that “almost everything therein contained as causes are still relevant today. None of the commendations were implemented nine years later.”

As to the cause, CAN insisted that “the disturbance was religious in motive, nature and proceedings.” The mob was chanting Islamic jihad songs, they came from the prayer ground and/or mosque and had been addressed by Muslim leaders. Various causes were identified in the document. The first one listed was the “derogatory and very inciting publications” by the Pen and Alkalami, the two Kano-
based twin papers we met in previous volumes. “Their number one enemy is Christians.” The notion that Kano citizens are 100 percent Muslims played a part as well. It ignored the sizable Christian minority and somehow legitimised terrorizing them. The government encouraged discrimination by its treatment of Christian students and civil servants. The latter work under “degrading contract conditions.” The police performed poorly because of their recent deployment to their own states of origin, which made it very hard for them to disregard the pressure of the local Muslim community. The recent defeat of Iraq in the Gulf War was experienced as a humiliation of Islam and called for revenge. Government media in Kano fanned this spirit with their insinuations.

Muslims objected to the use of the Race Course for the crusade. With threats from both sides, the state government was in a genuine bind. The author of a write-up in Liberation Times, a Kano-based newspaper run by a Baptist pastor, appeared to have no sensitivity for the government’s difficulty. He berated officials for “giving different excuses for not agreeing to release the place.” “A lot of religious politics was brought into a simple administrative issue. In the process, bitterness and distortion of facts had a field day, thereby laying the foundation for the mayhem.”

Of course, this was hardly just a “simple administrative issue;” it was a political trap from which there was nary an escape for the government. Having said that, I am quick to acknowledge that the trap did not develop by accident. It was the natural result of longstanding government pro-Muslim bias.

In keeping with the CAN memo, one Simeon Ogbonna strongly rejected the economic interpretation of this riot offered by the Christian Vice President Aikhomo. “Nothing,” Ogbonna proclaimed, “could be further from the truth.” It was “religious, pure and simple. It was the fear of conversion that sparked it off.” The stories of Bonnke’s successes elsewhere had caused fear in Kano. And so “the forces of hell would not have it so. They had to fight;
they had to stop it.” However, those who blame the Bonnke crusade “have no case to make,” unless “they can prove that Christians have no right to stage a crusade in Kano.” The history of the Bonnke ministry elsewhere in Nigeria clearly demonstrates that his crusades do not encourage violence. “The history of religious violence in Nigeria bears this out. Muslims have all along been the aggressors! Christians have always been at the receiving end.”

The similarity to apartheid was also noticed here. Joseph Fadipe wrote a strong article accusing Nigeria’s leaders of hypocrisy. They opposed the white apartheid regime while they practised “religious apartheid” in their own country, especially Kano. The reason for this situation was that the oppressors within Nigeria belonged to the same religion to which the “majority of those in government” also belonged. He “marvels” that the government searched for and arrested coup plotters, but failed “to arrest those fanatical Muslims who always cause religious disturbance. Is it not because the killers belong to the so-called state religion and therefore are sacred cows to the government?”

Daniel Bitrus, a Plateau Christian leader and at the time general secretary of the Bible Society of Nigeria, in a letter of condolence to Kano Christians, stated that “the main issue is intolerance and the unaccommodating attitude of Muslims to other religions.” He accused the Kano government “of taking a shallow and unfair decision by banning all [public] religious activities instead of confronting the Muslims with their barbaric action constantly meted out to the Christian community without any provocation.” As already heard so frequently, he noted that the findings of investigative panels are never published and thus no good ever results from them.

ECWA has a large compound in Kano. During the riots, staff members conducted a prayer walk around the entire compound. Rioters came twenty times to destroy the compound, but they walked away every time without touching anything. A few days after the riot, an alhaji was observed staring at the hospital by a
hospital staff member who asked him what he was after. The Muslim told him that “he had come with a group. As they approached the compound, they stopped in front of it because the compound was surrounded by pillars of fire. They assumed somebody else had set the place on fire and left.”

What does that tell us about protection?!

The role of the other protectors, the police, left much to be desired. They were aware of the Muslim threats of violence. The Liberation Times reporter had read one of the threat letters addressed to the police commissioner and copied to the governor and emir. The police would only have itself to blame, if the crusade was not prevented, it read. When CAN warned the police of the threats, they were variously called “alarmists” or they were “assured of adequate security measures being put in place.” Police inaction, according to our reporter, “encouraged the planners of the riot to unleash their reign of terror.” When the first phase of violence broke out, the police once again claimed that “everything was under control.” The police were actually seen to be conniving with the Muslim rioters instead of stopping them. When the Liberation Times reporter asked the police for assistance, an inspector “stated flatly that his team was not sent there to intervene in the crisis but to stay there! (whatever that means).” The reporter was fair enough to relay that some Muslims had protected Christians at considerable danger to themselves and that there were some “new breed” Muslims who disapproved of this violence. Victor Musa, the ECWA pastor, prayed that those Muslims be granted political power.

As a final comment on this riot, I cannot escape the impression that Christians were hell-bent on pursuing their course regardless of the likely consequences. Though there was no excuse for the intransigence of Muslim intolerance, I question the wisdom of Christian leaders who proceeded with their plans under such circumstances. But I also understand their being tired of constant harassment and denial of their constitutional rights. Given the fact that both parties
insisted on their rights, this was a no-win situation, made worse by the fact that the demands for their rights were based on conflicting foundations. It was a case of a traditional Muslim view of religious liberty versus that of a secular constitution, with neither recognizing that of the other. This unresolved conflict was to play a part throughout the next decades and culminated in the re-establishment of the full sharia around the turn of the century.

**Focus on Kaduna**

1. **Kafanchan, 1987**

Tsado and Ari were journalists with *Today’s Challenge* during the Kafanchan riots. They published a “Special Investigation” under the title “Who Is Trying to Destabilise Islam?” Their story shows how extremely twisted and distorted situations can become when people turn into desperate schemers with no holds barred. Under normal circumstances such a story would simply be considered unbelievable.11

During January 1987, the Muslim Circle of the University of Sokoto, the centre of Muslim power and prestige in Nigeria, made an accusation to the Director of National Security Services that the Jos ECWA Theological Seminary (JETS) had “designed a grand subversive strategy against Muslims in the country.” The documents on which the alleged plot was based were appended to their letter. As the story goes:

*It said that the documents were “dangerously provocative” to Muslims. The letter further asserted that it was the failure of government “to prevent the execution of such mischievous plans” that usually provokes Muslims to react, sometimes violently, against their opponents.*

One of the documents is captioned “Committee on Islamic Affairs, Action Division,” and bears the same postal address as JETS. Marked secret, but addressed to no one in particular, this document
stated that five booklets have been published in English, Hausa and Arabic, “using the Bible and Koran to confuse the Muslims and show them the true way.” The document stated that sixty-eight million copies of the said booklets have been printed for distribution through Challenge Bookshops in some northern states. It further said that 150 people have been appointed for the project. The undated letter has the stamp of the “Christian Propaganda Wing.”

Another document under a similar letter heading is a letter titled “Islamic School Project.” The letter said one Isa Bello and Usman Bala would be sent for training at BUK Kano and ABU Zaria. It further alleged that several intellectuals, including Dr. Yusufu Turaki, Principal of the Seminary, and “10 others to be appointed” will “teach in the school.” Said the document: “Desks, chairs all bought. School session will begin very soon. With a BA with specialization in Islamic Studies. MA Programme to be introduced shortly.”

A third document under the letter heading “ECWA Theological Seminary Jos,” is titled “Strategies for Muslim Outreach.” It stated that “funds have been made available for the establishment of another radio and TV production centre for Muslim evangelism.” It said the centre would meet [with] Christian governors “to try to get funds for such a school.”

A month later, a Muslim newspaper in Lagos, *Friday Nur*, published similar materials under the caption “Plans to subvert Islam; Christians Map out Strategies.” It alleged that the aim was “the total elimination of Islam from Nigeria.” In the Nigerian context, this is explosive stuff and cannot be ignored by authorities. Nathaniel Olutimkayin, Chairman of the JETS Board, refuted all these allegations in a press conference, claiming that the allegations were “malicious lies calculated to whip up sentiments and cause religious confusion in the country.”

It turned out that the government had in hand a letter allegedly written and signed by the JETS registrar to a former JETS student, Ebby Cheriyan, an Indian, dismissing him from the
school. Turaki denied that JETS had dismissed Cheriyan, but the latter had left the school in the company of his father for unknown reasons and destination. Turaki also denied all other allegations. He requested the government investigate these charges, in view of their seriousness, but officials declined.

Turaki did investigate. He learnt that Cheriyan had told a faculty member that Muslims were pressing him to convert to Islam. They also promised him a good job and a scholarship for further studies. The registrar who was to have signed was abroad on the very date shown on the letter. The parents of the young man reported how he had lied to them in various ways and that he just disappeared. When he did show up after some time, he claimed to have a job as Research Propaganda Officer with the Dantata Group in Kano. This, too, was found to be a lie.

Instead, Today’s Challenge discovered, Cheriyan was offered a teaching position in a yet to be established Arabic Teachers College in Jos, sponsored by JNI. His name had already appeared on the list of tutors submitted to the government. He had submitted a JETS testimonial that he had the course requirements for such a position. This testimonial was indeed signed by the JETS registrar, when Cheriyan told him he was to teach at the Institute of Mass Communication Technology in Jos. Attached to this testimonial was a letter written by Cheriyan to JNI, thanking them for his appointment with them and pledging “to work to my fullest capability to serve Islam.” In the end he admitted his role in all of this and sought forgiveness from his father.

In the meantime, security officers had come to JETS and told Turaki that they had found no truth in these allegations. Turaki thus wondered why “no concrete steps had been taken to stop the false rumours, and why the documents, which have been mass-produced, are still being circulated in Muslim circles and paraded in high government places across the country.”

Turaki also discovered that the documents
were produced by certain Muslim groups who masterminded them, fabricated them, funded and distributed them. He believed Cheriyan was only used as an agent. The fact that Cheriyan’s name was on the staff list of their proposed Arabic Teachers College shows the close association of the JNI with Cheriyan and the production of the said documents.

He commented that his investigation made everything appear “sinister and targeted against Christians.” Behind it all were Muslims.

When TC’s representative called on various government officials about this convoluted story, no one was prepared to talk, all of them giving reasons that sounded more like excuses. Similarly, the top official of JNI, Alhaji Abdulazeez, refused to comment “because of the situation in the country. We are all looking for peace in the country and more especially reporters and newsmen have not all been helpful in this respect. Sometimes when you say something, they fabricate and twist it to suit themselves to cause confusion, and we have witnessed enough confusion.”

The Plateau State Military Governor’s Office had written a letter to JETS, clearing them of these allegations: “Investigations have revealed that your Seminary never wrote any of the alleged anti-Islamic documents. However, effort is being intensified to identify those behind the plot.” But TC could not suppress the question as to the motives behind these developments: Was it a subversive attempt to cause religious violence and political instability? For example, the letter to the director of National Security Services stated that the documents “are dangerously provocative” and that Muslims normally “react” to such “mischievous plans sometimes violently.” Paragraph four of that letter reads:

*For the benefit of doubt, Sir, let’s consider this hypothetical situation. If these millions of booklets were to reach the public to confuse the Muslims through Challenge Bookshops, and the*
Muslims react in one way or the other, would the Muslims be held responsible or the Christians?

The Challenge reporter pointed out that this letter was written only some six weeks before the Kafanchan riots started during which more than 150 churches were destroyed. “Observers wonder if these fabricated documents and allegations were not some of the long term factors that led to the riots. They also wonder if some people are not deliberately sowing seeds of confusion in the country.”

