ENDNOTES

▲ Preface

1 For a basic summary of the antithesis between secularism and sharia as Nigerian Christians and Muslims see them, see Y. Turaki, 2003, chapter 7 of this volume.

2 See Companion CD <Miscellaneous Arts/Turaki Arts>.

3 Hausa for the English “Calm down!”

▲ Chapter 1

1 CAN, YouthCAN, 1987, p. 4.


3 T. Awoshakin, Apr/2003.

4 D. Dodo, 2000, p. 2.

5 One such exception was the ECWA Muslim scholar, the late Dr. Iyakachin Shelley. Turaki wrote, “We lost a great Islamic scholar who was highly respected by Islamic scholars throughout the world. I remember at one international seminar organized by Unijos and Professor Ali Mazrui’s Africa’s Triple Heritage. When Unijos saw the Islamic agenda in the pro-
gramme, they invited Shelley. He was the respondent to Mazrui’s Key Note Address. The following morning, Mazrui left his seat and walked straight to Shelley, shook his hand and said, ‘From now on, you are my professor.’ The Grand Khadi publicly said to Shelley, ‘We know that you are not a Muslim, but you know Islam better than we who are Muslims.’ The depth of his knowledge of Islam was astounding” (Y. Turaki, private letter, 14 Mar/2006).

7 M. Gaiya, 2004, p. 29.
13 M. Kukah, 1993, pp. 117–118.
14 P. Ostien, 2005, pp. vii, xxxvii.
15 J. Boer, 1979, pp. 479–482.
16 For a fuller discussion of this dualism, see J. Boer, 2006, vol. 5, part 2; 1979, pp. 449–460 and the Index entry “Dualism.”
17 NS, 15 Sept/77.
18 NS, 22 Nov/77.
19 NS, 2 Jan/78.
20 NS, 19 Sept/77.
21 NS, 2 Jan/78.
22 SS, 20 Nov/77.
23 NS, 22 May/78 and GTFK, 15 Aug/77.
24 NN, 6 July/78.
25 SS, 27 Nov/77.
26 NS, 15 Sept/77.
27 NS, 7 Nov/77.
28 NS, 16 Sept/77.
Notes for pp. 31-42

29 Institute of Church and Society, 1977.

▲ Chapter 2

1 D. Omotunde, 15 Nov/99.
7 M. Gaiya, 2004, p. 27.
8 D. Byang, 1988, pp. 36–42. See also D. Byang, 2000, where he summarizes the same material. Byang studied sociology but soon turned to a writing career as a journalist with ECWA’s TC. Later he was ordained into the clergy and served as chaplain at Unijos. Today, he is operating a church in Jos that he founded himself while he is also a post-graduate student at Unijos.
17 D. Agekameh, 15 Nov/99.
19 V. Grissen, p. 75.
20 See e.g. T. Baiyewu and S. Mwadkwon, 2001, p. 27.
21 M. Nyako, 2000, p. 44.
23 J. Onaiyekan, 2000, p. 3.
24 Official name for Nigeria’s Church of the Brethren.
25 B. Debki, 2000, p. 7. Since Debki’s book features in several volumes of this series, it may be useful to know the opinion of at least one Muslim of Debki’s work. See S. Bala, 2000, pp. 2–3.
30 D. Byang, 1988, p. 6.
31 O. Minchakpu, no. 3/95, p. 9.
32 NN, 3 Nov/99.
33 NN, 9 Nov/99.
34 K. Dada, 3 Nov/99.
36 A. Shittu, 26 Nov/99.
38 A. Alkali, 13 Nov/99.
39 W. Badejo, 2000, p. 17.
40 J. Onaiyekan, 2000, pp. 8–9.
Notes for pp. 52-62


48 L. Grissen, pp. 74–75.


50 B. Debki, pp. 8–10.


52 M. Gaiya, 2003, pp. 79–80. This list is public domain property and can be found in any number of books and documents. See also CAN, 1987, pp. 9–10. See another list provided by former Muslim, Emman Usman Shehu in J. Boer, 2004, vol. 3, pp. 40–41.

53 D. Byang begins his Introduction with this very statement. I have also selected it for “Important Statements” at the beginning of this book.


56 TC, no. 1/89, p. 9.

57 M. Kukah, 1993, p. 116. Kukah took over this claim from J. N. Anderson, “the renowned British expert on Islamic law.”

58 M. Kukah, 1993, p. 116. It should be remembered from volume 6 that some Muslims have made the same observations. Though they have a tendency to glorify the sharia of the past, some are very aware of its corrupt and inept use through the decades.


60 J. Bamigboye, 2000.

61 D. Byang, 1988, pp. 9–17, 45. See W. Sabiya in Chapter 6, (pp. 245).

62 TEKAN, 1987, pp. 51–53. It is of interest to note that Wilson Sabiya was chairman of the TEKAN committee producing this report. He was from Gongola State and undoubtedly the source of this information.
See more details from him in chapter 6, (pp 263).

63 M. Gaiya, 2003, pp. 91–92. Judge: “How can a pagan get this farm and not the Muslim?” Preacher: “Pagans will meet their end the same way Gomwalk and Dimka did.” Italics mine.


▲ Chapter 3


6 I have covered the Muslim papers in earlier volumes. The Christian concerns on secularism are treated in volume 5, while their concerns about sharia are distributed throughout these chapters.

7 B. Nwabueze, 2000, pp. 14–21. You may wish to reread this paragraph a few times. It is heavy stuff for legal laity. Please do realize that I am merely reporting here, not recommending.

8 R. Williams, 2000, pp. 22–32.

9 NN, 3 Nov/99.


12 It is interesting that six years later exactly the same argument was used by the Dutch Minister of Justice, Piet Hein Donner, representing the Christian Democrats, to defend the right of Muslims to sharia in The Netherlands. “For me it is clear: if two-thirds of the Dutch population should want to introduce the Sharia tomorrow, then the possibility should exist,” according to Donner. “It would be a disgrace to say: ‘That is not allowed!’” This statement caused such a crisis in the country that Parliament was hastily convened to deal with it. It evoked calls for the minister’s resignation. It also created a stir among the public who


15 U. Umar, 13 Jan/2004. Umar, a Muslim, describes Awoniyi as “incorruptible and sincere.” He “should have been among the hierarchy of the nation’s leadership.” Unfortunately, according to Umar, “there is no place, sadly, for honourable and conservative Nigerians in our polity.” See The Punch, 29 Apr/2004, for less favourable Muslim opinions about Awoniyi and the Forum.