Indeed, this may have been the case, as we shall see in the next paragraphs.

Five years later, Turaki stood before a Kaduna State tribunal investigating the Zangon-Kataf uprising. Since that body was accepting the false Muslim documents described above as relevant to that later event, he had cause to refer to them once again in his submission to the 1992 Tribunal. He charged that “Some clandestine religious syndicates masterminded, fabricated, produced and distributed the said documents which were primarily aimed at inciting and fanning the embers of religious violence in the country and tarnishing the good name of ECWA and to implicate her and Christianity in general.” He further commented, “It is sad and unfortunate that some Muslim groups could mastermind these false documents to deceive the entire nation and incite Muslim youths against innocent Christian churches in 1987 and subsequently.” Such acts “of telling lies and fabrication of falsehood, whether by eye-witness or radio or television or a newspaper or a write-up, these acts are in themselves strategies of blackmail and of inciting either religious or communal violence or both.”

Certainly the Kafanchan branch of CAN thought these incidents were related. According to them, the Kafanchan riots “actually have their origins in concerted attacks over the last few months, on the fundamental basis of the Christian faith by Muslims.” These attacks include the widespread distribution of documents and
videotapes about Jesus not being the Son of God and the Bible not His Word. Some of the videotapes were from a famous South African Muslim evangelist, Ahmed Deedat. They were distributed at an International Trade Fair in Kaduna and even were broadcast repeatedly on Sokoto and Kano government television stations. “When these psychological and spiritual attacks failed to provoke any counter attack from the Christians,” the CAN report explained, the next step taken by the Muslims was to resort to the violence of the Kafanchan riots.

The above report by the Kafanchan branch of CAN was part of a larger package of reports, written by a number of individuals and organisations, that is bundled together by CAN in its 1987 Release. Here CAN suggested that the government was supporting a Muslim jihad. It had plenty of evidence for such a suspicion in the course of this riot. It charged that both police and military failed to protect Christians deliberately by resorting to their favourite ploy of “waiting for order from our superiors.” It appeared

that the police was purposely ill-equipped to contain the situation. The military was helpless, because they could only move when orders were given. It clearly showed that the authority waited for the completion of this phase of the jihad before allowing the police and the army to maintain law and order. So, when the order came, it was too late to salvage the situation.

Another indication of government support was the involvement of official vehicles. Muslims were conveying “old tires and jerricans of petrol” for purposes of arson in pickups, some of which belonged to the government. In addition, a car associated with the emir was “following the operation supposedly to report the progress.”

CAN reported a curious feature of the Muslim violence. During its course, “warriors” were constantly shouting that “everything in the name of Allah shall end at the palace of Lamido of Adamawa, the Emir of Yola, the capital of Adamawa State, far east
of Kaduna.” CAN wondered about the significance of this call.

The violence also spread to ABU in Zaria. CAN reported that a university communiqué explained that officials could not control the Muslim students because of the influx of intruders from outside. CAN questioned the truth of this claim. Why did ABU authorities “contact the emir before taking security decisions?” The emir seemed to know more about their students than ABU authorities themselves. He stated in a broadcast that the problems were started by Muslim students. How, wondered CAN, did he know this? And why did he wait eighteen hours before taking any action? “There must be more to it than meets the eye.” Similarly, the governor in a broadcast promised decisive military intervention, but why did he also wait eighteen hours before stopping the rampage?18

The CAN report contains a humorous contradiction. In the main report, government media are criticised for exaggerating the violence. In the “Comments,” the government is criticised for minimizing it in the media.19 Who wants to be in government?! A veritable “no-win” situation.

So far, CAN’s release may seem partial or one-sided, but CAN was smart enough to include a variety of reports in this bundle, even one written by a Muslim school official, that would undercut any such charge. The Muslim was Lawal Garba, the school’s Students Affairs Officer, who, as one of the first victims, was beaten by the Muslims and received a fractured skull. According to him, Bako did misinterpret the Qur’an and had referred to Mohammed as a false prophet. In addition, Garba reported, Christians welcomed students from other schools with a banner at the school gate with the words, “Welcome to the Jesus Campus”—remember, it is a government college, not Christian. All of this was very provocative to Muslims. To top it off, Christian students burnt the college mosque in response to the Muslim attack.

In the Nigerian context of general volatility and Muslim intolerance, such behaviour amounts to an invitation to war. It may be
debatable whether anyone should have the freedom to behave like that in such a volatile context. The lack of wisdom and restraint among these Christian students is not debatable. Garba’s report also clearly indicated the same lack among the Muslim attackers. He ended up giving Christian students the higher marks.\textsuperscript{20}

Another document included in the CAN release is one from the ABU Christian community. It provides helpful details of the ABU parts of the episode as well as those around Zaria city. Though written independently from the CAN release, it fully confirms all the explanations and accusations of the “mother” document. By having appended the document to its release, CAN has appropriated it as well. Because of its relatively clear and systematic coverage of the ABU part of the riots, I include it as Appendix 9.

The purpose of this ABU Christian release was to correct the skewed picture the public was given of the flow of events that included “the burning of virtually all the churches in the Zaria area” as well as three chapels on academic campuses. Though we are promised “a more comprehensive report at a later date,” I am not aware that it ever materialised.

As far as the ABU situation is concerned, the origin of these riots is traced to “concerted attacks over the last few months on the fundamental basis of the Christian faith by Muslims both within and without the campus.” This part of the report is similar to explanations earlier in this chapter about Muslim tracts and videos that had been widely distributed and also broadcast over government television in Sokoto and Kano. Muslims shifted to “physical attacks” when spiritual provocation did not produce the Christian counter attack they were hoping to evoke. The release gave great detail on how the authorities were informed well ahead of time of plans to destroy chapels and churches, but they consistently refused to take action. When the main ABU chapel was burning, the Vice-Chancellor “appeared either unable or unwilling to effect any action.” The security agencies similarly used the traditional excuses not to intervene.
The failures on the part of the emir and the governor were classic as were the shenanigans of the media. It is all there in Appendix 9. All Christian attempts to avert the mayhem ran into roadblocks of resistance, deception, evasion and dereliction of duty. It is just one more sordid story that fits right into the established tradition of the not-so-secret government support of the not-so-covert Muslim jihad to take over Nigeria by hook or by crook—mostly by crook.

Another strong post-Kafanchan statement from another CAN official was that of Catholic Archbishop Peter Jatau, the Kaduna State Chairman of CAN. He recalled that several “religious disturbances” generated “commissions of inquiries or panels,” but “the culprits have never been brought to book. We have sacred cows in our society who must never be touched no matter what harm, covert or overt, they inflict on this nation.” The sacred cows, in such statements, are seldom clearly identified, but when Christians use the term, it always refers to Muslims. CAN’s response to the Donli report was that, though the members were “honourable women and men,” the committee’s “only achievement was the dereliction of the vital duties assigned to it.” The entire report was “deliberately evasive and designed to protect, nourish and sustain the cover-up syndrome that denies to all victims of oppression justice, and the sacred-cow concept that makes the privileged Muslim class bigger than the law of the land and their whims the law which the ever oppressed Christians must obey.” The committee “lacked the courage to sincerely and honestly address itself to the vital issues in its terms of reference and in consequence of this want of courage, its observations and recommendations were vague, evasive, hypocritical and deliberately skewed to please the whims of the Muslims.” CAN further objected that the report failed to identify specific people like Abubukar Gumi and the Kaduna government media, namely television and the New Nigerian, all of whom played destructive roles.21

Here is one case in which some of the sacred cows are identified. If the report’s recommendation about the sharia was going
to be accepted, then the government would also have to establish and pay for Christian ecclesiastical courts to apply canonical laws for Christians.22

There were a few other academics not included in the CAN release who also published significant statements about the Kafanchan riots. There was the Nerzit Committee of Concerned Citizens, a group of academics of Southern Zaria origin based at ABU. A major concern in their document is the bottled-up feelings of the locals against “the years of political domination initiated by Hausa-Fulani adventurism into Southern Zaria, dating back to the 19th century.” They described their case in terms almost exactly parallel to Muslim complaints about colonial and post-colonial oppression, except that victims and oppressors are reversed. The group argued that “colonial and post-colonial policies have facilitated the control of the Hausa-Fulani ruling class over the people,” a situation that still had not been addressed. This basic political factor had its repercussions in many sectors and generally led to alleged widespread deprivation and neglect of the area.

Steven Nkom, a sociologist and signatory to both the Nerzit document and the ABU inter-religious press statement,23 put it this way:

*What happened at Kafanchan was the local people’s way of saying we have had enough of all this rubbish. It was a way of rebuffing the expansionist bluff of the Hausa-Fulani ruling class. What the people were saying was: We rejected your ways and attempts to impose your faith then, we still do so now. We just want to be left alone.*24

A group of Nigerian lecturers at the Theological College of Northern Nigeria (TCNN) in Bukuru produced an eloquent and forceful statement about the Kafanchan chain of events. The group interpreted the ruckus as a “calculated *jihad* against Christians” that was planned and executed by some prominent and learned
personalities. They were able to carry out their plan because of their control over the media, which allowed them to distort the facts as to the origin of the fracas and “the extent of the brutality inflicted on Christians.” They picked up on a statement by the ASUU of ABU who spoke of “the obviously premeditated and coordinated acts of arson and assault” in the cities around the state. The group then supported their allegations with a number of points that I summarise here. They saw a connection with the recent honour received by Gumi from Saudi Arabia “for his services in promoting Islam in Nigeria.” The pretext about a Christian preacher publicly reading from the Qur’an was seen as a farce, since Muslims freely quote from the Bible, an assertion the document backed up with examples. The other pretext that the upheaval was the product of distorted “social-economic factors” was seen as equally false. If that were the case, the riots would have started between the indigenes and the Hausa settlers, not between Christian and Muslim students. The police would have come out much earlier to prevent death and destruction if it were a socio-economic event, but they failed to show up because it was a religious riot provoked by Muslims. The last point was that the governor took no steps to prevent the mayhem from spreading until “the jihadists had completed their assignments.” At that point he ordered the police and soldiers to get involved. Though the police came after the fact, the governor praised them for their performance! Well, yes, if this was (note the lack of the subjunctive “were”) a jihad, of course! They did their job.

So, wrote the lecturers, since they rejected the governor’s thesis that the riots were the result of socio-economic factors, they confessed to be “shocked” that the federal government “accepted the false report from the police and the Kaduna state government.” At this point the document quoted a public statement from President Babangida over the radio, part of which has already featured in Volume 2. Babangida said that though originally the cause was...
thought to be “religious differences,” investigations showed otherwise. While the origin may indeed have been religious, the subsequent killing and destruction throughout the state “were carefully masterminded by evil men with sinister motives, who saw the incident in Kafanchan as an opportunity to subvert the federal government and the nation.”

The authors wondered whether the police and the governor were among these sinister people, and, perhaps, even the president himself. If not, why were only churches destroyed and Christian leaders killed, except for Kafanchan and Funtua “where a few Muslims were also tragically affected.” In addition, the subsequent ban on religious activities and organisations on educational campuses throughout the nation “is a clear indication of the specifically religious nature of the troubles.”