16 A. Bally, 14 Nov/99.

17 I. Godwin, 16 Nov/99.

18 Ch. 5, (pp. 208-210).


20 The full story was begun by Buhari but completed by Babangida. See Chapter 5,( pp. 195-197).


23 NN, 8 May/85; 18 Oct/85; 8 Jan/86; 31 Dec/99, p. 15. See also J. Boer, ch. 2, vol. 8, planned for 2008.

24 NS, 7 Nov/77, 16 Sep/77.

25 YouthCan, 1987, pp. 18–19.

26 TC, no. 1/89, p. 9.
29 D. Byang, 1988, pp. 31–32.
30 D. Byang, 2000, pp. 6–7. For the missionary part in these pre-
independence efforts, see J. Boer, 1979, pp. 392–393, 408–409.
32 S. Richardson, 2000, pp. 82–85.
33 J. Onaiyekan, 2000, p. 12.
34 J. Gangwari, 2001, pp. 4–5, 47.
35 M. Gaiya, 2003, pp. 74–75. Dandaura’s view was further strength-
ened by the opinion of Mohammed Bello, retired Federal Chief Justice, a
Muslim, some of whose opinions are recorded in vol. 6.
37 The bulk of this document constitutes appendix 6, vol. 5.
38 It is unfortunate that Adegbola refers to the pluralistic arrange-
ments of various Western countries but skips The Netherlands with its
Kuyperian system. That system exemplifies exactly the principle of equal
treatment of all religions and worldviews, but without Sambo’s suggestion
that together these constitute the state religion. The latter suggestion is
impossible in view of the strong contradictions between religions. An
amalgam of contradictions would hardly provide a solid base for a state.
41 The motion was accompanied by a set of notes, “The Constituent
42 See appendix 1 for further discussion by Usman.
45 D. Byang, 1988, p. 7.
46 D. Dodo, 2000, p. 10.
48 D. Dodo, 2000, pp. 10–11.


54 D. Dodo, 2000, p. 22.

55 W. Badejo, 2000, p. 15.


58 A. Orire, 2000, pp. 6–7. For a brief history of Canon Law, see W. Walker, *A History of the Christian Church*. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1959, p. 263. Additional information can be gained from many Web sites. For example, the website article “Canon law” in Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia, says, “In Western culture, Canon Law is the law of the Roman Catholic and Anglican churches. The Eastern Orthodox concept of Canon Law is similar to but not identical to the more legislative and juridical model of....” The website “*Catholic Encyclopedia: Canon Law*” defines it as follows: “Canon law is the body of laws and regulations made by or adopted by ecclesiastical authority, for the government of the Christian organization and its members.” This is what the website “*Legal Dictionary*” has to say: It “has little or no legal effect today. Canon Law refers to that body of law which has been set by the Christian Church and which, in virtually all places, is not binding upon citizens and has virtually no recognition in the judicial system. Some citizens resort to Canon Law, however, for procedures such as marriage annulments to allow for a Christian church marriage where one of the parties has been previously divorced. Many church goers and church officers abide by rulings and doctrines of Canon Law. Also known as “ecclesiastical law.”

59 Such spillover occurred in village churches where semi-literate elders in Reformed churches learned something about democratic proce-
dures and rule of law within Reformed churches that some of them subsequently applied in the wider community.

60 NS, 8 Mar/94. M. Kukah, 1993, p. 120.
62 W. Badejo, 2000, p. 17.
63 M. Kukah, 27 Nov/95.
64 J. Onaiyekan, 2000, p. 9.
65 B. Debki, 2000, p. 34.

Chapter 4

1 The Pen, “Calling CAN…,” 7 Apr/89.
2 I. Umar, 19 Dec/99. For identification of Maguzawa turn to the section below that is devoted to them at p. 174-183, especially endnote 204, p. 435.
6 H. Dandaura, private discussion, Feb/2005.
9 F. Ayigbe, 12 Nov/99. See also J. Boer, 2007, vol. 6, throughout.
15 A. Shu’aibu, 26 Nov/99.

16 It is almost the major point in Yusufu Turaki’s chapter that good ideas on the part of Muslims are irrelevant to the Nigerian situation. It is the reality on the ground that counts.


19 See especially J. Boer, 2004, vol. 3, pp. 35–44. For a very recent statement regarding Muslim global plans for the world, see P. Poole, 11 May/2006.

20 In some Western countries, developments are taking place that were inherent in the situation from the beginning but to which the secularized West was blind. I warned my former compatriots about the inevitability of these events twenty years before they took place. My friends would look at me strangely and secretly wondered whether I had turned redneck. In The Netherlands especially people are now having second thoughts and realizing they are now paying the price for their earlier blindness and political correctness. One of those friends remembers our discussions and has retracted his suspicions about me. Remember the warnings of Ambassador Tanko Yusuf, who was brought up a Muslim (J. Boer, 2004, vol. 3, pp. 53–55).

21 J. Aguwa, pp. 23–24.


23 The Pen, “Calling CAN…,” 7 Apr/89. See the following articles from The Pen: “CAN Sues…,” 10 Mar/89, for more information on CAN’s suing the Government. S. A. Muhammad, 5 May/89. For further Okogie opposition to sharia because of the Muslim plan see J. Boer, 2004, vol. 3, p. 98; 2005, vol. 4, pp 119–120, 126 (notes 17 and 18), 233–234. This was not the first time Okogie evoked such negative reactions.

24 D. Byang, 1988, pp. 32–34.


26 CAN, 4 Oct/99.

See entry “Organisation of Islamic Conference” in indices of J. Boer, vols. 2, 3, 4, 5 of this series. It is interesting that Nigerian membership in OPEC (Organisation of Oil Exporting Countries) did not lead to great unrest in the nation. I was on a study leave in Amsterdam at the time, enjoying the auto-free streets of the city due to the OPEC boycott. Media attention was riveted on the OPEC boycott of the West, not on religious developments in Nigeria, though these were related to oil events. Had the issue of OPEC membership come up after the first CA, it probably would have been more controversial. Nigeria joined during the earlier, more innocent, age when the FG also confiscated Christian schools and hospitals without strong Christian resistance. Nigerian Christians had not yet been conscienticized. Besides, OPEC provided Nigerians with an unexpected deluge of money, the first phase of which clearly spread across the whole country. After an absence of a year and a half, I was astounded at the amazing number of motorcycles plying the streets and parked at both church and mosque. Overnight, it seemed, Nigeria had moved from subsistence to a money economy. Money has its own mysterious way! I am not aware of any significant Christian resistance to membership in OPEC, even though all its members were Muslim countries, with the exception of Nigeria and Venezuela. Byang does claim that it was “founded to propagate the interest of Islam” (D. Byang, 1988, p. 76). When Nigeria’s own Lukman became chairman of OPEC, I had the impression from the press that even Christians were proud of this recognition of their compatriot. Religious concerns simply never entered in. It was a different day. And it brought money!

CAN, Lagos State Branch, “President Babangida…."


Compass Direct, 23 June/2005.

M. Oloja, 2 June/2005.


A more constructive approach might have been for CAN and the Sultan to agree behind the scenes on a joint call for a joint meeting. Neither party, it seems to me, acted wisely, but that is cold war for you. It tends to derail sound thinking.

I. Eguabor, 4 Apr/88.
Actually, worry about INEC seems to have been misplaced. A few weeks before the April elections, President Obasanjo hosted a meeting of the National Council of State, that included former heads of state, current governors and presidential aspirants, at INEC headquarters. Former Military Head of State and current civilian presidential aspirant Muhammadu Buhari, along with the governors present, all declared themselves to be impressed by INEC’s election preparations. J. Lohor and C. Okocha, 5 Apr/2007. M. Abubakar, 5 Apr/2007. Leadership, 5 Apr/2007.

Leadership, 5 Apr/2007.

This theory has been around for a long time. Muslims themselves declare it, colonialists acted upon it and even the early missionaries adhered to it.

J. Boer, 1979, pp. 153, 211.

B. Debki, 2000, pp. 11–12.

For a very brief summary from the days of independence till the present see the NIREC lecture by W. Badejo. 2000, pp. 12–14. Also O. Director, 15 Nov/99, pp. 14–15. For an extensive discussion of the earlier ones see M. Kukah, 1993, chapter 4.

C. Williams, 12 Dec/95, pp. 6–7. J. Boer, vol. 3, 2004, pp. 37–42, 85–86, 231–237. This is a particularly one-sided speech that makes Christians look like saints and Muslims, devils. I believe its strident tone was coloured by the fact that the audience included potential donors: the Annual Conference of German Protestant Clergymen Ministering in Africa.

M. Kukah, 10 Nov/93.

J. Aguwa, 1993, pp. 24–25. Aguwa found this material in “The Sharia Debate Press Release” by the Muslim Students’ Society of ABU.

J. Onaiyekan, 2000, pp. 7–8.


M. Kukah, 1993, p. 128.


51 J. Onaiyekan, 2000, pp. 7–8.
52 O. Director, 15 Nov/99, p. 18.
53 D. Dung, July/2005, p. 3.
55 K. Dada, 3 Nov/99.
56 M. Gaiya, 2003, pp. 91–92.
57 M. Kukah, 1993, pp. 120–121.
60 I. Audu, 23 Aug/2000. The names Audu mentioned were “Kashim Ibrahim, Isa Kaita, Yahaya Gusau, Ahmed Talib, Ali Akitu, Mai-Bedde, etc.” Possible misspellings are due to difficult handwriting. Honour to whom it is due.
62 J. Gangwari, pp. 4–5.
64 CAN, 17 May/2000.
65 Vol. 6 shows many Muslims also objecting to the political under- and overtones.
72 D. Dodo, 2000, pp. 15–18, 36.
73 It is interesting to note that Onaiyekan, due to the heavy input from the military, wrote, “What we are now carrying around as the Abdulsalami 1999 Constitution is hardly what could be considered as the Constitution made by Nigerians” (J. Onaiyekan, 21 June/2001, p. 8).
74 Awoniyi’s estimate of the Ulama as an educated group stands in
stark contrast to that of J. Kantiok, who writes of “the ignorance of the so-called learned Muslim scholars in Nigeria.” He even accuses them of ignorance of Islam! (J. Kantiok, 1999, p. 297).

Here Awoniyi and Kantiok are in complete agreement about the Ulama. Kantiok describes them as “nothing but a bunch of political hoodlums, who hide under the banner of Islam to destabilize Nigeria.” In fact, he asserts that “the distortion of facts and deliberate lies by Muslim leaders is responsible for the tension between Christians and Muslims, especially in northern Nigeria” (J. Kantiok, 1999, pp. 297–298).

76 O. Awoniyi, 2002, pp. 23–33.
78 B. Debki, 2000, p. 11.
79 B. Debki, 2000, pp. 25–26. We already know from chapter 3 that Debki is aware of the steps taken by Buhari and Babangida to surreptitiously change the Constitution to open the door to the wider sharia. See chapter 3, p. 72. I do not understand why Debki talks here as if these generals did nothing to advance sharia.

81 B. Debki, 2000, pp. 28–31. Italics are mine.

83 L. Kyuney, TC, no. 1/97, p. 25. Italics mine.
84 Y. Madaki, TC, no. 1/96, p. 10.
85 The source is a document that was widely circulated. By the time it reached my screen, the origin was no longer verifiable, though the author is clearly identified.
86 D. Dodo, 2000, p. 15.
87 J. Gangwari, p. 48.
88 Do not forget that Sani claimed he did consult Christians! Whom to believe? Take your pick!
89 D. Dodo, 2000, p. 16. Again a contradiction: Muslims accused of failing to compromise, while he recognizes that the Penal Code itself was
the product of compromise from both sides!


91 D. Byang, 1988, pp. 9–17, 45.


93 Literal translation: “If you associate with a carrier of potash, your hair will become white.”


95 J. Onaiyekan, 2000, pp. 11, 13.

96 W. Badejo, 2000, p. 17.

97 Compass Direct is an American publisher. I utilize their information, since their sources are Nigerians. Sometimes they are named; at other times they are anonymous.

98 Compass Direct, 15 Nov/2005.


100 B. Gambo, June/2005, pp. 11–12.


104 M. Gaiya, 2003, p. 74.

105 D. Byang, 2000, pp. 7–8.


I challenge this statement. A review of the violence resulting from the various CAs shows otherwise. Even Dodo’s own references to the BZ era render the statement doubtful.

Remember the other discussion on this subject on p. 124 above.

D. Dodo, 2000, pp. 11, 15, 19, 22, 24.


See Companion CD <Miscellaneous Articles / Miss World> This folder includes many articles about the Miss World debacle, including articles by myself.


O. Minchakpu, “Eight Pastors…,” 26 Apr/2004. Volumes 1–3 of this series show that this is hardly a “new” trend.


B. Debki, 2000, pp. 1, 17.


D. Ityavyar and Z. Gundu, Stakeholders…, 2004, pp. 57, 68.

IGPB, Nov/2004, p. 3.


O. Minchakpu, 16 May/2005; 11 July/2005. A. Madugba, 2 Apr/2005. I encourage you to read the Madugba article on the way in which Muslim leaders try to threaten, deceive and manipulate President Obasanjo, according to their fellow Muslim Abubukar Umar. It gives
much credence to the accusations from the Christian side. See bibliography for access to the article.


135 Agence France-Presse, VS, 15 Sep/2006. For additional details, see Companion CD <Misc Arts/Muhammad/…>.


137 CC, 9 Oct/2006. Apart from this one incident—which was serious enough for the victims!—Nigerian reactions during the week were limited to angry threats and demonstrations as well as the “celebration” of a “day of anger.” There were also positive steps taken by various Muslim leaders to douse the anger and to discourage an outbreak of violence. This represents a considerable step forward that should be noted and appreciated. At a subsequent international conference in Vancouver that included many Muslims, Muslims publicly joked about violent Muslim protests against the Pope’s allegations of Muslim violence and clearly disapproved of it. That was a refreshing experience.


139 See Human Rights Watch, 21 Sep/2004, for further details about these groups.

140 Compass Direct, 16 Feb/2006.


148 Not exactly the beginning, of course. We have already read of such demolitions in 2001 and, below in this very document, in 1997.