All the reports were seen by these TCNN authors as cover-ups to protect the guilty. The latter included Gumi. The Council of Ulama, the national association of Muslim clergy found in most countries with large Muslim populations, agreed that the culprits were Muslims. Yet they claimed that Muslims had been arrested indiscriminately and they called for “the immediate release of all innocent Muslims arrested and to stop further arrest and molestation of innocent Muslims.” Since independence, the authors asserted, “Muslim fanatics have been the cause of any and every religious uprising in this country.” Yet, the president wanted people to believe that the two religions had “coexisted in our society for centuries without bitterness and without violence.” It was only a ploy to divert the attention of people from the truth to refer to the culprits as “children of Satan” and evil men but to refuse to identify the real perpetrators or the real cause.

Matthew Kukah once again hit the nail on the head. The ordinary locals saw the riots in terms of Muslim insolence and power. Their reasoning went as follows: “We allowed you to settle and gave you our lands and even our daughters in marriage. Now how dare
you turn around to spite us? Who do you think you are?” It was the same argument that Muslim authorities in the northern Muslim cities used with respect to the Christian settlers in their sabon garis. The ruling classes were offended by the challenge to their power. But the people of Southern Zaria resented the position of the Hausa “as middlemen in the minutest of business engagements, from the purchase of their seeds, the purchase of fertiliser to the sale of their crops.” They were upset by the continued economic climb of Muslims, while they themselves were on a “downward slope” in their own country. Even the superior education of their children could not overcome the Muslim means “of economic upward mobility.” It was in response to this local challenge that the Muslim elite formed the Northern Elders’ Committee, “a crisis management gimmick by the ruling class to save their power base” and to save the “false picture that the North still remained a united indivisible whole.”

As to the more remote cause for the riots sparked by the Kafanchan incident in 1987, Kukah argued that this was a reaction on the part of the indigenes against the non-indigenous Muslim ruling class imposed on them by the colonial regime. In the 1950s, the emir of Zaria had stated that “non-Muslims were meant to feed and sustain the power quest of the ruling class” and likened the parties “to the horse and the grass and warned that ‘the grass must never be allowed to eat up the horse.’” Such amazing statements and even more amazing attitudes did not stand alone. At another time Kukah quoted an earlier emir of Zaria, one Ibrahim, who, referring to the demands of the people of the Middle Belt for freedom to conduct their own affairs, as “...people who ate dogs and whose women wore little but a bunch of leaves” and wondered how such people could be “led to believe that they could administer themselves.” The Sardauna, probably the most revered Muslim ruler in northern Nigeria second only to Shehu Dan Fodio, allegedly said publicly in the House of Assembly that, “as for slaves, it is only because Islamic power is not strong here that we have not
got slaves to sell.” 27 The amazing and brazen attitude on the part of Muslims described in this paragraph must be seen as a major cause, both remote and immediate, for all the riots that involved the colonial imposition of Muslim emirs. As far as Nigerian Christians are concerned, brazen it is for sure and amazing only for those who have not lived with Muslims or not studied their history without the burdens of political correctness and secular bias.

The Kafanchan riots, Kukah suggested,

offered a barometer for testing these relations. For, over the years, the ruling class had indeed seen the people from this area as being responsible for providing labour to service their class exploits. But the years of exposure to missionary education... (despite its limited scope) had sharpened the identities and expectations of the products of these institutions with Christianity gradually becoming a rallying point for their identities.

Indeed, many Christians from the area had since then worked their way up into the highest echelons of power. Some challenged the very basis of Muslim power, as did Yohanna Madaki in the case of the emir of Muri, 28—but it did lead to Madaki’s dismissal from his own position of power as well, an indication that it takes sacrifice to challenge the Muslim power base.

Kukah’s impression was that the Muslim community had expected that the Kaduna state government would automatically support and defend Islam and all Muslims regardless of the facts at hand. After all, the governor and most officials were Muslims first of all. There was no sense among them that he was governor of all Kaduna people and owed them equal protection. Duties of government were to take second place to the defence of Islam. When, instead, the governor expressed embarrassment about the behaviour of fellow Muslims, they mounted a campaign against him. 29

The president initially denied the religious basis of the riots and attributed them to “evil men with sinister motives who saw the inci-
dent in Kafanchan as an opportunity to subvert the government and the nation,” the same statement picked up by the TCNN lecturers. Both the denial of a religious basis and the suggestion of evil men are, as we have already seen, classical responses of Nigerian governments to riots. The Kafanchan series of riots was interpreted as kind of an attempted civilian coup. The Donli tribunal rejected the submissions of various Christian groups relating to national politics, OIC and Islamisation of the country as irrelevant to the situation.

There is no way I can do full justice to all the reactions to these Kafanchan riots without creating an intolerable tome. I refer you to Kukah’s *Religion, Politics and Power in Northern Nigeria*, Chapter 6, where he explains not only the background but a whole series of responses. There was the government response to the riots themselves. Then there were the “Review of the Committee’s Recommendations,” “CAN’s Reactions to the Committee’s Findings,” “Muslim Reactions to the Committee’s Findings,” the “Karibi–Whyte Tribunal,” “Interpretation to the Committee’s Findings,” the Northern Elders’ Committee’s response and a concluding section. That is a plate too full for us and, as often happens with full plates, the various foods end up mixed and difficult to distinguish. That was my experience in trying to decipher the chapter. Still, I recommend it; it will be enlightening.

We have already met Chief Daniel D. Gowon in Volume 1. Daniel was chief of Wusasa, a Christian village in the shadow of Zaria, a large traditional Muslim community. He was also brother to Yakubu Gowon, a former head of state. He could be trusted to know the inside story. I have included part of his memorandum to the Kaduna State committee to investigate the Kafanchan riot as Appendix 2 in Volume 1. He emphasised a point that was sure to raise any Muslim’s blood pressure. He openly declared that there existed “extremist Muslim groups [that] seem to be questioning the fundamental basis on which this country is founded. It seems as if these groups now believe that Christianity has no place in Nigeria
and Christian communities in a ‘Muslim North’ should no longer be tolerated.” Gowon suggested that the Northern Muslims cannot tolerate the existence of a Christian community such as Wusasa, many residents of which have come out of Islam. He tried to force them to acknowledge that the North was not a homogeneous Muslim block; it contained various religions, specifically Christians and Traditionalists. Muslims will not admit that Christians have a right in the northern domain. It is too obvious a denial of the treasured concept of a “solid Muslim North.” And so, a hostile group of Muslims sent the almajirai\(^\text{30}\) to destroy the offence amongst them.

Like the other witnesses, so Gowon complained that both police and army failed to take prompt action. They claimed lack of authority. As a result, he declared Wusasa as “independent entity without protection, support or sympathy from those assigned to protect them.” Similarly, he accused the government-owned electronic media of promoting the mayhem and thus misusing government facilities by taking sides. He referred to the radio coverage of the riots as “that misguided and unguarded despicable deed.” The government television station engaged in what he called “an exercise in sensationalism” and “under-reporting” which served only their interest.

The reactions of governments and their commissions of enquiry were, unfortunately, classic. Kukah tells us that the president raised the nation’s hope when he announced his intention to deal firmly with the Kafanchan rioters. With the bravado that usually accompanies such announcements, Babangida declared that the government would not stand by and watch as “ambitious and mindless power seekers… push us into… civil war.” He added the traditional formula, “We do not recognise any sacred cow and none will be spared. Enough is enough.”\(^\text{31}\)

Little came of it. It came too close to the jugular.

*Kafanchan nearly released the genie from the bottle.*

*Therefore, the panels set up were mainly aimed at putting it*
back and so did not address the real questions of the riots, which were in the main, perceived as a fundamental challenge to the ruling class, whose interests the government seemed set to protect.

Though at first it looked like the president was serious in his intention, once it became clear that “at the heart of the riots was the legitimacy of the ruling class in northern Nigeria,” it became a different story. Representatives of this class “managed to turn back the...government’s determination to get to the roots of the people’s grievances, and... managed to manipulate the outcome and... consolidated its position.”

According to Kukah, the Kaduna state government Donli committee, headed as it was by a Christian female, had two unusual strikes against it and did not dare risk the wrath of the government. Consequently some of its proposals were only half-hearted, while others seemed to favour Muslims. Muslims were advised to cease using the derogatory terms “arne” and “kafiri.” The committee recommended that Friday be turned into a work-free day since it is the day of Muslim communal worship. Nigeria should remain in the international Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC). The sharia should be applied wholesale to Muslims, while others should have the option of a court of their choice. The Muslim demand for Islamic-type uniforms for college students was also supported. All of these had long been festering issues between the two religions. That report, together with its failure to pinpoint the root cause, can only be regarded as blatant one-sided support of Islam.

Byang also wrote a clear analysis of the Kaduna Riots Committee Report in which he summarised the disapproval from both the Kaduna government and CAN.

Since most of his analysis echoes much of the above, I merely draw attention to this material for those who want a complete
report. However, in the same article Byang also treated us to some inside information about the ill-fated committee via an interview with Christopher Abashiya, who represented CAN on the committee. Byang asked him about the surprise and disappointment of many Christians that he was party to the report. Abashiya explained that with an equal number of Christians and Muslims, four each, there were only two alternatives, namely to completely disagree or to strike a compromise. It was almost designed for failure. Complete disagreement would only lead to further polarization in the country and it would be an embarrassment before the whole world if the committee were disbanded without accomplishing anything. Without going into details, Abashiya hinted that the Christian members were not united. At least one of them must have agreed with the Muslims so that Abashiya’s group constituted the minority. He could have refused to accept the report and resign but decided that such a step was not helpful either. In view of Muslim threats that they would not accept the report in its totality, to achieve anything at all, they would have to be evasive. He rejected the charge that the committee had recommended the implementation of sharia in totality. He explained that what they said was that “the implementation of sharia would certainly affect the non-Muslims.” Should it come to this, “then provision must be made to give the non-Muslims the option to go to their own courts.” In addition, a vehicle would also be necessary for conflicts between Christians and Muslims. Such a statement hardly constitutes a recommendation for the full sharia. Let those who criticise him tell him how they would have handled the situation. Finally, the fact that the chairperson was a Christian implied she “had to be careful not to be perceived as representing the interest of Christians.”

Another one of Byang’s interviewees was Engineer Salifu of Kaduna CAN. He repeated the CAN charge that there was sufficient evidence to name the principal instigators. Because of the “sacred cows,” the committee refused and thus merely beat around
the bush. If Bako’s preaching had caused troubles, what of the preaching over the air by Gumi? Christians build a church. Muslims build a mosque next to it and then accuse Christians of provocation. Christians build a school. Muslims take it over and demand Muslim uniforms for the children. Then they accuse Christians of provocation. Christians build a hospital with a cross on it. Muslims say they are provoked. Is it their hospital? Have they built it? The Donli report was evasive and majored in minor issues not related to the crisis. Christians should praise the government for having rejected the report and the governor should be “commended for his straightforwardness. He did not lean towards any particular group.”

Byang closed his article with the “reliable” information that the government was already backtracking on its promise to pay for the claims for damaged churches by offering a mere fifty percent.

The dynamics of hostility in Kafanchan had been released and would not be bottled up again. Mutual provocation came easily after the 1987 events. In 1996, Monday Yakunat, a young Christian street preacher of considerable oratorical skills in Kafanchan, in the course of a session at the motor park, was suddenly hit by someone in the crowd. He fell unconscious. Immediately a group identified as Shi’ites managed to transport him on a motorcycle to a house that served as the local Shi’ite headquarters. This occurrence set into motion a chain of events that led to a riot in which twenty-seven Muslims were killed, and eventually to another government investigative committee.

It seems Nigerian Muslims never learn. Somewhere near to the change of the millennium, another clash took place in Kafanchan. The state government sought to install a new Muslim emir over the largely Christian population, the same practice dating back to the early colonial regime that had already inspired so much protest and violence in the Middle Belt. Christians organised a peaceful protest to change this internal colonialism. “They
blocked the roads leading into the towns and forced the cancellation of the installation.” Muslims reportedly attacked the protestors, killing two persons in the process. This, in turn, sparked a riot and led to the loss of 200 lives.35

2. ZANGON-KATAF (1992)

The general take on the Kataf people, who are mostly Christian, is very similar to that of Kafanchan and Tafawa Balewa. For decades, a smoldering situation had existed between the local Kataf villagers and the Muslim Hausa in the town. These settlers36 arrived around 1650 and were welcomed by the then Traditional Kataf people. Eventually the settlers became the dominant economic and political power in the area, but they never acclimatized in the sense of mixing with the local population. They have remained a distinct subculture. Muslim chiefs and non-indigenous Muslim emirs were imposed on the people. The indigenes complained that Muslims referred to them as “arna” and “kafiri,” Hausa terms of utter contempt. The Muslim community resented the sale and consumption of both beer and pork on the part of the locals. While local women were allowed to marry Muslims, the Kataf were offended that the reverse was never the case. The Muslim explanation that this was according to Muslim law hardly removed the sting. The situation was indeed very similar to that of Kafanchan and Tafawa Balewa, though the immediate provocation differed in each case.

The Kaduna State Branch of CAN, during its World Press Conference in 1992, expressed itself in an unusually aggressive tone. They viewed this riot in the larger context of the entire riot series from the beginning. It was not just local Muslims, but the entire Nigerian Hausa-Fulani Muslim community that was the aggressor against all Christians. All Muslims are expected to support each other in this struggle, including governor and security apparatus, no matter the nature of the provocation. Islam “uber
That is why it was so dangerous that, according to CAN, the “National Security System in Kaduna State is firmly controlled by Hausa-Fulani officers.”

How did this riot actually start? And who started it? It will be an interesting exercise to compare CAN’s answer to this question to that of Muslims in Volume 2 and to the flow of events as reported in Volume 1. I will not repeat those here, but to whet your appetite, let me just intimate that they are by no means the same! CAN, however, was not plagued by different interpretations; it had no doubts on this score.

It all started on February 6, 1992, the day on which the market, talked about in the earlier volumes, “was to move across the street to a better location already prepared by the LGC.” The claim in italics (which are mine) was in hot dispute. Here’s the CAN version:

*On getting to the new site on this fateful day, unsuspecting early market-goers, largely Christian Kataf natives, were attacked by...largely Muslim Hausa-Fulani settlers using dangerous weapons such as machine guns and daggers, leading to the loss of lives and massive destruction of property. The situation rose to this uncontrollable level because of the stand taken by Hausa settlers who think they are above the law. Of even greater threat to peaceful co-existence are those who believe they have divine authority to rule over others and to control and determine their spiritual, social and economic life. Because of their lofty position in Government, these very few powerful and well-connected individuals, openly vowed to prevent duly constituted authority from implementing decisions taken by the Local Government Council in the interests of the larger society.*

So far CAN’s explanation of the first installment, but what of the next on May 17? Who started that one? Was it a “spontaneous action, a mere spillover or was it carefully planned?” The document backtracks to May 9, the day on which “a letter was written to
Sultan Dasuki to formally notify him of plans to start a *jihad.*” It came from the “radical” Muslim Nigerian Aid Group of *Jama’atul Izalatul Bidi’a Ikamatu Sunna* in Zangon-Kataf. It was a “strongly worded letter in Hausa” and copied to the emir of Zaria, the commissioner of police and some other security officials, to the chairman of the Zangon-Kataf LGC, the district head and to “some Islamic groups.” Charged CAN, “Subsequently, they made good their promise to start a war five days after this letter was written to their spiritual leaders.” That is the background.

The immediate cause for the renewed rioting was “the dramatic entry into Kaduna” on May 17 of some powerful Muslim personalities who carried with them “the wounded and corpses of some of the rioters” of Zangon-Kataf, some 400 kilometres away. The vehicle was provided by the governor, himself a Muslim from Zango. The riot was clearly premeditated. It was carried out at night, which made it difficult to identify the culprits. Those who were trapped were either killed or severely wounded if they could not recite the Muslim confession or some other Arabic passage.

The anonymous author of the lengthy account in *TC*, 3/1992, reporting on the same “death parade” in Kaduna, suggested this was staged for the very purpose of arousing “religious sentiments not just against Katafs but all Christians.” And so “a purely communal fracas in a village was transformed into a wider religious war covering the whole state and resulting in the death of many Christians” and destruction of their properties, including many churches.

A *TC* reporter began to notice a recurring pattern, one that became clear to me as well as I moved from riot to riot. The pattern was typical. A quarrel arises between Muslims and their neighbours in a remote place. The quarrel turns into violence and death. The Muslims then carry their injured ones and corpses to the cities where the sight will provoke the Muslim public. Consequently, a vendetta is unleashed on innocent and unprotected Nigerians. The Kaduna series was classic.
It was classic in more ways. The familiar charge was once again that the security forces were slow in coming. The police did not intervene “until about 1:30 p.m. the following day.” People were under the impression that “police and rioters had reached an understanding, since the commanders are their ethnic brothers.” The rioters were left undisturbed until the military took over—but not until May 18.

The same ethnic power line could be traced everywhere. Both the army and the SSS (a security force) were “fully controlled” by the same ethnic group. The state governor himself, also a “Hausa-Fulani settler,” was “knee-deep in this conflict.” These ties were the alleged reason no Hausa-Fulani were detained, only Katafs.

The religious nature of the riots was demonstrated clearly by the fact that churches and pastors who were not Kataf at all were among the victims. It was directed at all Christians. In addition, the governor called in the Roman Catholic archbishop of Kaduna for consultation. Why, if it were not a religious riot?

The “remote cause,” to use bureaucratese, the long-standing bone of contention of Muslim control over Kataf land, came up again as well. “A situation in which a minority is more powerful and dictates to the majority is unacceptable,” CAN proclaimed. The situation “only reminds one of the obnoxious apartheid system against which this country has fought.”

In the previous chapter we learnt of the general role of government media in such events. This riot was no exception at this front either. The NN showed “brazen partiality” in its editorials of June 4 and 5. They openly served “the interests of the Hausa-Fulani.” Government radio stations in Kaduna also came out with “deliberate distortion of facts” to such an extent that one could easily gain the impression that the radio was meant to benefit only Muslims. Thus far CAN.

Yusufu Turaki, an indigene from Southern Zaria and ECWA general secretary at the time, was invited to appear before the Kaduna
State Tribunal on Religious and Communal Riots, the tribunal looking into the debacle. He prefaced his submission with a summary of the contributions ECWA has made to the nation through its schools and hospitals and emphasised the good relations with Muslims that ECWA has always fostered. “Prior to the 1980s,” he affirmed, “the northern states had lived in relative harmony and peace, especially the cordial and peaceful co-existence between the Muslims and Christians.” Of late this “balance of peace and harmony” has been “tilted and altered” and replaced with “mistrust, fears and suspicion.”

In the light of that history, he expressed puzzlement at the current hostility between the two religions. He summarised the losses ECWA incurred during the various riots. Under the heading “ECWA as a Victim of Religious Riots and Blackmail,” Turaki “is sad to note” that the “peaceful atmosphere has gradually moved to that of confrontation, intolerance and violence. Thus ECWA now stands as a victim of a society which has benefitted from its humanitarian, moral, spiritual and social services, which in consequence, has uplifted the lot of many northerners.”

Turaki expressed dismay that documents associated with the 1987 Kafanchan riots were used by this tribunal five years later. The 1992 tribunal obviously considered them relevant to the situation. It “beats my imagination,” he said, to see that “the same fabricated and false documents which Muslim groups have been parading around the country to boost their propaganda of incitement and violence were tendered.” How can this be when these documents were already tendered at the 1987 tribunal, “perhaps by the same groups or their agents”? These documents and related events had been investigated by the security services and by Plateau State Government; ECWA had been absolved from all the charges and the perpetrators had clearly been identified as Muslims. So why accept them as relevant for the 1992 riots? This was a serious charge against the tribunal indeed. “My honourable self had to stand before your tribunal yesterday in question of this religious
blackmail and bigotry,” he commented. Such procedures indicated that the derisive names some people gave to this tribunal, for example, “kangaroo court,” may not have been so far-fetched.

In consonance with other Christian leaders, Turaki considered this riot, as well as previous ones, “religious and communal riots,” an opinion expressed more than once in his document. However, the riots were “primarily communal but with some religious undertones, since the two parties can be divided along religious lines, as the Kataf are predominantly Christian, while the Hausa are Muslim.”

Apart from the general climate of violence, what, according to Turaki, were the major factors that led to the Kataf and subsequent riots? He wrote, “Sensitive issues and questions of religion, ethnicity, property and security are quite capable of triggering immediate and spontaneous violence.” This should mean that somehow the two parties were insensitive towards each other’s concerns in these areas. Again, “discrimination, bias, stereotype are capable of creating outbursts of riots and violence as one perceives to be looked down upon, demeaned or [have his] personality assaulted.” He was really saying that domination, bias and stereotype have in fact led to this violence. People have been looked down upon, demeaned and assaulted. There was no need to spell out exactly the identities of perpetrators and victims. The tribunal understood: He was accusing the Muslims of oppressing the others, while pretending to be evenhanded. As he proceeded with his submission, he became increasingly concrete and specific.

Turaki’s list of root causes comprised three major subjects, each of which was broken down into smaller categories. Many of the points also apply to most of the other riots. Hence they are important beyond this immediate situation. In Appendix 10, I give the floor to Turaki as he presented his list of “Root Causes and Fundamental Issues.”

In his conclusion, Turaki repeated some of the earlier problems. The crisis is a structural one. This was so in the North in general, but especially in Kaduna State. There were “structures of evil, manipula-
tion, discrimination, preferential and differential treatment, the subordination of others under the dominance of others, the creation of first class and second class citizens.” He decried the political imbalance and inequality between the predominantly Muslim North and the predominantly Christian South of Kaduna State and the lack of full integration of the Christians and non-Muslims into the mainstream of the State political machinery.... The preponderance of Islamic and Hausa culture which dominates the State machinery to the near exclusion of all others is another major socio-political factor causing religious and ethnic riots and violence. Where others feel deprived and discriminated against, justice must listen to them.40

Turaki also was national vice president of CAN at the time and as such he represented CAN at the funeral of Reverend Tacio Duniyo, one of the victims of the riots. At this occasion, he presented himself overtly as CAN’s mouthpiece regarding the reasons for and causes of these riots. The reasons he gave were indeed identical to many other pronouncements and documents of CAN at various levels. Though tempted to merely summarise his main points, I have decided to include them in total here, because their passion cannot be captured in summary statements.

1. The number one reason why there are frequent ethnic or tribal riots and violence in the northern states is that the political regimes of many states, whether military or civilian, have consistently and deliberately refused to create and grant autonomous chiefdoms to ethnic groups, the so-called Kabilu41 of the Middle Belt of Nigeria. In the southern part of Kaduna State, there are many ethnic groups that have, up to the present, been denied outright their rights to have their own chiefdoms and their own traditional rulers and thereby cannot govern themselves nor determine their own political and cultural destiny.
2. Another reason is that the governments in these states give preferential treatment and also grant superior and dominant socio-political role and status to settler peoples over against the indigenous peoples. It is the consistent and deliberate denial of any political, social, cultural and even religious rights and autonomy and political equality, participation, representation and distribution of resources to the indigenous people that generates discontent.