154 For stories of harassment of Christians of Kibiya, Tsoro, Shrima, Kukarwai, Gidan Kwaraya, all in Kano State, the bribery and intimidation on the part of Muslim authorities, see B. Gambo, June/2005, pp. 11–12.
155 M. Gaiya, 2004, p. 36. His source was Usman Dauda, the CAN secretary for Katsina state. The circumstance described makes it almost sure this church was being built in the heart of the city, not at the city’s fringe.
156 Weekly Trust, 3 Feb/2000, as quoted in S. Bala, 2000, p. 22.
157 Newswatch, 13 Mar/2000, as quoted in S. Bala, 2000, p. 23.
162 D. Byang, 2000, pp. 8–9. I expect to see Western fashion designers one of these days to emerge with a modernized, even sexy, version of the burqa! They will not be able to resist its allure and mystery—or the business it is likely to generate. The burqa is likely to become common property and thereby lose its function of identification. Would Muslim hackles be raised for such secularizing of a sacred symbol or, as is the habit of some, could it cause riots even?
169 Compass Direct, 31 Jan/2006.
The verse reads, “A woman must not wear men’s clothing, nor a man wear women’s clothing, for the Lord your God detests anyone who does this.” The FCN here engages in a static reading of the Bible that ignores cultural issues and that is a fundamentalist Christian parallel to the static reading of sharia. As long as both sides persist in such reading of their texts, a compromise will be hard to come by.


M. Gaiya, 2004, pp. 41–42. Source: Mail and Guardian On-line, 2 Nov/2003, p. 3. I expect that, if this legal system persists, modern techniques like DNA testing will eventually be incorporated.

B. Wakili, Jan/2006, pp. 11–13. Part of this article is attached at appendix 20.


D. Dodo, 2000, pp. 26–27.

O. Director, 15 Nov/99, p. 15.

I personally experienced the economic paralysis that occurred when Ibos fled from the North in 1966. Wukari, the town I lived in, was completely void of any supplies and just about all services. The value of business was driven home to me forcefully. Not even a single screw to repair a sagging door. The post office, the only link with the outside world, closed. These were difficult circumstances. Thank you, business people, for making society possible!
187 D. Byang, 2000, p. 11.
188 D. Dodo, 2000, pp. 32–33.
190 The book goes into great detail on the subject. On the back cover it states that these “laws are...immutable”—in other words, applicable anywhere. The book even has an ISBN number (1–895689–00–7) and is thus fully registered in Canada. Does it not classify as hate literature? How could it pass the censors and be awarded a number? Another case of Liberal political correctness? I wonder.
192 *Compass Direct*, 12 Dec/2005.
201 The Christian argument against Muslim claims of marginalization is supported by Sanusi L. Sanusi (S. Sanusi, Sep/2005, p. 24).
202 O. Minchakpu, 3 Sep/2003 (both).
203 For information about the National Conference see *Companion CD* <Misc. Arts/National Conference>.
204 The term “Maguzawa” is the plural of the Hausa “Bamaguje,” a word derived from the Arabic for “fireworshipper.” Its strict meaning in Hausa is “member of the pagan Maguzawa tribe of Kano and Katsina.” My study of Abraham’s dictionary indicates that the term carries contempt with it as it is associated with “arne,” a designation Northern
Muslims use for adherents of ATR that drips with contempt; with “biri,” meaning “monkey;” with “dauda,” meaning “dirt” as well as a prickly plant used to keep people away (R. C. Abraham, pp. 70, 26, 198). It would appear that the meaning of “those who have run away” attributed to the term by many secondary speakers of the language, based on the notion that it is based on the verb “gudu” or “run,” reasonable as it seems, is wrong. The implication of the latter incorrect meaning is that it refers to their history of having run away from or resisted Islam and retained their ATR. In Christian circles, many expand the meaning to refer to all core Northern adherents of ATR as well as to Christians from those communities, including those beyond Kano and Katsina. For additional background to the Maguzawa see Companion CD <Miscellaneous Articles / Maguzawa>.


207 M. Gaiya, 2003, pp. xi, 78. E. Duru and C. Nweje, 4 May/2001. It would appear that the contempt with which Hausa-Fulani Muslims have traditionally regarded the Maguzawa, until recently mostly adherents of ATR, has carried over to those who have converted to Christianity. Though now “People of the Book,” they should be accorded special respect from Muslims, but in the context of hostility between Christians and Muslims, that special status is denied them and they continue to be regarded with the old contempt.

208 CAN, 4 Oct/99.


210 M. Gaiya, 2003, pp. 77–78. E. Duru and C. Nweje, 2001. With the death of both Dandaura and Audu, it has become even more difficult to obtain information from or about these already low-profile organizations.


213 M. Gaiya, 2003, pp. 112–113. This is a far cry from an earlier statement credited to Professor Baikie. He said, “So far as Northern Christians are concerned, we have not been unduly molested and in fact

212 This is similar to Muslims transferring their contempt for Traditional Maguzawa to the new Christians. These Christians, it seems, get it from every direction, sandwiched as they are between thick walls of contempt and even denial from Muslims and suspicion on the part of Christians.


219 This claim is hardly correct. He may be the only Fulani bishop in the country, but definitely not the only Christian leader. What of Christopher Abashiya? And what, until recently, Professor Ishaya Audu?

220 Compass Direct, 21 Apr/2006.

221 J. Onaiyekan, 2000, pp. 11, 13.


224 M. Gaiya, 2004, p. 36.


229 M. Reis, 12 Nov/99.

230 NN, 12 July/2001. Governor Mu’azu traced the cause to the “ethnic problems between Hausa settlers and the Sayawa natives, which
started about forty-three years ago.” Now that is an honest statement by a Muslim governor on this type of issue. Not many would follow him there (NN, 13 July/2001). For further background to the Bauchi situation see J. Boer, index entries for “Bauchi” in vols. 1–3.

231 Y. Turaki, Chapter 7.


234 See Companion CD <Misc Arts/Miss World> folder for many articles on the Nigerian Miss World Pageant, including 2 articles by myself: <Boer-1.doc> and <Boer-2.doc>. Check out also under J. Boer, Bibliography, volume 5, 2006, pp. 261–262 for more Boer entries on the subject.

235 For background material on this situation, see J. Boer, Vol. 1, 2003, pp. 63–79.


237 Senior Fyneface, “Atikulating Obasanjo’s Renewed Third Term Agenda.” www.gamji.com, Sep/2006. For the benefit of foreign readers, “Atikulating” is a play on the name of Vice President Atiku.

238 D. Byang, 2000, p. 12.

239 M. Kukah, 1993, pp. 122, 124.

240 I realize most readers will not understand the reference here, but Kukah, being a Catholic scholar, will or should. Other readers should just skip over this issue. Reading Pope Benedict’s recent lecture at Regensburg shocked me into a renewed awareness that the traditional Catholic Scholasticism/Thomism is still alive and well in the Vatican (Benedict XVI, “Faith, Reason and the University: Memories and Reflections.” Lecture delivered at a meeting with the representatives of science at the University of Regensburg, 12 Sep/2006). The lecture can be read at www.trouw.nl/toespraakpaus.