3. A significant reason is that some state governments have refused to implement and protect consistently and faithfully the constitutional rights of every Nigerian citizen under their domain. Rather, these governments have sided with the strong and powerful sub-national and parochial interests that are increasingly becoming dogmatic and fanatical in denying both religious and cultural rights to those designated as minorities within their states.

4. The predicament of the Christian and the Kabilu in the northern states is that when he talks, no one takes him seriously. When he cries, no one listens to him. When he begs, no one gives to him. But when he reacts to these, he is crushed to death.

Turaki explained further,

The Christian in the northern states, however and wherever he is designated as a minority or a Kabilu, loses all constitutional rights, whether they are political, social, cultural or religious. The draconian Islamic laws, governmental practices and attitude are being systematically applied to Christians. Hence the loss of their human and religious rights.42

It is noteworthy that, though Turaki was addressing the Zangon-Kataf riots, he spoke of “states” and “governments”—plural. He was talking about the entire northern situation. The same situation pertained in several of them that contained kabilu, who were dominated by Muslims.
There was widespread agreement with these points of Turaki. Yohanna Madaki, another son of the soil, both lawyer and soldier by profession and former military governor of the defunct Gongola State and Benue State, is famous and popular with the people because he dared to face up to the Muslim emirate establishment of Muri and was subsequently “retired” by the army. He expressed himself in clear terms about the basic problems facing his people. “The main issue in this whole crisis is that of oppression. The issue is that of internal colonialism which is being rejected.” The fact that

people are oppressed in their own land causes discontent. Note that there is not any general anti-Hausa feeling or any such thing. No one is against the Hausa or Muslims. The common Hausa man or Muslim is innocent and well liked. Rather, the struggle is against the in-built domination of the emirate system which in any case favours only the ruling class.

So let me repeat that the issue is not land. That is incidental and brought up to sidetrack people from the real point. The real issue is also not religion. It’s only when they want to becloud the issue that they bring in religion to recruit the fanatics. The real issue is power—who dominates whom.

This issue was of long standing. “The outcry against domination,” asserted Madaki, “is age-old and successive governments in the state have done nothing.”

Chairman of the northern chapter of CAN at the time and now Roman Catholic archbishop of Kaduna, Peter Jatau, identified three main causes for the Zangon-Kataf series. The first remote cause, according to him, was political. It was the determination of the indigenes for self-determination and their own chiefdom. A few of the indigenous groups, Kagoro, Jaba and Maro, had already succeeded, but others were still subject to the emir. “All attempts to secure their freedom have been resisted even with imprisonment.” He added,
In Nigeria we condemn apartheid, colonialism and neo-colonialism, but why should we practise similar things among ourselves? This is double standard and the attitude of the emirs and Kaduna state government is against the principle of justice and fair play. . . . I don’t think the crisis will end as long as only cosmetic measures are applied.

Jatau told of a 1991 meeting of Christian and Muslim leaders in Kaduna about the incessant rioting. It recommended to President Babangida to grant the indigenes self-determination and chiefdoms, but the president had taken no action thus far.

The second remote cause was the religious. Churches were targeted. Why, if the impetus was not religious? Various pastors and CAN leaders were killed. Imams were used to call Muslims to war and they called prayers for war at various times. Finally, some people were stopped on the streets. If they could not recite portions of the Qur’an, they were either maimed or killed. So, many indications of the importance of religion as a motive.

The third remote cause was ethnic. It referred to the fact that a minority was “lording it over the majority indigenes.”

An anonymous author in TC put it similarly. There is nothing new about such clashes in Southern Zaria, he explained. Central to it all “is the issue of political and administrative control of the area. Since colonial times, political power has been with a tiny minority of Hausas in Zangon Kataf, because the British imposed Zaria emirate rule on the people of the area.” Then he dug into past history. Zango, he explained, means “a transit settlement of Hausa traders.” The town was known in the past as a “slave-raiding and trading post.” Thus it was part of the Muslim slaving culture that the British found on their arrival and that created so much havoc in the Middle Belt. To make sure non-Nigerians understand this situation, the reference is to slave raiding by the Hausa-Fulani Muslims among the indigenes in the area, which caused terrible havoc and
suffering. Northern Christians who are aware of their history see the current Muslim campaign for control as merely a continuation of that pre-colonial pattern.

The British stopped the slave raiding, but they imposed the emir of Zaria on the indigenes.

The history of the area since then has been one of unease, tension, and revolts against political and economic domination and oppressive Zaria rule. Many Katafs were imprisoned in Zaria and some even died in jail in the struggle for their political and cultural freedom.

Finally, in 1967 a Kataf was appointed district head, the “fruit of years of continuous struggle against the oppressive feudal rule. Before then only Hausa Muslims could be district head and even now the district is still under Zaria rule and any district head an appointee of the Zaria emir.” There was in effect a “political and cultural philosophy of separate development or ‘apartheid’” that “characterises the Zangon-Kataf Hausa settlement.” From its beginning it has been “the exclusive reserve of the Hausa.” The only indigenes who lived there were the district head and a few other non-Hausa officials.

The Kataf and their indigenous neighbours have long yearned for “self-determination, to have their own chiefdom with no allegiance whatsoever to the oppressive rule either from Zaria or Jema’a [Kafanchan] emirates.” Not long before the riots, retired General Zamani Lekwot had delivered an application to the government for a chiefdom. Ever since then, he and other indigenous leaders were allegedly targeted as rebels and subjected to “wrath and intimidation.” This lay behind the arrests after the riots. Some have been fired from their posts in the civil service. The election of Muhammed Lere as governor made things worse, for he hailed from the area and is related to Alhaji Mato, who was regarded as an important factor in the crisis. Since “their son” was governor, the
Muslims of Zango Kataf “became bolder and more daring in asserting their dominant and powerful position.” This relationship “led to the earlier crisis” about the market.

The market was located in the middle of the town and too crowded without room for expansion. The Kataf had long complained about various market issues, including “the maltreatment” of their women by the Muslims. When the local government wanted to relocate the market, the Hausa opposed the move, probably because “almost all the stalls and shops” were theirs. They wanted to retain control. They feared losing their privileged position through redistribution of stalls.

With his relative as governor, Alhaji Mato became brave and declared that the market issue was dead. He threatened a bloodbath over government radio if anyone moved it. He and his friends dealt directly with the governor and emir, bypassing local authorities, who were indigenes and would favour relocation. The resulting riot has already been told of in Volume 1.

Afterwards, the emir visited Zango to condole the Muslims and even gave them money, but he returned to Zaria without seeing the local authorities or condoling the Kataf. Instead, he summoned the Kataf leaders to see him in his distant palace. They refused the summons. The emir then paid them a visit and gave the Kataf an equal sum of money. In the meantime, the Kaduna government had also brought relief materials, but again only to the Hausa!

Relationships kept deteriorating. The Kataf started to demand the return of land said to have been “forcefully acquired” by a previous emir. This set in motion drawn-out procedures and wrangling that ended up in favour of the Hausa. Life became “disruptive,” with “allegations of abductions, forceful ejection of Kataf from public transport vehicles,” while the “Hausa never shied away from boasting about how prepared they were to deal with the Katafs.” Then, when the Hausa began to destroy Kataf farms, their youth threatened a jihad. Strangers were bused into town in
preparation for violence and, finally, corpses were displayed in the city. The situation was simply one of a riot waiting to happen.

As per tradition, the state government appointed a Judicial Commission of Enquiry into the crisis. Again it was headed by a Christian female judge, Justice Rahila Cudjoe. The Kataf boycotted its meetings for they objected to the composition of the Commission—not a single Kataf representative among them. Apart from the chairlady, all members were Muslim appointees of the emir of Zaria. It was felt to be biased in favour of the Hausa and expected to reject all evidence provided by the Kataf. The Commission sat in Kaduna, but visited the area twice. During the second visit, Alhaji Idiya, a member, in the hearing of his colleagues allegedly publicly threatened that the Muslims could “finish the Kataf community in three days.”

Among those who submitted memoranda to the Commission were the Kataf Youth Development Association of Zaria. Their complaint is also worth hearing for its emotional value. Ever since the 1980s the following tendency developed:

> The Kaduna government appoints people from the stranger communities of Zangon-Kataf [and others] to be the “representatives” of the people on the executive council and institutions. The occupants of Government House always know that these so-called “representatives” disdain the indigenous people, they never mix with them, and although they are born there and they live in those areas, they know nothing of the languages, customs and traditions of their host communities. These settler communities call the people “arna.” It is these blatant acts of discrimination by the government that give the minority settlers the audacity to attack the indigenes, whenever they wish, believing that the government is on their side.

These youths clearly indicated how little they expected from the government in terms of solutions. “In the final analysis,” they wrote,
we are left with the impression that government does not really care about peace, it only pays lip-service to it. Government does not seem to be really interested in lasting solutions, it only wants stop-gap measures. Government does not seem to be really interested in creating an atmosphere of trust and mutual respect, because it is unwilling to tread on some sacred toes. It is the ordinary people who get killed in these conflicts. It is they who are maimed, injured, rendered fatherless and motherless, whose children are imprisoned. The property owners get compensation, but who can compensate the poor for the lives they lose? Who can take away the burdens of decades of oppression and injustice through monetary compensation?\textsuperscript{48}

As expected, the Commission exonerated the Hausa and blamed the Kataf for the rioting. The Hausa suffered most of the casualties and, it concluded, acted in self-defence. This panel rejected the market incident as “nothing but a smokescreen.” Apart from making recommendations as to how to treat certain participants in the drama, the panel suggested that Muslims discontinue using terms like “arne” and “kafiri” to refer to non-Muslims, since they are insulting names. Beyond this, it merely urged tolerance and greater education.

According to Mahmud Jega, writing in \textit{Citizen}, the panel dodged the most sensitive issue, namely that of chieftaincy.\textsuperscript{49} This request, it suggested, should be processed through existing channels. But, at least, this suggestion implied some official recognition of a problem that the Kataf saw as absolutely crucial. That was one up from the general Muslim denial of this issue.

Another inquiry, the Justice Benedict Okadigbo Tribunal, was established to try retired Major General Zamani Lekwot and other Kataf leaders for their role in the riots. Some of them, including Lekwot, were condemned to be hung. This tribunal likewise was
widely condemned for its one-sided composition and for the sentence it meted out.\textsuperscript{50}

Fellow generals pleaded for clemency,\textsuperscript{51} something outspoken Anglican Bishop Benjamin Kwashi of Jos rejected, since Lekwot had committed no crime.\textsuperscript{52} Leaders of CAN and even Olusegun Obasanjo, at the time a private citizen between his military and civilian terms of head of state, entered the fray in defence of the general and his fellows. The situation was described by various human rights activists as “a sham, a mockery, a travesty of justice and a horrendous national tragedy.” Others used terms such as “kangaroo affair.” Madaki, one who has seen the depth of corruption, wrote that “we never knew until now that a judge could descend to such a terrible and disgraceful level, and be used against the people. In fact, the evidence available is that these judgements were written for the judges before the action was filed.” Okadigbo “was very, very uneasy each time he realised that an accused person may be free. He started shouting at counsels, shouting at the accused, just to make sure that he pleased his masters.”\textsuperscript{53} A retrial was widely demanded, for the tribunal was seen as “an instrument of entrenching the will and wishes of the strong and the privileged.” In fact, according to an ECWA statement, unless quickly corrected, it was capable of “plunging the whole nation into a serious social, political and religious crisis.” Only Katafs were “arrested, detained and brought to trial.” No wonder, since the tribunal was stacked with Muslims.