242 An important exception is that Muslims did accept and continue to defend the imposition of Muslim chiefs and emirs over non-Muslim ethnic groups. The issue was revisited recently in D. Dung, July/2005.
\section*{Chapter 5}


2 Appendix 8, 9 and 10.


CAN, 3 Apr/89, Appendix 12.

8 I remind you of the Dandaura delegation to the FG to advise on sharia in Chapter 4, (pp. 94-95). The intervention so strongly discredited by the TC writer may well have been of Dandaura’s inspiration, but not for reasons that the writer gives.

9 TC, no. 1/89, p. 9.

10 CAN, Northern Zone, 16 Apr/89. Appendix 11.


12 For more extensive details from this Model see CAN (Youth), 1987, pp. 5–7.


14 O. Minchakpu, TC, No. 3/95, p. 9.

15 REC, May/99, p. 2. Vol. 4 shows that by this time Christians had come to terms with the notion of “multi-religion.”


17 M. Kukah, 1993, pp. 67–69.

18 M. Kukah, 1993, pp. 73–74.


20 NN, 29 Sep/86. CAN, 3 Apr/89, Appendix 12.

22 Worldreach Nigeria, Dec/97.
27 President Obasanjo, 1 Oct/2002.
31 The Pointer, 18 Feb/2003. The actions of the FG have been described in volume 6, pp. 192–200.
33 J. Boer, “Nigerian Muslims and the Miss World Pageant.” May/2003. See also the <Miss World> folder under Companion CD <Miscellaneous Articles/>.
36 M. Gaiya, 2004, p. 37. His source was an article by Kalu in The Guardian.
38 M. Reis, 12 Nov/99.
40 TEKAN, Communique, 2001. This must not be understood as a general attitude towards the President. In fact, TEKAN has expressed considerable appreciation for his policies. The item in the communique following the one on sharia is an applause for his anti-corruption policy. In the communique of 2000, TEKAN literally gushed out in praise for the President.
42 D. Byang, Nov/2005. This paper once again demonstrates how both Christians and Muslims complain about the FG’s policy of favour-
ing the other side, a long-standing tradition that has been noted frequently in earlier volumes of this series.

44 A. Alkali, 13 Nov/99.
47 R. Williams, 2000, pp. 32–33.
48 NN, 2 Nov/99.
49 NN, 3 Nov/99.
50 NN, 9 Nov/99.
55 M. Nyako, 2000, p. 54.
56 S. Nyang, 2002.
60 B. Wakili, Jan/2006, p. 11.
61 Some Middle Belt ethnic groups, especially the Tiv, have always resisted this fashion along with the Hausa language. To them these have always been recognized as Muslim symbols they wanted nothing to do with.
65 J. Tsado, no. 5/87, p. 11.


73 *Compass Direct*, 16 Feb/2006.


75 S. Obassa, 29 Jan/2005, p. 29.


77 B. Debki, 2000, p. 18.

78 B. Debki, 2000, p. 21.


80 S. Lazarus, 28 June/2005.


**Chapter 6**

1 For further introduction to Sabiya, turn to J. Boer, vol. 3, 2004, p. 16 and to the entry “Sabiya” in the indices of vols. 3 and 5.

2 *TC*, no. 1/90, pp. 6–12

3 T. Falola, 1998, p. 82.

4 A stenciled paper privately distributed, 1978. It is a reaction to Muslim insistence on sharia in the CA of 1978. The first part of this paper also constitutes Appendix 4 of Volume 5.

5 That number is now 15.

6 Though Sabiya insisted on the need for dialogue, given Muslim attitudes as he experienced them, he doubted that it would yield any practical results. See his 1993 lecture below.

7 I agree with Sulaiman at this point. Sabiya’s disagreement here is
based on the different definitions the two have for religion. Sulaiman operates with a more comprehensive definition than does Sabiya, the Lutheran. Sulaiman’s includes political issues and government structures.

8 See also J. Boer, vol. 5, 2006, pp. 74–75.

9 Remember that this is an edited version of Sabiya’s paper, not mine (Boer’s). For Boer’s conception of the “sacred-secular” relationship, please turn to part 2 of vol. 5. I would never express myself the way Sabiya does here, for it suggests that the two constitute two different areas or entities. I regard them as two different spirits, perspectives or worldviews of one and the same reality. The difference between Sabiya and myself here is that of Lutheran and most other forms of Western Christianity versus the Kuyperian tradition.

10 Sulaiman may be wrong, but you can understand his mistake. After all, the Christian church in Nigeria did inherit a dualistic version of Christianity that often emphasizes its private nature at the expense of its public expression.

11 This, of course, is a hotly debated issue between Muslims and Christians and even evokes differences of opinion among Christians themselves. This is the main subject of volumes 4 and 5 of this series and the one underlying volumes 6 and 7.

12 This assertion is not historically correct. Christians have held high positions in the governments of some of the classic Muslim societies. Of course, under the current Nigerian climate, such would almost be unthinkable.

13 Daniel Shaka, Daily Times, 4 July/77. I, Boer, have provided end-notes to provide additional information or to make critical comments. I believe you, reader, can distinguish between Sabiya’s original notes and mine. It should be understood that the references in Sabiya’s own notes are not listed in the Bibliography of this book.

14 This assertion is not quite right. A valid constitution also provides for relations between religions and their adherents.

15 That makes a total of 110 percent!

16 M. Dodo. 27 July/77.

17 Some readers not intimately familiar with the development of states may be confused as to their number. Let it suffice for them to
realize that ever since the Gowon regime there has been a steady proliferation of states. Whatever number of states a writer counts depends on the decade he is discussing.

18 Draft Constitution, chapter 2, 7 (1).


20 M. S. U. Minjibir, Hansard, Constituent Assembly Papers. Emphasis Sabiya’s.

21 Fyzee, Outline of Islamic Jurisprudence. Emphases Sabiya’s.

22 Azzam, A.R. The Eternal Message of Mohammed, pp. 119–120.

23 Fyzee, ibid. Sabiya follows his own style for endnotes. Since I have not been able to find the information needed to make these notes conform to the rest of this series, I have left them as they are.

24 Hansard, ibid.

25 Fyzee, ibid.

26 Area Courts Edict, Northern States.

27 Case Notes of Northern Nigeria, 1963, p. 54.

28 My [Boer’s] layman’s question is whether Sabiya is not importing the foreign mechanism of precedent into sharia law from common law. Sharia law, I understand, does not accept precedents.

29 Correspondence, Tangale Waja Church file. Translation from Hausa is Sabiya’s.

30 Draft Constitution, vol. I.

31 Case Notes, ibid.

32 A. R. Azzam, ibid, p. 120.


35 Indian Constitution, Art. 44.

36 I disagree with Sabiya on this alleged disconnect between law
and religion. See my future vol. 8, to be published, God willing, in 2008.

38 G. Ajeigbe, CA, Hansard.
41 A. D. Gari, CA, Hansard.
42 Correspondence, Sabiya’s personal file. Translation Sabiya’s.
43 Fyzee, *Outline of Islamic Jurisprudence*. Azikiwe was Nigeria’s first President after independence.
44 *Nigerian Citizen*, 18 Apr/62.
45 For this Muslim plan, see also J. Boer, vol. 3, 2004, pp. 35–44.
46 *Nigerian Citizen*, 18 Apr/62. The “system” of 150 years ago was the sultanate established by Shehu Danfodio in 1804. By now it is 200 years ago.
47 The endnote is so confusing that I am not able to identify the speaker clearly.
48 *Laws of Northern Nigeria*, Vol. II.
49 Boer: This program of federal confiscation of Christian institutions, in retrospect, seems more like part of “the plan” than any altruistic relieving the churches of burdens.
50 Many articles have been written on the pilgrimage that will help you get answers to Sabiya’s questions. See appendix 17.
51 *Laws of Northern Nigeria*, Vol. II.
52 Fyzee, *Outline of Islamic Jurisdiction*.
55 *Daily Times*, 30 June/63.
56 *Nigerian Citizen*, 3 Jan/63.
57 W. Sabiya, Nov/98-Apr/99, pp. 20–21. This paper has been edited very heavily. If you were to read the original, you would understand the reason. It appears that a copy typist deleted and/or misunderstood some
words, phrases and even entire lines. In spite of these problems I still con-
sider it worthwhile to share Sabiya’s thoughts on dialogue.

58 All of a sudden Muslim neighbours have become fanatics, accord-
ing to Sabiya. The paper does not really prepare the reader for this drastic
change in atmosphere.


60 There are many communities by that name in northern Nigeria. It
is difficult to pinpoint which one Sabiya is talking about.

61 Boer: These Christian characteristics originated from their joint
heritage of ATR and dualistic Christianity.

▲ Chapter 7

1 Please check the “Kaduna” entry in the table of contents of J. Boer,
volume 1, 2003. Note Well: Unless otherwise indicated, the endnotes are
Turaki’s. At the end of each document you will find Turaki’s “references”
or bibliography. Boer’s endnotes will be clearly identified.


3 For bibliographical information see “References” below.


6 Y. Turaki, “Ethical and Cultural Foundations…,” 2003. See also J.

Turaki’s expose of these heirs of colonial structures and power sounds far
different and far more true than the self-image of that group of power-
brokers they expressed in a communique published and signed by some
of the very same people described by Turaki. Here they are made to sound
like the paragons of national wisdom, virtue and nobility who had
engaged in “a profound review of the state of the nation.” They claimed
to represent “a mature voice of moderation; a sensitive voice of reason; a
peaceful voice of patriotism and a credible voice of hope in our quest for
unity, anchored in justice, fairness, equity and the rule of law” (D/Trust, 1

8 J. Boer, 1979, chapter 10. That is the defining point of this 530-page publication. See also Boer, 1984, chapter 8.

9 J. Boer, vol. 2, 2004, pp. 37–44; vol. 4, 2005, pp. 85–100. A Muslim complaint published during the same month that Turaki delivered his lecture is that of Rufa’i Ibrahim. He complained about the Muslim sons of the North who have become its governors: “It is really disturbing how imprudent, reckless and profligate many of the Northern governors are.” These governors “have no clear understanding of the problems and their real causes. They have no clear idea how really deep the rot is or what has caused it. They have not been able to fully and correctly gauge the size of the problem in order to better shape the appropriate responses to them. This is the main reason why their vision is murky, they are not well-focussed, their sense of priority is bad, and they are financially imprudent and profligate” (R. Ibrahim, 28 May/2001).


11 See p. 320.


13 Y. Turaki, n.d.

14 Is Turaki suggesting that the majority in most of the sharia states are not Muslims and that sharia is imposed on them against the will of the majority? That may be true in some sharia states, including his own state of origin, but in all?

15 Turaki here seems to deviate from the Protestant principle of the priesthood of all believers and seems to regard religion as the province of the clergy. Politicians have no business in religion? Since the mature Turaki sympathizes with Kuyperian thought, I suspect his statement was a careless reversion to his earlier stage of development. The statement is an expression of clerical class interest that does not fit in the Kuyperian tradition (see vol. 5, part 2). Neither does Islam disqualify “ordinary” believers, including politicians, from taking religious initiatives.
16 Boer: It is unclear to me whether Turaki here is referring to state
governments or to the FG.

17 Boer: It is true that till date no governor has been probed for his
sharia activities, but currently some governors are being probed for evi-
dences of economic corruption. So, they are not above being probed any-
more.

18 Of course, we have read of elites taking each other to Sharia

19 Boer: Some examples of these conflicts are interspersed in various
volumes of this series.

20 For a Muslim discussion of this point see index entry “Multi-religi-
ion” in J. Boer, vol. 4, 2005, p. 262.

21 Boer: Why the difference? Could that be due to the unique cir-
cumstances of two huge blocks of each? Would Turaki prefer the revolu-
tionary and thus bloody approach?

22 Given this statement, I wonder about Turaki’s attitude towards the
Ten Commandments.

23 There are always exceptions. See J. Boer, vol. 6, 2007, pp.

24 In 1992, Turaki stood before a similar commission to investigate
the Zangon-Kataf riots, also in Kaduna State. See J. Boer, 2004, vol. 3,
Appendix 10, pp. 285–287, 197–201. As to the details of the Kaduna
riots of 2000 that Turaki addresses, see J. Boer, vol. 1, 2003, pp. 63–79.

25 Most of the items Turaki lists below are described in detail

26 Supporting Turaki’s claim of territoriality, Patrick Sookhdeo of the
Barnabas Fund wrote: “Islam is a territorial religion. Any space once
gained is considered sacred and should belong to the umma for ever. Any
lost space must be regained—even by force if necessary. Migrant Muslim
communities in the West are constantly engaged in sacralising new areas,
first the inner private spaces of their homes and mosques, and latterly
whole neighbourhoods (e.g., in Birmingham) by means of marches and
processions. So the ultimate end of sacred space theology is autonomy for
Muslims of the UK under Islamic law” (P. Sookhdeo, 12 Nov/2005).

27 An interesting development to be watched is that of the Cordoba
Cathedral. As Barnabas Fund reports it: “Spanish church leaders have refused a request from Spanish Muslims to worship in Cordoba Cathedral. This building, originally a mosque built in the eighth century on the site of a church and a Roman temple, was made into a cathedral after Cordoba was returned to Christian control in 1236. Classical Islam teaches that land once held by Muslims must never be given up to non-Muslims, and that mosques are permanent for all eternity. It is therefore not surprising that the Muslim request did not include any reciprocal offer concerning the many churches around the world which have been forcibly converted into mosques. Spanish media have reported that the Muslim Association of Cordoba is planning to build a vast complex including mosque, Islamic school, hotel, conference centre, library, swimming pool and sports complex, costing $22 million (Barnabas Prayer, 18 Apr/2007).