The only other Christian member of the tribunal, Graham Douglas, a lawyer of national prominence, withdrew and so did the defence counsels. They found it impossible to operate, given the terms of reference under which the tribunal was established.\textsuperscript{54}

In the national psyche, the issues of alleged crimes “receded in the face of the complex interplay between religion, ethnic hatred and legal chess-war.” The entire Zangon-Kataf story had become “a deadly addition to the national virus of sectional hatred and divi-
sion. Its trial was complicated, if not muddy, and highly emotional. It was inevitable, therefore, that it would leave many casualties.” In fact, the entire attempt seemed like one grand legal, political and ethical mess beyond description. The exhaustive report in TSM on this extraordinary “legal” mess leaves one with his head spinning and shaking in unbelief. The term “judicial terrorism” justifiably became a popular phrase.55

The federal government seemed divided on the issue. No one less than Vice President Augustus Aikhomu, a Christian, had ordered the arrest of some prominent Hausa personalities, Alhajis Mato, Danbala A. T. K. and Idia, for their roles in fanning the violence. They had frequently been mentioned in the riot stories. Mato, uncle to Dabo Lere, then military administrator of Kaduna State, is said to have “threatened bloodshed” during a programme on the federal radio in Kaduna. Many considered this action a most dangerous provocation in the midst of such violence, designed to intensify rather than alleviate the volatile situation. The arrest was prevented “because of pressures higher than that of the vice president”! It was even claimed that these alhajis were among those awarded contracts to reconstruct Zango town. As to the fate of the Christian detainees, General Lekwot and cohorts were at one stage cleared of charges and released, but he was “re-arrested a few minutes afterwards” with no fewer than twenty-two new charges against him.56 Eventually the general was released permanently.

The women from southern Zaria continued the struggle by means of a demonstration on July 8, 1992, in Kaduna city. When Nigerians appear in public events, they come out in colourful regalia, but this time they came in rags to demonstrate their displeasure at the way the government had followed up on the riots. They wore ashes on their foreheads to symbolise mourning for their husbands and sons, who “were killed in the hundreds by Islamic fanatics during the riots, while the charcoal on their cheeks symbolised the maltreatment of their kinsmen who are either in detention
or have been thrown into the labour market as a result of ongoing victimisation in the civil service as a result of the incident.”

The purpose of the demonstration was to hold a press conference to inform the world about the chain of events, but the police formed a barrier between them and the press corps. The lead woman, Mrs. Chechet, spoke about the “one-sided arrests of people, especially the Katafs” after the riots. She claimed “more than 400 men and women are languishing in … cells and prisons, not because they have committed any crime or were caught committing any, but just because they are Katafs. The Hausa-Fulans who actually started the problem have not been arrested till date.”

The speaker demanded their immediate release. An acceptable alternative would be the “immediate arrest” of various prominent Muslims who were alleged to have caused the riots, including the secretary to the federal government and the emir of Zaria. She also objected to the “release of fanatics who were caught actually slaughtering people. ‘We condemn this double standard,’ she said.” A non-negotiable, she declared, was the right of the indigenes to self-determination. “We will not be ruled again by strangers,” she announced, “who do not know, would not care to know and do not want to respect our customs and traditions.”

The Kaduna state government’s response to the demonstration was to move the prisoners into more secure detention. Trying to turn the tables on the ladies, the government warned that such demonstrations were dangerous and could escalate the crisis.57

Others similarly accused the government of “direct victimisation and intimidation.” Dr. Harrison Y. Bungwan, a Kataf leader, alleged that “most of the Kataf people in positions of authority have been arrested.” He claimed to be reliably informed that government intended to flush out Katafs from the state civil service on grounds of doubtful loyalty, including civil servants, local government employees and teachers. Local government officials were allegedly tricked into a meeting from where they were conveyed to
prison. While there, they were said to be maltreated. The people supplied them with food, for the government failed to feed them.58

Archbishop Jatau was unhappy about both state and federal government. He was disturbed by their “unwillingness or incapacity to stop such riots. They are always caught pants down.” Their pronouncements are “one-sided and discriminatory.” With respect to previous riots, the government did not rush in relief. However, “now that the government thinks the tide has turned against the Hausa Muslims, it is treating the situation with bias.” Even during the current riot series, worse things happened in other communities than in Zangon Kataf, “but no one is talking about these, only Zangon Kataf.” When the president visited the place, he showed one-sided concern to the Muslims, none of whom had been arrested, while “prominent Katafs have been arrested and searched.”59

One Austeen J. Tsedason also noticed that one-sided concern. In a letter to the editor he wrote, “The prompt reaction of Mr. President and his immediate order of relief measures, resettlement and full compensation of Hausa-Fulani Muslims leaves us with so many questions.” Among others, “What is so special about this incident?” Or, “Why did the president order the production of a film on this incident for all Nigerians to watch? Is it more grievous than the previous incidents where Christians were brutalised, killed or had their property looted?” Tsedason knew the answers. “The action of Mr. President depicts explicitly the role of the Nigerian government in religious matters,” he declared. “In Kano riots, where southerners and Christians lost their lives and property, the president described the episode as an act of Allah. But Zangon Kataf, which affected Muslim Hausa-Fulani, is described by him as a massacre. This is an eye opener.”60

In the description of this riot in Volume 1, there is also reference to violence in the federal prison in Zaria. The situation created a high degree of tension in the city, according to Isaiah Ilo, but this tension was not peculiar to this immediate situation. “It may be no
exaggeration to say that all over the North, the existing situation between Muslims and non-Muslims is that of simmering tension, mutual suspicion and alleged preparations against an expected day when mutual slaughter will be sparked off.” Nigerians, Ilo asserted, were not happy with Babangida’s “pledge to beef up security.” They would much prefer that he pledge

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\text{that his government will ensure that tacit support is no longer given to the perpetrators of religious intolerance and vexatious domination. Nigerians would have taken to the streets in jubilation had the president promised that government would not act in any way that could even be misconstrued as favouring a particular religion or ethnic group which has an avowed goal of subjugating others.}
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The problem is not one of poor security so much as “the reluctance of official authorities to use the forces for the protection of the targeted citizens.” The beefed-up security could be turned against the people.\(^{61}\)

Six years later, the matter was still not settled to everyone’s satisfaction. During mid-1998, renewed rioting was reported in the area over land. It was serious enough to warrant the sending of anti-riot police to ensure it would not escalate into yet another major fracas.\(^{62}\) Even after the turn of the millennium new unrest flared up.

However, some important steps have been taken in dismantling what has been called “internal colonialism.” A number of ethnic groups received their own chiefs. One step at a time. I have no doubt that this is an inexorable process that in time will reach its desired and natural conclusion.

In September, 2001, nine years after the Zangon-Kataf ruckus, the federal government-appointed Oputa panel on human rights abuses announced they would visit the area, since “peace was yet to fully return.” This was to be a “fact-finding mission” at the invitation of the Kataf community, which was “prompted by [continued]
allegations of ‘systematic marginalisation’ by the Kataf” against the state government. Although the Kataf community had enjoyed first-rate legal representation in the person of Chief Ajayi since the original riot till this time, the complaints remained. However, on this occasion, the Oputa panel was “expected to organise a symbolic peace parley” between the Kataf and the Hausa. The former had informed the panel that they “were ready to make peace and live in harmony with their Hausa neighbours.” The panel included our indefatigable son of the soil, Matthew Kukah, as well as Elisabeth Pam, a Christian from Jos.63


The new millenium was greeted with a lot of turbulence in Kaduna City in connection with sharia issues, as readers of Volume 1 will recall. “Father” Ishaya Audu wondered why the five-day Muslim demonstration in 2000 in favour of sharia could be so peaceful, when the “one day of peaceful demonstration against sharia was met with an orgy of serious violence unprecedented in the history of Kaduna. Arson, looting, murder and maiming galore! What could possibly have been the cause of all these?” To him it was “obvious that mere advocacy for sharia could not possibly be the sole reason why neighbours could suddenly find themselves at each other’s throats overnight.” And then the clincher: “Some satanic powers must have taken over from sane rational human beings!”

After all the mayhem and the lengthy rationalizations, perhaps Audu’s clincher comes closer to the core than any other foundational explanation, while it does not eliminate the sociological and other empirical explanations. It certainly echoes the words of the apostle Paul who declared that “…our struggle is not against flesh and blood, but against the rulers, against the authorities, against the powers of this dark world and against the spiritual forces of evil....”64
The most basic and long-time simmering problems in the Tafawa Balewa area of Bauchi state are two-fold. First, there is the alleged Muslim suppression of Christians and, secondly, the desire of the indigenes for Sayawa chiefs to replace the Muslim chiefs imposed on them by the colonial regime. These issues, shared with the people of Southern Kaduna and many other ethnic groups, created the dynamic of violence started by the 1991 riots which continued in the deep recesses of the psyche of the Bauchi peoples, both Christian and Muslims. They thus also undergirded the subsequent events through 1995 right into the new millennium.

In 1996, Minchakpu published a “Special Report” on the 1995 riots that shed much light on the earlier ones of 1991. He explained that this underlying issue had been smouldering for “over sixty years,” with the “Hausa-Fulani Muslims” attempting “by all means to totally subject the Sayawa to the ambit of their feudal exploitative system.” Minchakpu wrote that, prior to colonialism the Sayawa were a “politically self-ruled and independent community.” However, the British device of indirect rule “provided the opportunity for the Muslim exploiters to subject the Sayawa Christian community to all sorts of exploitations and inhuman treatment.”

The post-colonial period introduced no changes in this regard, since the “Muslim feudalists received the mantle of political leadership” from the British. Minchakpu continued, “The attempt by the Sayawas to free themselves from the clutches of feudal Muslim exploitation was heavily resisted by the exploiters. This degrading position has continued to be the bane of peace.” This situation was the “remote cause” that led to the eruption of April 22, 1991.65

Osa Director interviewed Baba Peter Gonto, the oldest living Sayawa at the time and founder of the Sayawa liberation struggle. Gonto’s story was most enlightening not only for the background
details of the Bauchi situation, but also as a typical example of similar histories in Southern Zaria and other places. Gonto, allegedly over 100 years old at this time, claimed that during his youth the Sayawas had control over Tafawa Balewa. Though Fulanis came to water their cattle and buy foodstuffs from the Sayawa, they made no claims on the area and did not settle there. It was the Hausa who only recently began to claim ownership of the area. The Sayawa, according to Gonto, “were very unhappy, because we gave them land and guaranteed them space and security. Suddenly they started agitating and claiming ownership.” The reason for their claim was that “they want to grab political power and own everything in Tafawa Balewa.” The land is fertile. The large population is a lucrative tax base for the Bauchi emirate. The Hausa profited “from the sweat of the Sayawa.” Gonto continued, “We are well educated. So they use us to run the parastatals. But when they find any of them [educated], they impose them to head the ministries while we provide the intellectual manpower. They actually use us.”

Gonto recalled how he started the struggle in 1926. Here is this part of his story:

I have been convicted three times in the law court. They have also arrested and detained me over four times. They have searched my house uncountable times. Even my Holy Bible, along with my property, has been carted away by the security agents on some occasions.

I assembled all the chiefs from the Sayawa. We had a meeting and agreed that we should be separated from Bauchi. I mean, the agent of the Bauchi emirate who was ruling us should be sent back and a Sayawa man appointed. I was then sentenced to six months imprisonment, and my comrades also got various sentences on trumped-up charges.