28 For details of this process see p. 105 as well as the pages in Index entry “Muslim-Invasion/Infiltration.”

29 The issue is that of Muslims of Hausa-Fulani origin invading land and territory that traditionally belongs to the original Traditionalists and claiming it as their own. This is a major issue underlying the riots described in vol. 1 of this series. It is discussed in detail throughout vol. 3 from the Christian point of view and in vol. 2, pp. 94–100 from the Muslim perspective.

30 In other writings this area may be referred to as “Southern Zaria.”

31 Though this statement is popularly associated with Karl Marx, he actually borrowed the idea from a 19th-century Anglican clergyman, Charles Kingsley, who complained, “We have used the Bible as if it were a mere special constable’s handbook, an opium dose for keeping beasts of burden patient while they are being overloaded” (J. Boer, 1979, p. 37).


33 It should be understood that at independence the northern two-thirds of the country constituted one political unit known as Northern Nigeria or the Northern Region. It included the Middle Belt along with the far North. A process of fragmentation of states set in under Yakubu Gowon that has continued ever since. The former North now consists of many states with their own capitals and governments. Premier Ahmadu Bello ruled the old entire North.
34 It could be argued that these relations were worse during the nineteenth century when Northern Muslims regularly swooped down upon Middle Belt communities, totally destroyed many of them, killed the inhabitants which where not carried off as slaves. See J. Boer, 1979, pp. 126–129; 1984, pp. 36–38; 2004, pp. 203–204.

35 It is unfortunate that Turaki does not provide any indication what this Christian law would contain. He makes no reference, as some others have done, to Canon Law. Did he have something new in mind?

▲ Chapter 8

1 Y. Abraham, Jan/2005. Kumm was the leader of the original missionaries of the Sudan United Mission, the mother of COCIN. Lugard was the first colonial Lieutenant Governor of Northern Nigeria and the first Governor General of the united Nigeria of 1914.


3 Kephas Gumap claims that 90 percent of Plateau is Christian. “It is almost the headquarters of Christianity in Nigeria” (LB, Mar/2005, p. 21).

4 The fact that Nasarawa has not become a sharia state probably indicates that Muslims do not feel secure enough to pull it off—in other words, that they are not sure of their majority.


7 I. Abdulsalami, 13 May/2007. The “other informant” reported that “she sung a stupid song: “Dariye, ikon Allah; Joshua, ikon Allah; Valentina, ikon Allah;…” [“ikon Allah” means “the power of God.”] The informant commented, “Pure blasphemy. The students were not impressed.” In another email he described the song as “obscene.”

8 I have a number of friends at various levels of society and from different sectors who are kind enough to provide me with inside information occasionally. Unless I have their permission to do otherwise, I refer to them throughout this chapter simply as “friend.” Each one of them will recognize himself. One Christian elder commented, “This is our governor!”
9 La-Nibetle’s own words—p. 34.

10 “Radical” is often understood negatively. Not so in this context. It means the person described goes to the basic root or cause of an issue. The word comes from the Latin “*radix,*” meaning “root.” I use the term as a compliment for a person who goes beyond the surface of things.


15 B. Guwal, 1988, p. 27. Original Hausa: “*zalunci de kishi, da kisan kai da shaidar zur da kuma sauransu.*”

16 B. Guwal, 1988, pp. 26–27. Original Hausa: “*Mu Kirista ba za mu yarda da shariar Muslunci ba; mun sani, sharia daga wurin Allah ne ta fita.*” “*Mun yanka shariar Muslunci, mun yar, domin ba wani abu mai amfani a cikinta.*”

17 C. Dah, 2004, p. 60.


21 I. Lar, July/2004. It appears that Plateau State Government released the “Reports of Past Commissions of Inquiry” to the 2004 Peace Conference for their consideration. (Plateau State Government, 2004, p. 1. N. Bagudu, Nov/2003). The complaint is a long-standing one. Back in 1995, Obed Minchakpu called it “disturbing” that “the findings of the tribunals and panels are not made public” (*TC*, 1/95, p. 9). There appears to be a well-established culture in government to hide reports that could embarrass some powerful personalities, not only in the matter of violence but also in the area of corruption. It has been some years ago since the Okigbo Tribunal looked into the missing billions of an oil windfall, but till today, the FG insists it cannot locate the report. It apparently contains potentially embarrassing information about former Military President
Ibrahim Babangida. The complainant, the indefatigable human rights lawyer Chief Gani Fawehinmi, names national institutions that have archived the report and where it can be located. No less than twenty copies! (I. Uwaleke, 5 May/2007).


30 J. La-Nibetle, 2000. Much of his book would have been used in vols. 3 and 5, if it had been available to me at the time. In response to reviewing an earlier version of this chapter, he strongly denied his anger, insisting that he enjoys good relations with the Muslim community, including some of their leaders in Jos. He surely succeeded in camouflaging that relationship!

31 J. La-Nibetle, 2000, pp. 37, 7, 14, 16.


34 Readers of earlier volumes and chapters will recognize these names as frontline soldiers and leaders in the Christian-Muslim battle in Nigeria.

35 J. La-Nibetle, 2000, pp. 27–28. Tofa’s material quoted from *The Pen*, 20 Aug/1990. At the time, Tofa was also Chairman of the Bureau for Islamic Propagation, the publishers of both *The Pen* and *Alkalami*.

36 J. La-Nibetle, 2000, pp. 9, 11, 14.


38 J. La-Nibetle, 2000, pp. 13–14, 10–11.

J. La-Nibetle, 2000, p. 16.


J. La-Nibetle, 2000, p. 25.


I. Abdulsalami, 6 Nov/2002. There had long been unrest among the Bogghom. One of their own sons warned them against “retrospective, retrogressive and sentimental ideas” and against “digging into historic clan identification, scramble for feudal recognition and land disputes.” They should also stop “any foreigner from exploiting our people’s resources” as well as from “molesting our beloved brothers” (D. Stephen, 28 Jan/86). Such dynamics usually take years to work themselves out. They often go underground, only to reappear years later. It is hard to believe this to be an isolated event, when there is evidence that already back in 1986 there was serious friction.

For information about corruption in general and gubernatorial

Notes for pp. 356-362
corruption specifically, see *Companion CD <Miscellaneous Articles/ Corruption>*. It contains numerous files on the subject. Under <Corruption> see also <Governors> for corruption at that level. See also Y. Abraham, *LB*, Mar/2006, p. 24.

53 For more details about violence in Plateau, see *Companion CD <Miscellaneous Articles/ Violence/ Plateau>*. For further details about Dariye in this context, be sure to open <Dariye> under the above file <Plateau>.