Asked whether there was “any religious undertone” in the struggle, Gonto replied,
In our early contacts with the Hausa-Fulani, the Sayawa were basically pagans, worshipping idols. At that time we lived with the Hausa-Fulani without any problem. But with the advent of Christian missionaries, we adopted Christianity. Then the rivalry started. In essence, religion is the fundamental reason for the oppression and quarrel between us and the Hausa-Fulani.

As to the goals of the Sayawa, Gonto claimed that “I have told all those concerned, including the emirs past and present, that we want our chiefdom. We don’t want imposition of any district head from outside. Our people should rule us, to that extent we will be independent.” His message to Sayawa youth was to continue the “fight for the dignity and respect of the Sayawa nationality.”

The Sayawa case was clear, even though the opposite Muslim viewpoint in Volume 2 seemed equally clear! Merely a matter of taking your pick?

Sayawa Christians were aware that their approach was difficult to swallow for the Muslim community. A report from “a Christian leader from northern Nigeria” in the files of the International Institute for the Study of Islam and Christianity (IISIC) explained that there was a Muslim nervousness at the growth of the Christian community. They feared that Bauchi could become predominantly Christian like its neighbour, Plateau State. Such anxiety easily turns into a spark. It is hard enough for Muslims to be in a minority position, but to see their power position erode before their very eyes is intolerable and may lead to desperate measures. The Bauchi case has all the earmarks of such desperation. So far the remote causes of these Bauchi riots.

The immediate cause of the 1991 riot, the actual spark, according to local Christians, was the Christian challenge to the Muslim monopoly of the butcher’s trade, including the abattoir. In this, too, the situation was typical of the entire far North and most of
the Middle Belt. There are a few different versions of the basic story. The spark was provided when a Muslim unknowingly bought pork from a Christian butcher. When he discovered his mistake and tried to return the item to the seller, the latter refused to take it back. The Muslim then stabbed and killed the Christian butcher. A group of butchers comprising both Christians and Muslims in turn killed the customer. When the two corpses were shown in public by the police, the violence started. At the end, according to the report, some 500 people were dead, with “about half” having been killed by the police. There is a slightly different version of this event in Volume 1.

This incident increased tension throughout the North and the Middle Belt to a flash point. Everywhere Christians and Muslims were ready to attack each other. We are told, “A huge amount of arms is moving around the country in the hands of civilians. People are arming themselves and training for guerrilla warfare.”

The National Executive Committee of CAN issued a statement under the title “Enough Is Enough,” a phrase they borrowed from Babangida, the head of state. CAN demanded “on behalf of all Christians in the whole country, the protection of their fundamental human rights and an end to selective negligence.” After the Kafanchan debacle of 1987, CAN had expected that the government “would have taken adequate preventive measures.” Unfortunately, history repeated itself in Bauchi, when “well organised Muslim fanatics burnt down about thirty-four churches and vicarages. Nearly 100 people were murdered.” The government once again failed in its “constitutional responsibility towards a section of the Nigerian citizenry.” CAN threatened that the “government is entitled to the loyalty of its citizenry only if it can protect the lives and properties of such citizenry” and referred to this principle as “an age-old doctrine.” At the moment the government did not appear to deserve such loyalty. CAN then called on the federal government “to discharge its avowed constitutional responsibility
by guaranteeing the security of the lives and properties of all Christians; because *Enough is Enough.*

Indeed, losing thirty-four churches to arsonists is enough.

In his 1996 “Special Report” Minchakpu described the aftermath of the 1991 riots and clearly showed their relation to those of 1995. He saw the 1991 version and its aftermath as an attempt at ethnic cleansing of the Sayawa community, a predominantly Christian community in a Muslim-dominated environment.

Minchakpu also reported on the “Justice Babalakin Commission” that was appointed to investigate the 1991 riots. Its recommendations aimed at solving the basic problem: the Sayawas given self-rule by receiving their own chieftaincy, a courageous recommendation. However, the state government, being under Muslim control, “refused to implement these recommendations.” Brief relief came with the appointment of a Christian military governor who brought a Sayawa son into the state cabinet. This was to give them a sense of belonging. Shortly afterwards, “the almighty feudalists” had the governor removed and replaced by Rasheed Raji, a Muslim. Raji, in turn and in deference to his godfathers, “quickly dropped the Christian commissioner and appointed one Alhaji Ibrahim [Musa]” in his place.

And then comes another classic example of insensitivity. The Tafawa Balewa LGC decided on a welcome reception for the same Ibrahim Musa who had replaced a Sayawa! Believe it or not, this reception was to be funded by compulsory payroll deductions from Sayawa civil servants! Sayawa women organised a peaceful protest during the first week of July, 1995 against this confiscation of their breadwinners’ salaries. On the advice of security agents, the reception was cancelled.

To the local Muslims “it was an abomination to allow a Christian have his liberty. They could not accept why Sayawa Christians could be so bold as to reject being exploited. Who are they to question their oppressors and exploiters from doing what
has been ordained by Allah, the business of exploitation, suppression, and engaging in profane acts?” It was at this point that the Muslims began their 1995 riot by setting the central market of Tafawa Balewa ablaze.⁷²

So, the 1991 unrest naturally developed into that of 1995; the latter being simply an extension or even continuation of the former. It was the same for subsequent riots in Bauchi state which continued into the new millennium.

2. 1995

Having explained the historical dynamics of these riots and the aftermath of the one of 1991, Minchakpu of TC, Madaki, the ex-governor-lawyer and Osa Director of TELL together tell us a great deal about the aftermath of the 1995 mayhem.

As to the horrors of murder retold by some individuals in Volume 1, Christians received little consolation or sympathy from Muslims. Under normal circumstances, the case of Dogo would attract sympathy almost anywhere, but not among Bauchi’s Muslims. Director tells the reaction of one Salisu Hameed Barau, a Hausa-Fulani lecturer at Tatari Ali Polytechnic in Bauchi, who hails from Tafawa Balewa. “In controlled rage,” he demanded to know why Dogo should “complain about the loss of his family. He got what he deserved. After all, he is said to have slaughtered six Hausa-Fulani in Jaja village during the crisis.” Director commented, “Such mutual hatred and gory details of murder and counter manslaughter are commonplace tales and almost a way of life among the Christian Sayawa and Muslim Hausa-Fulani in Tafawa Balewa.”

Madaki asserted that, though they were alerted and fully aware of events, the police took no action. The subsequent government investigation, according to him, went completely off the track. Suleiman Musa, chairman of the local government, though aware of the facts, was not interested in the dead or their statistics. He
pretended to have more important things to attend to. He did not even keep a record of the dead. Tapgun, a Christian, was ordered by his superiors to keep out of the investigation and thus he could not make any arrests. Suleiman Musa revealed that a programme had allegedly been in operation to deprive the Sayawas of their farms and homes by pushing them out, an attempt set in motion by no one less than Suleiman Adamu, the emir of Bauchi.73

As per tradition, Governor Raji appointed a military tribunal, but it, too, was beset with problems and irregularities. It was to try “some Sayawa Christian leaders.” He disregarded a Jos Federal High Court order to restrain him. That court order was in response to the Christian challenge. They had argued that they would not receive a fair hearing, since the tribunal was “illegally constituted” and “there was a tripartite conspiracy between the government of Bauchi State, the Bauchi State judiciary, and the emirate council of Bauchi State to ensure that they did not receive any fair hearing.” Furthermore, the composition was completely weighted in that it did not include one representative of the Sayawa people. Even the way in which the tribunal was established bypassed legal procedure. This was because “there are some powerful forces that are desperately looking for ways of eliminating the Sayawa leaders and the community in its entirety.” After all the atrocities committed against the Sayawa as reported in Volume 1, “not even one Muslim” was on trial for the violence they perpetrated. Instead, it is the victims, the Sayawa, who were standing trial before the illegal tribunal. True, twenty-four Muslims were initially arrested, but “within the twinkle of an eye, they were all set free” on bail.

Madaki also identified various illegalities and other irregularities in the trial, many of which would take us too far into legalities for our purposes. A startling one was the involvement in the tribunal of investigators of the case. By law, no one who has participated in an investigation is to sit on such a body. However, a
policeman who had participated in the investigations and arrests also sat on the tribunal.

Madaki reported what can only be described as fiendish shenanigans, totally irresponsible and illegal, on the part of Bauchi authorities, including Governor Raji. Reading Madaki’s allegations leaves one shaking his head in disbelief at the alleged desperate wranglings by the government to cover their own tracks as well as those of the Muslim community. The strong of heart can find documentation of this activity in the Minchakpu article and in Madaki’s own report as well as in an interview Minchakpu conducted with Madaki a year later.74

Minchakpu asked, “For what are the Sayawa being tried? Are they being tried for being victims? How reasonable is it to think that the Sayawas attacked themselves, killed their wives and children, set ablaze their houses and churches?” He concluded that “there must be something behind all these manipulations.” He charged that Raji, in openly “championing the cause of his fellow Muslims,” was not a representative of “good governance.” His determination to proceed with this illegal trial “goes to prove that there is a hidden religious agenda.”

In view of the alleged falsehood of the charges, it was not surprising that the accusers could identify neither the victims of alleged Sayawa atrocities nor the alleged Sayawa perpetrators. It was “established,” according to Minchakpu, “that there was no case against the Sayawa.” Yet, at the time of Minchakpu’s report, a number of Sayawa Christians had been in detention for over seven months.

Minchakpu’s incredible story continues. He alleged that the governor was behind this continued detention “without trial before a competent court of jurisdiction.” He wrote,

On November 20, 1995, the Bauchi State chief judge, having played his abracadabra and engaging in wuru-wuru
antics without success, bowed to the rule of law by declaring that there were no standing charges against the Sayawa Christians. He declared that they are illegally held. Yet, he still refused to direct that they be released. He instead asked the police to screen the Sayawas again.

In addition, Sayawa Christian civil servants were victimised. Three-hundred-fifty-seven Sayawas in the police force posted in Bauchi were transferred to other states. The state’s emirate council “decided that the traditional rulers in Toro and Tafawa Balewa expel all Sayawas domiciled there. These [places] are the abodes of the Sayawas. This is in addition to the pressures being mounted daily by the traditional council on the government to ensure that the formula of ethnic cleansing be applied on the Sayawas.”

Minchakpu ended his story with the challenge to the broader community of Nigerian Christians that, by forming a united front, they were the only ones who could prevent the destruction of the Sayawas.

But Minchakpu could not possibly give us all the intricacies of the entire story and so TC included a lengthy letter written by Madaki to the governor, his military colleague. Unfortunately, it is too lengthy for inclusion in this volume. However, in view of the clear picture it presents of the entire unbelievable drama, I pledge to include it in the promised accompanying CD. If you enjoy reading “legal smut,” you will eventually get it there. Go for it!

The media, often accused of fanning riots either by exaggerations or falsehood, were reportedly restrained in the case of Bauchi 1995. The federal and state governments had agreed to keep the lid on the riots by not broadcasting about it. The alleged reason was that spreading the news might also spread the violence, as it had done in previous cases. So, “mum” was the word.

This, according to the Christian Jonathan Manzo, was the “only saving grace.” The government had the injured brought to
Dass, a nearby village, instead of to Bauchi town, where “restless religious fundamentalists and undesirable elements could have capitalised on the situation to wreak havoc” once again in the town. Instead, medical people were brought in from Bauchi. It was an effective policy. The conflict became “Nigeria’s Hidden War,” as per the title of Director’s article. It seemed, he wrote, as if if the struggle was waged on “another planet.” However, to call the riot “unreported,” as Director did, is patently false. TC’s Minchakpu gave ample coverage of the event.

The hostilities have continued into the new millennium. In 2001, Minchakpu reported that the struggle “continued unabated for several years.” In a November 2001 article, he reported that during the previous two months more than 200 Christians were killed. In September, an escalation occurred due to Muslims conspiring with the state government to bring in “Muslim extremists” from Chad to attack Christians. Markus Musa, the chairman of the local chapter of CAN, reported, “The Muslim *jihadists* first invaded the two local government areas in August when the state government began the implementation of the sharia.” We are told that “Christians have appealed to the federal government, asking for its intervention in the marginalization, discrimination and persecution of the Christians in Bauchi state.” The president was requested to declare a state of emergency in the area. 76

▲ Focus on Potiskum 1994 ————————————

Minchakpu, ever ready to tell the Christian story, declared that the Potiskum riot was just one more example of the manipulation of religion and of the “contradictions inherent in our own political and administrative systems in the country.” He told of an official report that asserted that this issue was a pretext for “political machinations by the Bolewa ethnic group in active collaboration with the Hausa-Fulani ethnic groups in Potiskum.” The state’s police com-
missioner claimed that the incident was a case of “manipulation of the Islamic religion for political purposes” in the interest of “the feudal emirate institution, and as such, Islam has become a ready tool to suppress the other ethnic groups.” Minchakpu blamed the crisis on the Nangare local government’s Vice Chairman Yusufu Umar Kukuri, who “mobilised the fanatics to carry out the mayhem.” His goal was to eliminate “prominent Kare-Kare personalities, who are Christians.” The manipulators were trying to “cover up such satanic acts with a frame-up story of an alleged conversion of a nineteen-year-old Christian girl as the cause of the crisis. This is a shame and a disgrace!”

It was the story about Catherine Abban. The perpetrators of the violence, under the leadership of a Qur’anic teacher Hassan Adamu, claimed that they were “fighting the cause of Islam.” Their specific claim was that Catherine, a Christian, had converted to Islam but was denied the right to do so by both her parents and the police. Her father claimed that the aforementioned Adamu abducted her and hid her while forcefully converting her. Minchakpu wondered how these people could be rioting because of Catherine, when they had her in their custody already for two months. While the riot was running its course, a church property next to that of Abban was burnt, but his own was untouched. He himself was able to move around freely without being molested. Clearly, the issue of his daughter had nothing to do with the event.

The police declared this motivation a farce and that Catherine was used as an excuse. The real reason, according to them, was that the Muslims were engaging in the manipulation of religion because they had lost their power base to local people who had begun a quest for self-determination and had thus become a threat to the local “feudal emirate institution.” Here, as elsewhere, Islam became “a ready tool.” It sounds like the stories of Zangon-Kataf and Tafawa Balewa. It also is in line with my opinion, expressed earlier,
that these riots, even when the result of manipulation, usually have religion as an important component.

The police further revealed that the mayhem was organised by Vice Chairman Yusufu Umar Kukuri, who had “mobilised the fanatics.” The local CAN chapter claimed that the attack on Christians “was premeditated and well planned through the active collaboration of the Yobe State military administrator Dabo Aliyu, the emir of Fika, Minister of Agriculture Alhaji Adamu Ciroma and the administration of Nangare LGC.”

The police reported the arrest of fifty people, but Minchakpu claimed that Yusufu Umar, the brain behind the attack, was released by authorities before an official inquiry even began. Furthermore, the composition of the appointed committee “was one-sided in favour of the Muslims. Of the five-man committee, four are Muslims, while only one member is a Christian,” even though the government allegedly promised to include three Christians. In response to this imbalance, CAN told the governor that they did not believe justice would be done and that they would not even submit the customary CAN memorandum.

Yusufu Turaki, in an interview with TC, expressed the opinion that this attack was a “continuation of the implementation process of the grand design by Muslims to wipe out Christianity in northern Nigeria.”

It was simply one grand chorus about an alleged Muslim design that was sung as lustily as its antiphone in Volume 2—or should it be described as a grand lament?

TEKAN and ECWA published a joint press release on the last day of 1994, the concluding section of which was devoted to the Potiskum riot. It read as follows:

Our constitution allows religious freedom of worship, but why are Christians killed, maimed, and deprived of their rights? The recent killing of Christians, destruction of church build-
ings and burning of Christian properties in Potiskum mark the peak and open expression of government’s unwillingness to protect her citizens. The security was absent. The government-owned dailies refuse to report such happenings. The government describes such perpetrators of instability as “misguided elements” or “touts” and not Muslims. But such religious vandals do not kill Muslims nor destroy mosques, except the churches and Christians. Is the government really sincere? How shall unity be maintained with such open hypocrisy? Why are these religious riots so rampant only in the far North? Christians and Muslims in the South and Middle Belt build churches and mosques side by side and live together in peace. Why are the far North Muslims so harsh?9

\section*{Concluding Remarks}

I promised to attach as Appendix 11 an anonymous article from \textit{TC} as an appropriate closure to this volume. It is a document that hails from the middle of the period covered in this series and summarises well the attitude of Nigerian Christians throughout this period. I also attach as Appendix 12 another article from Minchakpu. Firebrand anti-Muslim as he seemed during his days at \textit{Today’s Challenge}, perhaps due to either maturing or pressure from the international news services that distribute his reports, the tone of his writing seems to be growing more mature and balanced—as does, perhaps, the attitude of Christians as well. The title of the article, “Christian Retaliation Increasing in Nigeria’s Violence,” shows a Christian stance moving away from the language of cheek turning, a process already noted earlier, to a more aggressive stance. Finally, an article written at the end of the Miss World debacle in 2002 by Father George Ehusani serves as a perfect bridge between this volume and the next one about sharia and thus constitutes Appendix 13.
Remember that this is only the end of a volume, not the end of the series. It is too early for firm concluding statements. Furthermore, I prefer to leave you readers to develop your own conclusions to these materials thus far. No doubt, Christian, Muslim and secularist readers will all have come to different conclusions by now. I caution you to be careful with your conclusions, unless you have read the earlier volumes as well. You may wish to hold all in abeyance until you have read the entire series.

The next step in our adventure will take us into the shadows of secularism. In Volume Five, I present the Nigerian Muslim view on secularism. That discussion will be followed by its Christian parallel. See you there! I treasure you as my fellow traveller.
1 “J. O.” Letter, 21 Aug/92.

2 With 2004 here, it will be “interesting” to see what will happen when the church applies for a renewal or extension. Is the Muslim community already making secret plans? All eyes will be on Kano.

3 Hausa terms derived from Arabic that drip with contempt: “pagan,” “worthless people,” “people without religion.”


5 Dandaura, 3 12/82, pp. 7-8.

6 Kukah, 1993, pp. 158-160.

7 Ogbonna, 1991, p. 5.


9 Liberation Times, Vol. 1, No. 5.


11 In fact, I would hardly have believed the story if I had not read Tsado’s master’s thesis about equally unbelievable corruption in a Nigerian state government. Tsado has shown he is capable of deep digging in incredibly murky waters.

12 Challenge Bookshops is a chain of bookshops owned by ECWA and thus closely associated also with JETS, a school of ECWA.

13 Nigerians love exaggerated large-scale thinking. Theirs is probably the only country in the world where such huge numbers could be taken seriously.

14 These are two major northern Nigeria universities.

15 Tsado and Ari, TC, 4/87.


17 Appendix 1.

18 Though CAN does not refer to it here, a list of Christian leaders
supposedly marked for elimination was making the rounds.


20 Appendix B in the CAN Release.


22 Kukah, 1993, pp. 194-195. CAN was not really calling for ecclesiastical or canon courts. It was only serving the government notice that if the sharia is enshrined in the constitution, then they will have to face the demand for canon courts, an implicit promise of a very messy development what with all the different Christian denominations. CAN was really advising the government not to go there but to retain its secularity.


24 Kukah, 1993, pp. 203-204. I find it hard to accept this as a causal explanation for the riots sparked by Kafanchan, since the initiative came from Muslims. I do accept it as a major explanation for the Zangon-Kataf episode, where the immediate initiative came mostly from Christians. The occasion was used to express their pent-up feelings. The connection between the riots and the content of the submission was, in my estimation, more psychological and emotional than causal.

25 Kukah, 1993, pp. 203-204.


27 Kukah, 1993, pp. 48-49.

28 Kukah, 1993, pp. 185-186.


30 Youthful students, often children, at the popular Qur’anic schools found in all Muslim communities.

31 His phrase later was used by CAN to haunt the government when CAN published its statement of 24 Apr/91 under that title.

32 Kukah, 1993, pp. 189-190.

33 Kukah, 1993, pp. 192-193.


36 The term “settler” is questionable here. Can a people who have lived in a place for 350 years still be considered settlers? The local
Christians and Traditionalists do so regard them; the “settlers” themselves have good reason to object to the designation. Where I use it in this chapter, I do so only as an expression of local Trado-Christian opinion.

37 Anonymous, TC, 3/92, p. 15.

38 CAN, Kaduna State Branch, 17 June/92.

39 There were some very good reasons for calling Turaki to testify: (1) He was the general secretary of ECWA, a prominent Christian denomination in the area; (2) He grew up in Kaduna State in an area contiguous to Zango–Kataf; (3) His doctoral dissertation deals extensively with the subjugation of the southern Kaduna people to the emir of Zaria on the part of the colonialists.


41 Hausa term for “tribes” or “ethnic groups.” When used by Muslims in Nigeria, it is a term of contempt and stands over against the “civilised” Muslim culture of the North.

42 Y. Turaki, TC, 3/92, pp. 6-7.

43 Y. Madaki, TC, 4/92, pp. 11-12.


45 See Boer, 1979, pp. 126-129 and 1984, pp. 36-37 for brief but pungent descriptions of that part of Muslim slave culture in West Africa that is always hidden.

46 TC, 4/92, pp. 4-13.


48 Anonymous, TC, 3/92, p. 11.

49 M. Jega, 15 June/92.

50 TC, 1/93, p. 4.

51 TSM, 14 Feb/93, p. 4.

52 TC, 1/93, pp. 6-8.

53 Madaki, TC, 3/93, p. 5.

54 TC, 1/93, p. 7.

55 TSM, 14 Feb/93, pp. 4, 6-15.

Nnanna, pp. 7-8.

57 TC, 4/92, pp. 4-8.
58 TC, 4/92, p. 8
59 Jatau, TC, 3/92, p. 15.
60 Tsedason, p. 3.
61 Ilo, p. 1.
65 Minchakpu, TC, 1/96, pp. 6-7.
66 Director, p. 8.
67 Probably the same “O. J.” we have met in earlier contexts.
68 IISIC, June/91.
69 IISIC, June/91.
70 CAN, 24 Apr/91.
71 CAN, 8 May/91. This CAN list was distributed by TEKAN among its members (14 May/91).
72 Minchakpu, TC, 1/96, pp. 6-7.
73 TC, 1/96, pp. 9-12.
74 Madaki, TC, 1/96; 1/97. Some of these materials may appear in the promised Companion CD volume.
75 TC, 1/96, pp. 9ff. See also Y. Madaki, TC, 1/97, for another lengthy and less technical report.
77 Minchakpu, TC, 1/95, p. 8.
78 Minchakpu, TC, 1/95, pp. 10-14, 20. For the detailed but unfinished story of Catherine, see Minchakpu’s interview with Abban. The distortions and corruption of the Muslim police, Muslim judges and all others in the case are beyond belief. The story is too long for inclusion in this book, but I hope to include major sections of it on the promised Companion CD.
79 TEKAN/ECWA Release, 31 Dec/94. Had the authors forgotten Christian behaviour in Kaduna State?