60 S. Dombin and A. Bala, Aug/2004, p. 10.
64 J. Lohor, 4 Mar/2003.
70 O. Minchakpu, 7 Feb/2005. There had been bad blood between the Plateau government and the Ulama for some time. Late 2003, the Government had banned the Council of Ulama from operating in the state, labeling it a sect (!) and accusing it of being related to the Maitasine movement. The accusation was published by the state’s Commissioner of Information, Dauda Isma’ila Lamba, a Muslim (I. Abdulsaalami, “Plateau
Already back in 1820, missionary strategists talked about establishing an “Apostle Street,” consisting of a chain of mission stations across Africa from west to east in order to stop the march of Islam. It was also an important emphasis of COCIN’s progenitor, the SUM. Karl Kumm, the revered founder of the SUM, had as his goal to halt Islam’s onward march. “The whole raison d’etre of the SUM,” he explained to the colonial government, was for the SUM “to counteract the Muslim advance.” He hoped to construct a chain of fifty stations across the continent, from Niger to Nile, along the Muslim-Pagan line (J. Boer, 1979, pp. 101–102, 115–116; 1984, p. 33). That was the Christian plan!

Globally, explanations based on poverty and ignorance received another blow on Thursday, August 10, 2006, with the arrest in Pakistan, UK and USA of a new crowd of would-be suicide destroyers. Quite a number of them were born British citizens, highly educated offspring of British professionals and property owners with assets enough to be frozen by the government (I. Macleod and S. Shukor, 11 Aug/2006). Neither does a bare political motive suffice here. The only foundational explanation that makes sense is the religious one. See B. Lewis, 8 Aug/2006.

For details, please refer to the entry “manipulation” in the indices of vols. 2–5.


E. Lamle, 2002.


This history has been summarized in volume 6, chapter 2.


See p. 241.

84 J. La-Nibetle, 2000, pp. 33, 37.
85 I. Abdulsalami, 6 Nov/2002.


89 Only yesterday did I meet a grassroot Canadian Christian in Vancouver who knows very little about Islam. However, he works with a grass-root Muslim colleague and is struck by the strong sense of and need for power that exudes from his colleague’s personality. Just an ordinary grass-root Muslim. The same psychology surfaces in completely different circumstances that writers across the world note time and again.


96 RLPL, 5 May/2004.
100 Y. Abraham, Jan/2005.
102 RLPL, 5 May/2004.
105 D. Fieguth, Winter, 2006, p. 4. For the example of James Wuye, see vol. 8, ch. 4.


109 C. Gotan, 2004, pp. 76–77. That last sentence is a ploy Muslims use throughout the Western countries where they constitute minorities. It is the same dynamic and the same ploy everywhere: Suppression of other religions in Muslim countries; cries of persecution and discrimination where Muslims form minorities.


111 Y. Turaki, chapter 7.

112 For a brief account of its origin see J. Boer, 1979, pp. 112–118; 1984, pp. 32–33.


114 J. Boer, 1979, pp. 69–70.


121 For short versions of these stories see J. Boer, 1979, pp. 126–129; 1984, pp. 36–40.


123 A Muslim sheikh from Baghdad, Jan/2006. It seems that today’s issues are of long-standing! When will the West learn? And whom is the US protecting there? See Companion CD <Misc Arts/Other Countries/Asia/Iraq/2007–05–11>.

129 B. Gambo, Dec/2004, p. 10. I have deleted some paragraphs dealing with Governor Dariye’s suspension and return. I also refer you to a good read, namely outgoing President Alexander Lar’s eloquent farewell speech to the re-instated Governor Dariye at Appendix 15 and Companion CD <Misc Arts/Christianity/ COCIN/ Pres. Lar to Dariye>.
131 Possibly in retaliation for sharia in the Northern states, Matthew Adams, a one-time Chairman of Jos South LGA, a pastor and long-time associate of mine, proposed to the Plateau State House of Assembly that they should “declare Plateau a Christian State.” It does not seem there was much interest in such a move (M. Adams, “The Irony…”).
132 The office of Gbong Gwom is one occupied by an indigenous chief of the Jos area. Its holders have so far been Christians.
133 This claim is wrong. Though I sympathize with Plateau State, it is not a state of saints! It can hardly claim to be free from all religious and tribal discrimination. Furthermore, Plateau is not the only non-sharia state in the Middle Belt, nor the only one dominated by Christians.
134 Gambo’s argument would have been even stronger if he had stated that no indigenous Christian has been so appointed in any sharia state.
135 Hausa for “The people of Plateau have straightened out their affairs. They have been reconciled to each other. That is good news.” The rest of this article deals with the return of Governor Dariye after his suspension by President Obasanjo and his declaration of a State of Emergency throughout Plateau State. Muslims favoured these measures and opposed his return, while Christians, including COCIN, opposed the action and welcomed him back. As Gambo indicates, Christians were only too aware of Dariye’s weaknesses and bad governance, but they rejected his suspension and welcomed his re-instatement, because they regarded the suspension as part of the Muslim scheme to undermine Christian power in the state and enhance their own. They found them-
selves between the devil and the deep blue sea, between a weak and allegedly corrupt but indigenous “Christian” governor and the Grand Plan of the Muslims. They chose for the former. For some details about the alleged corruption of Governor Dariye turn to the *Companion CD* <Misc Arts/ Corruption/ Governors/ Dariye>. For Christian support of Dariye, read especially the issues of *LB* published during the State of Emergency. This whole history led to a serious crisis in Christian support for the President in Plateau State. Though I do not go into details about these developments, throughout this chapter you will have heard rumblings of these events.


139 If Plateau Muslims were hesitant to object to the crusade, *DT* was not. It described the coming event as dangerous and demanded that Governor Dariye withdraw his approval. Nanpon Iliya of *LB* challenged *DT* how it could be dangerous, when in fact the same crusade has even been held in Muslim countries. What then of Plateau, a Christian state with a Muslim minority? *DT*, 19 Jan/2005, p. 40. N. Iliya, Mar/2005, p. 9.

140 Bonnke is a German evangelist who has targeted Nigeria. He frequently runs huge crusades there, but occasionally he has become the centre of controversy and the cause of riots. See e.g. “Bonnke” entries in indices of J. Boer, vols. 1 and 2. For an exhaustive report on the crusade, see CAN, Jan/2005.


146 O. Minchakpu, 10 Oct/2005; *Compass Direct*, 23 Sep/2005. Appendix 19. The article came to my attention too late for detailed analysis in this chapter. However, it is a *must* read, containing points from
both sides.


149 Especially the Prophet Ezekiel is full of warnings against unfaithful and self-serving leaders, who bring destruction to the land and to the Church. For a Nigerian warning to the Nigerian church see J. Tsado and D. Byang, *TC*, 6/88, pp. 4–7.

150 T. Arnold, 1913, throughout. This process is already visible in Western Europe, according to observers, where cold main Protestant denominations have called up the spiritual vacuum known as secularism. Islam is taking advantage of that vacuum with many turning to it from the coldness of the churches [*CC*, 25 Sep/2006].

151 See T. Arnold, 1913, for many examples of such developments.


▲ Chapter 9

1 F. Oso, 2001, pp. 73–74.


3 Ch. 5, pp. 285–288.